exercise of home rule in Illinois

2025Thus, Figgs’s claim that “[n]o Constitutional authority exists for the State Legislature to take away that power delegated directly to the people,” is belied by section 6(i), which expressly authorizes the legislature to “limit the concurrent exercise [of power] or specifically declare the State’s exercise [of power] to be exclusive.” Palm v. 2800 Lake Shore Condominium Association, 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 31 (holding that the General Assembly can “preempt the exercise of a municipality’s home rule powers by expressly limiting that authority” and can do so by including an “express statement to that

2020“If the legislature intends to limit or deny the exercise of home rule powers, the statute must contain an express statement to that effect.” Id.

2016Our analysis there applies equally to the case at bar. ¶ 37 “If the legislature intends to limit or deny the exercise of home rule powers, the statute must contain an express statement to that effect.” Palm, 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 31 (citing City of Evanston v. Create, Inc., 85 Ill. 2d 101, 108 (1981)).

2016“If the legislature intends to limit or deny the exercise of home rule powers, the statute must contain an express statement to that effect.” Palm, 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 31 (citing City of Evanston v. Create, Inc., 85 Ill. 2d 101, 108 (1981)). ¶ 67 Our constitution requires specificity when denying a home rule unit the use of its powers.

2012Section 6(a) allows great flexibility in the exercise of home rule power, conferring “ ‘the broadest powers possible.’ ” Schillerstrom, 198 Ill. 2d at 287 (quoting Scadron v. City of Des Plaines, 153 Ill. 2d 164, 174 (1992)).

2012“Thus, section 6(i) simply eliminates the implied preemption of home rule power ‘ “by judicial interpretation of unexpressed legislative intention. [Citation.]” ’ ” Schillerstrom, 198 Ill. 2d at 286 (quoting Scadron, 153 Ill. 2d at 186 ). ¶ 41 Our supreme court has devised a three-part inquiry for evaluating the constitutionality of the exercise of home rule power.

2004Ed. at 910 , 75 S. Ct. at 622 ; see also City of Chicago v. Roman, 184 Ill. 2d 504, 517 (1998) (the legislature knows how to limit the exercise of home rule authority when it so intends, and the absence of an express limitation will be construed in favor of home rule unit).

2004Ed. at 910 , 75 S. Ct. at 622 ; see also City of Chicago v. Roman , 184 Ill. 2d 504, 517 (1998) (the legislature knows how to limit the exercise of home rule authority when it so intends, and the absence of an express limitation will be construed in favor of home rule unit).

2013App. 3d 900, 904 (1974) (the resolution of zoning problems is left to the local exercise of plenary home rule power); accord Treadway v. City of Rockford, 24 Ill. 2d 488, 493-94 (1962) (pre-1970 Constitution) (‘Zoning lies primarily within the province of the municipality’); La Salle National Bank of Chicago v. County of Cook, 12 Ill. 2d 40, 46 (1957) (pre 1970 Constitution) (‘It is well established that it is primarily the province of the municipal body to determine the use and purpose to which property may be devoted’); see also Create, Inc., 85 Ill. 2d at 116 (city landlord-tenant ordinance

2001App. 3d 900, 904 (1974) (the resolution of zoning problems is left to the local exercise of plenary home rule power); accord Treadway v. City of Rockford, 24 Ill. 2d 488, 493-94 (1962) (pre-1970 Constitution) (“Zoning lies primarily within the province of the municipality”); La Salle National Bank of Chicago v. County of Cook, 12 Ill. 2d 40, 46 (1957) (pre-1970 Constitution) (“It is well established that it is primarily the province of the municipal body to determine the use and purpose to which property may be devoted”); see also Create, Inc., 85 Ill. 2d at 116 (city landlord-tenant ordinance

2013App. 3d 900, 904 (1974) (the resolution of zoning problems is left to the local exercise of plenary home rule power); accord Treadway v. City of Rockford, 24 Ill. 2d 488, 493-94 (1962) (pre-1970 Constitution) (‘Zoning lies primarily within the province of the municipality’); La Salle National Bank of Chicago v. County of Cook, 12 Ill. 2d 40, 46 (1957) (pre 1970 Constitution) (‘It is well established that it is primarily the province of the municipal body to determine the use and purpose to which property may be devoted’); see also Create, Inc., 85 Ill. 2d at 116 (city landlord-tenant ordinance

2001App. 3d 900, 904 (1974) (the resolution of zoning problems is left to the local exercise of plenary home rule power); accord Treadway v. City of Rockford, 24 Ill. 2d 488, 493-94 (1962) (pre-1970 Constitution) (“Zoning lies primarily within the province of the municipality”); La Salle National Bank of Chicago v. County of Cook, 12 Ill. 2d 40, 46 (1957) (pre-1970 Constitution) (“It is well established that it is primarily the province of the municipal body to determine the use and purpose to which property may be devoted”); see also Create, Inc., 85 Ill. 2d at 116 (city landlord-tenant ordinance

2025Thus, Figgs’s claim that “[n]o Constitutional authority exists for the State Legislature to take away that power delegated directly to the people,” is belied by section 6(i), which expressly authorizes the legislature to “limit the concurrent exercise [of power] or specifically declare the State’s exercise [of power] to be exclusive.” Palm v. 2800 Lake Shore Condominium Association, 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 31 (holding that the General Assembly can “preempt the exercise of a municipality’s home rule powers by expressly limiting that authority” and can do so by including an “express statement to that

2013Schillerstrom Homes, 198 Ill. 2d at 289-90 . ¶ 36 The “vital state policy” analysis was treated as the third part of that test, to be considered after determining whether the local ordinance pertains to the home rule unit’s government and affairs under section 6(a) and whether the legislature expressly preempted the exercise of home rule authority.

2018“That is, because the legislature can always vindicate state interests by express preemption, only vital state interests would allow a court to decide that an exercise of home rule power does not pertain to local government and affairs.” Id. (citing David C.

1985Our supreme court rejected a similar far-reaching argument in Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 483, 502 , stating: “The plaintiffs seek to apply a free-wheeling preemption rule to the exercise of home rule power.

2016Palm, 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 31 ; see also Village of Bolingbrook v. Citizens Utilities Co. of Illinois, 158 Ill. 2d 133, 138 (1994) (“In order to meet the requirements of section 6(h), legislation must contain express language that the area covered by the legislation is to be exclusively controlled by the State.”); Mulligan v. Dunne, 61 Ill. 2d 544, 550 (1975) (“a statute which purports to restrict home-rule powers must be specific”); City of Chicago v. - 16 - Roman, 184 Ill. 2d 504, 520 (1998) (no preemption where “the Corrections Code, although quite comprehensive, does not expressly limit the c

2015Palm, 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 31 ; see also Village of Bolingbrook v. Citizens Utilities Co. of Illinois, 158 Ill. 2d 133, 138 (1994) (“In order to meet the requirements of section 6(h), legislation must contain express language that the area covered by the legislation is to be exclusively controlled by the State.”); Mulligan v. Dunne, 61 Ill. 2d 544, 550 (1975) (“a statute which purports to restrict home-rule powers must be specific”); City of Chicago v. Roman, 184 Ill. 2d 504, 520 (1998) (no preemption where “the Corrections Code, although quite comprehensive, does not expressly limit the concurre

2016See also Midwest Gaming & Entertainment, LLC v. County of Cook, 2015 IL App (1st) 142786, ¶ 72 ("Our constitution requires specificity when denying a home rule unit the use of its powers.").

2016See also Midwest Gaming & Entertainment, LLC v. County of Cook, 2015 IL App (1st) 142786, ¶ 72 ("Our constitution requires specificity when denying a home rule unit the use of its powers.").

2016Palm, 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 31 ; see also Village of Bolingbrook v. Citizens Utilities Co. of Illinois, 158 Ill. 2d 133, 138 (1994) (“In order to meet the requirements of section 6(h), legislation must contain express language that the area covered by the legislation is to be exclusively controlled by the State.”); Mulligan v. Dunne, 61 Ill. 2d 544, 550 (1975) (“a statute which purports to restrict home-rule powers must be specific”); City of Chicago v. - 16 - Roman, 184 Ill. 2d 504, 520 (1998) (no preemption where “the Corrections Code, although quite comprehensive, does not expressly limit the c

2015Palm, 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 31 ; see also Village of Bolingbrook v. Citizens Utilities Co. of Illinois, 158 Ill. 2d 133, 138 (1994) (“In order to meet the requirements of section 6(h), legislation must contain express language that the area covered by the legislation is to be exclusively controlled by the State.”); Mulligan v. Dunne, 61 Ill. 2d 544, 550 (1975) (“a statute which purports to restrict home-rule powers must be specific”); City of Chicago v. Roman, 184 Ill. 2d 504, 520 (1998) (no preemption where “the Corrections Code, although quite comprehensive, does not expressly limit the concurre

2010People v. Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d 91, 98 (1999).

2010People v. Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d 91, 98 (1999).

2006For example, in City of Chicago v. Taylor, 332 Ill.

2006For example, in City of Chicago v. Taylor, 332 Ill.

2025Thus, we find section 5 of the Act to be a valid exercise of the legislature’s authority to limit the powers of home rule units under section 6(i) of Article VII of the Illinois Constitution. 9 No. 1-25-0173 ¶ 23 Figgs then argues that section 5 cannot be retroactively applied here, because it would “impair[] the voters’ constitutional rights to determine the means of selecting their own municipal officers, as guaranteed by the Illinois Constitution.” However, “[e]ven after voters approve a referendum to change a form of government, the General Assembly may reverse that action, even to the ext

2025Thus, Figgs’s claim that “[n]o Constitutional authority exists for the State Legislature to take away that power delegated directly to the people,” is belied by section 6(i), which expressly authorizes the legislature to “limit the concurrent exercise [of power] or specifically declare the State’s exercise [of power] to be exclusive.” Palm v. 2800 Lake Shore Condominium Association, 2013 IL 110505, ¶ 31 (holding that the General Assembly can “preempt the exercise of a municipality’s home rule powers by expressly limiting that authority” and can do so by including an “express statement to that

2013City of Evanston v. Create, Inc., 85 Ill. 2d 101, 108 (1981) (citing Stryker v. Village of Oak Park, 62 Ill. 2d 523, 528 (1976)).

1992(In re Application of Anderson (1990), 194 Ill.