Tucker defense in District of Columbia

2004Based upon the evidence presented during the hearing, the Hearing Committee determined that "Bar Counsel clearly and convincingly showed that [Mr.] Tucker's conduct involved moral turpitude on the facts because the totality of facts surrounding his conduct involved sufficient intentional dishonesty *10 for the purpose of personal gain." The Board agreed with the Hearing Committee, and this court adopted the report and recommendation of the Board that Mr. Tucker should be disbarred "because there [was] substantial evidence in [the] case to support a finding of moral turpitude." Tucker II, 766 A

2004Based upon the evidence presented during the hearing, the Hearing Committee determined that “Bar Counsel clearly and convincingly showed that [Mr.] Tucker’s conduct involved moral turpitude on the facts because the totality of facts surrounding his conduct involved sufficient intentional dis honesty for the purpose of personal gain.” The Board agreed with the Hearing Committee, and this court adopted the report and recommendation of the Board that Mr. Tucker should be disbarred “because there [was] substantial evidence in [the] case to support a finding of moral turpitude.” Tucker II, 766 A.2d

2004The order authorized the FBI agent to present testimony during Mr. Tucker's hearing before Hearing Committee Four, and to present "audio and video recordings relating to [Mr. Tucker's] alleged attempts to bribe an employee of the District of Columbia government." Id. at 1215 .

2004The order authorized the FBI agent to present testimony during Mr. Tucker’s hearing before Hearing Committee Four, and to present “audio and video recordings relating to [Mr. Tucker’s] alleged attempts to bribe an employee of the District of Columbia government.” Id. at 1215 .

2005As such, and given the fact that the government disclosed details and documents about the Brawner matter to the defense before trial, we cannot say that Ms. Washington’s 1990 grand jury testimony was “material” to Mr. Tucker’s defense in this case because we see no “reasonable probability that, had [the transcript of that testimony] been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceedings would have been different.” Rowland, supra, 840 A.2d at 687 (citing Strickler, supra, 527 U.S. at 280 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 ) (quoting Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 ); see also Matthews v. Un

2005As such, and given the fact that the government disclosed details and documents about the Brawner matter to the defense before trial, we cannot say that Ms. Washington’s 1990 grand jury testimony was “material” to Mr. Tucker’s defense in this case because we see no “reasonable probability that, had [the transcript of that testimony] been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceedings would have been different.” Rowland, supra, 840 A.2d at 687 (citing Strickler, supra, 527 U.S. at 280 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 ) (quoting Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 ); see also Matthews v. Un

2005As such, and given the fact that the government disclosed details and documents about the Brawner matter to the defense before trial, we cannot say that Ms. Washington’s 1990 grand jury testimony was “material” to Mr. Tucker’s defense in this case because we see no “reasonable probability that, had [the transcript of that testimony] been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceedings would have been different.” Rowland, supra, 840 A.2d at 687 (citing Strickler, supra, 527 U.S. at 280 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 ) (quoting Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 ); see also Matthews v. Un

2005As such, and given the fact that the government disclosed details and documents about the Brawner matter to the defense before trial, we cannot say that Ms. Washington’s 1990 grand jury testimony was “material” to Mr. Tucker’s defense in this case because we see no “reasonable probability that, had [the transcript of that testimony] been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceedings would have been different.” Rowland, supra, 840 A.2d at 687 (citing Strickler, supra, 527 U.S. at 280 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 ) (quoting Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 ); see also Matthews v. Un

2005As such, and given the fact that the government disclosed details and documents about the Brawner matter to the defense before trial, we cannot say that Ms. Washington’s 1990 grand jury testimony was “material” to Mr. Tucker’s defense in this case because we see no “reasonable probability that, had [the transcript of that testimony] been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceedings would have been different.” Rowland, supra, 840 A.2d at 687 (citing Strickler, supra, 527 U.S. at 280 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 ) (quoting Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 ); see also Matthews v. Un

2005We of course recognize that the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees a defendant the right to cross-examine witnesses against him, see Springer v. United States, 388 A.2d 846, 854 (D.C.1978), but that right may not be exercised “in whatever way and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 , 106 S.Ct. 292 , 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985).

2005We of course recognize that the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees a defendant the right to cross-examine witnesses against him, see Springer v. United States, 388 A.2d 846, 854 (D.C.1978), but that right may not be exercised “in whatever way and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 , 106 S.Ct. 292 , 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985).