belated claim in New York

2021Furthermore, since the expert's conclusions were based entirely [*2]upon plaintiff's tailored affidavit, the expert's affirmation also failed to raise a triable issue of fact ( Feaster-Lewis v Rotenberg , 93 AD3d 421, 422 [1st Dept 2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 803 [2012]).THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

2021Furthermore, since the expert's conclusions were based entirely [*2]upon plaintiff's tailored affidavit, the expert's affirmation also failed to raise a triable issue of fact ( Feaster-Lewis v Rotenberg , 93 AD3d 421, 422 [1st Dept 2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 803 [2012]).

2021Thus, plaintiff's affidavit containing a belated claim that the consent that she signed did not contain the description of possible risks and complications at the time she signed it, and that portion must have been added later, created only a feigned issue of fact insufficient to defeat defendants' motion ( see Pinto v Selinger Ice Cream Corp. , 47 AD3d 496 [1st Dept 2008]; Telfeyan v City of New York , 40 AD3d 372, 373 [1st Dept 2007]).

2021Thus, plaintiff's affidavit containing a belated claim that the consent that she signed did not contain the description of possible risks and complications at the time she signed it, and that portion must have been added later, created only a feigned issue of fact insufficient to defeat defendants' motion ( see Pinto v Selinger Ice Cream Corp. , 47 AD3d 496 [1st Dept 2008]; Telfeyan v City of New York , 40 AD3d 372, 373 [1st Dept 2007]).

2014The objectants’ belated challenge to the use of estate funds to pay the appellants’ legal fees in the federal action fits squarely in the category of claims that they released in the settlement, which “could have [been] asserted in the above referenced lawsuits to date” or “could have been made by any of the parties in any proceeding in the Surrogate’s Court, Suffolk County” (cf. Koufakis v Siglag, 85 AD3d 872, 873 [2011]; Rubycz-Boyar v Mondragon, 15 AD3d 811 [2005]; Tavoulareas v Bell, 292 AD2d 256, 257 [2002]; compare Cahill v Regan, 5 NY2d 292, 299 [1959]).

2014The objectants’ belated challenge to the use of estate funds to pay the appellants’ legal fees in the federal action fits squarely in the category of claims that they released in the settlement, which “could have [been] asserted in the above referenced lawsuits to date” or “could have been made by any of the parties in any proceeding in the Surrogate’s Court, Suffolk County” (cf. Koufakis v Siglag, 85 AD3d 872, 873 [2011]; Rubycz-Boyar v Mondragon, 15 AD3d 811 [2005]; Tavoulareas v Bell, 292 AD2d 256, 257 [2002]; compare Cahill v Regan, 5 NY2d 292, 299 [1959]).

2014The objectants’ belated challenge to the use of estate funds to pay the appellants’ legal fees in the federal action fits squarely in the category of claims that they released in the settlement, which “could have [been] asserted in the above referenced lawsuits to date” or “could have been made by any of the parties in any proceeding in the Surrogate’s Court, Suffolk County” (cf. Koufakis v Siglag, 85 AD3d 872, 873 [2011]; Rubycz-Boyar v Mondragon, 15 AD3d 811 [2005]; Tavoulareas v Bell, 292 AD2d 256, 257 [2002]; compare Cahill v Regan, 5 NY2d 292, 299 [1959]).

2014The objectants’ belated challenge to the use of estate funds to pay the appellants’ legal fees in the federal action fits squarely in the category of claims that they released in the settlement, which “could have [been] asserted in the above referenced lawsuits to date” or “could have been made by any of the parties in any proceeding in the Surrogate’s Court, Suffolk County” (cf. Koufakis v Siglag, 85 AD3d 872, 873 [2011]; Rubycz-Boyar v Mondragon, 15 AD3d 811 [2005]; Tavoulareas v Bell, 292 AD2d 256, 257 [2002]; compare Cahill v Regan, 5 NY2d 292, 299 [1959]).

2014The objectants’ belated challenge to the use of estate funds to pay the appellants’ legal fees in the federal action fits squarely in the category of claims that they released in the settlement, which “could have [been] asserted in the above referenced lawsuits to date” or “could have been made by any of the parties in any proceeding in the Surrogate’s Court, Suffolk County” (cf. Koufakis v Siglag, 85 AD3d 872, 873 [2011]; Rubycz-Boyar v Mondragon, 15 AD3d 811 [2005]; Tavoulareas v Bell, 292 AD2d 256, 257 [2002]; compare Cahill v Regan, 5 NY2d 292, 299 [1959]).

2014The objectants’ belated challenge to the use of estate funds to pay the appellants’ legal fees in the federal action fits squarely in the category of claims that they released in the settlement, which “could have [been] asserted in the above referenced lawsuits to date” or “could have been made by any of the parties in any proceeding in the Surrogate’s Court, Suffolk County” (cf. Koufakis v Siglag, 85 AD3d 872, 873 [2011]; Rubycz-Boyar v Mondragon, 15 AD3d 811 [2005]; Tavoulareas v Bell, 292 AD2d 256, 257 [2002]; compare Cahill v Regan, 5 NY2d 292, 299 [1959]).

2013Notwithstanding Maximum Litigation’s excuse for the belated hearing request, “the statutory time period in which to request a hearing is to be strictly construed, and the statute contains no provision permitting an extension of time in which an employer can request a hearing” (Matter of White [Lurie — Commissioner of Labor], 49 AD3d 932, 933 [2008] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; accord Matter of Agarwal [Bilingual Seit & Preschool, Inc. — Commissioner of Labor], 108 AD3d 807 , 808 [2013]).

2013Notwithstanding Maximum Litigation’s excuse for the belated hearing request, “the statutory time period in which to request a hearing is to be strictly construed, and the statute contains no provision permitting an extension of time in which an employer can request a hearing” (Matter of White [Lurie — Commissioner of Labor], 49 AD3d 932, 933 [2008] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; accord Matter of Agarwal [Bilingual Seit & Preschool, Inc. — Commissioner of Labor], 108 AD3d 807 , 808 [2013]).

2013Notwithstanding Maximum Litigation’s excuse for the belated hearing request, “the statutory time period in which to request a hearing is to be strictly construed, and the statute contains no provision permitting an extension of time in which an employer can request a hearing” (Matter of White [Lurie — Commissioner of Labor], 49 AD3d 932, 933 [2008] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; accord Matter of Agarwal [Bilingual Seit & Preschool, Inc. — Commissioner of Labor], 108 AD3d 807 , 808 [2013]).

2013Notwithstanding Maximum Litigation’s excuse for the belated hearing request, “the statutory time period in which to request a hearing is to be strictly construed, and the statute contains no provision permitting an extension of time in which an employer can request a hearing” (Matter of White [Lurie — Commissioner of Labor], 49 AD3d 932, 933 [2008] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; accord Matter of Agarwal [Bilingual Seit & Preschool, Inc. — Commissioner of Labor], 108 AD3d 807 , 808 [2013]).

2025The belated instruction offered [*5]during deliberations — which narrowly answered the jury's question and thus left unaddressed how the jury should utilize what remained of defendant's adoptive admission — did little to eliminate the harm caused ( see People v Calabria , 94 NY2d 519, 523 [2000]).

2025The belated instruction offered [*5]during deliberations — which narrowly answered the jury's question and thus left unaddressed how the jury should utilize what remained of defendant's adoptive admission — did little to eliminate the harm caused ( see People v Calabria , 94 NY2d 519, 523 [2000]).

2025The People's case was less than overwhelming, hinging as it did on the competing narratives of defendant and the victim's boyfriend, and County Court's errors thus cannot be deemed to have been harmless ( see People v Crimmins , 36 NY2d 230, 241 [1975]; People v Hansel , 200 AD3d 1327, 1331-1332 [3d Dept 2021], lv denied 38 NY3d 927 [2022]).

2025The People's case was less than overwhelming, hinging as it did on the competing narratives of defendant and the victim's boyfriend, and County Court's errors thus cannot be deemed to have been harmless ( see People v Crimmins , 36 NY2d 230, 241 [1975]; People v Hansel , 200 AD3d 1327, 1331-1332 [3d Dept 2021], lv denied 38 NY3d 927 [2022]).

2025Additionally, because petitioner failed to argue on administrative appeal that the belated hearing notice deprived the ALJ of jurisdiction to hear the matter, he "failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to that contention" ( Matter of Gorman v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs. , 34 AD3d 1361, 1361 [4th Dept 2006]).

2025Contrary to petitioner's contention, a suspension of his license for 180 days is not "so disproportionate to the offense as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness" ( id. [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2025The People's case was less than overwhelming, hinging as it did on the competing narratives of defendant and the victim's boyfriend, and County Court's errors thus cannot be deemed to have been harmless ( see People v Crimmins , 36 NY2d 230, 241 [1975]; People v Hansel , 200 AD3d 1327, 1331-1332 [3d Dept 2021], lv denied 38 NY3d 927 [2022]).

2025The People's case was less than overwhelming, hinging as it did on the competing narratives of defendant and the victim's boyfriend, and County Court's errors thus cannot be deemed to have been harmless ( see People v Crimmins , 36 NY2d 230, 241 [1975]; People v Hansel , 200 AD3d 1327, 1331-1332 [3d Dept 2021], lv denied 38 NY3d 927 [2022]).

2011In addition, there was no evidence to support the defendant’s belated claim that he pleaded guilty under duress as a result of prosecutorial conduct (see People v Seeber, 4 NY3d at 780-781).

2011The defendant’s right to subpoena witnesses to appear at a trial was waived as a matter of necessity upon the taking of his plea of guilty (see People v Gerber, 182 AD2d 252, 259-260 [1992]) and his claim regarding prosecutorial conduct was forfeited as a consequence of his plea (id. at 260).

2010The defendant’s contention that he was deprived of the effec tive assistance of counsel rests mainly on matter dehors the record and, thus, cannot be reviewed on direct appeal (see People v Bessaha, 54 AD3d 381, 382 [2008]; People v Monroe, 52 AD3d 623 [2008]).

2010In addition, there was no evidence to support the defendant’s belated claim of innocence or to indicate that he was induced to plead guilty as a result of fraud or mistake (see People v Smith, 54 AD3d 879 [2008]; People v Zakrzewski, 7 AD3d 881 [2004]; People v Davis, 250 AD2d 939, 940 [1998]).

2004We find this belated claim of possible partiality insufficient to establish the manifest necessity required to declare a mistrial (see Matter of Ferlito v Judges of County Ct., Suffolk County, 31 NY2d 416, 419-420 [1972]).

2004As a mistrial was not necessary, any retrial of petitioner is barred by the prohibition against double jeopardy and, therefore, the simplified traffic information must be dismissed (see Matter of Newman v Brennan, 2 AD3d 447, 448 [2003]).