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5 Tennessee opinions name it 1 courts 1999–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bouie v. City of Columbiagreen2 sentences2024He pointed out that our Court “made no pretense that the year-and-a-day rule was ‘bad’ law from the outset” but instead 5 asserted that “the need for the rule, as a means of assuring causality of the death, had disappeared with time.” Id. at 477 . 2024He pointed out that our Court “made no pretense that the year-and-a-day rule was ‘bad’ law from the outset” but instead 5 asserted that “the need for the rule, as a means of assuring causality of the death, had disappeared with time.” Id. at 477 . | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Laddgreen2 sentences1999Its lineage is generally traced to the thirteenth century where the rule was originally utilized as a statute of limitations governing the timé in which an individual might initiate a private action for murder known as “appeal of death.” See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 528 A.2d 1211, 1214 (D.C.1987); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 381 Mass. 411 , 409 N.E.2d 771, 773 (1980); People v. Stevenson, 416 Mich. 383 , 331 N.W.2d 143, 145 (1982); State v. Vance, 328 N.C. 613 , 403 S.E.2d 495, 497 (1991); Commonwealth v. Ladd, 402 Pa. 164 , 166 A.2d 501, 503 (I960); State v. Pine, 524 A.2d 1104, 1105 (R.I. 1999Its lineage is generally traced to the thirteenth century where the rule was originally utilized as a statute of limitations governing the timé in which an individual might initiate a private action for murder known as “appeal of death.” See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 528 A.2d 1211, 1214 (D.C.1987); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 381 Mass. 411 , 409 N.E.2d 771, 773 (1980); People v. Stevenson, 416 Mich. 383 , 331 N.W.2d 143, 145 (1982); State v. Vance, 328 N.C. 613 , 403 S.E.2d 495, 497 (1991); Commonwealth v. Ladd, 402 Pa. 164 , 166 A.2d 501, 503 (I960); State v. Pine, 524 A.2d 1104, 1105 (R.I. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Lewisgreen2 sentences1999Its lineage is generally traced to the thirteenth century where the rule was originally utilized as a statute of limitations governing the timé in which an individual might initiate a private action for murder known as “appeal of death.” See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 528 A.2d 1211, 1214 (D.C.1987); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 381 Mass. 411 , 409 N.E.2d 771, 773 (1980); People v. Stevenson, 416 Mich. 383 , 331 N.W.2d 143, 145 (1982); State v. Vance, 328 N.C. 613 , 403 S.E.2d 495, 497 (1991); Commonwealth v. Ladd, 402 Pa. 164 , 166 A.2d 501, 503 (I960); State v. Pine, 524 A.2d 1104, 1105 (R.I. 1999Its lineage is generally traced to the thirteenth century where the rule was originally utilized as a statute of limitations governing the timé in which an individual might initiate a private action for murder known as “appeal of death.” See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 528 A.2d 1211, 1214 (D.C.1987); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 381 Mass. 411 , 409 N.E.2d 771, 773 (1980); People v. Stevenson, 416 Mich. 383 , 331 N.W.2d 143, 145 (1982); State v. Vance, 328 N.C. 613 , 403 S.E.2d 495, 497 (1991); Commonwealth v. Ladd, 402 Pa. 164 , 166 A.2d 501, 503 (I960); State v. Pine, 524 A.2d 1104, 1105 (R.I. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Pinegreen1 sentence1999Its lineage is generally traced to the thirteenth century where the rule was originally utilized as a statute of limitations governing the timé in which an individual might initiate a private action for murder known as “appeal of death.” See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 528 A.2d 1211, 1214 (D.C.1987); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 381 Mass. 411 , 409 N.E.2d 771, 773 (1980); People v. Stevenson, 416 Mich. 383 , 331 N.W.2d 143, 145 (1982); State v. Vance, 328 N.C. 613 , 403 S.E.2d 495, 497 (1991); Commonwealth v. Ladd, 402 Pa. 164 , 166 A.2d 501, 503 (I960); State v. Pine, 524 A.2d 1104, 1105 (R.I. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Jacksongreen2 sentences1999Its lineage is generally traced to the thirteenth century where the rule was originally utilized as a statute of limitations governing the timé in which an individual might initiate a private action for murder known as “appeal of death.” See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 528 A.2d 1211, 1214 (D.C.1987); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 381 Mass. 411 , 409 N.E.2d 771, 773 (1980); People v. Stevenson, 416 Mich. 383 , 331 N.W.2d 143, 145 (1982); State v. Vance, 328 N.C. 613 , 403 S.E.2d 495, 497 (1991); Commonwealth v. Ladd, 402 Pa. 164 , 166 A.2d 501, 503 (I960); State v. Pine, 524 A.2d 1104, 1105 (R.I. 1999Jackson, 528 A.2d at 1214 ; Lewis, 409 N.E.2d at 772 . | 1 | 1 |
People v. Stevensongreen2 sentences1999Its lineage is generally traced to the thirteenth century where the rule was originally utilized as a statute of limitations governing the timé in which an individual might initiate a private action for murder known as “appeal of death.” See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 528 A.2d 1211, 1214 (D.C.1987); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 381 Mass. 411 , 409 N.E.2d 771, 773 (1980); People v. Stevenson, 416 Mich. 383 , 331 N.W.2d 143, 145 (1982); State v. Vance, 328 N.C. 613 , 403 S.E.2d 495, 497 (1991); Commonwealth v. Ladd, 402 Pa. 164 , 166 A.2d 501, 503 (I960); State v. Pine, 524 A.2d 1104, 1105 (R.I. 1999Its lineage is generally traced to the thirteenth century where the rule was originally utilized as a statute of limitations governing the timé in which an individual might initiate a private action for murder known as “appeal of death.” See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 528 A.2d 1211, 1214 (D.C.1987); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 381 Mass. 411 , 409 N.E.2d 771, 773 (1980); People v. Stevenson, 416 Mich. 383 , 331 N.W.2d 143, 145 (1982); State v. Vance, 328 N.C. 613 , 403 S.E.2d 495, 497 (1991); Commonwealth v. Ladd, 402 Pa. 164 , 166 A.2d 501, 503 (I960); State v. Pine, 524 A.2d 1104, 1105 (R.I. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Vancegreen2 sentences1999Its lineage is generally traced to the thirteenth century where the rule was originally utilized as a statute of limitations governing the timé in which an individual might initiate a private action for murder known as “appeal of death.” See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 528 A.2d 1211, 1214 (D.C.1987); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 381 Mass. 411 , 409 N.E.2d 771, 773 (1980); People v. Stevenson, 416 Mich. 383 , 331 N.W.2d 143, 145 (1982); State v. Vance, 328 N.C. 613 , 403 S.E.2d 495, 497 (1991); Commonwealth v. Ladd, 402 Pa. 164 , 166 A.2d 501, 503 (I960); State v. Pine, 524 A.2d 1104, 1105 (R.I. 1999Its lineage is generally traced to the thirteenth century where the rule was originally utilized as a statute of limitations governing the timé in which an individual might initiate a private action for murder known as “appeal of death.” See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 528 A.2d 1211, 1214 (D.C.1987); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 381 Mass. 411 , 409 N.E.2d 771, 773 (1980); People v. Stevenson, 416 Mich. 383 , 331 N.W.2d 143, 145 (1982); State v. Vance, 328 N.C. 613 , 403 S.E.2d 495, 497 (1991); Commonwealth v. Ladd, 402 Pa. 164 , 166 A.2d 501, 503 (I960); State v. Pine, 524 A.2d 1104, 1105 (R.I. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Rogers
green
2 sentences2024In Rogers, the Court wrote that, “[o]ur research indicates that the [year-and-a-day] rule has never served as the ground of decision in any Tennessee case,” that “abolition of the rule does not allow the State to obtain a conviction upon less proof,” and that, prior to Rogers, “[T]he Court of Criminal Appeals [had] opined that the year-and-a-day rule had been abolished by passage of the - 23 - [Criminal Sentencing Reform] Act [of 1989].” Id. at 402 . 2024We followed the same course in State v. Rogers when we abolished the year-and-a- day rule. 992 S.W.2d 393 (Tenn. 1999). | 3 | 2024–2024 |
Rogers v. Tennessee
green
2 sentences2015Cf. Rogers, 532 U.S. at 462-63 , 121 S.Ct. 1693 (holding that this Court’s abolition of the year-and-a-day rule was not unexpected or indefensible where the rule had been rejected “in the vast majority of jurisdictions”). 2015Cf. Rogers, 532 U.S. at 462-63 , 121 S.Ct. 1693 (holding that this Court’s abolition of the year-and-a-day rule was not unexpected or indefensible where the rule had been rejected “in the vast majority of jurisdictions”). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.