authorized inquiry in New York

2015Even if it were otherwise, the vague allegations of a purported entitlement to a loan modification that are advanced in the affirmation of the defendant’s counsel in opposition are unavailing (see Citibank, N.A. v Barclay, 124 AD3d 174 [1st Dept 2014]; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Meyers, 108 AD3d 9 [2d Dept 2013]; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Van Dyke, 101 AD3d 638 [1st Dept 2012]).

2015Even if it were otherwise, the vague allegations of a purported entitlement to a loan modification that are advanced in the affirmation of the defendant’s counsel in opposition are unavailing (see Citibank, N.A. v Barclay, 124 AD3d 174 [1st Dept 2014]; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Meyers, 108 AD3d 9 [2d Dept 2013]; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Van Dyke, 101 AD3d 638 [1st Dept 2012]).

2015Even if it were otherwise, the vague allegations of a purported entitlement to a loan modification that are advanced in the affirmation of the defendant’s counsel in opposition are unavailing (see Citibank, N.A. v Barclay, 124 AD3d 174 [1st Dept 2014]; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Meyers, 108 AD3d 9 [2d Dept 2013]; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Van Dyke, 101 AD3d 638 [1st Dept 2012]).

2004Thereafter, on January 31, 2001, the trial court authorized defense counsel to retain a psychiatrist for a “psychiatric examination and consultation.” Nevertheless, on February 8, 2001, one week after the prosecution moved pursuant to People v Almonor ( 93 NY2d 571 [1999]) for an order directing the defense to specify the type of psychiatric defense it intended to pursue, with the trial court reserving decision pending comple tion of the pretrial Huntley hearing, the court precluded the defense psychiatric expert from examining defendant.

1994(People v Walsh, 139 Misc 2d 161 [Nassau Dist Ct 1988].) Yet, if an officer, pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 (2) (b), has the authority to request that a driver take a chemical test more than two hours after the arrest, and the test results are deemed probative, why is a defendant’s refusal to take the authorized test not probative of a consciousness of guilt?

1968In Dawn, the reference was to ‘‘ matters relating to the conduct and affairs generally of John Doe and others ” (emphasis supplied); here it was to “ a certain investigation now being conducted by said Committee with regard to the practice of CHARLES A. A’HEARN and others in Violation of Sections 90 and 75OB of the Judiciary Law of the State of New York ”, Clearly, it seems to us, this language satisfies the rule of Dawn; and this independently of the parties’ prior correspondence, which disclosed the purposes of, and authority for the inquiry and petitioner’s recognition thereof, implicit, in

1948That the information sought as to secret credit allowances granted by Dairymen’s League to retail stores is confidential and involves trade secrets, is no excuse for a refusal to produce the records needed by the Commissioner of .Investigation in an authorized inquiry (Matter of Blitzer v. Bromberger, 295 N. Y. 596 ; Matter of Chapman, 166 U. S. 661, 669 ; Matter of Wallstein, 178 App. Div. 140, 141 ).

1948That the information sought as to secret credit allowances granted by Dairymen’s League to retail stores is confidential and involves trade secrets, is no excuse for a refusal to produce the records needed by the Commissioner of .Investigation in an authorized inquiry (Matter of Blitzer v. Bromberger, 295 N. Y. 596 ; Matter of Chapman, 166 U. S. 661, 669 ; Matter of Wallstein, 178 App. Div. 140, 141 ).

1948That the information sought as to secret credit allowances granted by Dairymen’s League to retail stores is confidential and involves trade secrets, is no excuse for a refusal to produce the records needed by the Commissioner of .Investigation in an authorized inquiry (Matter of Blitzer v. Bromberger, 295 N. Y. 596 ; Matter of Chapman, 166 U. S. 661, 669 ; Matter of Wallstein, 178 App. Div. 140, 141 ).