Tucker claim in Maine

2019“We review the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo to determine if any reasonable view of the evidence and those inferences that are justifiably drawn from that evidence supports the jury verdict.” Russell v. ExpressJet Airlines, Inc., 2011 ME 123, ¶ 10 , 32 A.3d 1030 (quotation marks omitted). [¶20] In order to prevail on a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, Tucker is required to prove five elements: (1) . . . a false representation (2) of a material fact (3) with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of whether it is true or false (4) for the purpose o

2019“We review the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo to determine if any reasonable view of the evidence and those inferences that are justifiably drawn from that evidence supports the jury verdict.” Russell v. ExpressJet Airlines, Inc., 2011 ME 123, ¶ 10 , 32 A.3d 1030 (quotation marks omitted). [¶20] In order to prevail on a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, Tucker is required to prove five elements: (1) . . . a false representation (2) of a material fact (3) with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of whether it is true or false (4) for the purpose o

2017Further, because Tucker has not provided a complete transcript of the hearing that resulted in the order from which she appeals, we will assume that the court’s inferred findings “are supported by *613 sufficient competent evidence in the record.” Springer v. Springer, 2009 ME 118, ¶ 8 , 984 A.2d 828 . [¶ 16] Under these circumstances, we can find no error in the court’s factual determinations and will not disturb its denial of Tucker’s motion.

2017Further, because Tucker has not provided a complete transcript of the hearing that resulted in the order from which she appeals, we will assume that the court’s inferred findings “are supported by *613 sufficient competent evidence in the record.” Springer v. Springer, 2009 ME 118, ¶ 8 , 984 A.2d 828 . [¶ 16] Under these circumstances, we can find no error in the court’s factual determinations and will not disturb its denial of Tucker’s motion.

2017As the moving party, Tucker had the burden of proof in the trial court, and therefore she must demonstrate on appeal “that a contrary finding is compelled by the evidence.” Dickens v. Baddy, 2015 ME 81, ¶ 12 , 119 A.3d 722 . [¶ 15] The court summarily denied Tucker’s motion.

2017As the moving party, Tucker had the burden of proof in the trial court, and therefore she must demonstrate on appeal “that a contrary finding is compelled by the evidence.” Dickens v. Baddy, 2015 ME 81, ¶ 12 , 119 A.3d 722 . [¶ 15] The court summarily denied Tucker’s motion.

2015In other words, an additional 20% fee . . . [in] Braley . . . .” Although Tucker was entitled to his judgment against Flynn, the contrasting letter to Tucker and email to Lilley that Flynn sent generates a genuine issue of material fact that precludes entry of summary judgment against Lilley. 9 [¶15] Because resolving these disputes will require a fact-finder “to choose between competing versions of the truth at trial,” McClare v. Rocha, 2014 ME 4, ¶ 10 , 86 A.3d 22 (quotation marks omitted), the court erred in entering summary judgment on Tucker’s claim against Lilley and LLO.

2015In other words, an additional 20% fee . . . [in] Braley . . . .” Although Tucker was entitled to his judgment against Flynn, the contrasting letter to Tucker and email to Lilley that Flynn sent generates a genuine issue of material fact that precludes entry of summary judgment against Lilley. 9 [¶15] Because resolving these disputes will require a fact-finder “to choose between competing versions of the truth at trial,” McClare v. Rocha, 2014 ME 4, ¶ 10 , 86 A.3d 22 (quotation marks omitted), the court erred in entering summary judgment on Tucker’s claim against Lilley and LLO.

2015They include (1) whether Lilley (as opposed to Flynn) owes Tucker no fee, as Lilley claims; 25%, as Tucker and Flynn claim; or 20%, as Flynn’s email to Lilley states; (2) whether Flynn’s claim that Troubh breached the SA and thereby nullified its entitlement to a fee under the MOA will be successful, 10 with the potential result that Troubh is owed nothing; and (3) whatever the fees due Tucker and Troubh may prove to be, which party has to pay them as between Flynn and LLO.1 We conclude that, with the exception of Tucker’s claim against Flynn, these disputes must be resolved in one consolidate

2015They include (1) whether Lilley (as opposed to Flynn) owes Tucker no fee, as Lilley claims; 25%, as Tucker and Flynn claim; or 20%, as Flynn’s email to Lilley states; (2) whether Flynn’s claim that Troubh breached the SA and thereby nullified its entitlement to a fee under the MOA will be successful, 10 with the potential result that Troubh is owed nothing; and (3) whatever the fees due Tucker and Troubh may prove to be, which party has to pay them as between Flynn and LLO.1 We conclude that, with the exception of Tucker’s claim against Flynn, these disputes must be resolved in one consolidate