obsolete principle in Michigan

1986The Court viewed the question before it to be (p 128) 'whether we are going to continue to be hobbled by such an obsolete rule [privity] and its swarming progeny of exceptions.’ The Court abandoned the privity requirement after a thorough résumé of its complex history and a review of the historic decision in MacPherson v Buick Motor Co, 217 NY 382 ; 111 NE 1050 (1916).” 19 Mich App 399 .

1986The Court viewed the question before it to be (p 128) 'whether we are going to continue to be hobbled by such an obsolete rule [privity] and its swarming progeny of exceptions.’ The Court abandoned the privity requirement after a thorough résumé of its complex history and a review of the historic decision in MacPherson v Buick Motor Co, 217 NY 382 ; 111 NE 1050 (1916).” 19 Mich App 399 .

1970Spence was followed by Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Company (1961), 363 Mich 235 .

1969The Court viewed the question before it to be (p 128) “whether we are going to continue to be hobbled by such an obsolete rule [privity] and its swarming progeny of exceptions.” The Court abandoned the privity requirement after a thorough résumé of its complex history and a review of the historic decision in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. (1916) 217 NY 382 ( 111 NE 1050 ). *400 Three Rivers was followed by Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Company (1961), 363 Mich 235 ; Barefield v. La Salle Coca-Cola Bottling Company (1963), 370 Mich 1 ; Hill v. Harbor Steel & Supply Corporation (1965), 37

1969The Court viewed the question before it to be (p 128) “whether we are going to continue to be hobbled by such an obsolete rule [privity] and its swarming progeny of exceptions.” The Court abandoned the privity requirement after a thorough résumé of its complex history and a review of the historic decision in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. (1916) 217 NY 382 ( 111 NE 1050 ). *400 Three Rivers was followed by Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Company (1961), 363 Mich 235 ; Barefield v. La Salle Coca-Cola Bottling Company (1963), 370 Mich 1 ; Hill v. Harbor Steel & Supply Corporation (1965), 37

1969The Court viewed the question before it to be (p 128) “whether we are going to continue to be hobbled by such an obsolete rule [privity] and its swarming progeny of exceptions.” The Court abandoned the privity requirement after a thorough résumé of its complex history and a review of the historic decision in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. (1916) 217 NY 382 ( 111 NE 1050 ). *400 Three Rivers was followed by Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Company (1961), 363 Mich 235 ; Barefield v. La Salle Coca-Cola Bottling Company (1963), 370 Mich 1 ; Hill v. Harbor Steel & Supply Corporation (1965), 37

1969In a cogent opinion summarizing the law developed in the cited cases, the Piercefield Court stated that an injured plaintiff may recover upon proof of (pp 98, 99) “a defect attributable to the manufacturer and a causal connection between the defect and the injury or damage of which he complains.” 3 Whether the accepted work doctrine has survived this emphatic rejection of the privity requirement in products liability cases, is, we believe, now a somewhat rhetorical question. 4 Although the accepted work doctrine is referred to in Benton Harbor Malleable Industries, Inc. v. Pearson Construction

1969The Court viewed the question before it to be (p 128) “whether we are going to continue to be hobbled by such an obsolete rule [privity] and its swarming progeny of exceptions.” The Court abandoned the privity requirement after a thorough résumé of its complex history and a review of the historic decision in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. (1916) 217 NY 382 ( 111 NE 1050 ). *400 Three Rivers was followed by Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Company (1961), 363 Mich 235 ; Barefield v. La Salle Coca-Cola Bottling Company (1963), 370 Mich 1 ; Hill v. Harbor Steel & Supply Corporation (1965), 37

1958Filene’s Sons Co., 317 Mass 529, 530, 531 ( 58 NE2d 825 ); Hampson v. Larkin, 318 Mass 716 ( 63 NE2d 888 ); Pearlman v. Garrod Shoe Co., Inc., 276 NY 172 ( 11 NE2d 718 ); Chanin v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 89 F2d 889 ( 111 ALR 1235 ); Rachlin v. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 96 F2d 597.” The principle of law requiring privity of contract to sustain actions for express or implied warranty is not an obsolete principle of law unique to Michigan, as is inferred in the opinion.

1958Filene's Sons Co., 317 Mass 529, 530, 531 ( 58 NE2d 825 ); Hampson v. Larkin, 318 Mass 716 ( 63 NE2d 888 ); Pearlman v. Garrod Shoe Co., Inc., 276 NY 172 ( 11 NE2d 718 ); Chanin v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 89 F2d 889 ( 111 ALR 1235 ); Rachlin v. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 96 F2d 597." The principle of law requiring privity of contract to sustain actions for express or implied warranty is not an obsolete principle of law unique to Michigan, as is inferred in the opinion.

1958A recent decision of the supreme court of Ohio (decided April, 1953), Wood v. General Electric Co., 159 Ohio St 273, 279 ( 112 NE2d 8 ), states: "Although a subpurchaser of an inherently dangerous article may recover from its manufacturer for negligence, in the making and furnishing of the article, causing harm to the subpurchaser or his property from a latent defect therein, no action may be maintained against such manufacturer by such subpurchaser for such harm, based upon implied warranty of fitness of the article so purchased. 46 Am Jur, Sales, §§ 810, 812, pp 934, 937; 2 Restatement of th

1958A recent decision of the supreme court of Ohio (decided April, 1953), Wood v. General Electric Co., 159 Ohio St 273, 279 ( 112 NE2d 8 ), states: "Although a subpurchaser of an inherently dangerous article may recover from its manufacturer for negligence, in the making and furnishing of the article, causing harm to the subpurchaser or his property from a latent defect therein, no action may be maintained against such manufacturer by such subpurchaser for such harm, based upon implied warranty of fitness of the article so purchased. 46 Am Jur, Sales, §§ 810, 812, pp 934, 937; 2 Restatement of th

1958Thus another brave if fleeting departure from the norm occurred in Ebers v. General Chemical Co., 310 Mich 261 (17 NCCA NS 660), where our decision approved the notion of recovery by a remote vendee against the manufacturer of a defective insecticide for peach trees where the proofs showed that the manufacturer had not adequately tested his product on Michigan trees.

1958Thus another brave if fleeting departure from the norm occurred in Ebers v. General Chemical Co., 310 Mich 261 (17 NCCA NS 660), where our decision approved the notion of recovery by a remote vendee against the manufacturer of a defective insecticide for peach trees where the proofs showed that the manufacturer had not adequately tested his product on Michigan trees.

1958Filene’s Sons Co., 317 Mass 529, 530, 531 ( 58 NE2d 825 ); Hampson v. Larkin, 318 Mass 716 ( 63 NE2d 888 ); Pearlman v. Garrod Shoe Co., Inc., 276 NY 172 ( 11 NE2d 718 ); Chanin v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 89 F2d 889 ( 111 ALR 1235 ); Rachlin v. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 96 F2d 597.” The principle of law requiring privity of contract to sustain actions for express or implied warranty is not an obsolete principle of law unique to Michigan, as is inferred in the opinion.

1958Filene’s Sons Co., 317 Mass 529, 530, 531 ( 58 NE2d 825 ); Hampson v. Larkin, 318 Mass 716 ( 63 NE2d 888 ); Pearlman v. Garrod Shoe Co., Inc., 276 NY 172 ( 11 NE2d 718 ); Chanin v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 89 F2d 889 ( 111 ALR 1235 ); Rachlin v. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 96 F2d 597.” The principle of law requiring privity of contract to sustain actions for express or implied warranty is not an obsolete principle of law unique to Michigan, as is inferred in the opinion.

1958A recent decision of the supreme court of Ohio (decided April, 1953), Wood v. General Electric Co., 159 Ohio St 273, 279 ( 112 NE2d 8 ), states: "Although a subpurchaser of an inherently dangerous article may recover from its manufacturer for negligence, in the making and furnishing of the article, causing harm to the subpurchaser or his property from a latent defect therein, no action may be maintained against such manufacturer by such subpurchaser for such harm, based upon implied warranty of fitness of the article so purchased. 46 Am Jur, Sales, §§ 810, 812, pp 934, 937; 2 Restatement of th

1958A recent decision of the supreme court of Ohio (decided April, 1953), Wood v. General Electric Co., 159 Ohio St 273, 279 ( 112 NE2d 8 ), states: "Although a subpurchaser of an inherently dangerous article may recover from its manufacturer for negligence, in the making and furnishing of the article, causing harm to the subpurchaser or his property from a latent defect therein, no action may be maintained against such manufacturer by such subpurchaser for such harm, based upon implied warranty of fitness of the article so purchased. 46 Am Jur, Sales, §§ 810, 812, pp 934, 937; 2 Restatement of th

1958Filene’s Sons Co., 317 Mass 529, 530, 531 ( 58 NE2d 825 ); Hampson v. Larkin, 318 Mass 716 ( 63 NE2d 888 ); Pearlman v. Garrod Shoe Co., Inc., 276 NY 172 ( 11 NE2d 718 ); Chanin v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 89 F2d 889 ( 111 ALR 1235 ); Rachlin v. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 96 F2d 597.” The principle of law requiring privity of contract to sustain actions for express or implied warranty is not an obsolete principle of law unique to Michigan, as is inferred in the opinion.

1958Filene's Sons Co., 317 Mass 529, 530, 531 ( 58 NE2d 825 ); Hampson v. Larkin, 318 Mass 716 ( 63 NE2d 888 ); Pearlman v. Garrod Shoe Co., Inc., 276 NY 172 ( 11 NE2d 718 ); Chanin v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 89 F2d 889 ( 111 ALR 1235 ); Rachlin v. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 96 F2d 597." The principle of law requiring privity of contract to sustain actions for express or implied warranty is not an obsolete principle of law unique to Michigan, as is inferred in the opinion.

1958A recent decision of the supreme court of Ohio (decided April, 1953), Wood v. General Electric Co., 159 Ohio St 273, 279 ( 112 NE2d 8 ), states: "Although a subpurchaser of an inherently dangerous article may recover from its manufacturer for negligence, in the making and furnishing of the article, causing harm to the subpurchaser or his property from a latent defect therein, no action may be maintained against such manufacturer by such subpurchaser for such harm, based upon implied warranty of fitness of the article so purchased. 46 Am Jur, Sales, §§ 810, 812, pp 934, 937; 2 Restatement of th

1958A recent decision of the supreme court of Ohio (decided April, 1953), Wood v. General Electric Co., 159 Ohio St 273, 279 ( 112 NE2d 8 ), states: "Although a subpurchaser of an inherently dangerous article may recover from its manufacturer for negligence, in the making and furnishing of the article, causing harm to the subpurchaser or his property from a latent defect therein, no action may be maintained against such manufacturer by such subpurchaser for such harm, based upon implied warranty of fitness of the article so purchased. 46 Am Jur, Sales, §§ 810, 812, pp 934, 937; 2 Restatement of th

1910It is said that we held in White v. Rice, 112 Mich. 403 ( 70 N. W. 1024 ), the late Mr. Justice Long writing the opinion, that: "The claim that is made, that the beneficiary in a trust for religious purposes must be a corporation organized under the laws of this State, has no force.

1910It is said that we held in White v. Rice, 112 Mich. 403 ( 70 N. W. 1024 ), the late Mr. Justice Long writing the opinion, that: "The claim that is made, that the beneficiary in a trust for religious purposes must be a corporation organized under the laws of this State, has no force.