Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
5 Louisiana opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bazley v. Tortorichgreen2 sentences2014SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 17.1 at 7-8 (7th ed. 2009)). 17 Id. at 1064. 14 object."18 In emphasizing the broad definition of “object” under the constitution, we held that “a bill may be as broad as the legislature chooses so long as all of its provisions ‘have a natural connection and reasonably relate, directly or indirectly, to one general and legitimate subject of legislation.’”19 In a one-object analysis, “[i]t matters not how comprehensive the act may be or how numerous its provisions; it does not violate such a constitutional provision if its language, reasonab 2014SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 17.1 at 7-8 (7th ed. 2009)). 17 Id. at 1064. 14 object."18 In emphasizing the broad definition of “object” under the constitution, we held that “a bill may be as broad as the legislature chooses so long as all of its provisions ‘have a natural connection and reasonably relate, directly or indirectly, to one general and legitimate subject of legislation.’”19 In a one-object analysis, “[i]t matters not how comprehensive the act may be or how numerous its provisions; it does not violate such a constitutional provision if its language, reasonab | 2 | 4 |
State v. Coopergreen2 sentences2014SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 17.1 at 7-8 (7th ed. 2009)). 17 Id. at 1064. 14 object."18 In emphasizing the broad definition of “object” under the constitution, we held that “a bill may be as broad as the legislature chooses so long as all of its provisions ‘have a natural connection and reasonably relate, directly or indirectly, to one general and legitimate subject of legislation.’”19 In a one-object analysis, “[i]t matters not how comprehensive the act may be or how numerous its provisions; it does not violate such a constitutional provision if its language, reasonab 2014SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 17.1 at 7-8 (7th ed. 2009)). 17 Id. at 1064. 14 object."18 In emphasizing the broad definition of “object” under the constitution, we held that “a bill may be as broad as the legislature chooses so long as all of its provisions ‘have a natural connection and reasonably relate, directly or indirectly, to one general and legitimate subject of legislation.’”19 In a one-object analysis, “[i]t matters not how comprehensive the act may be or how numerous its provisions; it does not violate such a constitutional provision if its language, reasonab | 1 | 3 |
Wall v. Closegreen2 sentences2014SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 17.1 at 7-8 (7th ed. 2009)). 17 Id. at 1064. 14 object."18 In emphasizing the broad definition of “object” under the constitution, we held that “a bill may be as broad as the legislature chooses so long as all of its provisions ‘have a natural connection and reasonably relate, directly or indirectly, to one general and legitimate subject of legislation.’”19 In a one-object analysis, “[i]t matters not how comprehensive the act may be or how numerous its provisions; it does not violate such a constitutional provision if its language, reasonab 2014SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 17.1 at 7-8 (7th ed. 2009)). 17 Id. at 1064. 14 object."18 In emphasizing the broad definition of “object” under the constitution, we held that “a bill may be as broad as the legislature chooses so long as all of its provisions ‘have a natural connection and reasonably relate, directly or indirectly, to one general and legitimate subject of legislation.’”19 In a one-object analysis, “[i]t matters not how comprehensive the act may be or how numerous its provisions; it does not violate such a constitutional provision if its language, reasonab | 1 | 1 |
St. Anna's Asylum v. Parkergreen2 sentences2013Anna’s Asylum v. Parker, 109 La. 592 , 33 So. 613, 616 (1903), that given the state constitution’s failure to specify the degree of particularity necessary to comply with the one-object rule: [T]he courts should not embarrass legislation by technical interpretations based upon mere form or phraseology. 2013Anna’s Asylum v. Parker, 109 La. 592 , 33 So. 613, 616 (1903), that given the state constitution’s failure to specify the degree of particularity necessary to comply with the one-object rule: [T]he courts should not embarrass legislation by technical interpretations based upon mere form or phraseology. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Doherty v. Calcasieu Parish School Bd.
green
2 sentences2001Doherty v. Calcasieu Parish School Board, 93-3017 (La.4/11/94), 634 So.2d 1172 ; Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So.2d 475 (La.1981). 1996Doherty v. Calcasieu Parish School Board, 93-3017 (La. 4/11/94); 634 So.2d 1172, 1175-76 ; Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So.2d 475, 485 (La.1981). | 2 | 1996–2001 |
Louisiana Federation of Teachers v. State
green
2 sentences2014In the Act 2 case, we explained that the one-object requirement is a restraint on the legislature, aimed at preventing the dilution of the majority vote through "logrolling," which is the "practice of procuring diverse and unrelated matters to be passed on as one 'omnibus' through the consolidated votes of the advocates of each separate measure when perhaps no single measure could have passed on its own merits," and through "riders," or the attachment of undesirable provisions "on bills certain to be passed because of their public popularity or desirability."16 We explained that the “object” o 2014In the Act 2 case, we explained that the one-object requirement is a restraint on the legislature, aimed at preventing the dilution of the majority vote through "logrolling," which is the "practice of procuring diverse and unrelated matters to be passed on as one 'omnibus' through the consolidated votes of the advocates of each separate measure when perhaps no single measure could have passed on its own merits," and through "riders," or the attachment of undesirable provisions "on bills certain to be passed because of their public popularity or desirability."16 We explained that the “object” o | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Forum for Equality PAC v. McKeithen
green
1 sentence2013Most recently, in Forum for Equality PAC v. McKeithen, 04-2477 (La.1/19/05), 893 So.2d 715 , we attributed a similarly broad definition to the one-object requirement of La. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Dooley
green
2 sentences1981State v. Cooper, 382 So.2d 963 (La.1980); State v. Dooley, 261 La. 295 , 259 So.2d 329 (1972). 1981State v. Cooper, 382 So.2d 963 (La.1980); State v. Dooley, 261 La. 295 , 259 So.2d 329 (1972). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.