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5 Tennessee opinions name it 2 courts 2013–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences2026“The issue under Miranda is whether a suspect received certain warnings and knowingly and voluntarily waived certain rights, whereas the essential inquiry under the voluntariness test is whether a suspect’s will was overborne so as to render the confession a product of coercion.” Davidson, 509 S.W.3d at 189 (first citing State v. Freeland, 451 S.W.3d 791, 815 (Tenn. 2014); and then citing State v. Smith, 933 S.W.2d 450, 455 (Tenn. 1996)). 2016While Miranda “asks whether a suspect received certain warnings and knowingly and voluntarily waived certain rights, . . . the essential inquiry under the voluntariness test is whether a suspect‟s will was overborne so as to render the confession a product of coercion.” Climer, 400 S.W.3d at 568 (citing Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 433-35 ; State v. Smith, 933 S.W.2d 450, 455 (Tenn. 1996)). “„Statements and confessions not made as a result of custodial interrogations must also be voluntary to be admissible.‟” State v. Tyler James Reed, No. M2012-02542-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 6123155 , at *11 (Tenn. Crim. | 4 | 4 |
State of Tennessee v. Lemaricus Devall Davidsongreen2 sentences2026“The issue under Miranda is whether a suspect received certain warnings and knowingly and voluntarily waived certain rights, whereas the essential inquiry under the voluntariness test is whether a suspect’s will was overborne so as to render the confession a product of coercion.” Davidson, 509 S.W.3d at 189 (first citing State v. Freeland, 451 S.W.3d 791, 815 (Tenn. 2014); and then citing State v. Smith, 933 S.W.2d 450, 455 (Tenn. 1996)). 2022See State v. Davidson, 509 S.W.3d 156, 189 (Tenn. 2016) (emphasizing that “[t]he due process voluntariness test is distinct from Miranda” and that while “[t]he issue under Miranda is whether a suspect received certain warnings and knowingly and voluntarily waived certain rights[,] . . . the essential inquiry under the voluntariness test is whether a suspect’s will was overborne so as to render the confession a product of coercion” (citations omitted)). | 2 | 2 |
State of Tennessee v. John T. Freeland, Jr.green2 sentences2026“The issue under Miranda is whether a suspect received certain warnings and knowingly and voluntarily waived certain rights, whereas the essential inquiry under the voluntariness test is whether a suspect’s will was overborne so as to render the confession a product of coercion.” Davidson, 509 S.W.3d at 189 (first citing State v. Freeland, 451 S.W.3d 791, 815 (Tenn. 2014); and then citing State v. Smith, 933 S.W.2d 450, 455 (Tenn. 1996)). 2016Freeland, 451 S.W.3d at 815 (quoting State v. Climer, 400 S.W.3d 537, 568 (Tenn. 2013); State v. Smith, 933 S.W.2d 450, 455 (Tenn. 1996)). | 1 | 2 |
State of Tennessee v. David Hooper Climer, Jr.green2 sentences2016Freeland, 451 S.W.3d at 815 (quoting State v. Climer, 400 S.W.3d 537, 568 (Tenn. 2013); State v. Smith, 933 S.W.2d 450, 455 (Tenn. 1996)). 2016While Miranda “asks whether a suspect received certain warnings and knowingly and voluntarily waived certain rights, . . . the essential inquiry under the voluntariness test is whether a suspect‟s will was overborne so as to render the confession a product of coercion.” Climer, 400 S.W.3d at 568 (citing Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 433-35 ; State v. Smith, 933 S.W.2d 450, 455 (Tenn. 1996)). “„Statements and confessions not made as a result of custodial interrogations must also be voluntary to be admissible.‟” State v. Tyler James Reed, No. M2012-02542-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 6123155 , at *11 (Tenn. Crim. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Thackergreen1 sentence2016App. Nov. 20, 2013), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 14, 2014) (quoting State v. Thacker, 164 S.W.3d 208, 248 (Tenn. 2005)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dickerson v. United States
red
2 sentences2016While Miranda “asks whether a suspect received certain warnings and knowingly and voluntarily waived certain rights, . . . the essential inquiry under the voluntariness test is whether a suspect‟s will was overborne so as to render the confession a product of coercion.” Climer, 400 S.W.3d at 568 (citing Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 433-35 ; State v. Smith, 933 S.W.2d 450, 455 (Tenn. 1996)). “„Statements and confessions not made as a result of custodial interrogations must also be voluntary to be admissible.‟” State v. Tyler James Reed, No. M2012-02542-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 6123155 , at *11 (Tenn. Crim. 2013Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 433-35 , 120 S.Ct. 2326 ; State v. Smith, 933 S.W.2d 450, 455 (Tenn.1996). | 2 | 2013–2016 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.