coconspirator exception in California

1983Where payment of money is a crucial objective of a conspiracy, and a coconspirator's statement is made shortly after the substantive crime is committed but before the money is paid, the coconspirator's statements may be admissible under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule. ( People v. Saling (1972) 7 Cal.3d 844, 852 [ 103 Cal. Rptr. 698 , 500 P.2d 610 ]; People v. Leach (1975) 15 Cal.3d 419, 428-432 [ 124 Cal. Rptr. 752 , 541 P.2d 296 ].) Independent evidence of the continuing nature of the conspiracy is necessary. ( Id., at p. 432.) Here, there was ample independent evidence that

1983Where payment of money is a crucial objective of a conspiracy, and a coconspirator's statement is made shortly after the substantive crime is committed but before the money is paid, the coconspirator's statements may be admissible under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule. ( People v. Saling (1972) 7 Cal.3d 844, 852 [ 103 Cal. Rptr. 698 , 500 P.2d 610 ]; People v. Leach (1975) 15 Cal.3d 419, 428-432 [ 124 Cal. Rptr. 752 , 541 P.2d 296 ].) Independent evidence of the continuing nature of the conspiracy is necessary. ( Id., at p. 432.) Here, there was ample independent evidence that

1992(People v. Brawley (1969) 1 Cal.3d 277, 286 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 461 P.2d 361 ]; Bourjaily v. United States, supra, 483 U.S. at pp. 181-184 [97 L.Ed.2d at pp. 156-158].) But because the court erred in finding the statements to come within the coconspirator exception, defendant’s state and federal rights were violated. i Nevertheless, under any standard the error must be deemed harmless.

1992(People v. Brawley (1969) 1 Cal.3d 277, 286 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 461 P.2d 361 ]; Bourjaily v. United States, supra, 483 U.S. at pp. 181-184 [97 L.Ed.2d at pp. 156-158].) But because the court erred in finding the statements to come within the coconspirator exception, defendant’s state and federal rights were violated. i Nevertheless, under any standard the error must be deemed harmless.

1986(People v. Jourdain (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 396, 404 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 702 ]; People v. Morales (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 368, 374 [ 69 Cal.Rptr. 402 ].) Here, the People introduced more than sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case that Ambrose and his female employees were engaged in a conspiracy to commit acts of prostitution.

1986(People v. Jourdain (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 396, 404 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 702 ]; People v. Morales (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 368, 374 [ 69 Cal.Rptr. 402 ].) Here, the People introduced more than sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case that Ambrose and his female employees were engaged in a conspiracy to commit acts of prostitution.

1983Where payment of money is a crucial objective of a conspiracy, and a coconspirator's statement is made shortly after the substantive crime is committed but before the money is paid, the coconspirator's statements may be admissible under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule. ( People v. Saling (1972) 7 Cal.3d 844, 852 [ 103 Cal. Rptr. 698 , 500 P.2d 610 ]; People v. Leach (1975) 15 Cal.3d 419, 428-432 [ 124 Cal. Rptr. 752 , 541 P.2d 296 ].) Independent evidence of the continuing nature of the conspiracy is necessary. ( Id., at p. 432.) Here, there was ample independent evidence that

1983Where payment of money is a crucial objective of a conspiracy, and a coconspirator's statement is made shortly after the substantive crime is committed but before the money is paid, the coconspirator's statements may be admissible under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule. ( People v. Saling (1972) 7 Cal.3d 844, 852 [ 103 Cal. Rptr. 698 , 500 P.2d 610 ]; People v. Leach (1975) 15 Cal.3d 419, 428-432 [ 124 Cal. Rptr. 752 , 541 P.2d 296 ].) Independent evidence of the continuing nature of the conspiracy is necessary. ( Id., at p. 432.) Here, there was ample independent evidence that

2016A prima facie showing of a conspiracy for the purposes of admissibility of a coconspirator’s statement under Evidence Code section 1223 simply means that a reasonable jury could find it more likely than not that the conspiracy existed at the time the statement was made.” (People v. Herrera (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 46, 63 [ 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 911 ].) Applying this test, we conclude the prosecution provided sufficient evidence, independent of the statements themselves, from which the trial court could have found a prima facie case that the statements were uttered by coconspirators engaged in an ongoing

2016Code, § 1223; accord, People v. Herrera (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 46, 63 [“In order for a declaration to be admissible under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule, the proponent must proffer sufficient evidence to allow the trier of fact to determine that the conspiracy exists by a preponderance of the evidence”].) Taken together, the evidence was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Love had entered into an agreement with Bates and Nichelle to commit the target crime (i.e., dissuading a witness from testifying) as charged in count 1. b.

2016(People v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 816-817 [out-of-court statements not “testimonial” if not made to “law enforcement” or otherwise “to create an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony”].) Detective Jara’s testimony that she also learned of Yorba’s contacts with Rodriguez through Yorba’s post-arrest statement accordingly is of no consequence.

2016(People v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 816-817 [out-of-court statements not “testimonial” if not made to “law enforcement” or otherwise “to create an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony”].) Detective Jara’s testimony that she also learned of Yorba’s contacts with Rodriguez through Yorba’s post-arrest statement accordingly is of no consequence.

2007(See People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1231 [ 283 Cal.Rptr. 144 , 812 P.2d 163 ] [statements fell within the coconspirator exception because they “could reasonably be viewed as an attempt to commit a potential witness to silence, thereby concealing the murder”].) We thus conclude that, assuming respondent preserved this issue, the referee properly admitted the evidence over the hearsay objection.

2007(See People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1231 [ 283 Cal.Rptr. 144 , 812 P.2d 163 ] [statements fell within the coconspirator exception because they “could reasonably be viewed as an attempt to commit a potential witness to silence, thereby concealing the murder”].) We thus conclude that, assuming respondent preserved this issue, the referee properly admitted the evidence over the hearsay objection.

2017There, we found that a legislative purpose to treat prostitutes as misdemeanants meant they could not be charged as coconspirators with their pimps, because that would elevate their conduct to felony status, frustrating the legislative purpose of the statutory scheme. ( Id . at p. 1075, 62 Cal.Rptr.3d 34 ; see People v. Pangelina (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 414 , 422, 172 Cal.Rptr. 661 ; Williams v. Superior Court (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 8 , 12-14, 106 Cal.Rptr. 89 .) However, we also found prostitutes could be treated as uncharged coconspirators, as D. was in this case. ( Bogan, at p. 1075, 62 Cal.Rpt

2017There, we found that a legislative purpose to treat prostitutes as misdemeanants meant they could not be charged as coconspirators with their pimps, because that would elevate their conduct to felony status, frustrating the legislative purpose of the statutory scheme. ( Id . at p. 1075, 62 Cal.Rptr.3d 34 ; see People v. Pangelina (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 414 , 422, 172 Cal.Rptr. 661 ; Williams v. Superior Court (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 8 , 12-14, 106 Cal.Rptr. 89 .) However, we also found prostitutes could be treated as uncharged coconspirators, as D. was in this case. ( Bogan, at p. 1075, 62 Cal.Rpt

2023Their theory “was merely ‘a vehicle for using otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence against’ [Salvant] by the use of the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule.” (People v. Jourdain (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 396, 403 .) The prosecutor’s closing argument that Salvant and Moore conspired to kill Sarkar does not alter our conclusion.

2014The conspiracy theory was merely 'a vehicle for using otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence against' appellant by the use of the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule.' [Citation.]" (Jourdain, supra, 111 Cal.App.3d at p. 403 .) Thus, once "there had been proof of the existence of the conspiracy, there was no error in instructing the jury on the law of conspiracy." (Id. at p. 404.) The Jourdain court concluded that the conspiracy instructions, including CALJIC No. 6.24 "did not tell the jury it could find appellant guilty upon less than reasonable doubt." (Ibid.) Rather, as in this case

1987The admission of co-conspirators’ declarations into evidence thus actually furthers the ‘Confrontation Clause’s very mission’ which is to ‘advance “the accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal trials.” ’ Tennessee v. Street, 471 US 409, 415 , 85 L Ed 2d 425 , 105 S Ct 2078 (1985), quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 US 74, 89 , 27 L Ed 2d 213 , 91 S Ct 210 (1970).” (United States v. Inadi, supra, 475 U.S. at pp. 395-396 [89 L.Ed.2d at pp. 398-399].) The reasoning of the United States Supreme Court about the special value of evidence under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule i

1987The admission of co-conspirators’ declarations into evidence thus actually furthers the ‘Confrontation Clause’s very mission’ which is to ‘advance “the accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal trials.” ’ Tennessee v. Street, 471 US 409, 415 , 85 L Ed 2d 425 , 105 S Ct 2078 (1985), quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 US 74, 89 , 27 L Ed 2d 213 , 91 S Ct 210 (1970).” (United States v. Inadi, supra, 475 U.S. at pp. 395-396 [89 L.Ed.2d at pp. 398-399].) The reasoning of the United States Supreme Court about the special value of evidence under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule i

2019Hearsay statements made by coconspirators are admissible against a party if the offering party presents independent *660 evidence to establish the prima facie existence of a conspiracy. ( People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86 , 139, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796 , 825 P.2d 781 .) "Once independent proof of a conspiracy has been shown, three preliminary facts must be established: '(1) that the declarant was participating in a conspiracy at the time of the declaration; (2) that the declaration was in furtherance of the objective of that conspiracy; and (3) that at the time of the declaration the party against

2019Hearsay statements made by coconspirators are admissible against a party if the offering party presents independent *660 evidence to establish the prima facie existence of a conspiracy. ( People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86 , 139, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796 , 825 P.2d 781 .) "Once independent proof of a conspiracy has been shown, three preliminary facts must be established: '(1) that the declarant was participating in a conspiracy at the time of the declaration; (2) that the declaration was in furtherance of the objective of that conspiracy; and (3) that at the time of the declaration the party against

2017Law (15th ed. 1996) Conspiracy, § 683, p. 549, italics added.) The seminal case cited by Wharton involved the conviction of a man and a willing woman for conspiring to violate the Mann Act (popularly known as the federal "White Slavery" statute), which generally provided that "[t]ransportation of a woman or girl whether with or without her consent, or causing or aiding it, or furthering it in any of the specified ways, are the acts punished, when done with a purpose which is immoral within the meaning of the law." ( Gebardi v. United States (1932) 287 U.S. 112 , 118, 53 S.Ct. 35 , 36, 77 L.Ed.

2017Law (15th ed. 1996) Conspiracy, § 683, p. 549, italics added.) The seminal case cited by Wharton involved the conviction of a man and a willing woman for conspiring to violate the Mann Act (popularly known as the federal "White Slavery" statute), which generally provided that "[t]ransportation of a woman or girl whether with or without her consent, or causing or aiding it, or furthering it in any of the specified ways, are the acts punished, when done with a purpose which is immoral within the meaning of the law." ( Gebardi v. United States (1932) 287 U.S. 112 , 118, 53 S.Ct. 35 , 36, 77 L.Ed.

2017There, we found that a legislative purpose to treat prostitutes as misdemeanants meant they could not be charged as coconspirators with their pimps, because that would elevate their conduct to felony status, frustrating the legislative purpose of the statutory scheme. ( Id . at p. 1075, 62 Cal.Rptr.3d 34 ; see People v. Pangelina (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 414 , 422, 172 Cal.Rptr. 661 ; Williams v. Superior Court (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 8 , 12-14, 106 Cal.Rptr. 89 .) However, we also found prostitutes could be treated as uncharged coconspirators, as D. was in this case. ( Bogan, at p. 1075, 62 Cal.Rpt

2017There, we found that a legislative purpose to treat prostitutes as misdemeanants meant they could not be charged as coconspirators with their pimps, because that would elevate their conduct to felony status, frustrating the legislative purpose of the statutory scheme. ( Id . at p. 1075, 62 Cal.Rptr.3d 34 ; see People v. Pangelina (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 414 , 422, 172 Cal.Rptr. 661 ; Williams v. Superior Court (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 8 , 12-14, 106 Cal.Rptr. 89 .) However, we also found prostitutes could be treated as uncharged coconspirators, as D. was in this case. ( Bogan, at p. 1075, 62 Cal.Rpt

1992Although made months after Jovita's death, Dominique's statements to her attorney, occurred at a time when the ultimate objective of the conspiracy — securing the life insurance proceeds and the house — had yet to be achieved. ( People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 139 [ 5 Cal. Rptr.2d 796 , 825 P.2d 781 ]; People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1231 [ 283 Cal. Rptr. 144 , 812 P.2d 163 ]; People v. Leach, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 430-431, fn. 10 ; People v. Saling (1972) 7 Cal.3d 844 [ 103 Cal. Rptr. 698 , 500 P.2d 610 ].) Finally, because Dominique's statements fell within an exception to the h

1992Although made months after Jovita's death, Dominique's statements to her attorney, occurred at a time when the ultimate objective of the conspiracy — securing the life insurance proceeds and the house — had yet to be achieved. ( People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 139 [ 5 Cal. Rptr.2d 796 , 825 P.2d 781 ]; People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1231 [ 283 Cal. Rptr. 144 , 812 P.2d 163 ]; People v. Leach, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 430-431, fn. 10 ; People v. Saling (1972) 7 Cal.3d 844 [ 103 Cal. Rptr. 698 , 500 P.2d 610 ].) Finally, because Dominique's statements fell within an exception to the h

1981Thus, since Castro’s statements were admissible under the coconspirator exception, there was no confrontation or Aranda (People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 353 , 407 P.2d 265 ]) violation.

1981Thus, since Castro’s statements were admissible under the coconspirator exception, there was no confrontation or Aranda (People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 353 , 407 P.2d 265 ]) violation.

2022If, on the one hand, the conspiracy at issue was a conspiracy to commit murder, then the conspiracy ended when Tiburcio, Sanchez, and Contreras were killed, as “acts committed by conspirators subsequent to the completion of the crime which is the primary object of a conspiracy cannot be deemed to be overt acts in furtherance of that conspiracy.” (People v. Zamora (1976) 18 Cal.3d 538, 560 ; see also Krulewitch v. United States (1949) 336 U.S. 440, 443 [rejecting the idea that “even after the central criminal objectives of a conspiracy have succeeded or failed, an implicit subsidiary phase of t

2021(People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 976 [“ ‘ “No rule of decision is better or more firmly established by authority, nor one resting upon a sounder basis of reason and propriety, than that a ruling or decision, itself correct in law, will not be disturbed on appeal merely because given for the wrong reason.

2017There, we found that a legislative purpose to treat prostitutes as misdemeanants meant they could not be charged as coconspirators with their pimps, because that would elevate their conduct to felony status, frustrating the legislative purpose of the statutory scheme. ( Id . at p. 1075, 62 Cal.Rptr.3d 34 ; see People v. Pangelina (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 414 , 422, 172 Cal.Rptr. 661 ; Williams v. Superior Court (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 8 , 12-14, 106 Cal.Rptr. 89 .) However, we also found prostitutes could be treated as uncharged coconspirators, as D. was in this case. ( Bogan, at p. 1075, 62 Cal.Rpt

2017There, we found that a legislative purpose to treat prostitutes as misdemeanants meant they could not be charged as coconspirators with their pimps, because that would elevate their conduct to felony status, frustrating the legislative purpose of the statutory scheme. ( Id . at p. 1075, 62 Cal.Rptr.3d 34 ; see People v. Pangelina (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 414 , 422, 172 Cal.Rptr. 661 ; Williams v. Superior Court (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 8 , 12-14, 106 Cal.Rptr. 89 .) However, we also found prostitutes could be treated as uncharged coconspirators, as D. was in this case. ( Bogan, at p. 1075, 62 Cal.Rpt

2017(Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed. 1982) [Conspiracy,] pp. 693-694.) For example, the acts of a coconspirator who has been granted prosecutorial immunity may be considered in establishing the culpability of other coconspirators. [Citations.] 'Where ... the discharge of an alleged coconspirator is not inconsistent with his guilt, but simply bars a subsequent prosecution of him, it does not invalidate the conviction of his coconspirators.' [Citation.] Similarly, a defendant may be charged with conspiracy to deliver documents to a foreign *864 government even though his coconspirators are not

2017(Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed. 1982) [Conspiracy,] pp. 693-694.) For example, the acts of a coconspirator who has been granted prosecutorial immunity may be considered in establishing the culpability of other coconspirators. [Citations.] 'Where ... the discharge of an alleged coconspirator is not inconsistent with his guilt, but simply bars a subsequent prosecution of him, it does not invalidate the conviction of his coconspirators.' [Citation.] Similarly, a defendant may be charged with conspiracy to deliver documents to a foreign *864 government even though his coconspirators are not

2017(See People v. Palmer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 856, 861-867 [rejecting the so-called “rule of consistency” in conspiracy cases].) 14 seminal case cited by Wharton involved the conviction of a man and a willing woman for conspiring to violate the Mann Act (popularly known as the federal “White Slavery” statute), which generally provided that “[t]ransportation of a woman or girl whether with or without her consent, or causing or aiding it, or furthering it in any of the specified ways, are the acts punished, when done with a purpose which is immoral within the meaning of the law.” (Gebardi v. United St