logical corollary principle in New York

1964Such a policy is a logical corollary of the doctrine of People v. Walsh ( 262 N. Y. 140 [1933]) and is applicable to those special cases in which the opportunity for the examination of the prosecution’s evidence at the trial by the defendant would be inadequate.” (Emphasis supplied.) To summarize: as to Items 1 and 2 the motion is granted on consent; it is denied as to Item 3; and granted to the extent hereinbefore indicated as to Item 4.

1964Such a policy is a logical corollary of the doctrine of People v. Walsh ( 262 N. Y. 140 ) and is applicable to those specific cases in which the opportunity for the inspection and examination by the defendant of the prosecution evidence at the trial would be inadequate.

1989It would seem to be a logical corollary to this rule that the Statute of Limitations may not begin to run before all the elements of a cause of action may truthfully be alleged, nor may it continue to run for any period of time during which an element of the cause of action can no longer be truthfully alleged (cf., Homer Eng’g Co. v State of New York, 12 NY2d 508, 510-511 ).

1974(See Moat v. Moat, 27 A D 2d 895, 896; Kulok v. Kulok, 20 A D 2d 568, 569; Van Dyke v. Van Dyke, 278 App. Div. 446, 448-449 ; Family Ct. Act, § 461; Domestic Relations Law, § 240; “ Almandares ” v. “ Almandares”, 186 Misc. 667, 671 ; 2 Foster and Freed, Law and the Family [1966], § 28.28.) While Altschuler v. Altschuler ( 248 App. Div. 768 ) is often cited for its dictum that in regard to the dependency of eondi tions “ a judicial decree * * * is distinguishable from * * * contracts of separation ’ ’, 2 in fact the decision seems consistent with the Callender-Larkin rulings discussed above.

1974(See Moat v. Moat, 27 A D 2d 895, 896; Kulok v. Kulok, 20 A D 2d 568, 569; Van Dyke v. Van Dyke, 278 App. Div. 446, 448-449 ; Family Ct. Act, § 461; Domestic Relations Law, § 240; “ Almandares ” v. “ Almandares”, 186 Misc. 667, 671 ; 2 Foster and Freed, Law and the Family [1966], § 28.28.) While Altschuler v. Altschuler ( 248 App. Div. 768 ) is often cited for its dictum that in regard to the dependency of eondi tions “ a judicial decree * * * is distinguishable from * * * contracts of separation ’ ’, 2 in fact the decision seems consistent with the Callender-Larkin rulings discussed above.

1974(See Moat v. Moat, 27 A D 2d 895, 896; Kulok v. Kulok, 20 A D 2d 568, 569; Van Dyke v. Van Dyke, 278 App. Div. 446, 448-449 ; Family Ct. Act, § 461; Domestic Relations Law, § 240; “ Almandares ” v. “ Almandares”, 186 Misc. 667, 671 ; 2 Foster and Freed, Law and the Family [1966], § 28.28.) While Altschuler v. Altschuler ( 248 App. Div. 768 ) is often cited for its dictum that in regard to the dependency of eondi tions “ a judicial decree * * * is distinguishable from * * * contracts of separation ’ ’, 2 in fact the decision seems consistent with the Callender-Larkin rulings discussed above.