9 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Department of Educ. v. Roegreen2 sentences2018Dep’t of Educ. v. Roe, 679 So. 2d 756, 757 (Fla. 1996). 2018Dep’t of Educ. v. Roe, 679 So. 2d 756, 757 (Fla. 1996). | 1 | 1 |
Green v. Stategreen1 sentence2016However, “[w]here the only proof of guilt is circumstantial, no matter how strongly the evidence may suggest guilt, a conviction cannot be sustained unless the evidence is inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” Green v. State, 667 So.2d 208, 212 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Law, 559 So.2d 187, 188 (Fla.1989)); see also Davis v. State, 761 So.2d 1154, 1159 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (“Under the facts of this case, one could intuitively conclude that [the defendant] might be guilty. | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Stategreen1 sentence2016However, “[w]here the only proof of guilt is circumstantial, no matter how strongly the evidence may suggest guilt, a conviction cannot be sustained unless the evidence is inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” Green v. State, 667 So.2d 208, 212 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Law, 559 So.2d 187, 188 (Fla.1989)); see also Davis v. State, 761 So.2d 1154, 1159 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (“Under the facts of this case, one could intuitively conclude that [the defendant] might be guilty. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lawgreen1 sentence2016However, “[w]here the only proof of guilt is circumstantial, no matter how strongly the evidence may suggest guilt, a conviction cannot be sustained unless the evidence is inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” Green v. State, 667 So.2d 208, 212 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Law, 559 So.2d 187, 188 (Fla.1989)); see also Davis v. State, 761 So.2d 1154, 1159 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (“Under the facts of this case, one could intuitively conclude that [the defendant] might be guilty. | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Stategreen1 sentence2004See Jackson v. State, 793 So.2d 117 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). | 1 | 1 |
Harrison v. La Placida Community Ass'ngreen1 sentence1999Her assertion that the trial judge legally erred in dismissing the action may not be addressed in a rule 1.540(b) motion as the rule was "never intended and should not be utilized as a `substitute for appellate review of judicial error.'" Harrison v. La Placida Community Ass'n, 665 So.2d 1138, 1141 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). | 1 | 1 |
Gene Flinn v. Elaine Gordon, Dexter Lehtinengreen1 sentence1992Although Tucker's claim of qualified immunity from suit involves a type of protection that cannot be effectively or adequately restored by an appeal, once it is lost by exposure to trial, see Flinn v. Gordon, 775 F.2d 1551, 1552 (11th Cir.1985), cert. den., 476 U.S. 1116 , 106 S.Ct. 1972 , 90 L.Ed.2d 656 (1986), we decline to exercise our limited and discretionary jurisdiction because the order *462 does not violate a clearly established principle of law or otherwise depart from the essential requirements of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice. | 1 | 1 |
Martin-Johnson, Inc. v. Savagegreen1 sentence1992See Martin-Johnson, Inc. v. Savage, 509 So.2d 1097, 1099 (Fla. 1987); Combs v. State, 436 So.2d 93 (Fla. 1983); Chalfonte Devel. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Tucker v. Resha
green
1 sentence2012The district court denied Tucker’s petition, concluding that although “Tucker’s claim of qualified immunity from suit involve[d] a type of protection that cannot be adequately restored once lost by exposure to trial, ... the order did not depart from the essential requirements of law because genuine factual issues exist[ed] as to both counts.” Id. (citation omitted). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Sylvester v. State
green
1 sentence2002Tucker’s motion to dismiss centered on the argument that pursuant to Sylvester v. State, 770 So.2d 249 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000), a computerized driving record was insufficient to establish that a defendant’s driver’s license had been permanently revoked. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Tucker v. Resha
green
2 sentences1994While the district court recognized that Tucker's claim of qualified immunity from suit involves a type of protection that cannot be adequately restored once lost by exposure to trial, id. at 464 , the court determined that the order did not depart from the essential requirements of law because genuine factual issues exist as to both counts. 1994Id. at 464-67 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Combs v. State
green
1 sentence1992See Martin-Johnson, Inc. v. Savage, 509 So.2d 1097, 1099 (Fla. 1987); Combs v. State, 436 So.2d 93 (Fla. 1983); Chalfonte Devel. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
G. J. Deasy Investment, Inc. v. Mattox
green
1 sentence1992Although Tucker's claim of qualified immunity from suit involves a type of protection that cannot be effectively or adequately restored by an appeal, once it is lost by exposure to trial, see Flinn v. Gordon, 775 F.2d 1551, 1552 (11th Cir.1985), cert. den., 476 U.S. 1116 , 106 S.Ct. 1972 , 90 L.Ed.2d 656 (1986), we decline to exercise our limited and discretionary jurisdiction because the order *462 does not violate a clearly established principle of law or otherwise depart from the essential requirements of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Flinn v. Gordon
green
2 sentences1992Although Tucker's claim of qualified immunity from suit involves a type of protection that cannot be effectively or adequately restored by an appeal, once it is lost by exposure to trial, see Flinn v. Gordon, 775 F.2d 1551, 1552 (11th Cir.1985), cert. den., 476 U.S. 1116 , 106 S.Ct. 1972 , 90 L.Ed.2d 656 (1986), we decline to exercise our limited and discretionary jurisdiction because the order *462 does not violate a clearly established principle of law or otherwise depart from the essential requirements of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice. 1992Although Tucker's claim of qualified immunity from suit involves a type of protection that cannot be effectively or adequately restored by an appeal, once it is lost by exposure to trial, see Flinn v. Gordon, 775 F.2d 1551, 1552 (11th Cir.1985), cert. den., 476 U.S. 1116 , 106 S.Ct. 1972 , 90 L.Ed.2d 656 (1986), we decline to exercise our limited and discretionary jurisdiction because the order *462 does not violate a clearly established principle of law or otherwise depart from the essential requirements of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Bryant v. State
green
1 sentence1982Bryant v. State, 386 So.2d 237 (Fla. 1980). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.