juvenile transfer hearing in California

2021As noted, the Supreme Court granted review and ordered this court to vacate our summary denial and direct the Department to show cause why Shields is not entitled to a juvenile transfer hearing in light of In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 and People v. Garcia (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 316 .) We have done so.

2018Code, § 707, subd. (a)(1).) 1 After we filed an unpublished opinion affirming the judgment, Vela filed a petition for rehearing contending that Proposition 57 applies retroactively to his case. ( In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 , 48 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 408 P.2d 948 ( Estrada ).) Ordinarily, this court will not address an issue that has been raised for the first time in a petition for rehearing. ( People v. Holford (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 155 , 136 Cal.Rptr.3d 713 .) However, for good cause we may do so. ( Alameda County Management Employees Assn. v. Superior Court (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 325 , 33

2022Franklin Remand Defendants contend we must order a limited remand under Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th 261 .

2022Following a series of continuances, defendant filed substantive briefing as to his Gutierrez request in 2020; he also simultaneously filed substantive briefing in support of a request to make a sufficient record of information relevant to a future youth offender parole hearing under People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin) and a request for a juvenile transfer hearing under Proposition No. 57 (approved Nov. 8, 2016) (Proposition 57).

2021(Vela, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 82 .) In resolving the matter, the court “order[ed] the juvenile court to conduct a juvenile transfer hearing.” (Ibid.) In Cervantes, the court held that the defendant could “avail himself of a fitness hearing, and if he does so, the matter shall be transferred to the juvenile court for a transfer hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707.” (Cervantes, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 621 .) 19 evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”]; Pen.

2021(Vela, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 82 .) In resolving the matter, the court “order[ed] the juvenile court to conduct a juvenile transfer hearing.” (Ibid.) In Cervantes, the court held that the defendant could “avail himself of a fitness hearing, and if he does so, the matter shall be transferred to the juvenile court for a transfer hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707.” (Cervantes, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 621 .) 19 evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”]; Pen.

2023He argues his conviction and sentence must be vacated and the matter remanded for a juvenile transfer hearing pursuant to Proposition 57 (the “Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016”) (Proposition 57), and People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152 (Padilla).

2023(Lopez, supra, at p. 1120.) 7 To assist the reader, we again note that the high court in Padilla stated that, in extending retroactive benefits from Proposition 57 to Padilla, he was not allowed to raise claims unrelated to his sentence and whatever potential a juvenile transfer hearing “may have for reducing his punishment (the nonfinal part of his judgment), it does not authorize or constitute relitigation of guilt.” ( Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 169–170, boldface added.) 17.

2019As a result, we conditionally reversed the judgment and remanded the matter to respondent Stanislaus County Superior Court with directions to, in pertinent part, *664 conduct a juvenile transfer hearing and either (1) treat the convictions as juvenile adjudications, *366 and impose an appropriate disposition, if it found it would not have transferred T.D. to a court of criminal jurisdiction; or (2) reinstate T.D.'s convictions and sentence if it found it would have transferred T.D. to a court of criminal jurisdiction because he was not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the juveni

2019As a result, we conditionally reversed the judgment and remanded the matter to respondent Stanislaus County Superior Court with directions to, in pertinent part, *664 conduct a juvenile transfer hearing and either (1) treat the convictions as juvenile adjudications, *366 and impose an appropriate disposition, if it found it would not have transferred T.D. to a court of criminal jurisdiction; or (2) reinstate T.D.'s convictions and sentence if it found it would have transferred T.D. to a court of criminal jurisdiction because he was not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the juveni

2023When this is the situation, recourse to section 654 will be unnecessary because a specific statute prevails over a more general one relating to the same subject. . . . [¶] Only if the specific statutes do not provide the answer should the court turn to section 654.” (People v. Ahmed (2011) 53 Cal.4th 156, 163 .) 4 (People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415 , 424–425; People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857 , 893–895.) Last, after we issued our opinion in this appeal, Camarillo petitioned the Supreme Court for review on an issue he did not brief in this court: Does the 2022 amendment to Welfare a

2020(Ibid.) Federico finally rejected the defendant’s argument that the full resentencing rule described in People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857 , 893–894 (Buycks), allowed the trial court to consider any relevant circumstances, such as the enactment of Proposition 57, that had occurred after the defendant was originally sentenced.

2018The court explained: “By making youth (and all that accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that harshest prison sentence, such a scheme poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment.” (Miller v. Alabama, supra, at p. 479 .) In People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 265, 268 , the California Supreme Court held that the proscription in Graham against LWOP for nonhomicide offenses applies equally to sentences that are the functional equivalent of LWOP. 68 We assume, solely for purposes of our discussion of these issues, that Diaz’s case will remain in criminal (adult) court follo

2018The court explained: “By making youth (and all that accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that harshest prison sentence, such a scheme poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment.” (Miller v. Alabama, supra, at p. 479 .) In People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 265, 268 , the California Supreme Court held that the proscription in Graham against LWOP for nonhomicide offenses applies equally to sentences that are the functional equivalent of LWOP. 68 We assume, solely for purposes of our discussion of these issues, that Diaz’s case will remain in criminal (adult) court follo

2017Defendant argues she is entitled to relief under the Act because (1) the provisions of Proposition 57 requiring a juvenile transfer hearing are retroactive to cases not yet final, pursuant to the holding of In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada), and (2) retroactivity to juvenile offenders with LWOP sentences is required under Montgomery, supra, 577 U.S. ___ [ 136 S.Ct. 718 ].

2017FACTS ** DISCUSSION *823 I-V *** VI PROPOSITION 57 In granting rehearing, we asked the parties to submit supplemental briefing regarding whether Proposition 57 applies retroactively to defendant's case. *177 Defendant argues she is entitled to relief under the Act because (1) the provisions of Proposition 57 requiring a juvenile transfer hearing are retroactive to cases not yet final, pursuant to the holding of In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 , 48 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 408 P.2d 948 ( Estrada ), and (2) retroactivity to juvenile offenders with LWOP sentences is required under Montgomery , supra ,

2023When this is the situation, recourse to section 654 will be unnecessary because a specific statute prevails over a more general one relating to the same subject. . . . [¶] Only if the specific statutes do not provide the answer should the court turn to section 654.” (People v. Ahmed (2011) 53 Cal.4th 156, 163 .) 4 (People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415 , 424–425; People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857 , 893–895.) Last, after we issued our opinion in this appeal, Camarillo petitioned the Supreme Court for review on an issue he did not brief in this court: Does the 2022 amendment to Welfare a

2023When this is the situation, recourse to section 654 will be unnecessary because a specific statute prevails over a more general one relating to the same subject. . . . [¶] Only if the specific statutes do not provide the answer should the court turn to section 654.” (People v. Ahmed (2011) 53 Cal.4th 156, 163 .) 4 (People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415 , 424–425; People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857 , 893–895.) Last, after we issued our opinion in this appeal, Camarillo petitioned the Supreme Court for review on an issue he did not brief in this court: Does the 2022 amendment to Welfare a

2022In any case, “[a]lthough, as a general rule, ‘an appeal from an order in a criminal case removes the subject matter of that order from the jurisdiction of the trial court’ [citation] it is settled that an unauthorized sentence is subject to correction despite the circumstance that an appeal is pending.” (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1044 .) 7 In our review of the statutory history of Proposition 57, we found nothing that distinguished judgments based on authorized sentences from judgments based on unauthorized sentences.

2021If defendant seeks to add to the record below on remand, “the trial court may ‘exercise its discretion to conduct this process efficiently, ensuring that the information introduced is relevant, noncumulative, and otherwise in accord with the governing rules, statutes, and regulations.’” (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 459 , quoting People v. Rodriguez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1123, 1132 .) DISPOSITION Judgment is conditionally reversed, and this matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to refer the case to the juvenile court to conduct a juvenile transfer hearing.

2021(See Delgado, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 855 .) On remand, defendant may raise for the first time in the trial court his arguments that (1) he is entitled to a juvenile transfer hearing, (2) the trial court should exercise its discretion regarding whether to dismiss the firearm enhancements, and (3) fees and fines should not be imposed.

2021If defendant seeks to add to the record below on remand, “the trial court may ‘exercise its discretion to conduct this process efficiently, ensuring that the information introduced is relevant, noncumulative, and otherwise in accord with the governing rules, statutes, and regulations.’” (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 459 , quoting People v. Rodriguez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1123, 1132 .) DISPOSITION Judgment is conditionally reversed, and this matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to refer the case to the juvenile court to conduct a juvenile transfer hearing.

2021As noted, the Supreme Court granted review and ordered this court to vacate our summary denial and direct the Department to show cause why Shields is not entitled to a juvenile transfer hearing in light of In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 and People v. Garcia (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 316 .) We have done so.

2021As noted, the Supreme Court granted review and ordered this court to vacate our summary denial and direct the Department to show cause why Shields is not entitled to a juvenile transfer hearing in light of In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 and People v. Garcia (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 316 .) We have done so.

2021Appealing from his resentencing, defendant argues that (1) he is entitled to a juvenile transfer hearing pursuant to Proposition 57, (2) the trial court failed to exercise its discretion as to the firearm enhancements, and (3) the fees and fines imposed should be stricken pursuant to People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 .

2018Code, § 1260 )," the court ordered a limited remand. ( Id . at p. 81, 218 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 .) Specifically, the Vela court ordered as follows: "Here, under these circumstances, Vela's conviction and sentence are conditionally reversed and we order the juvenile court to conduct a juvenile transfer hearing. ( § 707.) When conducting the transfer hearing, the juvenile court shall, to the extent possible, treat the matter as though the prosecutor had originally filed a juvenile petition in juvenile court and had then moved to transfer Vela's cause to a court of criminal jurisdiction. ( § 707, subd. (

2018Code, § 1260 )," the court ordered a limited remand. ( Id . at p. 81, 218 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 .) Specifically, the Vela court ordered as follows: "Here, under these circumstances, Vela's conviction and sentence are conditionally reversed and we order the juvenile court to conduct a juvenile transfer hearing. ( § 707.) When conducting the transfer hearing, the juvenile court shall, to the extent possible, treat the matter as though the prosecutor had originally filed a juvenile petition in juvenile court and had then moved to transfer Vela's cause to a court of criminal jurisdiction. ( § 707, subd. (