overburdening analysis in Maine

2011Accordingly, they contend that Woods should not be permitted to erect a fence along the end of the easement that blocks their access to Holt’s upland. [¶ 74] A court’s overburdening analysis “evaluate[s] whether it is reasonable to conclude that a particular use was within the contemplation of the parties to the conveyance and, in that context, whether the contested use made of the servient estate by the dominant estate exceeds the rights granted to the user.” Poire v. Manchester, 506 A.2d 1160, 1163 (Me.1986).

2009The first test, the so-called "Overburdening Analysis" is used where the dispute arises between a dominant and servient tenement, as is the case here. lO The overburdening analysis evaluates "whether it is reasonable to conclude that a particular use was within the contemplation of the parties to the conveyance and, in that context, whether the contested use made of the servient estate by the dominant estate exceeds the rights granted to the user." Poire, 506 A.2d at 1163 .

2020Kaler, 49 Me. at 208 .; see also Chandler v. Goodridge, 23 Me. 78, 82 (1843) (“by the location of a way over the land of any person, the public have acquired an easement, which the owner of the land cannot extinguish or interrupt; but the soil and freehold remain in the owner, although encumbered by the way”)(citation omitted); see also Littlefield v. Hubbard, 120 Me. 226, 230 , 113 A. 304, 306 (1921) (“Whatever the defendant's right of passage over the way, if any, she had no right to build a concrete walk or otherwise disturb the soil upon the fee of the plaintiff.”). “[A]n easement for a ri

2020Kaler, 49 Me. at 208 .; see also Chandler v. Goodridge, 23 Me. 78, 82 (1843) (“by the location of a way over the land of any person, the public have acquired an easement, which the owner of the land cannot extinguish or interrupt; but the soil and freehold remain in the owner, although encumbered by the way”)(citation omitted); see also Littlefield v. Hubbard, 120 Me. 226, 230 , 113 A. 304, 306 (1921) (“Whatever the defendant's right of passage over the way, if any, she had no right to build a concrete walk or otherwise disturb the soil upon the fee of the plaintiff.”). “[A]n easement for a ri

2020Kaler, 49 Me. at 208 .; see also Chandler v. Goodridge, 23 Me. 78, 82 (1843) (“by the location of a way over the land of any person, the public have acquired an easement, which the owner of the land cannot extinguish or interrupt; but the soil and freehold remain in the owner, although encumbered by the way”)(citation omitted); see also Littlefield v. Hubbard, 120 Me. 226, 230 , 113 A. 304, 306 (1921) (“Whatever the defendant's right of passage over the way, if any, she had no right to build a concrete walk or otherwise disturb the soil upon the fee of the plaintiff.”). “[A]n easement for a ri

2020Kaler, 49 Me. at 208 .; see also Chandler v. Goodridge, 23 Me. 78, 82 (1843) (“by the location of a way over the land of any person, the public have acquired an easement, which the owner of the land cannot extinguish or interrupt; but the soil and freehold remain in the owner, although encumbered by the way”)(citation omitted); see also Littlefield v. Hubbard, 120 Me. 226, 230 , 113 A. 304, 306 (1921) (“Whatever the defendant's right of passage over the way, if any, she had no right to build a concrete walk or otherwise disturb the soil upon the fee of the plaintiff.”). “[A]n easement for a ri

2020Kaler, 49 Me. at 208 .; see also Chandler v. Goodridge, 23 Me. 78, 82 (1843) (“by the location of a way over the land of any person, the public have acquired an easement, which the owner of the land cannot extinguish or interrupt; but the soil and freehold remain in the owner, although encumbered by the way”)(citation omitted); see also Littlefield v. Hubbard, 120 Me. 226, 230 , 113 A. 304, 306 (1921) (“Whatever the defendant's right of passage over the way, if any, she had no right to build a concrete walk or otherwise disturb the soil upon the fee of the plaintiff.”). “[A]n easement for a ri

2020Kaler, 49 Me. at 208 .; see also Chandler v. Goodridge, 23 Me. 78, 82 (1843) (“by the location of a way over the land of any person, the public have acquired an easement, which the owner of the land cannot extinguish or interrupt; but the soil and freehold remain in the owner, although encumbered by the way”)(citation omitted); see also Littlefield v. Hubbard, 120 Me. 226, 230 , 113 A. 304, 306 (1921) (“Whatever the defendant's right of passage over the way, if any, she had no right to build a concrete walk or otherwise disturb the soil upon the fee of the plaintiff.”). “[A]n easement for a ri

1986See, e.g., Barchenski v. Pion, 9 Mass.App. 896 , 402 N.E.2d 1095 (1980); Logan v. Brodrick, 29 Wash.App. 796 , 631 P.2d 429 (1981); Restatement of Property §§ 482-484 (1944); cf. Englishmans Bay Co. v. Jackson, 340 A.2d 198, 200 (Me.1975) (whether right-of-way grant authorized vehicle as well as foot travel when contemplated use of the right of way was not expressly delineated in the deed is determined by the “objectively manifested intention of the parties in light of circumstances in existence recently prior to the execution of the conveyance”).

1986See, e.g., Barchenski v. Pion, 9 Mass.App. 896 , 402 N.E.2d 1095 (1980); Logan v. Brodrick, 29 Wash.App. 796 , 631 P.2d 429 (1981); Restatement of Property §§ 482-484 (1944); cf. Englishmans Bay Co. v. Jackson, 340 A.2d 198, 200 (Me.1975) (whether right-of-way grant authorized vehicle as well as foot travel when contemplated use of the right of way was not expressly delineated in the deed is determined by the “objectively manifested intention of the parties in light of circumstances in existence recently prior to the execution of the conveyance”).

1986See, e.g., Barchenski v. Pion, 9 Mass.App. 896 , 402 N.E.2d 1095 (1980); Logan v. Brodrick, 29 Wash.App. 796 , 631 P.2d 429 (1981); Restatement of Property §§ 482-484 (1944); cf. Englishmans Bay Co. v. Jackson, 340 A.2d 198, 200 (Me.1975) (whether right-of-way grant authorized vehicle as well as foot travel when contemplated use of the right of way was not expressly delineated in the deed is determined by the “objectively manifested intention of the parties in light of circumstances in existence recently prior to the execution of the conveyance”).