juvenile transfer hearing in Tennessee

2011In Graves, the case relied upon by Appellant, the preliminary hearing rather than a juvenile transfer hearing, was not recorded as required by Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 5.1(a). 126 S.W.3d at 875 .

2010In Graves, the case relied upon by Appellant, the preliminary hearing rather than a juvenile transfer hearing, was not recorded as required by Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 5.1(a). 126 S.W.3d at 875 .

2021In its written order summarily dismissing the petitioner’s Rule 36.1 motion, the trial court found that the petitioner was 18 years old at the time of the offenses—a fact which the petitioner acknowledged—and, consequently, “was properly adjudicated as an adult” and “was lawfully sentenced.” In this appeal, the petitioner reasserts his argument that his sentence is illegal because the criminal court lacked jurisdiction and because his sentence of life without the possibility of parole is prohibited under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).

2020This is consistent with our principle holdings above, concluding that a juvenile transfer hearing is a critical stage in the proceedings which “must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.” Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. at 560-62 ; see also State v. Iacona, 2001-Ohio-1292 , 93 Ohio St. 3d 83, 92 , 752 N.E.2d 937, 947 (Ohio 2001) (holding that the State is under a constitutional duty to “disclose to a juvenile respondent all evidence in the state’s possession favorable to the juvenile respondent and material either to guilt or punishment that is known at the time of a

2020In this appeal as of right, the Defendant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the process of transferring a juvenile to criminal court after a finding of three statutory factors by the juvenile court judge violates the Defendant’s rights under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); (2) whether the State’s suppression of alleged eyewitness identifications prior to the juvenile transfer hearing constitutes a Brady violation, requiring remand for a new juvenile transfer hearing; (3) whether the juvenile court erred in transferring the Defendant to criminal court given de

2020As an issue of first impression in Tennessee,3 the Defendant contends that the juvenile transfer hearing process as outlined in Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-134 (a)(4), violates the holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).

2018Id.

2018Id.

2013In Howell, our supreme court held that trial counsel’s representation of the defendant was deficient because trial counsel failed to offer evidence at the defendant’s juvenile transfer hearing concerning his mental health. 185 S.W.3d at 327 .

2006As such, we find no error in the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss.1 Although the Sawyers court stated that even the total deprivation of a juvenile transfer hearing did not implicate a lack of the conviction court’s jurisdiction, it recognized that “[t]he right involved, although created by statute, is sufficiently fundamental to be considered a matter of due process, in the context of juvenile justice.” Id.

1999Ann. § 37-1-115, see Lundy, 808 S.W.2d at 446 , the knowing and voluntary nature of the appellant’s confession is relevant both to the use of the appellant’s confession at the juvenile transfer hearing and to the use of the confession at the appellant’s trial before the Madison County Circuit Court.

1993In State v. Causby, supra, a first-degree murder case, this Court held that the trial court properly admitted a co-defendant’s former testimony from a juvenile transfer hearing under the former testimony exception to the hearsay rule because the defendants had a full opportunity and similar motive to develop the prior testimony.

1993In State v. Causby, supra , a first-degree murder case, this Court held that the trial court properly admitted a co-defendant's former testimony from a juvenile transfer hearing under the former testimony exception to the hearsay rule because the defendants had a full opportunity and similar motive to develop the prior testimony.