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42 New York opinions name it 7 courts 1977–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Claytongreen2 sentences2014County Court ordered a Clayton hearing (see People v Clayton, 41 AD2d 204 [1973]), specifically finding that “the present policy of the . . . 2014County Court ordered a Clayton hearing (see People v Clayton, 41 AD2d 204 [1973]), specifically finding that “the present policy of the . . . | 4 | 26 |
People v. Rickertgreen2 sentences2015(See People v Rickert, 58 NY2d 122, 126 [1983]; People v Clayton, 41 AD2d 204, 207 [2d Dept 1973].) In entertaining such a motion, the court must scrutinize the merits of the defendant’s application in light of the enumerated factors set forth in CPL 210.40, and weigh the respective interests of the defendant, the complainant and the community at large. 2003(See People v Clayton, 41 AD2d 204 [2d Dept 1973].) The remedy of dismissal in the interest of justice, while having a “respected place in the common law” (People v Rickert, 58 NY2d 122, 126 [1983]), is now governed by Criminal Procedure Law § 170.40 (1). | 3 | 3 |
People v. Pyattgreen2 sentences2014(People v Schlessel, 104 AD2d 501, 502 [2d Dept 1984].) The court must consider individually and collectively each of the factors listed in CPL 170.40 (1) 2 and must, where dismissal is granted, place its reasons on the record. 2010Where the defendant does not meet this burden, the court may summarily deny the motion (People v Schlessel, 104 AD2d 501, 502 [2d Dept 1984]). | 3 | 3 |
People v. Jenkinsgreen1 sentence2022Resolution of a Clayton motion requires "strik[ing] a sensitive balance between the individual and the State interests to determine whether the ends of justice are served by dismissal" ( People v Jenkins , 11 NY3d 282, 287 [internal quotation marks omitted]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Federmangreen1 sentence2014In many respects, this case resembles People v Federman ( 19 Misc 3d 478, 480-481 [Crim Ct, NY County 2008]), where the court granted a Clayton motion after the defendant demonstrated similarly atypical motives. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Harmongreen1 sentence2014(See also Clayton, 41 AD2d at 206-208 .) The power to dismiss an accusatory instrument in furtherance of justice should be used “sparingly and only in that rare and unusual case where it cries out for fundamental justice beyond the confines of conventional considerations.” (People v Harmon, 181 AD2d 34, 36 [1st Dept 1992] [citations and internal quotation marks omitted].) A Clayton motion should be granted only where a defendant has demonstrated by a preponderance of the credible evidence that a compelling reason exists to warrant dismissal in the interest of justice; if the defendant fails to | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hidalgogreen2 sentences2009The valid waiver by defendant of the right to appeal also encompasses his challenge to the severity of the sentence (see People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 255-256 [2006]; People v Hidalgo, 91 NY2d 733, 737 [1998]). 2009The valid waiver by defendant of the right to appeal also encompasses his challenge to the severity of the sentence (see People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 255-256 [2006]; People v Hidalgo, 91 NY2d 733, 737 [1998]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Lopezgreen2 sentences2009The valid waiver by defendant of the right to appeal also encompasses his challenge to the severity of the sentence (see People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 255-256 [2006]; People v Hidalgo, 91 NY2d 733, 737 [1998]). 2009The valid waiver by defendant of the right to appeal also encompasses his challenge to the severity of the sentence (see People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 255-256 [2006]; People v Hidalgo, 91 NY2d 733, 737 [1998]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Figginsgreen2 sentences2008Affording the trial court this discretion does not, as the dissent maintains, improperly shift the burden of proof from the People to defendant (see dissenting op at 293). 2 Once defendant violated his plea agreement by being rearrested, the court was “no longer bound by the plea promise and could properly impose an enhanced sentence” (People v Figgins, 87 NY2d 840, 841 [1995]). 2008Affording the trial court this discretion does not, as the dissent maintains, improperly shift the burden of proof from the People to defendant ( see dissenting op at 293). [2] Once defendant violated his plea agreement by being rearrested, the court was "no longer bound by the plea promise and could properly impose an enhanced sentence" ( People v Figgins, 87 NY2d 840, 841 [1995]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Stultzgreen1 sentence2008“There can be no denial of effective assistance of . . . counsel arising from counsel’s failure to ‘make a motion or argument that had little or no chance of success’ ” (People v Caban, 5 NY3d 143, 152 [2005], quoting People v Stultz, 2 NY3d 277, 287 [2004]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Cabangreen1 sentence2008“There can be no denial of effective assistance of . . . counsel arising from counsel’s failure to ‘make a motion or argument that had little or no chance of success’ ” (People v Caban, 5 NY3d 143, 152 [2005], quoting People v Stultz, 2 NY3d 277, 287 [2004]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Averygreen1 sentence2007Plea agreements should be “tailored to the particular circumstances of the defendant’s case” (People v Avery, 85 NY2d 503, 507 [1995]), which is what Supreme Court, the People, and defendant, attempted to do in February 2002. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Callahangreen1 sentence2007In light of defense counsel’s inexplicable withdrawal of the Clayton motion, his failure to register any protest to the additional conditions imposed by the court for granting it and the court’s clear message that resistance would lead to continued incarceration, defendant’s decision to “comply with the program” can hardly be said to be the product of free will so as to be considered “voluntary, knowing and intelligent” (People v Callahan, 80 NY2d 273, 283 [1992]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Johnsongreen1 sentence2007Thus, it is unpreserved for review and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal (CPL 470.05 [2]; see People v Johnson, 83 NY2d 831, 834 [1994]). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Zerbstgreen1 sentence2007Thus, the record fails to demonstrate “ ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege’ ” (Harris, 61 NY2d at 17 , quoting Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458, 464 [1938]; see Jefpaul Garage Corp. v Presbyterian Hosp. in City of N.Y., 61 NY2d 442, 446 [1984]) so as to warrant the conclusion that defendant knowingly and voluntarily abandoned the issues raised by his Clayton motion. | 1 | 1 |
Jefpaul Garage Corp. v. Presbyterian Hospitalgreen1 sentence2007Thus, the record fails to demonstrate “ ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege’ ” (Harris, 61 NY2d at 17 , quoting Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458, 464 [1938]; see Jefpaul Garage Corp. v Presbyterian Hosp. in City of N.Y., 61 NY2d 442, 446 [1984]) so as to warrant the conclusion that defendant knowingly and voluntarily abandoned the issues raised by his Clayton motion. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Outleygreen1 sentence2007Indeed, the court noted following the bench conference that defendant had evinced “some kind of attitude problems and some resistance ... in terms of documentation and proofs and things like that.” A “sentencing court must assure itself that the information upon which it bases the sentence is reliable and accurate,” including whether or not the defendant has complied with the conditions of a plea agreement, and the nature and extent of the inquiry is within the court’s discretion (People v Outley, 80 NY2d 702, 712, 713 [1993]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Simmonsgreen1 sentence2001Another Justice, who presided over the fourth trial, considered and denied the motion. [3] See also, People v Fisher, 223 NY 459 (1918) (allowing, pursuant to former Code of Criminal Procedure § 8 [3] [now CPL 670.10 (1)], the admission of a stenographic transcript of a preliminary examination taken in accordance with former Code of Criminal Procedure § 221-b [now Judiciary Law § 319]); People v Geraci, 85 NY2d 359 (1995) (authorizing the use of Grand Jury testimony where the defendant intimidated the witness). [4] See also, People v Ayala, 75 NY2d 422, 428-429 (1990) (holding that prior testi | 1 | 1 |
People v. McRaygreen1 sentence2001Because this case examines the minimal requirements of due diligence, the issue is properly before us ( cf., People v McRay, 51 NY2d 594, 601 [1980]). [2] After defendant's conviction, he moved to have the Clayton motion reconsidered. | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Ayalagreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Horelickgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Vecchiogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| People v. Vernonyellow | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Suitte
green
2 sentences1994Her sentence, which was the minimum allowed by law, was not excessive (see, People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 ). 1993The sentence imposed was not excessive (see, People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 ). | 2 | 1993–1994 |
People v. Litman
green
2 sentences1994(People v Kirby, 92 AD2d 848 [1st Dept 1983].) The power to order such a dismissal should be sparingly used (People v Belkota, 50 AD2d 118 [4th Dept 1975]), in the rare case which "cries out for fundamental justice.” (People v Belge, 41 NY2d 60 [1976], cited in People v Litman, 99 AD2d 573 [3d Dept 1984].) Indeed, the statute makes clear the notion that the public, too, has an interest in the dismissal, since the effect of the dismissal on the public’s confidence in the criminal justice system is a factor which must be considered in the Clayton hearing. 1994(People v Kirby, 92 AD2d 848 [1st Dept 1983].) The power to order such a dismissal should be sparingly used (People v Belkota, 50 AD2d 118 [4th Dept 1975]), in the rare case which "cries out for fundamental justice.” (People v Belge, 41 NY2d 60 [1976], cited in People v Litman, 99 AD2d 573 [3d Dept 1984].) Indeed, the statute makes clear the notion that the public, too, has an interest in the dismissal, since the effect of the dismissal on the public’s confidence in the criminal justice system is a factor which must be considered in the Clayton hearing. | 2 | 1985–1994 |
People v. Haugh
neutral
1 sentence2014(See People v Haugh, 26 Misc 3d 1029 [Henrietta Just Ct 2009] [dismissing DWI case where offense was the culmination of a series of sympathetic and highly unusual personal circumstances].) Second, the facts of the case are extremely unusual. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Hernandez
neutral
1 sentence2014People v Hernandez, 111 AD3d 513 [1st Dept 2013] [affirming grant of Clayton motion based on a combination of the facts of case and defendant’s lifetime of good behavior].) Finally, the People have been offering the defendant an ACD consistently since May 31, 2013, which was more than seven months ago. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Schaffer
green
1 sentence2011In discussing the unresolved Jackson motion, the Schaffer Court indicated that “[s]hould the trial court determine that there is no substantial probability that defendant will attain the capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist his attorneys in the foreseeable future — an issue the People contest — the defendant will be entitled to either be released or civilly committed as set forth above.” ( 86 NY2d at 469 .) Thus, the People maintain, the Court of Appeals has implicitly recognized the District Attorney as a rightful participant in a Jackson hearing. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
People v. Cortes
green
2 sentences2009The contention of defendant that the court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment without conducting a Clayton hearing is forfeited by the plea and does not survive his valid waiver of the right to appeal (see generally People v Cortes, 44 AD3d 538 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 1032 [2008]). 2009The contention of defendant that the court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment without conducting a Clayton hearing is forfeited by the plea and does not survive his valid waiver of the right to appeal (see generally People v Cortes, 44 AD3d 538 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 1032 [2008]). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
People v. Gragert
green
2 sentences2008(People v Gragert, 1 Misc 3d 646 [Crim Ct, NY County 2003] [a court may consider relevant factors individually and collectively, and need not discuss each of the 10 factors point-by-point].) Although defendant has sought to apportion his argument among several of the Clayton factors, his motion rests primarily on his assertions that as a matter of public policy, and because the evidence against him is weak, the case against him should be dismissed. 2008(People v Gragert, 1 Misc 3d 646 [Crim Ct, NY County 2003] [a court may consider relevant factors individually and collectively, and need not discuss each of the 10 factors point-by-point].) Although defendant has sought to apportion his argument among several of the Clayton factors, his motion rests primarily on his assertions that as a matter of public policy, and because the evidence against him is weak, the case against him should be dismissed. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
People v. Harris
green
1 sentence2007Thus, the record fails to demonstrate “ ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege’ ” (Harris, 61 NY2d at 17 , quoting Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458, 464 [1938]; see Jefpaul Garage Corp. v Presbyterian Hosp. in City of N.Y., 61 NY2d 442, 446 [1984]) so as to warrant the conclusion that defendant knowingly and voluntarily abandoned the issues raised by his Clayton motion. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
People v. Fernandez
green
1 sentence2006If the jury were to find that a defendant, who was charged with attempted murder in the second degree, acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, then the conviction is mitigated to one of attempted manslaughter in the first degree (see, People v White, 125 AD2d 932 [1986]). . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
People v. . Fisher
green
1 sentence2001Another Justice, who presided over the fourth trial, considered and denied the motion. [3] See also, People v Fisher, 223 NY 459 (1918) (allowing, pursuant to former Code of Criminal Procedure § 8 [3] [now CPL 670.10 (1)], the admission of a stenographic transcript of a preliminary examination taken in accordance with former Code of Criminal Procedure § 221-b [now Judiciary Law § 319]); People v Geraci, 85 NY2d 359 (1995) (authorizing the use of Grand Jury testimony where the defendant intimidated the witness). [4] See also, People v Ayala, 75 NY2d 422, 428-429 (1990) (holding that prior testi | 1 | 2001–2001 |
People v. Geraci
green
1 sentence2001Another Justice, who presided over the fourth trial, considered and denied the motion. [3] See also, People v Fisher, 223 NY 459 (1918) (allowing, pursuant to former Code of Criminal Procedure § 8 [3] [now CPL 670.10 (1)], the admission of a stenographic transcript of a preliminary examination taken in accordance with former Code of Criminal Procedure § 221-b [now Judiciary Law § 319]); People v Geraci, 85 NY2d 359 (1995) (authorizing the use of Grand Jury testimony where the defendant intimidated the witness). [4] See also, People v Ayala, 75 NY2d 422, 428-429 (1990) (holding that prior testi | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| People v. Lasdon green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| People v. Saunders neutral | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| People v. Yong Ho Han green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| People v. Rahman neutral | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| People v. Kohl green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| People v. Belkota green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| People v. Kirby green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| People v. Merlo green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| People v. Purcell green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| People v. Tambe green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| People v. Zagarino green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| People v. Boyer green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Gary v. Country Club Acres, Inc. neutral | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| People v. Kass neutral | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| People v. Johnson green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Cohen v. New York Herald Tribune, Inc. green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| People ex rel. Sardo v. Zelker neutral | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| People v. Harris neutral | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| People v. Forte green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| People v. Leone green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Pereira v. Pereira green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.