necessaries doctrine in North Carolina

2009Further, in Forsyth Memorial, our Supreme Court concluded that “unless defendant [wife] can establish some exception to the necessaries doctrine, she must be held liable to the hospital for the necessary services it provided her husband.” Forsyth Memorial, 342 N.C. at 619 , 467 S.E.2d at 90 . 2 The holdings of Baptist Hospitals and Forsyth Memorial bind this Court to uphold the application of the “Doctrine of Necessaries.” Cannon v. Miller, 313 N.C. 324 , 327 S.E.2d 888 (1985) (iterating that this Court does not have the authority to overrule decisions of the Supreme Court of North Carolina).

2009Further, in Forsyth Memorial, our Supreme Court concluded that “unless defendant [wife] can establish some exception to the necessaries doctrine, she must be held liable to the hospital for the necessary services it provided her husband.” Forsyth Memorial, 342 N.C. at 619 , 467 S.E.2d at 90 . 2 The holdings of Baptist Hospitals and Forsyth Memorial bind this Court to uphold the application of the “Doctrine of Necessaries.” Cannon v. Miller, 313 N.C. 324 , 327 S.E.2d 888 (1985) (iterating that this Court does not have the authority to overrule decisions of the Supreme Court of North Carolina).

2009Further, in Forsyth Memorial, our Supreme Court concluded that “unless defendant [wife] can establish some exception to the necessaries doctrine, she must be held liable to the hospital for the necessary services it provided her husband.” Forsyth Memorial, 342 N.C. at 619 , 467 S.E.2d at 90 . 2 The holdings of Baptist Hospitals and Forsyth Memorial bind this Court to uphold the application of the “Doctrine of Necessaries.” Cannon v. Miller, 313 N.C. 324 , 327 S.E.2d 888 (1985) (iterating that this Court does not have the authority to overrule decisions of the Supreme Court of North Carolina).

2009Further, in Forsyth Memorial, our Supreme Court concluded that “unless defendant [wife] can establish some exception to the necessaries doctrine, she must be held liable to the hospital for the necessary services it provided her husband.” Forsyth Memorial, 342 N.C. at 619 , 467 S.E.2d at 90 . 2 The holdings of Baptist Hospitals and Forsyth Memorial bind this Court to uphold the application of the “Doctrine of Necessaries.” Cannon v. Miller, 313 N.C. 324 , 327 S.E.2d 888 (1985) (iterating that this Court does not have the authority to overrule decisions of the Supreme Court of North Carolina).

1995The Cole court, in what was a true necessaries case, noted that the necessaries doctrine was applied in Pool v. Everton, 50 N.C. (5 Jones) 241 (1858), and went on to cite the North Carolina Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Pool holding in Sibley v. Gilmer, 124 N.C. 631 , 32 S.E. 964 (1899) as follows: [I]n cases where the husband and wife had separated, no notice of separation need be given to prevent his liability for debts contracted by the wife during the separation — even for necessaries— the law being that if the separation was without good cause on the part of the wife, her debt con

1995The Cole court, in what was a true necessaries case, noted that the necessaries doctrine was applied in Pool v. Everton, 50 N.C. (5 Jones) 241 (1858), and went on to cite the North Carolina Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Pool holding in Sibley v. Gilmer, 124 N.C. 631 , 32 S.E. 964 (1899) as follows: [I]n cases where the husband and wife had separated, no notice of separation need be given to prevent his liability for debts contracted by the wife during the separation — even for necessaries— the law being that if the separation was without good cause on the part of the wife, her debt con

1995The Cole court, in what was a true necessaries case, noted that the necessaries doctrine was applied in Pool v. Everton, 50 N.C. (5 Jones) 241 (1858), and went on to cite the North Carolina Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Pool holding in Sibley v. Gilmer, 124 N.C. 631 , 32 S.E. 964 (1899) as follows: [I]n cases where the husband and wife had separated, no notice of separation need be given to prevent his liability for debts contracted by the wife during the separation — even for necessaries— the law being that if the separation was without good cause on the part of the wife, her debt con

1995With respect to defendant’s contention that Ms. Chisholm is not entitled to benefit from the separation exception to the necessaries doctrine because she failed to notify the hospital of her separation at the time her husband was admitted to the hospital and the medical services rendered, the hospital cites Pool v. Everton, 50 N.C. (5 Jones) 241 (1858); Cole v. Adams, 56 N.C.

1995With respect to defendant’s contention that Ms. Chisholm is not entitled to benefit from the separation exception to the necessaries doctrine because she failed to notify the hospital of her separation at the time her husband was admitted to the hospital and the medical services rendered, the hospital cites Pool v. Everton, 50 N.C. (5 Jones) 241 (1858); Cole v. Adams, 56 N.C.

1995App. 714 , 289 S.E.2d 918 (1982); and Memorial Hospital of Alamance County, Inc. v. Brown, 50 N.C.

1995App. 714 , 289 S.E.2d 918 (1982); and Memorial Hospital of Alamance County, Inc. v. Brown, 50 N.C.

1987Alamance County Hospitals, Inc. v. Neighbors, 315 N.C. 362 , 338 S.E. 2d 87 (1986). *350 A corresponding duty on the part of the wife has also been a feature of the common law.

1987Alamance County Hospitals, Inc. v. Neighbors, 315 N.C. 362 , 338 S.E. 2d 87 (1986). *350 A corresponding duty on the part of the wife has also been a feature of the common law.

1984App. 318 , 307 S.E. 2d 212 (1983), disc. rev. denied, 310 N.C. 308 , 312 S.E. 2d 651 (1984), is applicable here.

1984App. 318 , 307 S.E. 2d 212 (1983), disc. rev. denied, 310 N.C. 308 , 312 S.E. 2d 651 (1984), is applicable here.

1984App. 177 , 310 S.E. 2d 409 (1984) in which this Court, in discussing the doctrine of necessaries, said: “[W]hen anyone sells or furnishes necessaries to a married woman in her individual capacity, and in reliance upon her separate estate or credit, it is the law in most jurisdictions that the husband is not liable, and that the creditor must seek payment from the one contracted with. [Citations omitted.]” Id. at 179 , 310 S.E. 2d at 411 .

1984App. 177 , 310 S.E. 2d 409 (1984) in which this Court, in discussing the doctrine of necessaries, said: “[W]hen anyone sells or furnishes necessaries to a married woman in her individual capacity, and in reliance upon her separate estate or credit, it is the law in most jurisdictions that the husband is not liable, and that the creditor must seek payment from the one contracted with. [Citations omitted.]” Id. at 179 , 310 S.E. 2d at 411 .

1984(Emphasis added.) In my view, the social policy that spun the doctrine of necessaries, see Robertson v. Robertson, 218 N.C. 447 , 11 S.E. 2d 318 (1940) and McClure v. McClure, 64 N.C.

1984(Emphasis added.) In my view, the social policy that spun the doctrine of necessaries, see Robertson v. Robertson, 218 N.C. 447 , 11 S.E. 2d 318 (1940) and McClure v. McClure, 64 N.C.

1984(Emphasis added.) In my view, the social policy that spun the doctrine of necessaries, see Robertson v. Robertson, 218 N.C. 447 , 11 S.E. 2d 318 (1940) and McClure v. McClure, 64 N.C.

1984(Emphasis added.) In my view, the social policy that spun the doctrine of necessaries, see Robertson v. Robertson, 218 N.C. 447 , 11 S.E. 2d 318 (1940) and McClure v. McClure, 64 N.C.