reason of the general rule (Pennsylvania) · Go Syfert
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reason of the general rule in Pennsylvania

5 Pennsylvania opinions name it 2 courts 1985–1993 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (0)

CaseFollowedCited
No positive-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania.

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (6)

CaseCitedYears
Snyder v. Massachusetts green
scotus · 1934
2 sentences

1993Second, once a witness is shown to be unavailable, “the Clause countenances only hearsay marked with such trustworthiness that ‘there is no material departure from the reason of the general rule.’ ” Id., at 65 , 100 S.Ct. at 2539 , quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 , 54 S.Ct. 330, 333 , 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934).

1993Second, once a witness is shown to be unavailable, “the Clause countenances only hearsay marked with such trustworthiness that ‘there is no material departure from the reason of the general rule.’ ” Id., at 65 , 100 S.Ct. at 2539 , quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 , 54 S.Ct. 330, 333 , 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934).

51985–1993
Ohio v. Roberts red
scotus · 1980
2 sentences

1993Second, once a witness is shown to be unavailable, “the Clause countenances only hearsay marked with such trustworthiness that ‘there is no material departure from the reason of the general rule.’ ” Id., at 65 , 100 S.Ct. at 2539 , quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 , 54 S.Ct. 330, 333 , 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934).

1993Second, once a witness is shown to be unavailable, “the Clause countenances only hearsay marked with such trustworthiness that ‘there is no material departure from the reason of the general rule.’ ” Id., at 65 , 100 S.Ct. at 2539 , quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 , 54 S.Ct. 330, 333 , 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934).

31985–1993
Commonwealth v. Kravontka green
pa · 1989
2 sentences

1993Thus, in situations where the "witness has been shown to be unavailable, the admission of hearsay is limited to situations where the declaration is inherently trustworthy, bearing adequate “indicia of reliability.” Commonwealth v. Kravontka, 384 Pa.Super. 346 , 558 A.2d 865 (1989); Ohio v. Roberts, supra, at 66 , 100 S.Ct. at 2539 .

1993Thus, in situations where the "witness has been shown to be unavailable, the admission of hearsay is limited to situations where the declaration is inherently trustworthy, bearing adequate “indicia of reliability.” Commonwealth v. Kravontka, 384 Pa.Super. 346 , 558 A.2d 865 (1989); Ohio v. Roberts, supra, at 66 , 100 S.Ct. at 2539 .

11993–1993
Mancusi v. Stubbs green
scotus · 1972
2 sentences

1990The principle recently was formulated in Mancusi v. Stubbs [ 408 U.S. 204 , 92 S.Ct. 2308 , 33 L.Ed.2d 293 (1972) ]: “The focus of the Court’s concern has been to insure that there ‘are indicia of reliability which have been widely viewed as determinative of whether a statement may be placed before the jury though there is no confrontation of the declarant,’ Dutton v. Evans, supra, [ 400 U.S. 74 ] at 89, [ 91 S.Ct. 210, 220 , 27 L.Ed.2d 213 ] and to ‘afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement,’ California v. Green, supra [ 399 U.S. 149 ] at 16

1990The principle recently was formulated in Mancusi v. Stubbs [ 408 U.S. 204 , 92 S.Ct. 2308 , 33 L.Ed.2d 293 (1972) ]: “The focus of the Court’s concern has been to insure that there ‘are indicia of reliability which have been widely viewed as determinative of whether a statement may be placed before the jury though there is no confrontation of the declarant,’ Dutton v. Evans, supra, [ 400 U.S. 74 ] at 89, [ 91 S.Ct. 210, 220 , 27 L.Ed.2d 213 ] and to ‘afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement,’ California v. Green, supra [ 399 U.S. 149 ] at 16

11990–1990
California v. Green red
scotus · 1970
2 sentences

1990The principle recently was formulated in Mancusi v. Stubbs [ 408 U.S. 204 , 92 S.Ct. 2308 , 33 L.Ed.2d 293 (1972) ]: “The focus of the Court’s concern has been to insure that there ‘are indicia of reliability which have been widely viewed as determinative of whether a statement may be placed before the jury though there is no confrontation of the declarant,’ Dutton v. Evans, supra, [ 400 U.S. 74 ] at 89, [ 91 S.Ct. 210, 220 , 27 L.Ed.2d 213 ] and to ‘afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement,’ California v. Green, supra [ 399 U.S. 149 ] at 16

1990The principle recently was formulated in Mancusi v. Stubbs [ 408 U.S. 204 , 92 S.Ct. 2308 , 33 L.Ed.2d 293 (1972) ]: “The focus of the Court’s concern has been to insure that there ‘are indicia of reliability which have been widely viewed as determinative of whether a statement may be placed before the jury though there is no confrontation of the declarant,’ Dutton v. Evans, supra, [ 400 U.S. 74 ] at 89, [ 91 S.Ct. 210, 220 , 27 L.Ed.2d 213 ] and to ‘afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement,’ California v. Green, supra [ 399 U.S. 149 ] at 16

11990–1990
Dutton v. Evans green
scotus · 1970
2 sentences

1990The principle recently was formulated in Mancusi v. Stubbs [ 408 U.S. 204 , 92 S.Ct. 2308 , 33 L.Ed.2d 293 (1972) ]: “The focus of the Court’s concern has been to insure that there ‘are indicia of reliability which have been widely viewed as determinative of whether a statement may be placed before the jury though there is no confrontation of the declarant,’ Dutton v. Evans, supra, [ 400 U.S. 74 ] at 89, [ 91 S.Ct. 210, 220 , 27 L.Ed.2d 213 ] and to ‘afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement,’ California v. Green, supra [ 399 U.S. 149 ] at 16

1990The principle recently was formulated in Mancusi v. Stubbs [ 408 U.S. 204 , 92 S.Ct. 2308 , 33 L.Ed.2d 293 (1972) ]: “The focus of the Court’s concern has been to insure that there ‘are indicia of reliability which have been widely viewed as determinative of whether a statement may be placed before the jury though there is no confrontation of the declarant,’ Dutton v. Evans, supra, [ 400 U.S. 74 ] at 89, [ 91 S.Ct. 210, 220 , 27 L.Ed.2d 213 ] and to ‘afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement,’ California v. Green, supra [ 399 U.S. 149 ] at 16

11990–1990

Where else courts name it

GA 10 (1924–1998) AL 8 (1989–2001) MD 8 (1972–2001) PA 5 (1985–1993) HI 5 (1923–2005) TX 5 (1986–2002) WA 5 (1975–2001) MS 4 (1986–1988) MA 4 (1982–1997) MI 4 (1974–2011) SD 4 (1984–1985) OR 3 (1982–2021) VA 3 (1918–2003) WI 3 (1981–1986) CA 3 (1987–2005) DC 3 (1981–1984) IN 2 (1896–1911) NC 2 (1984–2001) NY 2 (1882–1982) FL 2 (1988–2000) CO 2 (1888–1930) OK 2 (1986–1991) NJ 2 (1845–1845)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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