prompt presentment rule in West Virginia

2015Va. 339 , 582 S.E.2d 786 (2003). 4 Despite this recognition regarding the significance of a violation of the prompt presentment statute, we also have determined that “[c]ertain delays such as delays in the transportation of a defendant to the police station, completion of booking and administrative procedures, recordation and transcription of a statement, and the transportation of a defendant to the magistrate do not offend the prompt presentment requirement.” State v. Sugg, 193 W.Va. 388, 395-96 , 456 S.E.2d 469, 476-77 (1995) (citing State v. Ellsworth J.R., 175 W.Va. 64, 70 , 331 S.E.2d 503

2015Va. 339 , 582 S.E.2d 786 (2003). 4 Despite this recognition regarding the significance of a violation of the prompt presentment statute, we also have determined that “[c]ertain delays such as delays in the transportation of a defendant to the police station, completion of booking and administrative procedures, recordation and transcription of a statement, and the transportation of a defendant to the magistrate do not offend the prompt presentment requirement.” State v. Sugg, 193 W.Va. 388, 395-96 , 456 S.E.2d 469, 476-77 (1995) (citing State v. Ellsworth J.R., 175 W.Va. 64, 70 , 331 S.E.2d 503

2021Va. 388 , 456 S.E.2d 469 (1995), we stated that “delays in the transportation of a defendant to the police station, completion of booking and administrative procedures, recordation and transcription of a statement, and the transportation of a defendant to the magistrate do not offend the prompt presentment requirement.” Id. at 395-96 , 456 S.E.2d at 476-77 (footnote omitted).

2021Va. 388 , 456 S.E.2d 469 (1995), we stated that “delays in the transportation of a defendant to the police station, completion of booking and administrative procedures, recordation and transcription of a statement, and the transportation of a defendant to the magistrate do not offend the prompt presentment requirement.” Id. at 395-96 , 456 S.E.2d at 476-77 (footnote omitted).

2007Essentially, "once a defendant is in police custody with sufficient probable cause to warrant an arrest, the prompt presentment rule is . . . triggered." Syl Pt. 2, in part, State v. Humphrey, 177 W.Va. 264 , 351 S.E.2d 613 (1986).

2007Essentially, "once a defendant is in police custody with sufficient probable cause to warrant an arrest, the prompt presentment rule is . . . triggered." Syl Pt. 2, in part, State v. Humphrey, 177 W.Va. 264 , 351 S.E.2d 613 (1986).

2017For instance, time spent by police in certain activities such as transporting the defendant to the police headquarters or completing normal booking, processing and paperwork must not be included in the time frame of any “delay.” See State v. Rogers, 231 W.Va. 205, 211 , 744 S.E.2d 315, 321 (2013) (driving defendant to police barracks and normal booking procedure, including interview of suspect after arrested if willing to give statement not included in calculating "delay"); State v. Newcomb, 223 W.Va. 843, 866 , 679 S.E.2d 675, 698 (2009) (being kept at scene “for legitimate law enforcement pu

2017For instance, time spent by police in certain activities such as transporting the defendant to the police headquarters or completing normal booking, processing and paperwork must not be included in the time frame of any “delay.” See State v. Rogers, 231 W.Va. 205, 211 , 744 S.E.2d 315, 321 (2013) (driving defendant to police barracks and normal booking procedure, including interview of suspect after arrested if willing to give statement not included in calculating "delay"); State v. Newcomb, 223 W.Va. 843, 866 , 679 S.E.2d 675, 698 (2009) (being kept at scene “for legitimate law enforcement pu

2015See State v. Milburn, 204 W.Va. 203 , 511 S.E.2d 828 (1998) (holding that delay in taking defendant to magistrate did not violate the prompt presentment rule because the delay was for the purpose of questioning the defendant about a crime for which he was not arrested).

2015See State v. Milburn, 204 W.Va. 203 , 511 S.E.2d 828 (1998) (holding that delay in taking defendant to magistrate did not violate the prompt presentment rule because the delay was for the purpose of questioning the defendant about a crime for which he was not arrested).

2017In providing guidance to the circuit courts as to whether an inculpatory statement should be suppressed due to a violation of the prompt presentment rule, we established in Syllabus Point 6 of State v. Persinger, 169 W.Va. 121 , 286 S.E.2d 261 (1982) that “[t]he delay in taking the defendant to a magistrate may be a critical factor where it appears that the primary purpose of the delay was to obtain a confession from the defendant.” Id. at 121 , 286 S.E.2d at 263 .

2017In providing guidance to the circuit courts as to whether an inculpatory statement should be suppressed due to a violation of the prompt presentment rule, we established in Syllabus Point 6 of State v. Persinger, 169 W.Va. 121 , 286 S.E.2d 261 (1982) that “[t]he delay in taking the defendant to a magistrate may be a critical factor where it appears that the primary purpose of the delay was to obtain a confession from the defendant.” Id. at 121 , 286 S.E.2d at 263 .

2024We have also recognized, however, that “[c]ertain delays . . . in . . . completion of booking and administrative procedures . . . do not offend the prompt presentment requirement.” State v. Rogers, 231 W.

2024Va. 205, 210 , 744 S.E.2d 315, 320 (2013) (citations omitted).

2003See also State v. Grubbs, 178 W.Va. 811, 814 , 364 S.E.2d 824, 827 (1987) (The prompt presentment rule "requires an individual to be promptly taken before a neutral magistrate after arrest.

2003See also State v. Grubbs, 178 W.Va. 811, 814 , 364 S.E.2d 824, 827 (1987) (The prompt presentment rule "requires an individual to be promptly taken before a neutral magistrate after arrest.

2017For instance, time spent by police in certain activities such as transporting the defendant to the police headquarters or completing normal booking, processing and paperwork must not be included in the time frame of any “delay.” See State v. Rogers, 231 W.Va. 205, 211 , 744 S.E.2d 315, 321 (2013) (driving defendant to police barracks and normal booking procedure, including interview of suspect after arrested if willing to give statement not included in calculating "delay"); State v. Newcomb, 223 W.Va. 843, 866 , 679 S.E.2d 675, 698 (2009) (being kept at scene “for legitimate law enforcement pu

2017For instance, time spent by police in certain activities such as transporting the defendant to the police headquarters or completing normal booking, processing and paperwork must not be included in the time frame of any “delay.” See State v. Rogers, 231 W.Va. 205, 211 , 744 S.E.2d 315, 321 (2013) (driving defendant to police barracks and normal booking procedure, including interview of suspect after arrested if willing to give statement not included in calculating "delay"); State v. Newcomb, 223 W.Va. 843, 866 , 679 S.E.2d 675, 698 (2009) (being kept at scene “for legitimate law enforcement pu

2011In Syllabus Point 2 of State v. Fortner, 182 W.Va. 345 , 387 S.E.2d 812 (1989), this Court held: ‘“Ordinarily the delay in taking an accused who is under arrest to a magistrate after a confession has been obtained from him does not vitiate the confession under our prompt presentment rule.’ Syllabus Point 4, State v. Humphrey, 177 W.Va. 264, 351 S.E.2d 613 (1986).” Syllabus Point 8, State v. Worley, 179 W.Va. 403 , 369 S.E.2d 706 , cert. denied, 488 U.S. 895 , 109 S.Ct. 236 , 102 L.Ed.2d 226 (1988).

2011In Syllabus Point 2 of State v. Fortner, 182 W.Va. 345 , 387 S.E.2d 812 (1989), this Court held: ‘“Ordinarily the delay in taking an accused who is under arrest to a magistrate after a confession has been obtained from him does not vitiate the confession under our prompt presentment rule.’ Syllabus Point 4, State v. Humphrey, 177 W.Va. 264, 351 S.E.2d 613 (1986).” Syllabus Point 8, State v. Worley, 179 W.Va. 403 , 369 S.E.2d 706 , cert. denied, 488 U.S. 895 , 109 S.Ct. 236 , 102 L.Ed.2d 226 (1988).

2011In Syllabus Point 2 of State v. Fortner, 182 W.Va. 345 , 387 S.E.2d 812 (1989), this Court held: ‘“Ordinarily the delay in taking an accused who is under arrest to a magistrate after a confession has been obtained from him does not vitiate the confession under our prompt presentment rule.’ Syllabus Point 4, State v. Humphrey, 177 W.Va. 264, 351 S.E.2d 613 (1986).” Syllabus Point 8, State v. Worley, 179 W.Va. 403 , 369 S.E.2d 706 , cert. denied, 488 U.S. 895 , 109 S.Ct. 236 , 102 L.Ed.2d 226 (1988).

1990See State v. Worley, 179 W.Va. 403, 414 , 369 S.E.2d 706, 717 , cert. denied, 488 U.S. 895 , 109 S.Ct. 236 , 102 L.Ed.2d 226 (1988).

2011In Syllabus Point 2 of State v. Fortner, 182 W.Va. 345 , 387 S.E.2d 812 (1989), this Court held: ‘“Ordinarily the delay in taking an accused who is under arrest to a magistrate after a confession has been obtained from him does not vitiate the confession under our prompt presentment rule.’ Syllabus Point 4, State v. Humphrey, 177 W.Va. 264, 351 S.E.2d 613 (1986).” Syllabus Point 8, State v. Worley, 179 W.Va. 403 , 369 S.E.2d 706 , cert. denied, 488 U.S. 895 , 109 S.Ct. 236 , 102 L.Ed.2d 226 (1988).

2011In Syllabus Point 2 of State v. Fortner, 182 W.Va. 345 , 387 S.E.2d 812 (1989), this Court held: ‘“Ordinarily the delay in taking an accused who is under arrest to a magistrate after a confession has been obtained from him does not vitiate the confession under our prompt presentment rule.’ Syllabus Point 4, State v. Humphrey, 177 W.Va. 264, 351 S.E.2d 613 (1986).” Syllabus Point 8, State v. Worley, 179 W.Va. 403 , 369 S.E.2d 706 , cert. denied, 488 U.S. 895 , 109 S.Ct. 236 , 102 L.Ed.2d 226 (1988).

2020Va. 515, 529 , 801 S.E.2d 530, 544 (2017), that [o]ur prior decisions raising a violation of the prompt presentment rule have drawn a clear distinction between appropriate police conduct in interviewing a suspect who wishes to give a voluntary statement and police conduct that reveals coercive or inappropriate means of obtaining a confession.

2017For instance, time spent by police in certain activities such as transporting the defendant to the police headquarters or completing normal booking, processing and paperwork must not be included in the time frame of any “delay.” See State v. Rogers, 231 W.Va. 205, 211 , 744 S.E.2d 315, 321 (2013) (driving defendant to police barracks and normal booking procedure, including interview of suspect after arrested if willing to give statement not included in calculating "delay"); State v. Newcomb, 223 W.Va. 843, 866 , 679 S.E.2d 675, 698 (2009) (being kept at scene “for legitimate law enforcement pu

2017For instance, time spent by police in certain activities such as transporting the defendant to the police headquarters or completing normal booking, processing and paperwork must not be included in the time frame of any “delay.” See State v. Rogers, 231 W.Va. 205, 211 , 744 S.E.2d 315, 321 (2013) (driving defendant to police barracks and normal booking procedure, including interview of suspect after arrested if willing to give statement not included in calculating "delay"); State v. Newcomb, 223 W.Va. 843, 866 , 679 S.E.2d 675, 698 (2009) (being kept at scene “for legitimate law enforcement pu

2017For instance, time spent by police in certain activities such as transporting the defendant to the police headquarters or completing normal booking, processing and paperwork must not be included in the time frame of any “delay.” See State v. Rogers, 231 W.Va. 205, 211 , 744 S.E.2d 315, 321 (2013) (driving defendant to police barracks and normal booking procedure, including interview of suspect after arrested if willing to give statement not included in calculating "delay"); State v. Newcomb, 223 W.Va. 843, 866 , 679 S.E.2d 675, 698 (2009) (being kept at scene “for legitimate law enforcement pu

2017For instance, time spent by police in certain activities such as transporting the defendant to the police headquarters or completing normal booking, processing and paperwork must not be included in the time frame of any “delay.” See State v. Rogers, 231 W.Va. 205, 211 , 744 S.E.2d 315, 321 (2013) (driving defendant to police barracks and normal booking procedure, including interview of suspect after arrested if willing to give statement not included in calculating "delay"); State v. Newcomb, 223 W.Va. 843, 866 , 679 S.E.2d 675, 698 (2009) (being kept at scene “for legitimate law enforcement pu

2003It is a legislatively created and judicially adopted rule. [12] See Rogers v. Albert, 208 W.Va. 473, 477 , 541 S.E.2d 563, 567 (2000) (per curiam) ("[T]he right to prompt presentment is not constitutionally guaranteed outside the context of a warrantless arrest, but rather exists as a statutory and procedural right.").

2003It is a legislatively created and judicially adopted rule. [12] See Rogers v. Albert, 208 W.Va. 473, 477 , 541 S.E.2d 563, 567 (2000) (per curiam) ("[T]he right to prompt presentment is not constitutionally guaranteed outside the context of a warrantless arrest, but rather exists as a statutory and procedural right.").