summary inquiry in New York

2024A full evidentiary hearing is not required and "the nature and extent of the inquiry — whether through a summary hearing pursuant to CPL 400.10 or some other fair means — is within the court's discretion" ( People v Driscoll , 131 AD3d 766, 767 [3d Dept 2015] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted], lv denied 27 NY3d 996 [2016]; see People Fiammegta , 14 NY3d 90, 97 [2010]; People v Outley , 80 NY2d 702, 713 [1993]; see e.g.

2024A full evidentiary hearing is not required and "the nature and extent of the inquiry — whether through a summary hearing pursuant to CPL 400.10 or some other fair means — is within the court's discretion" ( People v Driscoll , 131 AD3d 766, 767 [3d Dept 2015] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted], lv denied 27 NY3d 996 [2016]; see People Fiammegta , 14 NY3d 90, 97 [2010]; People v Outley , 80 NY2d 702, 713 [1993]; see e.g.

2024A full evidentiary hearing is not required and "the nature and extent of the inquiry — whether through a summary hearing pursuant to CPL 400.10 or some other fair means — is within the court's discretion" ( People v Driscoll , 131 AD3d 766, 767 [3d Dept 2015] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted], lv denied 27 NY3d 996 [2016]; see People Fiammegta , 14 NY3d 90, 97 [2010]; People v Outley , 80 NY2d 702, 713 [1993]; see e.g.

2024A full evidentiary hearing is not required and "the nature and extent of the inquiry — whether through a summary hearing pursuant to CPL 400.10 or some other fair means — is within the court's discretion" ( People v Driscoll , 131 AD3d 766, 767 [3d Dept 2015] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted], lv denied 27 NY3d 996 [2016]; see People Fiammegta , 14 NY3d 90, 97 [2010]; People v Outley , 80 NY2d 702, 713 [1993]; see e.g.

2019In determining whether to exercise its discretion to conduct a summary inquiry on a properly pleaded application, courts consider two factors: (1) Whether the subject of inquiry has already been sufficiently illuminated through other means, such as by news media or publicly available reports ( see Matter of Riches, 75 AD3d at 39-40 ; Matter of City of New York [ Seligman] , 179 Misc 505, 508 [Sup Ct, Bronx County 1942]), respondents' concession of the facts ( see Matter of Larkin v Booth , 33 AD2d 542 [1st Dept 1969]; Matter of Green , 187 Misc 2d at 151-152 ; Matter of Greenfield v Quill , 18

2019In determining whether to exercise its discretion to conduct a summary inquiry on a properly pleaded application, courts consider two factors: (1) Whether the subject of inquiry has already been sufficiently illuminated through other means, such as by news media or publicly available reports ( see Matter of Riches, 75 AD3d at 39-40 ; Matter of City of New York [ Seligman] , 179 Misc 505, 508 [Sup Ct, Bronx County 1942]), respondents' concession of the facts ( see Matter of Larkin v Booth , 33 AD2d 542 [1st Dept 1969]; Matter of Green , 187 Misc 2d at 151-152 ; Matter of Greenfield v Quill , 18

2021Generally, courts have considered three factors in assessing whether to hold a summary inquiry: (1) the importance of the issue that would be the subject of the inquiry ( see generally Guiliani , 187 Misc 2d at 150 ); (2) the pendency of ongoing investigations or lack thereof ( see Riches , 75 AD3d at 39 ); and (3) whether the violations and neglect of duties had been fully explored in public( see Farina , 171 AD3d at 63).

2021Moreover, there is direct precedent for ordering a summary inquiry into leaks of confidential criminal records ( see Giuliani , 187 Misc 2d at 139-140, 151-152 ).

2021Of these, only the Leich matter went forward with the summary inquiry; Giuliani was resolved before any proceedings were held ( see Riches , 75 AD3d at 38 and n *).

2021Nor is a summary inquiry appropriate for issues which lack some broader public significance supporting a need for transparency ( see Riches , 75 AD3d at 39-40 ).

2024People v Williams , 27 NY3d 212, 217 [2016]; People v Maclean , 226 AD3d at 1181-1182; People v Larock , 211 AD3d 1234, 1236 [3d Dept 2022]; People v Turner , 158 AD3d 892 , 893 [3d Dept 2018]).

2024People v Williams , 27 NY3d 212, 217 [2016]; People v Maclean , 226 AD3d at 1181-1182; People v Larock , 211 AD3d 1234, 1236 [3d Dept 2022]; People v Turner , 158 AD3d 892 , 893 [3d Dept 2018]).

2024People v Williams , 27 NY3d 212, 217 [2016]; People v Maclean , 226 AD3d at 1181-1182; People v Larock , 211 AD3d 1234, 1236 [3d Dept 2022]; People v Turner , 158 AD3d 892 , 893 [3d Dept 2018]).

2024People v Williams , 27 NY3d 212, 217 [2016]; People v Maclean , 226 AD3d at 1181-1182; People v Larock , 211 AD3d 1234, 1236 [3d Dept 2022]; People v Turner , 158 AD3d 892 , 893 [3d Dept 2018]).

2024A full evidentiary hearing is not required and "the nature and extent of the inquiry — whether through a summary hearing pursuant to CPL 400.10 or some other fair means — is within the court's discretion" ( People v Driscoll , 131 AD3d 766, 767 [3d Dept 2015] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted], lv denied 27 NY3d 996 [2016]; see People Fiammegta , 14 NY3d 90, 97 [2010]; People v Outley , 80 NY2d 702, 713 [1993]; see e.g.

2024A full evidentiary hearing is not required and "the nature and extent of the inquiry — whether through a summary hearing pursuant to CPL 400.10 or some other fair means — is within the court's discretion" ( People v Driscoll , 131 AD3d 766, 767 [3d Dept 2015] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted], lv denied 27 NY3d 996 [2016]; see People Fiammegta , 14 NY3d 90, 97 [2010]; People v Outley , 80 NY2d 702, 713 [1993]; see e.g.

2021Section 1109 unambiguously contains no such restriction ( see Matter of Brown v Wing , 93 NY2d 517, 522 [1999] ["the proper judicial function is to discern and apply the will of the legislature" when a statute is unambiguous] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2021Section 1109 unambiguously contains no such restriction ( see Matter of Brown v Wing , 93 NY2d 517, 522 [1999] ["the proper judicial function is to discern and apply the will of the legislature" when a statute is unambiguous] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2003The Court of Appeals provided the following summary of the doctrine: “As recapitulated most recently in Barnett Bank [of Marion County, N.A. v Nelson, 517 US 25, 31 (1996)], congressional preemptive intent may be shown from express language in the Federal statute; it may also be established implicitly because the Federal legislation is so comprehensive in its scope that it is inferable that Congress wished fully to occupy the field of its subject matter (‘field preemption’), or because State law conflicts with the Federal law.

2003The Court of Appeals provided the following summary of the doctrine: "As recapitulated most recently in Barnett Bank [ of Marion County, N.A. v Nelson , 517 US 25, 31 (1996)], congressional preemptive intent may be shown from express language in the Federal statute; it may also be established implicitly because the Federal legislation is so comprehensive in its scope that it is inferable that Congress wished fully to occupy the field of its subject matter ('field preemption'), or because State law conflicts with the Federal law.

2019In determining whether to exercise its discretion to conduct a summary inquiry on a properly pleaded application, courts consider two factors: (1) Whether the subject of inquiry has already been sufficiently illuminated through other means, such as by news media or publicly available reports ( see Matter of Riches, 75 AD3d at 39-40 ; Matter of City of New York [ Seligman] , 179 Misc 505, 508 [Sup Ct, Bronx County 1942]), respondents' concession of the facts ( see Matter of Larkin v Booth , 33 AD2d 542 [1st Dept 1969]; Matter of Green , 187 Misc 2d at 151-152 ; Matter of Greenfield v Quill , 18

2019In determining whether to exercise its discretion to conduct a summary inquiry on a properly pleaded application, courts consider two factors: (1) Whether the subject of inquiry has already been sufficiently illuminated through other means, such as by news media or publicly available reports ( see Matter of Riches, 75 AD3d at 39-40 ; Matter of City of New York [ Seligman] , 179 Misc 505, 508 [Sup Ct, Bronx County 1942]), respondents' concession of the facts ( see Matter of Larkin v Booth , 33 AD2d 542 [1st Dept 1969]; Matter of Green , 187 Misc 2d at 151-152 ; Matter of Greenfield v Quill , 18

2026Consistent with CPL 400.10 (3), the court here conducted a summary hearing that was sufficient to "enable the court to determine that defendant failed to comply with the terms and conditions of his interim probation supervision" ( Rollins , 50 AD3d at 1536 ) and, in any event, the evidence adduced was sufficient even if viewed under the standard set forth in CPL 410.70 (3).

2025The record establishes that, in accordance with the procedure set forth in CPL 400.10 (3), the court "advise[d] [defendant] of the factual contents of any report or memorandum it ha[d] received" regarding the alleged violations of interim probation ( id. ), allowed defendant to respond to those allegations, and conducted a summary hearing that "was of sufficient depth to enable the court to determine that defendant failed to comply with the terms and conditions of [her] interim probation supervision" ( People v Rollins , 50 AD3d 1535, 1536 [4th Dept 2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 939 [*2][2008] [int

2010It involved a different statute (Public Officers Law § 34), pursuant to which the Governor directed a justice of the Supreme Court to conduct an investigation. ( 247 NY at 405, 408-409 ; see Green, 187 Misc 2d at 145 [“In contrast to the statute challenged in Richardson, under the summary inquiry provision, the Justice of the Supreme Court is not made the delegate of the Governor, or of any other executive official.

2000I conclude that the duties of the Justice under the summary inquiry provision are more akin to those upheld by the Court of Appeals in Davies (supra), and by the Appellate Division in Mitchel (supra), and more consistent with the variety of traditionally permissible judicial roles than those which were struck down in Richardson (supra), and that respondent has not met his burden of showing that section 1109 creates a constitutionally impermissible “public trust.” Constitutionality of Section 1109 as Applied The Mayor further contends that, if a summary inquiry were granted, section 1109 would

2026Indeed, upon conducting the summary hearing, the court possessed sufficient reliable and accurate information to support its conclusion that defendant violated the conditions of his interim probation by failing to adhere to his curfew and by failing to report to his probation officer as directed (<i>see People v Bolster</i>, 210 AD3d 1205, 1206-1207 [3d Dept 2022]; <i>People v Waite</i>, 119 AD3d 1086, 1087-1088 [3d Dept 2014]; <i>see generally McIntosh</i>, 213 AD3d at 1267 ; <i>People v Lynn</i>, 144 AD3d 1491 , 1492-1493 [4th Dept 2016], <i>lv denied</i> 28 NY3d 1186 [2017]).

2026Moreover, defendant did not dispute that he was aware of the conditions of his interim probation; rather, defendant acknowledged that he violated those conditions by failing to adhere to his curfew and failing to report to his probation officer as directed (<i>see People v Butler</i>, 151 AD3d 1959 , 1960 [4th Dept 2017], <i>lv denied</i> 30 NY3d 948 [2017]; <i>Waite</i>, 119 AD3d at 1087-1088 ; <i>see also Wheeler</i>, 242 AD3d at 1632).</p> <p>We reject defendant's contention that the court, having resolved the threshold issue of youthful offender status eligibility in defendant's favor (<i>

2026Indeed, upon conducting the summary hearing, the court possessed sufficient reliable and accurate information to support its conclusion that defendant violated the conditions of his interim probation by failing to adhere to his curfew and by failing to report to his probation officer as directed (<i>see People v Bolster</i>, 210 AD3d 1205, 1206-1207 [3d Dept 2022]; <i>People v Waite</i>, 119 AD3d 1086, 1087-1088 [3d Dept 2014]; <i>see generally McIntosh</i>, 213 AD3d at 1267 ; <i>People v Lynn</i>, 144 AD3d 1491 , 1492-1493 [4th Dept 2016], <i>lv denied</i> 28 NY3d 1186 [2017]).

2026Moreover, defendant did not dispute that he was aware of the conditions of his interim probation; rather, defendant acknowledged that he violated those conditions by failing to adhere to his curfew and failing to report to his probation officer as directed (<i>see People v Butler</i>, 151 AD3d 1959 , 1960 [4th Dept 2017], <i>lv denied</i> 30 NY3d 948 [2017]; <i>Waite</i>, 119 AD3d at 1087-1088 ; <i>see also Wheeler</i>, 242 AD3d at 1632).</p> <p>We reject defendant's contention that the court, having resolved the threshold issue of youthful offender status eligibility in defendant's favor (<i>

2025The record establishes that, in accordance with the procedure set forth in CPL 400.10 (3), the court "advise[d] [defendant] of the factual contents of any report or memorandum it ha[d] received" regarding the alleged violations of interim probation ( id. ), allowed defendant to respond to those allegations, and conducted a summary hearing that "was of sufficient depth to enable the court to determine that defendant failed to comply with the terms and conditions of [her] interim probation supervision" ( People v Rollins , 50 AD3d 1535, 1536 [4th Dept 2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 939 [*2][2008] [int

2025The record establishes that, in accordance with the procedure set forth in CPL 400.10 (3), the court "advise[d] [defendant] of the factual contents of any report or memorandum it ha[d] received" regarding the alleged violations of interim probation ( id. ), allowed defendant to respond to those allegations, and conducted a summary hearing that "was of sufficient depth to enable the court to determine that defendant failed to comply with the terms and conditions of [her] interim probation supervision" ( People v Rollins , 50 AD3d 1535, 1536 [4th Dept 2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 939 [*2][2008] [int

2025Although defendant now contends that the court improperly delegated its fact-finding function to the probation department in making its determination, she failed to preserve that contention for our review inasmuch as she did not object on that ground when the court gave her an opportunity to do so ( see People v Boje , 194 AD3d 1367, 1368 [4th Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 970 [2021]; People v Koons , 187 AD3d 1638, 1639 [4th Dept 2020]; People v Dissottle , 68 AD3d 1542, 1544 [3d Dept 2009], lv denied 14 NY3d 799 [2010]).

2025Although defendant now contends that the court improperly delegated its fact-finding function to the probation department in making its determination, she failed to preserve that contention for our review inasmuch as she did not object on that ground when the court gave her an opportunity to do so ( see People v Boje , 194 AD3d 1367, 1368 [4th Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 970 [2021]; People v Koons , 187 AD3d 1638, 1639 [4th Dept 2020]; People v Dissottle , 68 AD3d 1542, 1544 [3d Dept 2009], lv denied 14 NY3d 799 [2010]).

2025The record establishes that, in accordance with the procedure set forth in CPL 400.10 (3), the court "advise[d] [defendant] of the factual contents of any report or memorandum it ha[d] received" regarding the alleged violations of interim probation ( id. ), allowed defendant to respond to those allegations, and conducted a summary hearing that "was of sufficient depth to enable the court to determine that defendant failed to comply with the terms and conditions of [her] interim probation supervision" ( People v Rollins , 50 AD3d 1535, 1536 [4th Dept 2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 939 [*2][2008] [int

2025The record establishes that, in accordance with the procedure set forth in CPL 400.10 (3), the court "advise[d] [defendant] of the factual contents of any report or memorandum it ha[d] received" regarding the alleged violations of interim probation ( id. ), allowed defendant to respond to those allegations, and conducted a summary hearing that "was of sufficient depth to enable the court to determine that defendant failed to comply with the terms and conditions of [her] interim probation supervision" ( People v Rollins , 50 AD3d 1535, 1536 [4th Dept 2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 939 [*2][2008] [int

2025Although defendant now contends that the court improperly delegated its fact-finding function to the probation department in making its determination, she failed to preserve that contention for our review inasmuch as she did not object on that ground when the court gave her an opportunity to do so ( see People v Boje , 194 AD3d 1367, 1368 [4th Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 970 [2021]; People v Koons , 187 AD3d 1638, 1639 [4th Dept 2020]; People v Dissottle , 68 AD3d 1542, 1544 [3d Dept 2009], lv denied 14 NY3d 799 [2010]).

2025Although defendant now contends that the court improperly delegated its fact-finding function to the probation department in making its determination, she failed to preserve that contention for our review inasmuch as she did not object on that ground when the court gave her an opportunity to do so ( see People v Boje , 194 AD3d 1367, 1368 [4th Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 970 [2021]; People v Koons , 187 AD3d 1638, 1639 [4th Dept 2020]; People v Dissottle , 68 AD3d 1542, 1544 [3d Dept 2009], lv denied 14 NY3d 799 [2010]).

2022Further, inasmuch as there were no "significant alternatives suggested by" OOIDA in its comments, (State Administrative Procedure Act § 202 [5] [b] [i]), DOT was not required to provide a statement of the reasons why any such alternatives were not incorporated into the rule ( see State Administrative Procedure Act § 202 [5] [b] [ii]; compare Matter of Medical Socy. of State of N.Y. v Serio , 100 NY2d at 870).