Hurst v. State (2009)

“When there is only a bare speculation of tampering, it is proper to admit the evidence and let what doubt remains go to the weight.” Hurst v. State, 285 Ga. 294, 296 (2009).

Compare Stockard v. State, 327 Ga. App. 184, 188 (2) ( 761 SE2d 351 ) (2014) (because state made no attempt to elicit evidence of where crime occurred, it failed to demonstrate that county in which crime occurred could not be determined). 5 See Martin, supra at 46 (“[V]enue generally is a question for the jury.”). 6 See OCGA § 17-2-2 (h); Drake v. State, 238 Ga. App. 584, 588 (2) ( 519 SE2d 692 ) (1999) (pursuant to OCGA § 17-2-2 (h), venue in child molestation case proper i…

Hurst v. State, 285 Ga. 294, 296 (2) ( 676 SE2d 165 ) (2009) (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Walker complains that not every person who was responsible for transporting the shoes from the point they were seized to the forensic laboratory testified at trial, but the failure to have each person who was in control of evidence subject to the chain of custody requirement testify at trial “does not, without more, make the substance or testimony relating to it inadmissible.” Co…

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hurst v. State, 285 Ga. 294, 296 (2) ( 676 SE2d 165 ) (2009).

When there is only a bare speculation of tampering, it is proper to admit the evidence and let what doubt remains go to the weight.4 4 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hurst v. State, 285 Ga. 294, 296 (2) ( 676 SE2d 165 ) (2009). 3 (a) Mickens’s mouth swabs.

(Emphasis supplied.) The principle contained in the charge is a correct statement of the legal standard required to prove chain of custody.6 Therefore, Coleman cannot satisfy 4 (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Id. at 33 (2) (a). 5 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Kelly, supra. 6 Hurst v. State, 285 Ga. 294, 296 (2) ( 676 SE2d 165 ) (2009); Anderson v. State, 247 Ga. 397, 399 (2) ( 276 SE2d 603 ) (1981); Morrow v. State, 229 Ga. App. 242, 244 (2) (…

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Kelly, supra. Hurst v. State, 285 Ga. 294, 296 (2) ( 676 SE2d 165 ) (2009); Anderson v. State, 247 Ga. 397, 399 (2) ( 276 SE2d 603 ) (1981); Morrow v. State, 229 Ga. App. 242, 244 (2) ( 493 SE2d 616 ) (1997).

Hurst v. State, 285 Ga. 294, 296 (2) ( 676 SE2d 165 ) (2009) (citations and punctuation omitted).

When there is only a bare speculation of tampering, it is proper to admit the evidence and let what doubt remains go to the weight.1 The lack of testimony by a crime lab employee who originally receives drugs does not, in all circumstances, break the chain of custody.2 “Absent affirmative evidence 1 Hurst v. State, 285 Ga. 294, 296 (2) ( 676 SE2d 165 ) (2009) (citations and punctuation omitted). 2 Johnson v. State, 271 Ga. 375, 382 (13) ( 519 SE2d 221 ) (1999), citing Givens…

Johnson, P. J., and Ellington, J., concur. 1 OCGA § 40-6-393 (a). 2 OCGA § 40-6-394. 3 OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (1) (DUI less safe), (a) (5) (per se DUI). 4 See Merritt v. State, 288 Ga. App. 89, 91 (1) ( 653 SE2d 368 ) (2007). 5 See OCGA § 40-1-1 (1): “ ‘Alcohol concentration’ means grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood or grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.” 6 Smith v. State, 291 Ga. App. 353, 355 (3) ( 662 SE2d 176 ) (2008). 7 (Citations and punctuation omitted.…

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hurst v. State, 285 Ga. 294, 296 (2) ( 676 SE2d 165 ) (2009), In this case, Kuykendall’s arguments lack merit for several reasons.

See Hurst v. State, 285 Ga. 294, 297 (3) ( 676 SE2d 165 ) (2009); Santana v. State, 283 Ga. App. 696, 698 (1) ( 642 SE2d 390 ) (2007) (trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted cell phone records under OCGA § 24-3-14).

It should be further noted that, before the trial began, the trial court ruled that given the number of co-defendants, “to make it easy,” any objection raised by one defense attorney would preserve the issue as to all five defendants. 4 See Barnes v. State, 269 Ga. 345, 348 (4) ( 496 SE2d 674 ) (1998) (because appellant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his accomplice’s truck, he lacked standing to challenge search thereof); Burgeson v. State, 267 Ga. 102, 105 (3) …

See Hurst v. State , 285 Ga. 294 , 296 (2), 676 S.E.2d 165 (2009) ("When there is only a bare speculation of tampering, it is proper to admit the evidence and let what doubt remains go to the weight." (citation and punctuation omitted)).

See Hurst v. State, 285 Ga. 294, 296 (2) ( 676 SE2d 165 ) (2009) (“When there is only a bare speculation of tampering, it is proper to admit the evidence and let what doubt remains go to the weight.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

See Hurst v. State, 285 Ga. 294, 297 (3) ( 676 SE2d 165 ) (2009).

See id.