38 Alabama opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
OM v. Stategreen2 sentences2022As this Court noted in O.M., supra: "[W]e need not decide whether or to what extent the rights of confrontation and cross-examination exist at a preliminary hearing because those rights apply to a juvenile transfer hearing in Alabama by virtue of … statute." O.M., 595 So. 2d at 517 . 10 CR-21-0024 harmless-error analysis in other transfer cases that involved a violation of the accused juvenile's right to confrontation, and those cases provide helpful examples of the balancing required in such analysis.4 In D.D.P. v. State, 595 So. 2d 528 (Ala. Crim. 2022As this Court noted in O.M., supra: "[W]e need not decide whether or to what extent the rights of confrontation and cross-examination exist at a preliminary hearing because those rights apply to a juvenile transfer hearing in Alabama by virtue of … statute." O.M., 595 So. 2d at 517 . 10 CR-21-0024 harmless-error analysis in other transfer cases that involved a violation of the accused juvenile's right to confrontation, and those cases provide helpful examples of the balancing required in such analysis.4 In D.D.P. v. State, 595 So. 2d 528 (Ala. Crim. | 6 | 13 |
Ex Parte WTKgreen2 sentences2005Ex parte W.T.K., 586 So.2d 850, 853 (Ala.1991) ("It is particularly important to protect a juvenile's constitutional rights at a transfer hearing. 2005Ex parte W.T.K., 586 So.2d 850, 853 (Ala.1991) (“It is particularly important to protect a juvenile’s constitutional rights at a transfer hearing. | 2 | 4 |
WM v. Stategreen2 sentences2002Although generally in a juvenile transfer hearing “hearsay evidence is admissible to show probable cause that the accused committed the crime in question,” W.M. v. State, 607 So.2d 1303, 1304 (Ala.Crim.App.1992), hearsay evidence cannot “constitute the sole basis for a finding of probable cause to transfer the child to circuit court.” O.M. v. State, 595 So.2d 514, 518 (Ala.Crim.App.1991). 1994See also M.M. v. State, 629 So.2d 734 (Ala.Cr.App.1993); W.M. v. State, 607 So.2d 1303, 1304-05 (Ala.Cr.App.1992). | 2 | 2 |
Ex Parte Clanahangreen2 sentences1998See, generally, Ex parte Clanahan , 261 Ala. 87 , 72 So.2d 833 (1954). 1998See, generally, Ex parte Clanahan , 261 Ala. 87 , 72 So.2d 833 (1954). | 2 | 2 |
M.M. v. Stategreen2 sentences1994See also M.M. v. State, 629 So.2d 734 (Ala.Cr. 1994See also M.M. v. State, 629 So.2d 734 (Ala.Cr.App.1993); W.M. v. State, 607 So.2d 1303, 1304-05 (Ala.Cr.App.1992). | 2 | 2 |
Duncan v. Stategreen2 sentences1994At the probable cause phase of a juvenile transfer hearing, the juvenile court must find that “a reasonable man would believe the crime occurred and that the defendant committed it.” Duncan v. State, 394 So.2d 930, 932 (Ala.1981). 1994At the probable cause phase of a juvenile transfer hearing, the juvenile court must find that "a reasonable man would believe the crime occurred and that the defendant committed it." Duncan v. State, 394 So.2d 930, 932 (Ala.1981). | 2 | 2 |
Cruse v. Stategreen2 sentences1992See Cruse v. State, 489 So.2d 694, 695-97 (Ala.Cr.App.1986) (second transfer hearing not barred after original order of transfer reversed on appeal due to insufficiency of evidence); Driver v. State, 456 So.2d 1140, 1141-42 (Ala.Cr.App.1984). “[I]t cannot be disputed that courts of record have the inherent power to set aside and vacate their orders and judgments, although a judge should not merely ‘change his mind’ without sufficient cause or reason.” Carter v. State, 435 So.2d 137, 141 (Ala.Cr.App.1982) (revocation of youthful offender status after previous grant justified by receipt of infor 1992See Cruse v. State, 489 So.2d 694, 695-97 (Ala.Cr.App.1986) (second transfer hearing not barred after original order of transfer reversed on appeal due to insufficiency of evidence); Driver v. State, 456 So.2d 1140, 1141-42 (Ala.Cr.App.1984). "[I]t cannot be disputed that courts of record have the inherent power to set aside and vacate their orders and judgments, although a judge should not merely `change his mind' without sufficient cause or reason." Carter v. State, 435 So.2d 137, 141 (Ala.Cr.App.1982) (revocation of youthful offender status after previous grant justified by receipt of infor | 2 | 2 |
Carter v. Stategreen2 sentences1992See Cruse v. State, 489 So.2d 694, 695-97 (Ala.Cr.App.1986) (second transfer hearing not barred after original order of transfer reversed on appeal due to insufficiency of evidence); Driver v. State, 456 So.2d 1140, 1141-42 (Ala.Cr.App.1984). “[I]t cannot be disputed that courts of record have the inherent power to set aside and vacate their orders and judgments, although a judge should not merely ‘change his mind’ without sufficient cause or reason.” Carter v. State, 435 So.2d 137, 141 (Ala.Cr.App.1982) (revocation of youthful offender status after previous grant justified by receipt of infor 1992See Cruse v. State, 489 So.2d 694, 695-97 (Ala.Cr.App.1986) (second transfer hearing not barred after original order of transfer reversed on appeal due to insufficiency of evidence); Driver v. State, 456 So.2d 1140, 1141-42 (Ala.Cr.App.1984). "[I]t cannot be disputed that courts of record have the inherent power to set aside and vacate their orders and judgments, although a judge should not merely `change his mind' without sufficient cause or reason." Carter v. State, 435 So.2d 137, 141 (Ala.Cr.App.1982) (revocation of youthful offender status after previous grant justified by receipt of infor | 2 | 2 |
Kent v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1992A juvenile transfer hearing “must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.” Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 , 86 S.Ct. 1045, 1057 , 16 L.Ed.2d 84, 98 (1966). 1992A juvenile transfer hearing “must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.” Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 , 86 S.Ct. 1045, 1057 , 16 L.Ed.2d 84, 98 (1966). | 2 | 2 |
City of Columbus v. Grantgreen2 sentences1992See Civ.R. 59(A)(8), 60(B)(2); cf. Columbus v. Grant (1981), 1 Ohio App.3d 96, 97 [ 439 N.E.2d 907 ] (court has discretion to permit a party to reopen its case at trial for evidence that may have been available earlier).” The rule in Alabama is that jeopardy does not attach to a juvenile transfer hearing. 1992See Civ.R. 59(A)(8), 60(B)(2); cf. Columbus v. Grant (1981), 1 Ohio App.3d 96, 97 [ 439 N.E.2d 907 ] (court has discretion to permit a party to reopen its case at trial for evidence that may have been available earlier).” The rule in Alabama is that jeopardy does not attach to a juvenile transfer hearing. | 2 | 2 |
Bryars v. Stategreen2 sentences1992See Cruse v. State, 489 So.2d 694, 695-97 (Ala.Cr.App.1986) (second transfer hearing not barred after original order of transfer reversed on appeal due to insufficiency of evidence); Driver v. State, 456 So.2d 1140, 1141-42 (Ala.Cr.App.1984). “[I]t cannot be disputed that courts of record have the inherent power to set aside and vacate their orders and judgments, although a judge should not merely ‘change his mind’ without sufficient cause or reason.” Carter v. State, 435 So.2d 137, 141 (Ala.Cr.App.1982) (revocation of youthful offender status after previous grant justified by receipt of infor 1992See Cruse v. State, 489 So.2d 694, 695-97 (Ala.Cr.App.1986) (second transfer hearing not barred after original order of transfer reversed on appeal due to insufficiency of evidence); Driver v. State, 456 So.2d 1140, 1141-42 (Ala.Cr.App.1984). "[I]t cannot be disputed that courts of record have the inherent power to set aside and vacate their orders and judgments, although a judge should not merely `change his mind' without sufficient cause or reason." Carter v. State, 435 So.2d 137, 141 (Ala.Cr.App.1982) (revocation of youthful offender status after previous grant justified by receipt of infor | 2 | 2 |
Griffin v. Wisconsingreen2 sentences1991See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 , 107 S.Ct. 3164 , 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987) (wherein the Court held that warrantless search of probationer’s home on less than probable cause does not violate the Fourth Amendment). 1991See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 , 107 S.Ct. 3164 , 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987) (wherein the Court held that warrantless search of probationer’s home on less than probable cause does not violate the Fourth Amendment). | 2 | 2 |
Ward v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1991See Ward v. Commonwealth, 407 Mass. 434 , 554 N.E.2d 25, 27 (1990) (appeal of juvenile transfer order under ch. 119, § 61 Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. 1991See Ward v. Commonwealth, 407 Mass. 434 , 554 N.E.2d 25, 27 (1990) (appeal of juvenile transfer order under ch. 119, § 61 Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. | 2 | 2 |
Q.J.S. v. Stategreen1 sentence2022"In a juvenile transfer hearing, hearsay evidence is admissible to show that there is probable cause that the accused committed the crime, but it cannot constitute the sole basis for a finding of probable cause." Q.J.S. v. State, 12 So. 3d 164, 165 (Ala. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Leonard v. Stategreen1 sentence2009The court cited, in support of its decision, precedent establishing that “[a]n indigent defendant is not entitled to a free transcript of the testimony taken at his preliminary hearing,” 665 So.2d at 211 (citing Leonard v. State, 369 So.2d 873, 875 (Ala.Crim.App.1979)), and reasoned that “[a] juvenile transfer hearing is in the nature of a preliminary hearing,” 665 So.2d at 211 (citing O.M. v. State, 595 So.2d 514, 517 (Ala.Crim.App.1991)). | 1 | 1 |
C.E.B. v. Stategreen1 sentence2002See also C.E.B. v. State, 661 So.2d 786 (Ala.Crim.App.1994)(finding of probable cause in a transfer hearing cannot be based solely on hearsay testimony). | 1 | 1 |
Bombailey v. Stategreen1 sentence1995In Bombailey v. State, 580 So.2d 41, 45 (Ala.Cr.App.1990), this court held that the testimony of a witness at a juvenile proceeding was admissible under § 12-15-100, Code of Alabama 1975, at a subsequent trial in circuit court. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
DDP v. State
green
2 sentences2022As this Court noted in O.M., supra: "[W]e need not decide whether or to what extent the rights of confrontation and cross-examination exist at a preliminary hearing because those rights apply to a juvenile transfer hearing in Alabama by virtue of … statute." O.M., 595 So. 2d at 517 . 10 CR-21-0024 harmless-error analysis in other transfer cases that involved a violation of the accused juvenile's right to confrontation, and those cases provide helpful examples of the balancing required in such analysis.4 In D.D.P. v. State, 595 So. 2d 528 (Ala. Crim. 1994The appellant alleges that his constitutional right to confront witnesses was violated by the admission of the affidavit of Southside Assistant Police Chief Stanley Stroup and a document entitled “underlying facts and circumstances” which had been used to obtain a search warrant and by the admission of an autopsy report. “[A]t a juvenile transfer hearing, hearsay evidence that violates the child’s right of confrontation may not even be admitted, much less constitute the sole basis for a finding of probable cause to transfer the child to circuit court, because such a practice violates Rules 11( | 7 | 1994–2022 |
Ex Parte Whisenant
green
2 sentences1991However, in Ex parte Whisenant, 466 So.2d 1006 (Ala.1985), the Court *852 found that the juvenile's confession was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made and that it was therefore inadmissible in the juvenile transfer hearing. 1991However, in Ex parte Whisenant, 466 So.2d 1006 (Ala.1985), the Court found that the juvenile’s confession was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made and that it was therefore inadmissible in the juvenile transfer hearing. | 5 | 1986–1991 |
Gulledge v. State
green
2 sentences1985Gulledge , supra. Such transfer hearing is not a hearing to adjudicate the guilt or innocence of the child accused of a crime, but rather, such hearing is a probable cause hearing to determine whether the child should be transferred out of the juvenile court for criminal prosecution as an adult. 1985Gulledge , supra. See also Spellman v. State , 469 So.2d 695 (Ala.Crim.App. 1985). | 3 | 1982–1985 |
Ex Parte ADR
green
2 sentences2015Specifically, in Ex parte A.D.R., 690 So.2d 1208 (Ala.1996), the Alabama Supreme Court held that a juvenile who had been transferred from the juvenile court to the circuit court could, under Rule 32, file an out-of-time appeal challenging his counsel’s effectiveness at a juvenile-transfer hearing. 2000In Ex parte A.D.R. , 690 So.2d 1208 (Ala. 1996), the Alabama Supreme Court reversed this court's holding that Rule 32 afforded no mechanism for a court to consider a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel arising from a juvenile transfer hearing, because such a hearing was not a "conviction." Using the same rationale it later reiterated in Ho , this court determined that the language of Rule 32.1 limited the application of Rule 32 to "any defendant who has been convicted of a criminal offense." The Supreme Court wrote: "Neither the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure nor the Alabama Rules | 2 | 2000–2015 |
McKinney v. State
green
2 sentences2009The court cited, in support of its decision, precedent establishing that “[a]n indigent defendant is not entitled to a free transcript of the testimony taken at his preliminary hearing,” 665 So.2d at 211 (citing Leonard v. State, 369 So.2d 873, 875 (Ala.Crim.App.1979)), and reasoned that “[a] juvenile transfer hearing is in the nature of a preliminary hearing,” 665 So.2d at 211 (citing O.M. v. State, 595 So.2d 514, 517 (Ala.Crim.App.1991)). 2009The court cited, in support of its decision, precedent establishing that “[a]n indigent defendant is not entitled to a free transcript of the testimony taken at his preliminary hearing,” 665 So.2d at 211 (citing Leonard v. State, 369 So.2d 873, 875 (Ala.Crim.App.1979)), and reasoned that “[a] juvenile transfer hearing is in the nature of a preliminary hearing,” 665 So.2d at 211 (citing O.M. v. State, 595 So.2d 514, 517 (Ala.Crim.App.1991)). | 2 | 2001–2009 |
Pointer v. Texas
green
2 sentences1991We also hold that because an extrajudicial statement which violates the right of confrontation is constitutionally inadmissible in an adult criminal proceeding, see, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 , 85 S.Ct. 1065 , 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965), it is, by virtue of § 12-15-66(b), inadmissible at a juvenile transfer hearing. 1991We also hold that because an extrajudicial statement which violates the right of confrontation is constitutionally inadmissible in an adult criminal proceeding, see, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 , 85 S.Ct. 1065 , 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965), it is, by virtue of § 12-15-66(b), inadmissible at a juvenile transfer hearing. | 2 | 1991–1991 |
M.B.M. v. State
green
1 sentence2008M.B.M. v. State, 848 So.2d 283 (Ala.Crim.App.2002). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
TLR v. State
green
1 sentence1994T.L.R., 608 So.2d at 770 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Ray v. State
green
1 sentence1985The trial judge was ordered pursuant to Ray v. State, 435 So.2d 53 (Ala.1983), to “correct its transfer order to reflect whether consideration was given to all requirements of § 12-15-34(d), Code of Alabama 1975.” Ray v. State, supra at 54. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Spellman v. State
green
1 sentence1985Gulledge , supra. See also Spellman v. State , 469 So.2d 695 (Ala.Crim.App. 1985). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Winstead v. State
green
1 sentence1980In Winstead, supra, the court held that strict rules of evidence do not apply in a juvenile transfer hearing. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.