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5 New York opinions name it 4 courts 1915–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldsongreen1 sentence2017We are in no way disadvantaged by deciding the applicability of the federal rule now, when it is obvious the Court is already well familiar with the issues, our constitutional standards, and the federal analysis. - 5 - - 6 - No. 119 The United States Supreme Court has determined that "where lapse of time has not invested a party with title to real or personal property, a state legislature, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, may repeal or extend a statute of limitations, even after right of action is barred thereby, restore to the plaintiff [the] remedy, and divest the defendant of the | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Adams Express Company v. Croninger
green
2 sentences1915An interesting case, in view of the applicability of the federal rule (Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491 , 33 Sup. Ct. 148, 57 L. 1915An interesting case, in view of the applicability of the federal rule (Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491 ; Davenport v. C. & O. | 2 | 1915–1915 |
Whren v. United States
green
1 sentence1998In the Third Department, post -Whren rulings have likewise continued to apply the primary motivation test, and have done so without any attempt to analyze or distinguish Whren (supra) and, indeed, without reference to it. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
People v. Camarre
green
1 sentence1998Although New York’s intermediate appellate courts appear to have recognized the concept of pretext when a stop, ostensibly for a traffic infraction, is utilized primarily for an unrelated reason and have found such stops to be unjustified (see, e.g., People v Laws, 213 AD2d 226 , supra; People v David, 223 AD2d 551, 552-553 ; People v Young, 241 AD2d 690 ; People v Camarre, 171 AD2d 1002 , supra), they have never provided a uniform analytical framework for determining whether a stop is pretextual. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
People v. Laws
green
1 sentence1998Although New York’s intermediate appellate courts appear to have recognized the concept of pretext when a stop, ostensibly for a traffic infraction, is utilized primarily for an unrelated reason and have found such stops to be unjustified (see, e.g., People v Laws, 213 AD2d 226 , supra; People v David, 223 AD2d 551, 552-553 ; People v Young, 241 AD2d 690 ; People v Camarre, 171 AD2d 1002 , supra), they have never provided a uniform analytical framework for determining whether a stop is pretextual. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
People v. David
green
1 sentence1998Although New York’s intermediate appellate courts appear to have recognized the concept of pretext when a stop, ostensibly for a traffic infraction, is utilized primarily for an unrelated reason and have found such stops to be unjustified (see, e.g., People v Laws, 213 AD2d 226 , supra; People v David, 223 AD2d 551, 552-553 ; People v Young, 241 AD2d 690 ; People v Camarre, 171 AD2d 1002 , supra), they have never provided a uniform analytical framework for determining whether a stop is pretextual. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
People v. Washington
green
1 sentence1998Similarly, in Washington ( 238 AD2d, at 49 , supra), the First Department concluded that it was not necessary to reach the applicability of the Federal standard because the automobile stop was valid under the New York rule prohibiting pretextual traffic stops. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
People v. Young
green
1 sentence1998Although New York’s intermediate appellate courts appear to have recognized the concept of pretext when a stop, ostensibly for a traffic infraction, is utilized primarily for an unrelated reason and have found such stops to be unjustified (see, e.g., People v Laws, 213 AD2d 226 , supra; People v David, 223 AD2d 551, 552-553 ; People v Young, 241 AD2d 690 ; People v Camarre, 171 AD2d 1002 , supra), they have never provided a uniform analytical framework for determining whether a stop is pretextual. | 1 | 1998–1998 |