instrument of judicial inquiry in Oregon

2008The Court of Appeals relied upon the following passage from Penrod/Brown : “ ‘[W]e emphasize the two essential elements that must coincide to make the writ of habeas corpus a proper instrument of judicial inquiry [into the circumstances respecting the custody of a prisoner]: The need for immediate attention, if this appears from the urgency of the harm to which the prisoner claims to be exposed or if it is found to be required as a matter of constitutional law, and the practical inadequacy of an alternative remedy to meet this need.’ ” Barrett, 209 Or App at 299 (quoting Penrod /Brown, 283 Or

2007As the Supreme Court explained in Penrod/Brown v. Cupp, 283 Or 21, 28 , 581 P2d 934 (1978), “we emphasize the two essential elements that must coincide to make the writ of habeas corpus a proper instrument of judicial inquiry: The need for immediate attention, if this appears from the urgency of the harm to which the prisoner claims to be exposed or if it is found to be required as a matter of constitutional law, and the practical inadequacy of an alternative remedy to meet this need.

2008The Court of Appeals relied upon the following passage from Penrod/Brown : “ ‘[W]e emphasize the two essential elements that must coincide to make the writ of habeas corpus a proper instrument of judicial inquiry [into the circumstances respecting the custody of a prisoner]: The need for immediate attention, if this appears from the urgency of the harm to which the prisoner claims to be exposed or if it is found to be required as a matter of constitutional law, and the practical inadequacy of an alternative remedy to meet this need.’ ” Barrett, 209 Or App at 299 (quoting Penrod /Brown, 283 Or

2006For example, in Keenan v. Peterson, 307 Or. 323, 325 , 767 P.2d 441 (1989), in the context of a challenge to random monitoring of telephone calls in prison, the court said, "An injunction proceeding, an action for declaratory judgment or a mandamus proceeding all would be sufficiently timely to adjudicate petitioner's claims." In Gage , the inmate challenged the failure to credit him for time served.

2006For example, in Keenan v. Peterson, 307 Or. 323, 325 , 767 P.2d 441 (1989), in the context of a challenge to random monitoring of telephone calls in prison, the court said, "An injunction proceeding, an action for declaratory judgment or a mandamus proceeding all would be sufficiently timely to adjudicate petitioner's claims." In Gage , the inmate challenged the failure to credit him for time served.

1989In Gage v. Maass, supra, 306 Or at 204 , we underscored the fact that both elements must be present to sustain the deprivation of legal rights type of a habeas corpus claim.