assured clear distance rule in Pennsylvania

1983See, Unangst v. Whitehouse, 235 Pa.Super. 458, 463-468 , 344 A.2d 695 (1975) (explanation of the assured clear distance rule); Schweinberg v. Irwin, 379 Pa. 360, 363-64 , 109 A.2d 181 (1954) (duty of care imposed when children are known to be in the vicinity).

1983See, Unangst v. Whitehouse, 235 Pa.Super. 458, 463-468 , 344 A.2d 695 (1975) (explanation of the assured clear distance rule); Schweinberg v. Irwin, 379 Pa. 360, 363-64 , 109 A.2d 181 (1954) (duty of care imposed when children are known to be in the vicinity).

2014Brown v. Schriver, 254 Pa. Super. 468 , 386 A.2d 45 (1978).

2014Brown v. Schriver, 254 Pa. Super. 468 , 386 A.2d 45 (1978).

1972In the case of Enfield v. Stout, 400 Pa. 6 , 161 A. 2d 22 (1960), our Supreme Court held that if there is any evidence in an intersection accident upon the consideration of which reasonable men might differ, the assured clear distance rule should be determined by the jury.

1972In the case of Enfield v. Stout, 400 Pa. 6 , 161 A. 2d 22 (1960), our Supreme Court held that if there is any evidence in an intersection accident upon the consideration of which reasonable men might differ, the assured clear distance rule should be determined by the jury.

1975Relative to this situation, the assured clear distance rule has often been held only applicable to static or essentially static objects or to objects moving in the same direction as the operator, Fleischman v. Reading, supra; Long v. Pennsylvania Truck Lines, Inc., 335 Pa. 236 , 5 A.2d (1939); Reifel v. Hershey Estates, supra; Flick v. James Mon-fredo, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 1143 (E.D.

1973See, e.g., Long v. Pa. Truck Lines, Inc., 335 Pa. 236 , 5 A. 2d 224 (1939) (a driver who stays on his side of the road may assume that an approaching driver will do the same; the assured clear distance rule does not require that as he turns a curve he must anticipate that an approaching driver might occupy the center of the road).

2020Accord Papandrea v. Hartman, 507 A.2d 822 , 826 -7- J-A10014-20 (Pa.Super. 1986); Potenberg v. Varner, 424 A.2d 1370, 1372 (Pa.Super. 1981).

1984However, “[wjhere the facts do not conclusively establish the existence of a sudden emergency, it is proper to charge the jury on both the assured clear distance rule and the sudden emergency doctrine in order that the jury has the applicable law to apply the facts as they find them.” Potenburg v. Varner, 284 Pa.Superior Ct. 19, 22, 424 A.2d 1370, 1372 (1981); Stacy v. Thrower Trucking, Inc., 253 Pa.Superior Ct. 150, 156-60, 384 A.2d 1274, 1277-79 (1978).

2015Dranzo v. Winterhalter, 577 A.2d 1349, 1357 (Pa. Super. 1990), appeal denied, 585 A.2d 468 (Pa. 1991) (citations omitted). [W]here the police initiate a traffic stop based on a safety hazard allegedly created by the driver, the police must possess specific facts justifying the intrusion.

1994Springer v. Luptowski, 535 Pa. 332, 336 , 635 A.2d 134, 136 (1993); Dranzo v. Winterhalter, 395 Pa.Super. 578, 593-94 , 577 A.2d 1349, 1357 (1990); Spearing v. Starcher, supra at 25-29, 532 A.2d at 38-39 ; Mickey v. Ayers, 336 Pa.Super. 512, 516-20 , 485 A.2d 1199, 1202-1203 (1984); Elder v. Orluck, 334 Pa.Super. 329, 341-42 , 483 A.2d 474, 481 (1984), aff'd, 511 Pa. 402 , 515 A.2d 517 (1986); Brown v. Schriver, 254 Pa.Super. 468, 471-74 , 386 A.2d 45, 47-48 (1978); Unangst v. Whitehouse, supra at 463, 344 A.2d at 698; Reifel v. Hershey Estates, 222 Pa.Super. 212, 214 , 295 A.2d 138, 139 (1972

1975See Fleischman v. Reading, supra; Stark v. Fullerton Trucking Co., supra. If the entry was made within the assured clear distance ahead but at a point sufficiently distant to still allow the driver sufficient time in which to stop, the duty imposed is not that of the assured clear distance rule but rather that of the general duty of care and control on the road. 1 See Enfield v. Stout, supra; see also Reich v. Miller, 260 Iowa 929 , 151 N.W.2d 605 (1967); Wells v. Wildin, 224 Iowa 913 , 277 N.W. 308 (1938).

1975See Fleischman v. Reading, supra; Stark v. Fullerton Trucking Co., supra. If the entry was made within the assured clear distance ahead but at a point sufficiently distant to still allow the driver sufficient time in which to stop, the duty imposed is not that of the assured clear distance rule but rather that of the general duty of care and control on the road. 1 See Enfield v. Stout, supra; see also Reich v. Miller, 260 Iowa 929 , 151 N.W.2d 605 (1967); Wells v. Wildin, 224 Iowa 913 , 277 N.W. 308 (1938).

1973A limiting factor to this rule has always been that where a sudden and clear emergency arises, unforseeable to a plaintiff and of such severity as to put a driver in instantaneous disability, a court may not charge the jury as to the assured clear distance rule: Reifel v. Hershey Estates, 222 Pa. Superior Ct. 212 , 295 A. 2d 138 (1972); McElroy v. Rozzi, 194 Pa. Superior Ct. 184 , 166 A. 2d 331 (1960).

1973A limiting factor to this rule has always been that where a sudden and clear emergency arises, unforseeable to a plaintiff and of such severity as to put a driver in instantaneous disability, a court may not charge the jury as to the assured clear distance rule: Reifel v. Hershey Estates, 222 Pa. Superior Ct. 212 , 295 A. 2d 138 (1972); McElroy v. Rozzi, 194 Pa. Superior Ct. 184 , 166 A. 2d 331 (1960).

1972The maintenance of such a relationship between speed and visibility is mandated by the assured clear distance rule. [1] The Supreme *219 Court in Enfield v. Stout, 400 Pa. 6, 11 , 161 A. 2d 22, 25 (1960) made the following statement which has been subsequently quoted time and again: "For many years under the law of Pennsylvania it has been the rule that the driver of an automobile on a public highway must be alert to have it under such control that he can stop it within the `assured clear distance ahead.' This requires that the driver operate his automobile at such a rate of speed and in such

1972The maintenance of such a relationship between speed and visibility is mandated by the assured clear distance rule. [1] The Supreme *219 Court in Enfield v. Stout, 400 Pa. 6, 11 , 161 A. 2d 22, 25 (1960) made the following statement which has been subsequently quoted time and again: "For many years under the law of Pennsylvania it has been the rule that the driver of an automobile on a public highway must be alert to have it under such control that he can stop it within the `assured clear distance ahead.' This requires that the driver operate his automobile at such a rate of speed and in such

1986Sullivan v. Wolson, 262 Pa.Super. 397 , 396 A.2d 1230 (1979); Brown v. Schriver, 254 Pa.Super. 468 , 386 A.2d 45 (1978).

1986Sullivan v. Wolson, 262 Pa.Super. 397 , 396 A.2d 1230 (1979); Brown v. Schriver, 254 Pa.Super. 468 , 386 A.2d 45 (1978).

2014In discussing the issues raised in that appeal, we noted that, “the assured clear distance rule applies to essentially static or static objects, including vehicles moving in the same direction, while the sudden emergency doctrine applies only to moving in-strumentalities thrust into a driver’s path of travel.” Papandrea, 507 A.2d at 826 .

1999In fact, Dupes’ brief argues that “it was improper to instruct the jury that the assured clear distance rule applied to the plaintiff without instructing the jury that if the plaintiff was confronted with a sudden emergency, the assured clear distance rule was not applicable to her.” (Plaintiff’s brief, 2.) Dupes relies on Papandrea v. Hartman, 352 Pa. Super. 163 , 507 A.2d 822 (1986) for the proposition that, where a sudden emergency arises, the “assured clear dis tance ahead” rale is inapplicable.

1989Recently, in McKee et al. v. Evans et al., 380 Pa.Super. 120 , 551 A.2d 260 (1988), this Court, sitting en banc, discussed the interplay of the assured clear distance rule and the “sudden emergency” doctrine.

1989Recently, in McKee et al. v. Evans et al., 380 Pa.Super. 120 , 551 A.2d 260 (1988), this Court, sitting en banc, discussed the interplay of the assured clear distance rule and the “sudden emergency” doctrine.

2014Although we stated in Elder that “the assured clear distance rule applies to essentially static or static objects, including vehicles moving in the same direction,” id., that was not the basis for our conclusion that the trial court erred by charging the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine.

1994Springer v. Luptowski, 535 Pa. 332, 336 , 635 A.2d 134, 136 (1993); Dranzo v. Winterhalter, 395 Pa.Super. 578, 593-94 , 577 A.2d 1349, 1357 (1990); Spearing v. Starcher, supra at 25-29, 532 A.2d at 38-39 ; Mickey v. Ayers, 336 Pa.Super. 512, 516-20 , 485 A.2d 1199, 1202-1203 (1984); Elder v. Orluck, 334 Pa.Super. 329, 341-42 , 483 A.2d 474, 481 (1984), aff'd, 511 Pa. 402 , 515 A.2d 517 (1986); Brown v. Schriver, 254 Pa.Super. 468, 471-74 , 386 A.2d 45, 47-48 (1978); Unangst v. Whitehouse, supra at 463, 344 A.2d at 698; Reifel v. Hershey Estates, 222 Pa.Super. 212, 214 , 295 A.2d 138, 139 (1972

1995This Court was presented with similar facts more recently in Springer v. Luptowski, 535 Pa. 332 , 635 A.2d 134 (1993), wherein a majority of this Court upheld the trial court’s instruction to the jury that the plaintiffs’ decedent had violated the assured clear distance ahead rule and was, therefore, negligent as a matter of law.

1995This Court was presented with similar facts more recently in Springer v. Luptowski, 535 Pa. 332 , 635 A.2d 134 (1993), wherein a majority of this Court upheld the trial court’s instruction to the jury that the plaintiffs’ decedent had violated the assured clear distance ahead rule and was, therefore, negligent as a matter of law.

1994The complexity of the issue is further revealed in Potenburg v. Varner, supra. While the court in Stacy confined its statement of the law to "this situation”, Stacy v. Thrower Trucking, Inc., supra at 159, 384 A.2d at 1279 , this Court in Potenburg , cited the rule as universally applicable: Where the facts do not conclusively establish the existence of a sudden emergency, it is proper to charge the jury on both the assured clear distance rule and the sudden emergency doctrine in order that the jury has the applicable law to apply to the facts as they find them.

1994While the court in Stacy confined its statement of the law to "this situation", Stacy v. Thrower Trucking, Inc., supra at 159, 384 A.2d at 1279 , this Court in Potenburg , cited the rule as universally applicable: Where the facts do not conclusively establish the existence of a sudden emergency, it is proper to charge the jury on both the assured clear distance rule and the sudden emergency doctrine in order that the jury has the applicable law to apply to the facts as they find them.

1972By this is meant the range of the driver’s vision which, of course, in darkness is the scope of his headlights: Weibel v. Ferguson, 342 Pa. 113 , 19 A. 2d 357 (1941).” In Griffith v. Weiner, 373 Pa. 184, 187 , 95 A. 2d 517, 518 (1953), the following statement was made which also has often been quoted by the Supreme Court: “What this distance will be will vary according to the visibility at the time and other attending circumstances.” If within the visible distance there is another vehicle, the assured clear distance rule is not applicable.

1972By this is meant the range of the driver’s vision which, of course, in darkness is the scope of his headlights: Weibel v. Ferguson, 342 Pa. 113 , 19 A. 2d 357 (1941).” In Griffith v. Weiner, 373 Pa. 184, 187 , 95 A. 2d 517, 518 (1953), the following statement was made which also has often been quoted by the Supreme Court: “What this distance will be will vary according to the visibility at the time and other attending circumstances.” If within the visible distance there is another vehicle, the assured clear distance rule is not applicable.

1983See, Unangst v. Whitehouse, 235 Pa.Super. 458, 463-468 , 344 A.2d 695 (1975) (explanation of the assured clear distance rule); Schweinberg v. Irwin, 379 Pa. 360, 363-64 , 109 A.2d 181 (1954) (duty of care imposed when children are known to be in the vicinity).

1983See, Unangst v. Whitehouse, 235 Pa.Super. 458, 463-468 , 344 A.2d 695 (1975) (explanation of the assured clear distance rule); Schweinberg v. Irwin, 379 Pa. 360, 363-64 , 109 A.2d 181 (1954) (duty of care imposed when children are known to be in the vicinity).

1982Long. v. Pennsylvania Truck Lines, 335 Pa. 236 , 5 A.2d 224 (1939); See Greene v. Morelli Brothers, 463 F. 2d 725 (3d Cir. 1972).

1975Pa.), aff’d, 487 F.2d 1394 (3d Cir. 1973); Greene v. Morelli Bros., 463 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1972) ; and it has been held that the approaching driver need not anticipate the negligence of the other driver in calculating his assured clear distance.

1973A limiting factor to this rule has always been that where a sudden and clear emergency arises, unforseeable to a plaintiff and of such severity as to put a driver in instantaneous disability, a court may not charge the jury as to the assured clear distance rule: Reifel v. Hershey Estates, 222 Pa. Superior Ct. 212 , 295 A. 2d 138 (1972); McElroy v. Rozzi, 194 Pa. Superior Ct. 184 , 166 A. 2d 331 (1960).

1973A limiting factor to this rule has always been that where a sudden and clear emergency arises, unforseeable to a plaintiff and of such severity as to put a driver in instantaneous disability, a court may not charge the jury as to the assured clear distance rule: Reifel v. Hershey Estates, 222 Pa. Superior Ct. 212 , 295 A. 2d 138 (1972); McElroy v. Rozzi, 194 Pa. Superior Ct. 184 , 166 A. 2d 331 (1960).

1971Maranen v. Philadelphia, 394 Pa. 531, 535 , 147 A. 2d 413, 415 (1959); McElroy v. Rozzi, 194 Pa. Superior Ct. 184, 188 , 166 A. 2d 331, 333 (1960).

1960As recently as January, 1959, Chief Justice Joxes in the case of Maranca v. Philadelphia, 394 Pa. 531, 535 , said: “It is well recognized that the assured clear distance rule has no application to a case in which a driver is blinded by the lights of an oncoming vehicle . . .

2020See Cunningham, supra at 658 (explaining that vehicles moving in the same direction were viewed as essentially static objects subject to the assured clear distance rule).

2020As our High Court cautioned in Lockhart, supra at 1180 , the rule does not impose “a duty upon a driver to anticipate any and all possible occurrences, however remote[,]” but only those that “may reasonably be expected to be within his path.” Mr. Bergkvist concedes that there are circumstances where it is proper to instruct the jury on both the assured clear distance rule and the sudden emergency doctrine, but maintains that Mr. Searer failed to prove the four elements necessary to invoke a sudden emergency defense here.

2020See also Lockhart, supra at 1183 (holding that where the evidence does not conclusively establish that the party seeking the defense of the sudden emergency doctrine created the sudden emergency, the jury should be instructed on both the assured clear distance rule and the sudden emergency doctrine).

2020Specifically, Mr. Bergkvist argues that the evidence ____________________________________________ 2The interrelationship between the assured clear distance rule and the sudden emergency doctrine was poetically defined by then-Judge Eakin in Zangrando v. Sipula, 756 A.2d 73, 77 (Pa.Super. 2000): “In sum, assured clear distance creates duty when one drives; the emergency doctrine excuses it should sudden peril arise.” -9- J-A10014-20 unequivocally showed that Mr. Searer caused or contributed to the emergency by failing to keep his vehicle an assured clear distance behind Mr. Bergkvist’s vehicle.

1999Actually, what the case holds is that, where the evidence conclusively shows a sudden emergency, the rale is not applicable. “[I]f the facts giving rise to the emergency leave no room for doubt, [then] the issue becomes a matter of law for the judge.” Id. at 169 , 507 A.2d at 825 , citing Polumbo v. DeStefano, 329 Pa. Super. 360, 366 , 478 A.2d 828, 831 (1984).

1999Actually, what the case holds is that, where the evidence conclusively shows a sudden emergency, the rale is not applicable. “[I]f the facts giving rise to the emergency leave no room for doubt, [then] the issue becomes a matter of law for the judge.” Id. at 169 , 507 A.2d at 825 , citing Polumbo v. DeStefano, 329 Pa. Super. 360, 366 , 478 A.2d 828, 831 (1984).