summary hearing in Maine

2023A. Standard of Review and Pertinent Law [¶8] Because, by statute, our “standard of review must be the same as for the Superior Court,” 21-A M.R.S. § 905(3), we engage in a direct review of the ballot question as drafted by the Secretary of State, without reference to the Superior Court’s judgment, to “determine whether the description of the subject matter is understandable to a reasonable voter reading the question for the first time and will not mislead a reasonable voter who understands the proposed legislation into voting contrary to that voter’s wishes,” id. § 905(2); see Olson v. Sec’y o

2023A. Standard of Review and Pertinent Law [¶8] Because, by statute, our “standard of review must be the same as for the Superior Court,” 21-A M.R.S. § 905(3), we engage in a direct review of the ballot question as drafted by the Secretary of State, without reference to the Superior Court’s judgment, to “determine whether the description of the subject matter is understandable to a reasonable voter reading the question for the first time and will not mislead a reasonable voter who understands the proposed legislation into voting contrary to that voter’s wishes,” id. § 905(2); see Olson v. Sec’y o

2022We have noted that “[t]he statutory procedure leads to and ultimately focuses on a final hearing,” where “a later, wholly dispositive, determination [is] made on the same petition . . . with all parties having adequate time to prepare and present evidence on [its merits].” In re Erica B., 520 A.2d 342, 344 (Me. 1987). “[T]he protection of and best interests of the child are the paramount considerations in both such hearings.

2001Id.; see also In re Isaiah B., 1999 ME 174, ¶ 8 , 740 A.2d 988, 991 (finding, “[ijnterlocutory orders are not final judgments for the purpose of res judicata ”). [¶ 10] Res judicata is also inapplicable in this case because the preliminary order is interlocutory in nature and, as such, is not appealable.

2001Id.; see also In re Isaiah B., 1999 ME 174, ¶ 8 , 740 A.2d 988, 991 (finding, “[ijnterlocutory orders are not final judgments for the purpose of res judicata ”). [¶ 10] Res judicata is also inapplicable in this case because the preliminary order is interlocutory in nature and, as such, is not appealable.

1985See also Charest v. Bishop, 137 Minn. 102 , 162 N.W. 1063 (1917), where the petitioner sought the return of money given to his attorney for his bail.

1985See also Charest v. Bishop, 137 Minn. 102 , 162 N.W. 1063 (1917), where the petitioner sought the return of money given to his attorney for his bail.

1985This Court has said, An attorney is at common law answerable to the summary jurisdiction of the courts for any dereliction of duty and may be compelled to account for and pay over moneys or property belonging to his client which he has received in his professional capacity and withholds after due demand_ [0]n any prima facie showing that the attorney is wrongfully withholding moneys indisputably belonging to the client, the court will issue a summary rule.... *630 People’s Savings Bank v. Chesley, 138 Me. 353, 356 , 26 A.2d 632, 633-34 (1942). 3 In Chesley we cited the similar use of such a su

1985This Court has said, An attorney is at common law answerable to the summary jurisdiction of the courts for any dereliction of duty and may be compelled to account for and pay over moneys or property belonging to his client which he has received in his professional capacity and withholds after due demand_ [0]n any prima facie showing that the attorney is wrongfully withholding moneys indisputably belonging to the client, the court will issue a summary rule.... *630 People’s Savings Bank v. Chesley, 138 Me. 353, 356 , 26 A.2d 632, 633-34 (1942). 3 In Chesley we cited the similar use of such a su