United States v. Eddy Wilmer Vail-Bailon (2017)

I disagree that, when the facts and law we considered in United States v, Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d 1293, 1305-07 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc), are properly accounted for, Vail-Bailon is materially distinguishable from the case here. 1 Specifically, I take issue with two of footnote 4’s statements: (1) “The non-violent force situations put forward by the defendant in [Vail-Bailon] were, in the majority’s view, farfetched ones that had never led to a prosecution and were extremely …

See, e.g. , United States v. Vail-Bailon , 868 F.3d 1293 , 1304 (11th Cir. 2017) (relying on dicta in state court opinion in determining whether state offense was "crime of violence"); id. at 1322 (Rosenbaum, J. dissenting) (noting that state decision relied on by majority was dicta); United States v. Smith , 582 F. App'x 590 , 596 & n.5 (6th Cir. 2014) (relying on dicta in state court opinion in determining whether North Carolina common law robbery was a crime of violence b…

Id.; United States v. Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d 1293, 1306 (11th Cir. 2017) (conclud- ing that the realistic-probability test requires the defendant to show that there is a realistic probability that the state would prosecute conduct that falls outside the scope of the federal definition).

United States v. Vail-Balon, 868 F.3d 1293, 1299 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc).

See Jones, 906 F.3d at 1328-29 (ACCA); Hylor v. United States, 896 F.3d 1219 , 1222- 23 (11th Cir. 2018) (ACCA); United States v. Deshazior, 882 F.3d 1352, 1357-58 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1255 (2019) (ACCA); United States v. Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d 1293, 1301-02 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2620 (2018) (Sentencing Guidelines).

See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 191 , 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684-85 (2013); United States v. Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d 1293, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 19 V.

Return of the Jury robbery are not violent felonies); United States v. Lee, 886 F.3d 1161 , 1165–71 (11th Cir. 2018) (Jordan, J., concurring) (opining that prior Eleventh Circuit decisions holding that robbery is a violent felony were wrongly decided);United States v. Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d 1293, 1308 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Wilson, J., dissenting) (opining that battery is not a violent felony); Vail- Bailon, 868 F.3d at 1315 (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting) (same); United Sta…

Return of the Jury robbery are not violent felonies); United States v. Lee, 886 F.3d 1161 , 1165–71 (11th Cir. 2018) (Jordan, J., concurring) (opining that prior Eleventh Circuit decisions holding that robbery is a violent felony were wrongly decided);United States v. Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d 1293, 1308 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Wilson, J., dissenting) (opining that battery is not a violent felony); Vail- Bailon, 868 F.3d at 1315 (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting) (same); United Sta…

Because that means, at a minimum, that the victim must suffer physical pain or injury, a felony battery conviction under the Indiana statute necessarily requires that the defendant use "force capable of causing physical pain or injury." Curtis Johnson , 559 U.S. at 140 , 130 S.Ct. at 1271 ; Castleman , 134 S.Ct. at 1416-17 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[I]t is impossible to cause bodily injury without using force 'capable of' producing that result."); cf. Vail-Bailon , 868 F.3d…

See, e.g., United States v. Gardner, 823 F.3d 793, 803-04 (4th Cir. 2016) (analyzing North Carolina cases); United States v. Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d 1293, 1306 (11th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he real-world examples of Florida felony battery we are aware of all involve conduct that clearly required the use of physical force.”).

As this Court has recently observed, “[i]t is a safe operating assumption that when the Supreme Court articulates a standard, it actually means the words it has used to set out that standard....” United States v. Eddy Wilmer Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d 1293, 1301 (11th Cir. 2017).

United States v. Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d 1293, 1299 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc).

Stat. § 18-3-203 (1)(g); Fla. Stat. § 784.03 (1)(a), 784.041(1)(b); United States v. Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d 1293, 1299 (11th Cir. 2017); Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1 (g)(1); Nev.

Critical for our purposes, the touching element of this offense can be satisfied “by any physical contact, no matter how slight,” United States v. Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d 1293, 1298 (11th Cir. 2017) (quotation omitted), including “only nominal contact” such as “tapping a law enforcement officer on the shoulder without consent,” State v. Hearns, 961 So. 2d 211, 219 (Fla. 2007).

In United States v. Vail-Bailon, we held that, by its plain terms and according to Florida caselaw interpreting such terms, USCA11 Case: 21-12917 Date Filed: 03/24/2022 Page: 6 of 10 6 Opinion of the Court 21-12917 Florida’s felony battery statute categorically matched the Guide- lines’ definition of a “crime of violence.” 868 F.3d 1293, 1303 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc).

United States v. Vail Bailon, 868 F.3d 1293, 1296 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc).

Cf. United States v. Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d 1293, 1304 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (“[Florida] felony battery, which includes the additional element that the touch or strike in fact cause significant physical injury, necessarily requires the use of force capable of causing pain or injury and therefore does so qualify [as a violent felony].”).

See Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d at 1302 (“[W]e conclude that the test set out in Curtis Johnson articulates the standard we should follow. . . .”). 12 Case: 14-15733 Date Filed: 05/06/2020 Page: 13 of 19 we hold that the district court did not err in concluding that Welch’s Florida felony- battery conviction was a “violent felony” under the ACCA.

United States v. Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d 1293, 1296 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2620 (2018).

United States v. Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d 1293, 1299 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc), cert denied, 138 S. Ct. 2620 (2018). 2 Case: 19-11028 Date Filed: 10/01/2019 Page: 3 of 4 Durham’s argument that his prior conviction under § 784.041 was not a crime of violence is foreclosed by Vail-Bailon.

See Curtis Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 , 130 S. Ct. 1265, 1271 (2010) (concluding that the phrase “physical force” in the ACCA’s elements clause “means violent force—that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person”); see also Stokeling v. United States, 586 U.S. ___ , 139 S. Ct. 544, 552-53 (2019) (reaffirming Curtis Johnson’s “capable” standard for the definition of physical force); United States v. Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d 1293, 129…

Our test for determining whether an offense calls for the use of physical force under Curtis Johnson looks to “whether the statute calls for violent force that is capable of causing physical pain or injury to another.” United States v. Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d 1293, 1302 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc).

See United States v. Green , 873 F.3d 846 , 869 (11th Cir. 2017) (determining that a § 2L1.2 case "compels a conclusion that [the same] statute likewise constitutes a violent felony under the elements clause of the ACCA"); *757 United States v. Vail-Bailon , 868 F.3d 1293 , 1298 n.8 (11th Cir. 2017) ("The elements clause of the ACCA is identical to the elements clause of § 2L1.2.

United States v. Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d 1293, 1308 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc).

United States v. Seabrooks, 839 F.3d 1326, 1338 (11th Cir. 2016) (ACCA), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2265 (2017); United States v. Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d 1293, 1296 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (career offender), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2620 (2018).

United States v. Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d 1293, 1296 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2620 (2018).

See, e.g. , Hylor v. United States , 896 F.3d 1219 (11th Cir. 2018) (Jill Pryor, J., concurring) (opining that attempted murder and attempted armed robbery are not violent felonies); United States v. Lee , 886 F.3d 1161 , 1165-71 (11th Cir. 2018) (Jordan, J., concurring) (opining that prior Eleventh Circuit decisions holding that robbery is a violent felony were wrongly decided); United States v. Vail-Bailon , 868 F.3d 1293 , 1308 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Wilson, J., diss…

On rehearing, this Court held that a conviction under Florida’s felony battery statute categorically qualifies under the Guidelines’ elements clause. 1 See United States v. Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d 1293, 1303-04 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2620 (2018).

The majority’s contention is also inconsistent with no fewer than six of our sister circuits. 2 2 See United States v. Bowles, 2018 WL 2230626 , at *3 (4th Cir. May 16, 2018) (“If a slap in the face qualifies as force capable of causing physical pain, then so must a push or a shove meant to rip property from a person who is resisting a theft.”) (internal citation omitted); United States v. Pyles, 888 F.3d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he force required is ‘only that degree…

The majority’s contention is also inconsistent with no fewer than six of our sister circuits. 2 2 See United States v. Bowles, 2018 WL 2230626 , at *3 (4th Cir. May 16, 2018) (“If a slap in the face qualifies as force capable of causing physical pain, then so must a push or a shove meant to rip property from a person who is resisting a theft.”) (internal citation omitted); United States v. Pyles, 888 F.3d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he force required is ‘only that degree…

In United States v. Vail-Bailon, this Court, sitting en banc, concluded that a 5 Case: 17-12051 Date Filed: 02/16/2018 Page: 6 of 9 conviction for felony battery under Fla. Stat. § 784.041 qualifies as a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, which contains the same elements clause as the ACCA. 868 F.3d 1293, 1297, 1308 (11th Cir.) (en banc), petition for cert. docketed, No. 17-7151 (Dec. 20, 2017); see also, e.g., Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293 , 1309 n.16 (11…

United States v. Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d 1293, 1296 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc).

In a sentencing hearing on September 7, 1993, the District Court stated that “the Defendant is an armed career criminal.” It said no more on the matter. 5 Case: 17-10028 Date Filed: 02/01/2018 Page: 6 of 6 v. Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d 1293, 1302 (11th Cir. 2017) (holding that the ACCA requires only “violent force that is capable of causing physical pain or injury to another (emphasis added)).

United States v. Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d 1293, 1296 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc).

United States v. Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d 1293, 1298 (11th Cir. 2017).

United States v. Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d 1293, 1298 (11th Cir. 2017).

See United States v. Green, 873 F.3d 846, 869 (11th Cir. 2017) (determining that a § 2L1.2 case “compels a conclusion that [the same] statute likewise constitutes a violent felony under the elements clause of the ACCA”); United States v. Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d 1293 , 1298 n.8 (11th Cir. 2017) (“The elements clause of the ACCA is identical to the elements clause of § 2L1.2.

United States v. Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d 1293, 1295 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2620 (2018) (mem.). 563 Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 560 (BIA 2019) Interim Decision #3956 In that case, the Eleventh Circuit considered whether the offense of felony battery under Florida law is a crime of violence under the United States Sentencing Guidelines.

See United States v. Vail-Bailon , 868 F.3d 1293 , 1299-1302 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc).

See United States v. Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d 1293 , 1299–1308 (11th Cir. 2017); Douglas v. United States, 858 F.3d 1069 , 1071–72 (7th Cir. 2017); see also United States v. Mendez, 593 F. App’x 441 , 443–44 (6th Cir. 2014).

See United States v. Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d 1293, 1296 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc).

See United States v. Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d 1293, 1295 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (holding that Florida felony battery categorically qualifies as a crime of violence).

See United States v. Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d 1293 , 1298 n.8 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (“The elements clause of the ACCA is identical to the elements clause of § 2L1.2.

See United States v. Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d 1293, 1306 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (“[T]he need to focus on the least culpable conduct criminalized by a statute is not an invitation to apply legal imagination to the statute.” (internal quotations omitted)).

See Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d at 1302–03.

See Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d at 1296-98, 1308 .

See Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d at 1299, 1308 .

See United States v. Vail-Bailon , 868 F.3d 1293 , 1297 (11th Cir. 2017) (in banc).

See United States v. Vail‐Bailon, No. 15‐10351, 2017 WL 3667647, at 3 (11th Cir. Aug. 25, 2017) (in banc). 8 The Connecticut first degree assault provision has two subdivisions.

See Vail-Bailon , 868 F.3d at 1301 (" Under normal circumstances , a slight tap on the shoulder or a tickle might be offensive if it is unwanted, but it will not be capable of causing either pain or injury." (emphasis added) ); see also United States v. Jennings , 860 F.3d 450 , 457 (7th Cir. 2017) ("Similarly, any number of forceful acts beyond simple touching may in context suffice to inflict bodily harm upon a victim (or instill fear of such harm)." (emphasis added) ).