exercise of home rule in Florida

1997VIII , s. 2 (b), Fla. Const.; and Speer v. Olson, 367 So.2d 207 , 211 (Fla. 1978) (first sentence of s. 125.01 (1), Fla. Stat., grants to the governing body of a county the full power to carry on county government, and unless the Legislature has preempted a particular subject, county governing body has full authority to act through the exercise of home rule power). 7 See, e.g ., City of Miami Beach v. Rocio Corporation , 404 So.2d 1066 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), pet. for rev. den ., 408 So.2d 1092 (Fla. 1981) (while concurrent legislation may be enacted by both state and local governments in areas no

1992Cf ., City of Miami Beach v. Rocio Corporation, supra , at footnote 12 (although legislation may be concurrent, enacted by both state and local governments in areas not preempted by the state, concurrent legislation enacted by municipalities may not conflict with state law). 16 See , Carson v. Miller, 370 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1979), and Gilmore v. Civil Service Board, 528 So.2d 1271 (1 D.C.A.

1983In Tweed v. City of Cape Canaveral, supra, the city council had fired the police chief before the expiration of his contract of employment, and the city had contended that the contract was void in that it purported to bind the city "to a contract involving a governmental function of the City beyond the terms of office of the City Council who entered into the contract." Id., at 409 .

1979It is the further intent of the Legislature to extend to municipalities the exercise of powers for municipal governmental, corporate, or proprietary purposes not expressly prohibited by the Constitution, general or special law, or county charter and to remove any limitations, judicially imposed or otherwise, on the exercise of home rule powers other than those so expressly prohibited... ." [3] Tweed v. City of Cape Canaveral, 373 So.2d 408 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979). [4] Ramsey v. City of Kissimmee, 139 Fla. 107 , 190 So. 474 (Fla. 1939).

1982Section 166.021 (4), F.S., states that the intent of the Legislature in enacting Ch. 166 , F.S., was to `. . . extend to municipalities the exercise of powers for municipal governmental, corporate, or proprietary purposes not expressly prohibited by the constitution, general or special law, or county charter and to remove any limitations, judicially imposed or otherwise, on the exercise of home rule powers other than those so expressly prohibited.' Applicable Florida Supreme Court cases which address the home rule powers of municipalities under s 166.021 , F.S., are City of Miami Beach v. Fort

1978VIII, State Const. Section 166.021 was unanimously held to be constitutionally valid in City of Miami Beach v. Forte Towers, Inc., supra .

2006VIII of the State Constitution, municipalities ... may exercise any power for municipal purposes, except when expressly prohibited by law. .... (3) ... [T]he legislative body of each municipality has the power to enact legislation concerning any subject matter upon which the state Legislature may act, except: .... (c) Any subject expressly preempted to state or county government by the constitution or by general law; .... (4) The provisions of this section shall be so construed as to secure for municipalities the broad exercise of home rule powers granted by the constitution. [4] The legislati

2005See also s. 125.01 (1)(w), Fla. Stat. (county commission may perform any other acts not inconsistent with law which are in the common interest of the people of the county and exercise all powers and privileges not specifically prohibited by law); and s. 125.01 (3)(b), Fla. Stat. (provisions of section shall be liberally construed in order to effectively carry out purposes of section and secure for counties the broad exercise of home rule powers authorized by State Constitution). 8 376 So.2d 1158 , 1160 (Fla. 1979).

2003Section 125.01(3)(b) provides for a liberal construction of section 125.01 "in order to effectively carry out the purpose of this section and to secure for the counties the broad exercise of home rule powers authorized by the State Constitution." 729 So.2d at 1001 .

1997And see, Thomas v. State , 614 So.2d 468 , 470 (Fla. 1993) (municipal ordinances are inferior to state laws and must not conflict with any controlling provision of a statute); City of Casselberry v. Orange County Police Benevolent Association , 482 So.2d 336 (Fla. 1986) (if specific conflicts arise, state statute will prevail); City of Hialeah v. Martinez , 402 So.2d 602 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), pet. for rev. dism issed, 411 So.2d 380 (Fla. 1981); Scavella v. Fernandez , 371 So.2d 535 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (county ordinance requiring claims against county be filed within 60 days was in conflict with a

1997VIII , s. 2 (b), Fla. Const.; and Speer v. Olson, 367 So.2d 207 , 211 (Fla. 1978) (first sentence of s. 125.01 (1), Fla. Stat., grants to the governing body of a county the full power to carry on county government, and unless the Legislature has preempted a particular subject, county governing body has full authority to act through the exercise of home rule power). 7 See, e.g ., City of Miami Beach v. Rocio Corporation , 404 So.2d 1066 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), pet. for rev. den ., 408 So.2d 1092 (Fla. 1981) (while concurrent legislation may be enacted by both state and local governments in areas no

1997And see, Thomas v. State , 614 So.2d 468 , 470 (Fla. 1993) (municipal ordinances are inferior to state laws and must not conflict with any controlling provision of a statute); City of Casselberry v. Orange County Police Benevolent Association , 482 So.2d 336 (Fla. 1986) (if specific conflicts arise, state statute will prevail); City of Hialeah v. Martinez , 402 So.2d 602 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), pet. for rev. dism issed, 411 So.2d 380 (Fla. 1981); Scavella v. Fernandez , 371 So.2d 535 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (county ordinance requiring claims against county be filed within 60 days was in conflict with a

1997And see, Thomas v. State , 614 So.2d 468 , 470 (Fla. 1993) (municipal ordinances are inferior to state laws and must not conflict with any controlling provision of a statute); City of Casselberry v. Orange County Police Benevolent Association , 482 So.2d 336 (Fla. 1986) (if specific conflicts arise, state statute will prevail); City of Hialeah v. Martinez , 402 So.2d 602 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), pet. for rev. dism issed, 411 So.2d 380 (Fla. 1981); Scavella v. Fernandez , 371 So.2d 535 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (county ordinance requiring claims against county be filed within 60 days was in conflict with a

1997And see, Thomas v. State , 614 So.2d 468 , 470 (Fla. 1993) (municipal ordinances are inferior to state laws and must not conflict with any controlling provision of a statute); City of Casselberry v. Orange County Police Benevolent Association , 482 So.2d 336 (Fla. 1986) (if specific conflicts arise, state statute will prevail); City of Hialeah v. Martinez , 402 So.2d 602 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), pet. for rev. dism issed, 411 So.2d 380 (Fla. 1981); Scavella v. Fernandez , 371 So.2d 535 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (county ordinance requiring claims against county be filed within 60 days was in conflict with a

1992Cf ., City of Miami Beach v. Rocio Corporation, supra , at footnote 12 (although legislation may be concurrent, enacted by both state and local governments in areas not preempted by the state, concurrent legislation enacted by municipalities may not conflict with state law). 16 See , Carson v. Miller, 370 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1979), and Gilmore v. Civil Service Board, 528 So.2d 1271 (1 D.C.A.

1992Cf ., City of Miami Beach v. Rocio Corporation, supra , at footnote 12 (although legislation may be concurrent, enacted by both state and local governments in areas not preempted by the state, concurrent legislation enacted by municipalities may not conflict with state law). 16 See , Carson v. Miller, 370 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1979), and Gilmore v. Civil Service Board, 528 So.2d 1271 (1 D.C.A.

1990It is the further intent of the Legislature to extend to municipalities the exercise of powers for municipal governmental, corporate, or proprietary purposes not expressly prohibited by the constitution, general or special law, or county charter and to remove any limitations, judicially imposed or otherwise, on the exercise of home rule powers other than those so expressly prohibited. . . 4 See, Town of Indian River Shores v. Coll, 378 So.2d 53 (4 D.C.A.

1990It is the further intent of the Legislature to extend to municipalities the exercise of powers for municipal governmental, corporate, or proprietary purposes not expressly prohibited by the constitution, general or special law, or county charter and to remove any limitations, judicially imposed or otherwise, on the exercise of home rule powers other than those so expressly prohibited. . . 4 See, Town of Indian River Shores v. Coll, 378 So.2d 53 (4 D.C.A.

1990Fla., 1973), cert. denied, 295 So.2d 305 (Fla. 1974). 3 Section 166.021 (4), F.S., in pertinent part, provides: The provisions of this section shall be so construed as to secure for municipalities the broad exercise of home rule powers granted by the constitution.

1986City of Boca Raton v. Gidman, 440 So.2d 1277 , 1280 (Fla. 1983).

1984Under Speer v. Olson, 367 So.2d 207 (Fla. 1978), and Home Builders and Contractors Association of Palm Beach County, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners of Palm Beach County, 446 So.2d 140 (4 D.C.A.Fla., 1983), unless the Legislature has acted to preempt a particular subject relating to county government by general or special law, county government, by reason of the first sentence of s 125.01 (1), F.S., which provides that "[t]he legislative and governing body of a county shall have the power to carry on county government," has full authority to act through the exercise of home rule power an

1979NOTES [1] Daly v. Stokell, 63 So.2d 644 (Fla. 1953); City of Riviera Beach v. Witt, 286 So.2d 574 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973); cert. denied 295 So.2d 304 (Fla. 1974); 56 Am.Jur.2d, Municipal Corporations, § 154. [2] "(4) The provisions of this section shall be so construed as to secure for municipalities the broad exercise of home rule powers granted by the Constitution.