Stafford v. Los Angeles Cnty. Employees' Ret. Bd., 270 P.2d 12 (Cal. 1954). · Go Syfert
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Stafford v. Los Angeles Cnty. Employees' Ret. Bd., 270 P.2d 12 (Cal. 1954). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 1977 · …any person who prevails in an action which he has brought to enjoin a violation of this division or to recover civil penalties.... at p. 799 ⚠ not in text
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 1992 · …every statute should be construed with reference to the whole system of law of which it is a part so that all may be harmonized and have effect. at p. 799 ✓
cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 1992 · …where two statutes deal with the same subject matter, the more recent enactment prevails as the latest expression of the legislative will. ⚠ not in text
165 citation events (7 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Untitled California Attorney General Opinion (calag, 2017-07-26)
Treatment trajectory · 1954 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1954 1990 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 46 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Untitled California Attorney General Opinion
Cal. Att'y Gen. · 2017 · confidence medium
Lodging houses with five or fewer guest rooms 2016 California Building Code (effective Jan. 1, 2017) (italics and bold omitted). 7 Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379 , 1386- 1387. 8 Id. at p. 1387. 9 Coalition of Concerned Communities, Inc. v. Los Angeles (2004) 34 Cal.4th 733, 737 ; see also Select Base Materials, Inc. v. Bd. of Equalization (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645 , 3 16-801 We begin with the text of section 13146, which provides, in relevant part: The responsibility for enforcement of building standards adopted by the State Fire Marshal and published in…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Porter v. Board of Retirement of the Orange County Employees Retirement System
Cal. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
A. etc. Retirement Board (1954) 42 Cal.2d 795, 798 [ 270 P.2d 12 ], cited by defendant, relied on statutes to hold a deputy sheriff’s “disability pensions shall not be cumulative with workmen’s compensation benefits awarded for the same disability.” Those statutes, under the former State Employees’ Retirement System, now PERS, have been repealed. ( Pennington, supra, 20 Cal.App.3d at pp. 58-59.) Here, defendant has not cited any applicable charter or statute precluding plaintiff’s ability to recover both her temporary disability benefits under workers’ compensation and her disabi…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Elk Hills Power v. Board of Equalization
Cal. · 2013 · confidence medium
A. etc. Retirement Board (1954) 42 Cal.2d 795, 799 [ 270 P.2d 12 ].) The language of section 110(d)’s preamble, “Except as provided in subdivision (e) . . . all of the following shall apply . . . ,” permits more than one reasonable interpretation.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lori Rubinstein Physical Therapy, Inc. v. PTPN, Inc.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
A. etc. Retirement Board (1954) 42 Cal.2d 795, 799 [ 270 P.2d 12 ] [statutes must be “ ‘construed with reference to the whole system of law of which [they are] a part so that all may be harmonized and have effect’ ”].) *1140 Moreover, by choosing to subscribe to a PPO plan, the subscribers themselves impair the nonpreferred providers’ ability to compete for their business.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sears v. Baccaglio (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
It is elemental that if new provisions cannot be reconciled with earlier provisions of an entire scheme, the new provisions should prevail. “[Wjhere two statutes deal with the same subject matter, the more recent enactment prevails as the latest expression of legislative will.” (2B Sutherland, Statutory Construction (5th ed. 1992) § 51.02, p. 122, fn. omitted; Stafford v. L.A. etc. Retirement Board (1954) 42 Cal.2d 795, 798 [ 270 P.2d 12 ].) The majority’s sleight of hand, which consists of the imputation to section 1717 of a legislative purpose that never existed, seems to me transpare…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Superior Court (Romero) (2×)
Cal. · 1996 · confidence medium
A. etc. Retirement Board (1954) 42 Cal.2d 795, 798 [ 270 P.2d 12 ].) Defendant concludes: If the initiative version of the Three Strikes law, by superseding the legislative version with a statute (§ 1170.12) to which section 1385(b) does not refer, restored the court’s discretion to strike prior felony conviction allegations in furtherance of justice, then that ameliorative change in the law applies retroactively to his benefit.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Prudential Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Court (2×)
Cal. · 1992 · confidence medium
It is elemental that in ascertaining the intent of the Legislature, “ ‘every statute should be construed with reference to the whole system of law of which it is a part so that all may be harmonized and have effect.’ ” (Select Base Materials v. Board of Equal. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645 [ 335 P.2d 672 ], quoting Stafford v. L.A. etc. Retirement Board (1954) 42 Cal.2d 795, 799 [ 270 P.2d 12 ]; accord, Moyer v. Workmen’s Comp.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) County of Santa Clara v. Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n of Santa Clara County, Inc.
Cal. · 1992 · confidence medium
Under settled rules of construction, when there is a conflict between two provisions, the later statute prevails over one passed earlier (Stafford v. L.A. etc. Retirement Board (1954) 42 Cal.2d 795, 798 [ 270 P.2d 12 ]; see also Woods v. Young (1991) 53 Cal.3d 315, 324 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 613 , 807 P.2d 455 ]), and a specific enactment governs over a more general one (San Francisco Taxpayers Assn. v. Board of Supervisors (1992) 2 Cal ,4th 571, 577 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 245 , 828 P.2d 147 ]; Brill v. County of Los Angeles (1940) 16 Cal.2d 726, 735-736 [ 108 P.2d 443 ]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) City of Highland v. County of San Bernardino
Cal. Ct. App. · 1992 · confidence medium
A. etc. Retirement Board (1954) 42 Cal.2d 795, 799 [ 270 P.2d 12 ]: “ ‘[E]very statute should be construed with reference to the whole system of law of which it is a part so that all may be harmonized and have effect.’ ”) 14 4.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) California State Employees' Ass'n v. State Personnel Board (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 1986 · confidence medium
"The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. ( California Toll Bridge Authority v. Kuchel, 40 Cal.2d 43, 53 [ 251 P.2d 4 ]; County of Alameda v. Kuchel, 32 Cal.2d 193, 199 [ 195 P.2d 17 ]; Dickey v. Raisin Proration Zone No. 1, 24 Cal.2d 796, 802 [ 151 P.2d 505 , 157 A.L.R. 324 ]; 82 C.J.S., Statutes, § 321, p. 560; 45 Cal.Jur.2d, Statutes, § 126, p. 634.) Moreover, `every statute should be construed with reference to the whole system of law of which it is a part so that all may be…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Continental Insurance v. Crockett
Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. · 1985 · confidence medium
Cobb Co. v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 273, 277 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 143 , 682 P.2d 338 ]; Select Base Materials v. Board of Equal. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645 [ 335 P.2d 672 ].) “Moreover, ‘every statute should be construed with reference to the whole system of law of which it is a part so that all may be harmonized and have effect.’ (Stafford v. Los Angeles etc. Retirement Board [(1954)] 42 Cal.2d 795, 799 [ 270 P.2d 12 ].)” (Select Base Materials, supra, at p. 645.) “When, as here, there is no direct evidence of the legislative intent, the court turns first to the words of the enact…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Taylor v. Board of Trustees (2×)
Cal. · 1984 · confidence medium
Proc., § 1859, Stafford v. Los Angeles County Employees’ Retirement Board (1954) 42 Cal.2d 795, 798 [ 270 P.2d 12 ].) Also, substitute and temporary classifications should be strictly and narrowly defined.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Barnes v. Chamberlain
Cal. Ct. App. · 1983 · confidence medium
A. etc. Retirement Board (1954) 42 Cal.2d 795, 799 [ 27 P.2d 12 ].) Section 917.4 is one of the express exceptions to the “general stay” rule found in Code of Civil Procedure section 916: “[T]he perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in trial court . . . .” Section 917.4 applies only to a specific class of persons, to wit: an appellant who has been ordered to sell or convey real property.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Landrum v. Superior Court (2×)
Cal. · 1981 · confidence medium
A. etc. Retirement Board (1954) 42 Cal.2d 795, 799 [ 270 P.2d 12 ]; Select Base Materials v. Board of Equal. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645 [ 335 P.2d 672 ]; People v. Ruster, supra, 16 Cal. 3d at p. 696 .) If Peters were reaffirmed, this court would be presented with the alternative of either rendering section 859b a dead letter or sanctioning a wasteful procedure in which a useless and untimely preliminary examination must be held.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) San Rafael Fireman's Association v. City Council of the City of San Rafael
Cal. Ct. App. · 1980 · confidence medium
A specific provision relating to a particular subject will govern in respect to that subject, as against a general provision, although the latter, standing alone, would be broad enough to include the subject to which the more particular provision relates.” [Citations.]” (County of Placer v. Aetna Cas. etc. Co. (1958) 50 Cal.2d 182, 189 [ 323 P.2d 753 ]; Stafford v. L.A. etc. Retirement Board (1954) 42 Cal.2d 795, 798-799 [ 270 P.2d 12 ]; Whittemore v. Seydel (1946) 74 Cal.App.2d 109, 119-120 [ 168 P.2d 212 ].) Section 4085 did not require the signator’s printed name, and the absence of t…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wheeler v. Board of Administration of the Public Employees' Retirement System
Cal. · 1979 · confidence medium
Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230-231 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 144 , 514 P.2d 1224 ], italics added; Stafford v. L.A. etc. Retirement Board (1954) 42 Cal.2d 795, 799 [ 270 P.2d 12 ].) Moreover, “where there are conflicting provisions, the one susceptible to only one meaning will control the one that is susceptible of two meanings, if the statute can thereby be made harmonious. [Citations.]” (REA Enterprises v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Com. (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 596, 610 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 201 ].) The above quoted language of section 21202 is clear and unambiguous in its intent to assure…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Palos Verdes Faculty Ass'n v. Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified School District (2×)
Cal. · 1978 · confidence medium
A. etc. Retirement Board (1954) 42 Cal.2d 795, 799 [ 270 P.2d 12 ].)” In addition to these general precepts, a more specific principle is directly applicable when, as here, the Legislature undertakes to amend a statute which has been the subject of judicial construction.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Piazza Properties, Ltd. v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles
Cal. Ct. App. · 1977 · confidence medium
A. etc. Retirement Board (1954) 42 Cal.2d 795, 799 [ 270 P.2d 12 ].) Under the foregoing precepts, section 10758 of the Revenue and Taxation Code cannot be construed as statutory authorization for refund of all fees erroneously collected without regard to the legislatively established claim limitation period set forth in Vehicle Code section 42231 et seq.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Great Lakes Properties, Inc. v. City of El Segundo (2×)
Cal. · 1977 · confidence medium
Although the statutory language is susceptible to the trial court’s interpretation, the section’s wording is equally susceptible to the interpretation that attorneys fees are to be awarded to “any person who prevails in an action [which he has] brought to enjoin a violation of this division or to recover civil penalties....” Moreover, our cases have long made clear that a statutory provision cannot be interpreted in a vacuum but must “be construed with reference to the whole system of law of which it is a part....” (Stafford v. L.A. etc. Retirement Board (1954) 42 Cal.2d 795, 799 […
cited Cited as authority (rule) Morrison v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board
Cal. Ct. App. · 1976 · confidence medium
A. etc. Retirement Board, 42 Cal.2d 795, 799 [ 270 P.2d 12 ]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Ruster
Cal. · 1976 · confidence medium
A. etc. Retirement Board (1954) 42 Cal.2d 795, 799 [ 270 P.2d 12 ]; County of Los Angeles v. Frisbie (1942) 19 Cal.2d 634, 639 [ 122 P.2d 526 ].) When this principle of statutory construction is followed here, it becomes clear that section 2101 applies to completed, as well as attempted, unemployment insurance fraud and, therefore, that it precludes prosecution of such fraud under section 484.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bentley v. Swoap
Cal. Ct. App. · 1974 · confidence medium
A. etc. Retirement Board, 42 Cal.2d 795, 799 [ 270 P.2d 12 ].) When section 11253 is read in conjunction with sections 11202, 11250, 11251 and 11263, it is clear that it was the legislative intent to terminate benefits under AFDC at the age of 18 years except as provided in subdivision (a) of section 11253 which extends such benefits to a child up to age 21 when he is regularly attending school or a training program.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Moyer v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board
Cal. · 1973 · confidence medium
A. etc. Retirement Board (1954) 42 Cal.2d 795, 799 [ 270 P.2d 12 ].) With these principles in mind we first turn to probe the meaning of the word “voluntary.” It is defined as “proceeding from the will: produced in or by an act of choice,” or “of or relating to will.” (Webster’s Third New Internat.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) City of Costa Mesa v. McKenzie
Cal. Ct. App. · 1973 · confidence medium
A. etc. Retirement Board, 42 Cal.2d 795, 799-800 [ 270 P.2d 12 ].) Since Ordinance No. 64-45 is devoid of any indication that workmen’s compensation benefits are to be deducted from disability benefits payable under the ordinance, no such deduction is permissbile.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Oakland Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Oakland
Cal. Ct. App. · 1973 · confidence medium
A. etc. Retirement Board, 42 Cal.2d 795, 799 [ 270 P.2d 12 ]; Eden Memorial Park Assn. v. Superior Court, 189 Cal.App.2d 421, 426 [ 11 Cal.Rptr. 189 ].) Also, it accords with the general policy of the law, for if the contrary, that is, respondents’ contention, be upheld, there may be the following results: 1) If the state, acting in response to its own directive under section 50082, supplies enough funds for all local agencies to buy all of the described equipment, the provisions of the Labor *103 Code as well as of the Government Code would be met. 2) But suppose the state, using its own fu…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Mrozek (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 1972 · confidence medium
They furnish points of contact between the two codes that make it appropriate to consider like language found in each of them: "`[E]very statute should be construed with reference to the whole system of law of which it is a part so that all may be harmonized and have effect. [Citations.]' ( Stafford v. Realty Bond Service Corp. ... 39 Cal.2d 797, 805 ; ...)" ( Stafford v. L.A. etc. Retirement Board, 42 Cal.2d 795, 799 [ 270 P.2d 12 ].) Vehicle Code section 565 defines "special construction equipment"; *119 "special mobile equipment," defined as not self-propelled, is dealt with in section 575.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors (2×)
Cal. · 1972 · confidence medium
(E.g., Keeler v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 619, 632 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 481 , 470 P.2d 617 , 40 A.L.R.3d 420 ].) I recognize, of course, that an enactment must be interpreted so as to harmonize its various parts, by considering the particular clause or section in the light of the statutory framework as a whole (Select Base Materials v. Board of Equal., supra, 51 Cal.2d 640, 645 ; Stafford v. L.A. etc. Retirement Board (1954) 42 Cal.2d 795, 799 [ 270 P.2d 12 ]); but a special or particular provision qualifies the general, especially where the provisions are inconsistent and cannot be reconciled…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Franchise Tax Board
Cal. Ct. App. · 1972 · confidence medium
(California Toll Bridge Authority v. Kuchel, 40 Cal.2d *106 43, 53 [ 251 P.2d 4 ]; County of Alameda v. Kuchel, 32 Cal.2d 193, 199 [ 195 P.2d 17 ]; Dickey v. Raisin Proration Zone No. J, 24 Cal.2d 796, 802 [ 151 P.2d 505 , 157 A.L.R. 324 ]; 82 C.J.S., Statutes, § 321, p. 560; 45 Cal.Jur.2d, Statutes, § 126, p. 634.) Moreover, 'every statute should be construed with reference to the whole system of law of which it is a part so that all may be harmonized and have effect.’ (Stafford v. Los Angeles etc. Retirement Board, 42 Cal.2d 795, 799 [ 270 P.2d 12 ].) If possible, significance should be …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Los Angeles Fire & Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 1972 · confidence medium
A. etc. Retirement Board (1954) 42 Cal.2d 795, 799 [ 270 P.2d 12 ]; J.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wallace v. Department of Motor Vehicles
Cal. Ct. App. · 1970 · confidence medium
The lack of recorded specific legislative intent demands that Vehicle Code section 13352 “ ‘be construed with reference to the whole system of law of which it is a part so that all may be harmonized and have effect.’ ” (Stafford v. Los Angeles etc. Retirement Board, 42 Cal.2d 795, 799 [ 270 P.2d 12 ].) Thus, it is our conclusion that for the reasons noted above the Legislature’s 1949 amendment to section 13352 and the Legislature’s subsequent actions demonstrate an intent to include section 367d of the Penal Code within the purview of section 13352, subdivision (c), of the Vehicle …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Merrill v. Department of Motor Vehicles
Cal. · 1969 · confidence medium
Therefore we must interpre the statute in question in accordance with applicable rulei of statutory construction, fundamental among which ar those which counsel that the aim of such construction shouli be the ascertainment of legislative intent so that the purposi of the law may be effectuated (Select Base Materials, Inc. v Board of Equalization (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645 [ 335 P.2d 672 ], and cases there cited); that a statute should be con-| strued with reference to the entire statutory system of which it forms a part in such a way that harmony may be achieved among the parts (Stafford v. Los…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) City & County of San Francisco v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 1969 · confidence medium
Cases 445 [writ denied 8/1/68, 1 Civ. 25466 (Div. 2), hearing in S.Ct. denied 8/28/68]; and cf. Stafford v. Los Angeles etc. Retirement Board (1954) 42 Cal.2d 795, 797-800 [ 270 P.2d 12 ]; Lyons v. Hoover (1953) 41 Cal.2d 145, 148-149 [ 258 P.2d 4 ]; Barnett v. Brizee, supra (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 97, 98-100 [ 65 Cal.Rptr. 493 ]; O'Brien v. City of San Jose (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 609 , 614-615 *397 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 744 ]; Holt v. Board of Police etc. Comrs. (1948) 86 Cal.App.2d 714, 719-720 [ 196 P.2d 94 ]; and Lopez v. City of Los Angeles (1968) 33 Cal. Comp.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. One 1962 Chevrolet Bel Air
Cal. Ct. App. · 1967 · confidence medium
(California Toll Bridge Authority v. Kuchel, 40 Cal.2d 43, 53 [ 251 P.2d 4 ]; County of Alameda v. Kuchel, 32 Cal.2d 193, 199 [ 195 P.2d 17 ] ; Dickey v. Raisin Proration Zone No. 1, 24 Cal.2d 796, 802 [ 151 P.2d 505 , 157 A.L.R. 324 ] ; 82 C.J.S., Statutes, § 321, p. 560; 45 Cal.Jur.2d, Statutes, § 126, p. 634.) Moreover, ' every statute should be construed with reference to the whole system of law of which it is a part so that all may be harmonized and have effect. ’ (Stafford v. Los Angeles etc. Retirement Board, 42 Cal.2d 795, 799 [ 270 P.2d 12 ].) If possible, significance should be g…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Darling
Cal. Ct. App. · 1964 · confidence medium
(Stafford v. Los Angeles etc. Retirement Board, 42 Cal.2d 795, 799 [ 270 P.2d 12 ]; Stafford v. Realty Bond Service Corp., 39 Cal.2d 797, 805 [ 249 P.2d 241 ].) If the interpretation placed upon section 490a by the People in support of their contention in the instant ease is accepted, then the theft of 10 cents from a parking meter would subject the thief to imprisonment in the state prison from 1 to 10 years (Pen.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cranston v. Patell
Cal. Ct. App. · 1963 · confidence medium
(Select Base Materials, Inc. v. Board of Equalisation (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645 [ 335 P.2d 672 ]; California Toll Bridge Authority v. Kuchel (1952) 40 Cal.2d 43, 53 [ 251 P.2d 4 ].) It is also settled that “ [E]very statute should be construed with reference to the whole system of law of which it is a part so that all may be harmonized and have effect.” (Stafford v. Los Angeles etc. Retirement Board (1954) 42 Cal.2d 795, 799 [ 270 P.2d 12 ].) Where two interpretations of a statute are possible, the court ought to favor that which will lead to the more reasonable result.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Kuhn
Cal. Ct. App. · 1963 · confidence medium
(Stafford v. Los Angeles etc. Retirement Board, 42 Cal.2d 795, 799 [ 270 P.2d 12 ]; Stafford v. Realty Bond Service Corp., 39 Cal.2d 797, 805 [ 249 P.2d 241 ].) When so considered, the subject phrase means “regardless of intent to evade”; indicates that intent is an immaterial factor in the offense described (Turner v. State, 157 Tex. Crim.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brown v. Cranston
Cal. Ct. App. · 1963 · confidence medium
(California Toll Bridge Authority v. Kuchel, 40 Cal.2d 43, 53 [ 251 P.2d 4 ]; County of Alameda v. Kuchel, 32 Cal.2d 193, 199 [ 195 P.2d 17 ]; Dickey v. Raisin Proration Zone No. 1, 24 Cal.2d 796, 802 [ 151 P.2d 505 , 157 A.L.R. 324 ]; 82 C.J.S., Statutes, § 321, p. 560; 45 Cal.Jur.2d, Statutes, § 126, p. 634.) Moreover, 'every statute should be construed with reference to the whole system of law of which it is a part so that all may be harmonized and have effect. ’ (Stafford v. Los Angeles etc. Retirement Board, 42 Cal.2d 795, 799 [ 270 P.2d 12 ].) If possible, significance should be give…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Modesto Irrigation District v. City of Modesto
Cal. Ct. App. · 1962 · confidence medium
(Stafford v. Los Angeles etc. Retirement Board, 42 Cal.2d 795, 799 [ 270 P.2d 12 ] ; Stafford v. Realty Bond Service Corp., 39 Cal.2d 797, 805 [ 249 P.2d 241 ].) It is also fundamental that where two statutes are in pari materia they should be not only construed together, but they should be reconciled so as to uphold both of them if reasonably possible.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gleason v. City of Santa Monica
Cal. Ct. App. · 1962 · confidence medium
Transit Authority v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 54 Cal.2d 684, 688-689 [ 8 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 355 P.2d 905 ].) In Ross v. Board of Retirement, 92 Cal.App.2d 188 at p. 193 [ 206 P.2d 903 ], the court stated that “the date of ‘adoption’ is the date of passage of the ordinance . . . [and] the date of ‘adoption’ or passage of an ordinance or statute is not the date the enactment becomes of actual force and power, that is, effective, unless the enactment should specifically so declare. [Citation.] ” “ Moreover, ‘ every statute should be construed with reference to the whole system…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) City of San Diego v. Otay Municipal Water District
Cal. Ct. App. · 1962 · confidence medium
(Stafford v. Los Angeles etc. Retirement Board, 42 Cal.2d 795, 799 [ 270 P.2d 12 ].) The charter provides that no person or corporation shall establish or operate works for supplying water to inhabitants of the City without the latter’s consent.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) San Bernardino Fire & Police Protective League v. City of San Bernardino
Cal. Ct. App. · 1962 · confidence medium
The fundamental rules of construction applicable to the case at bar are stated in Select Base Materials, Inc. v. Board of Equalization, supra, 51 Cal.2d 640, 645 ; require the court to “ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law” (ibid.); direct that *414 “every statute should be construed with reference to the whole system of law of which it is a part so that all may be harmonized and have effect” (Stafford v. Los Angeles etc. Retirement Board, 42 Cal.2d 795, 799 [ 270 P.2d 12 ]); and limit the consideration given to the phraseology of a statute…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Eden Memorial Park Assn. v. Superior Court
Cal. Ct. App. · 1961 · confidence medium
Co. v. Railroad Com., 13 Cal.2d 89, 100 [ 87 P.2d 1055 ]; Stafford v. Realty Bond Service Corp., 39 Cal.2d 797, 805 [ 249 P.2d 241 ] ; Stafford v. Los Angeles etc. Retirement Board, 42 Cal.2d 795, 799 [ 270 P.2d 12 ].) As we interpret the provisions of the Health and Safety Code in question, their effect is to exempt from the classes of property which may be taken under the provisions of section 1240, Code of Civil Procedure, property dedicated for cemetery use.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) J. T. Jenkins Co. v. County of Los Angeles
Cal. Ct. App. · 1960 · confidence medium
Statutes, § 321, p. 560; 45 Cal.Jur.2d Statutes, § 126, p. 634.) Moreover, ‘every statute should be construed with reference to the whole system of law of which it is a part so that all may be harmonized and have effect.' (Stafford v. Los Angeles etc. Retirement Board, 42 Cal.2d 795, 799 [ 270 P.2d 12 ].) If possible, significance should be given to every word, phrase, sentence and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Select Base Materials, Inc. v. Board of Equalization (2×)
Cal. · 1959 · confidence medium
(California Toll Bridge Authority v. Kuchel, 40 Cal.2d 43, 53 [ 251 P.2d 4 ]; County of Alameda v. Kuchel, 32 Cal.2d 193, 199 [ 195 P.2d 17 ]; Dickey v. Raisin Proration Zone No. 1, 24 Cal.2d 796, 802 [ 151 P.2d 505 , 157 A.L.R. 324 ]; 82 C.J.S., Statutes, 321, p. 560; 45 Cal.Jur.2d, Statutes, 126, p. 634.) [2] Moreover, "every statute should be construed with reference to the whole system of law of which it is a part so that all may be harmonized and have effect." (Stafford v. Los Angeles etc. Retirement Board, 42 Cal.2d 795, 799 [ 270 P.2d 12 ].) [3] If possible, significance should be given…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) California Comp. Ins. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com.
Cal. Ct. App. · 1954 · confidence medium
It would be out of harmony with the principles previously discussed to take this language out of the context of the circumstances under which it was adopted and extend it to cover benefits received by the employee under a parallel act which is part of the pattern of wage-loss legislation. [18] " '[E]very statute should be construed with reference to the whole system of law of which it is a part so that all may be harmonized and have effect. [Citations.]' " (Stafford v. Los Angeles etc. Retirement Board, 42 Cal.2d 795, 799 [ 270 P.2d 12 ]; Stafford v. Realty Bond Service Corp., 39 Cal.2d 797, 8…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) California Compensation Insurance v. Industrial Accident Commission
Cal. Ct. App. · 1954 · confidence medium
It would be out of harmony with the principles previously discussed to take this language out of the context of the circumstances under which it was adopted and extend it to cover benefits received by the employee under a parallel act which is part of the pattern of wage-loss legislation. " ‘ [B] very statute should be construed with reference to the whole system of law of which it is a part so that all may be harmonized and have effect. [Citations.]’” (Stafford v. Los Angeles etc. Retirement Board, 42 Cal.2d 795, 799 [270 P.2d 12]; Stafford v. Realty Bond Service Corp., 39 Cal.2d 797, 8…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
ELSAN H. STAFFORD, Appellant,
v.
THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT BOARD Et Al., Respondents
L. A. 23091.
California Supreme Court.
May 11, 1954.
270 P.2d 12
1954 Cal. LEXIS 210
Elsan H. Stafford, in pro. per., for Appellant., Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel (Los Angeles), and Edward H. Gaylord, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondents.
Schauer, Carter.
Cited by 75 opinions  |  Published

Lead Opinion

SCHAUER, J.

Petitioner, a retired deputy sheriff of the County of Los Angeles, seeks mandamus to compel respondent County Employees’ Retirement Board to pay him a pension. A general demurrer to his amended petition for the writ was sustained without leave to amend, and he appeals from the ensuing judgment of dismissal. We have concluded that the trial court correctly determined that petitioner is not entitled to the payments he seeks, and that the judgment should be affirmed.

Petitioner alleges that he entered the service of the county as a deputy sheriff in August, 1946. He was injured in line of duty, and in January, 1950, was retired by reason of resulting disability. In May, 1950, the Industrial Accident Commission awarded him $5,603.53, which was paid in a lump sum by State Compensation Insurance Fund, the workmen’s compensation insurance carrier for the county. Petitioner thereafter applied to respondent board for payment of a pension. Acting assertedly pursuant to, and in reliance upon, the provisions of section 32081 of the Government Code, hereinafter (p. 797) quoted in all material parts, the board refused to make any payment on account of the pension until (using the language of subdivision (a) of section 32081) “the total amount of the retirement payments which would otherwise be paid equals the total amount received [by petitioner] under the workmen’s compensation act.”

[*797] Petitioner’s pension rights are set forth in the Comity Peace Officers Retirement Law (now codified as Gov. Code, §§ 31900-32082), passed by the state in 1931, and adopted by Los Angeles County pursuant to the provisions of section 31930.[1] Section 32055 provides that “Upon retirement of a member for service connected disability, he shall receive an annual pension, payable in monthly installments, equal to one-half of his terminal salary, not to exceed two hundred fifty dollars ($250) a month.” Section 32080 declares that “It is the intention of this chapter [the Retirement Law] that pensions allowed for injury incurred in line of duty shall not be cumulative with the benefits under workmen’s compensation awarded for the same injury or disability.” Section 32081, hereinbefore referred to and relied upon by respondent board, provides that “If any beneficiary receives compensation under any workmen’s compensation act or by virtue of any judgment obtained against the county . . . for disability arising out of and in the course of the employment of a member or pensioner, the benefits shall be modified as follows:

“ (a) If the amount is paid in one sum . . . the beneficiary shall not receive any retirement payments until the total amount of the retirement payments which would otherwise be paid equals the total amount received under the workmen’s compensation act or by virtue of the judgment ...”

Petitioner first contends that section 32081 does not apply to him because section 31908 states that “ ‘Beneficiary’ means any person in receipt of a pension, or other benefit provided by the retirement system.” Since, says petitioner, he has not yet received a pension he is not a beneficiary as that term is used in section 32081. However, section 31903 declares that “Unless the context otherwise requires, the definitions and general provisions contained in this article govern the construction of this chapter.” It seems clear that the context of section 32081 requires that petitioner be included within the term “beneficiary,” as otherwise the entire section would appear to apply to no one and to be meaningless. It is not to be assumed that the Legislature indulged in an idle act. (Scheas v. Robertson (1951), 38 Cal.2d 119, 129 [238 P.2d 982] ; see also Stafford v. Realty [*798] Bond Service Corp. (1952), 39 Cal.2d 797, 805 [249 P.2d 241].) Moreover, a contrary view would defeat the declared policy of section 32080 that disability pensions shall not be cumulative with workmen’s compensation benefits awarded for the same disability. In addition, as pointed out by respondent, the right to a future retirement allowance has been held to be a “benefit” (see Palaske v. City of Long Beach (1949), 93 Cal.App.2d 120, 124-127 [208 P.2d 764]), thus bringing petitioner within the section 31908 definition of “beneficiary” as one who is in receipt of some “other benefit provided by the retirement system.”

Petitioner also contends that because he contributed to the fund from which his pension is to be paid, the result of the withholding of pension benefits from him until such benefits, otherwise payable, equal the amount of his workmen’s compensation award is to cause him to contribute to the cost of such award, in violation of the provisions of section 3751 of the Labor Code.[2] This contention likewise is untenable as applied to the facts of this case. In the first place, both section 3751 of the Labor Code and sections 32080 'and 32081 of the Government Code (pursuant to which the pension payments are being withheld) are basically of equal sanction as enactments of the Legislature. Section 31902 of the Government Code expressly declares that the Retirement Law “shall not be construed as a local measure.” The Workmen’s Compensation Act, including the provisions upon which Labor Code section 3751 is based, was enacted in 1913. The Retirement Law, including the provisions of Government Code sections 32080 and 32081, was enacted in 1931. Therefore, if it be deemed that a conflict exists between the provisions of the Labor Code section and those of sections 32080 and 32081, the latter sections, being later in time, must be held to prevail. (Nelson v. Reilly (1948), 88 Cal.App.2d 303, 306 [198 P.2d 694].) Also, since the Retirement Law is a particular and specific law, dealing with the retirement benefits of county peace officers, its provisions must be held to prevail over the general workmen’s compensation provisions expressed in section 3751 of the Labor Code. (See Board of Supervisors v. Simpson (1951), 36 Cal.2d 671, 673 [227 P.2d 14]; Rose v. State of California (1942), 19 Cal.2d[*799] 713, 723-724 [123 P.2d 505]; Whittemore v. Seydel (1946), 74 Cal.App.2d 109, 120 [168 P.2d 212] ; 23 Cal.Jur. 762-763, and cases there cited.)

It appears, however, that there is no conflict between the two statutory provisions, and that compliance with section 32081 of the Government Code will not constitute an exaction or receipt by the employer from the employee of a contribution, in violation of Labor Code section 3751. Rather, section 32081 may be construed as fixing or defining a period during which pension payments will be suspended. “ [E]very statute should be construed with reference to the whole system of law of which it is a part so that all may be harmonized and have effect. [Citations.] ” (Stafford v. Realty Bond Service Corp. (1952), supra, 39 Cal.2d 797, 805; see also Rose v. State of California (1942), supra, 19 Cal.2d 713, 724; 23 Cal.Jur. 784-785, and eases there cited.) Although this construction may be considered to result in a reduction in the amount of pension payments which the retired officer would otherwise receive, it may be noted that under the terms of section 32064 of the Government Code a reduction (even complete termination, prior to amendment of the provision in 1947) may also occur if the officer engages in public employment other than service in the armed forces of the United States.

Cases, relied upon by petitioner are neither compelling nor persuasive to a contrary holding. Larson v. Board of Police etc. Commrs. (1945), 71 Cal.App.2d 60, 62 [162 P.2d 33] ; Johnson v. Board of Police etc. Pension Commrs. (1946), 74 Cal.App.2d 919, 921 [170 P.2d 48] ; and Holt v. Board of Police etc. Commrs. (1948), 86 Cal.App.2d 714, 719-720 [196 P.2d 94], all deal with a section of the Long Beach city charter which stated that “This provision is intended to be in lieu of and take the place, in so far as it applies, of the Workmen’s Compensation, Insurance and Safety Act . . . and any person who would be entitled to a pension under the provisions of this amendment and who applies for a pension hereunder shall be deemed to have waived all provisions under the Workmen’s Compensation,- Insurance and Safety Act ...” (See p. 62 of 71 Cal.App.2d.) It was held that the charter provision, a matter of local concern, could not constitute the pension provisions a substitute for workmen’s compensation. As pointed out in the Holt case (p. 719 of 86 Cal.App.2d), however, the charter did not provide that workmen’s compensation was to be in lieu of and take the place of the pension provisions, and none of[*800] the cited cases passes upon such a situation. Healy v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1953), 41 Cal.2d 118, 121 [258 P.2d 1], concerns a Los Angeles city charter provision that if an employee entitled to a pension because of injury is granted workmen’s compensation, then his pension should be construed as such compensation and applied in payment of the award. The city was permissibly uninsured for workmen’s compensation. It was held that the general workmen’s compensation law must prevail over the local charter provision in case of conflict between the two, and that “the validity of” any credit given the city against the workmen’s compensation award “depends upon whether Healy contributed to the pension for which the credit was allowed and whether as a result of the credit he was required, directly or indirectly, to pay part of the cost of his compensation in violation of section 3751” of the Labor Code. However, as already noted, in the case presently before us the retirement law provision under which defendant acted is a part of general state law rather than a local charter provision, and the payments which are deferred or reduced are those of the pension rather than of the compensation award. An Alameda city ordinance which was construed to likewise require reduction of pension payments in case of payment of workmen’s compensation was upheld against a similar contention of conflict with the workmen’s compensation act, in Foster v. Pension Board (1937), 23 Cal.App.2d 550, 554-555 [73 P.2d 631].

Other contentions by petitioner are without merit and appear to have been abandoned by him. For example, it was suggested that his vested rights in his pension were in some manner impaired by defendant’s compliance with the provisions of section 32080 and 32081 of the Government Code. However, those provisions were in effect both when petitioner first became a deputy sheriff and when he was retired; consequently his pension rights were neither altered nor impaired during or after his service for the county.

For the reasons above stated the judgment is affirmed.

Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., and Bray, J. pro tem.,* concurred.

Spence, J., concurred in the judgment.

1

Government Code, section 31930: “This chapter shall become effective in any county upon its acceptance by ordinance passed by four-fifths vote of its board of supervisors, and becomes operative in the county on January 1st or July 1st following the expiration of three months after the passage of the ordinance.”

2

Labor Code, section 3751: “No employer shall exact or receive from any employee any contribution, or make or take any deduction from the earnings of any employee either directly or indirectly, to cover the whole or any part of the cost of compensation under this division. Violation of this section is a misdemeanor.”

Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.

Dissent

CARTER, J.

I dissent.

The majority holding requires an employee to contribute[*801] to workmen's compensation payable to him contrary to the constitutional and statutory policy of this state. It is of little consequence that the payments of disability pension are to be withheld up to the amount of the workmen’s compensation received by the employee rather than that the pension was credited against the compensation as was the case in Healy v. Industrial Acc. Com., 41 Cal.2d 118 [258 P.2d 1]. That involved merely a matter of time and method of accomplishing the illegal result. Under the pension law the county employee was required to and did contribute to the pension fund. Now that contribution is taken from him because he has received workmen’s compensation, that is, payment of his pension to which he contributed is withheld because he received workmen’s compensation. He is,- in effect, and for all practical purposes, paying part of the workmen’s compensation to which he is entitled without contribution by him.

The policy of this state envisions no such contribution. The Constitution provides for a complete system of workmen’s compensation. “The Legislature is hereby expressly vested with plenary power, unlimited by any provision of this Constitution, to create, and enforce a complete system of workmen’s compensation, by appropriate legislation, and in that behalf to create and enforce a liability on the part of any or all persons to compensate any or all of their workmen for injury or disability, and their dependents for death incurred or sustained by the said workmen in the course of their employment, irrespective of the fault of any party. A complete system of workmen’s compensation includes adequate provisions for the comfort, health and safety and general welfare of any and all workmen and those dependent upon them for support to the extent of relieving from the consequences of any injury or death incurred or sustained by workmen in the course of their employment, irrespective of the fault of any party; also full provision for securing safety in places of employment; . . . full provision for adequate insurance coverage against liability to pay or furnish compensation; ... all of which matters are expressly declared to be the social public poUcy of this State, binding upon all departments of the State government.” (Cal. Const., art. XX, §21; emphasis added.) The Legislature has implemented this policy by providing that: “No employer shall exact or receive from any employee any contribution,[*802] or make or take any deduction from the earnings of any employee either directly or indirectly, to cover the whole or any part of the cost of compensation under this division. Violation of this section is a misdemeanor.” (Lab. Code, § 3751.) And: “Liability for compensation shall not be reduced or affected by any insurance, contribution or other benefit whatsoever due to or received by the person entitled to such compensation, except as otherwise provided by this division.” (Lab. Code, § 3752.) Nothing could be more specific than the last quoted provision. Contrary to the majority opinion it is more specific than the pension law (Gov. Code, § 31900 et seq.) and if there is a conflict, it controls.

California Jurisprudence, after referring to sections 3751 and 3752 of the Labor Code, states: “Accordingly contributions or benefits received from a labor union during a strike may not be deducted from the disability indemnity payable under the act. And when the employer takes out accident insurance in favor of the employee, out of whose wages the premiums are eventually payable, such workman is entitled, to the benefits under the policy in addition to those to which he is entitled under the statute, and the employer may not set off against compensation due from him any amounts paid under the policy.” (27 Cal.Jur. 513.) The rule is settled that the payment of salary or wages does not prevent an award of workmen’s compensation for disability and the salary is not to be deducted from the compensation unless there is express provision therefor. (Department of Motor Vehicles v. Industrial Acc. Com., 14 Cal.2d 189 [93 P.2d 131].)

The pension act cannot, under the Constitution (art. XX, § 21, supra) require that the employee contribute toward the payment of his compensation. As seen, that constitutional provision states that it is the policy of this state that there shall be a liability on the part of employers to pay compensation to their employees; that the employee shall be relieved of the consequences of an industrial injury. If the employee has to contribute to the payment of his workmen’s compensation the employer is to that extent not liable and the employee to that extent has not been relieved of the consequences of the injury. The underlying principle of a complete system of workmen’s compensation which is the constitutionally declared policy of this state is that compensation for injuries shall be borne by industry as a part of the cost of production. (Union Iron Wks. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 190 Cal. 33 [210[*803] P. 410]; Employers’ Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 179 Cal. 432 [177 P. 273] ; Western Metal Supply Co. v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 407 [156 P. 491, Ann.Cas. 1917 E 390] ; Western Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury, 170 Cal. 686 [151 P. 398].) It must necessarily follow that no contributions to the payment of workmen’s compensation can be required of the employee. Therefore the pension act cannot constitutionally require such contribution. If it is argued that there is no contribution but only less pension payable to the employee, then what becomes of the contribution to the pension fund by the employee? Either the portion he supplied is taken away from him or he is required to help pay the workmen’s compensation which he is entitled to receive without contribution and in either case he has been deprived of at least a portion of that to which he is lawfully entitled under the workmen’s compensation law. It seems clear to me that if the Legislature may provide, in the face of article XX, section 21, of the Constitution, that an injured employee who receives workmen’s compensation may be barred from receiving a pension from a fund to which he has contributed, it may also bar him from receiving payments under a policy of health and accident insurance on which he has paid all the premiums, or from receiving other benefits from welfare agencies to which he has made contributions in order to secure such benefits. Under the majority holding here such legislation would be upheld. In my opinion it would violate the above cited constitutional mandate.

I would, therefore, reverse the judgment.

Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied June 9, 1954. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.