law negligence analysis in Washington

2013The majority impermissibly uses Keller v. City of Spokane, 146 Wn.2d 237 , 44 P.3d 845 (2002), as a broad broom, sweeping the legal causation prong into the duty prong of the common law negligence analysis.

2013The majority impermissibly uses Keller v. City of Spokane, 146 Wn.2d 237 , 44 P.3d 845 (2002), as a broad broom, sweeping the legal causation prong into the duty prong of the common law negligence analysis.

2013The majority impermissibly uses Keller v. City of Spokane, 146 Wn.2d 237 , 44 P.3d 845 (2002), as a broad broom, sweeping the legal causation prong into the duty prong of the common law negligence analysis.

2013The majority impermissibly uses Keller v. City of Spokane, 146 Wn.2d 237 , 44 P.3d 845 (2002), as a broad broom, sweeping the legal causation prong into the duty prong of the common law negligence analysis.

2016App. 720, 731 , 233 P.3d 914 (2010). -4- No. 73927-1-1/5 has reason to know that the dog has vicious or dangerous propensities.6 Carr does not dispute that the Riveroses had no notice that Kid had any dangerous propensity; thus, she now asserts only a common law negligence claim.

2016The defendant dog owner's admission that the dog would react if provoked was not enough evidence of negligence to survive summary judgment.12 Like in Beeler, the Riveroses had 9 See, e.g., Sliqer, 156 Wn.

2016"The quantum of evidence necessary to support a finding of Jones Act negligence is less than that required for common law negligence and even 13 Young. 112 Wn.2d at 225 (guoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 , 106 S. Ct. 2548 , 91 L.

2016"The quantum of evidence necessary to support a finding of Jones Act negligence is less than that required for common law negligence and even 13 Young. 112 Wn.2d at 225 (guoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 , 106 S. Ct. 2548 , 91 L.

2013In this way, the majority relies on Keller’s narrow language about municipalities’ duties to motorists to not only answer the duty question but also sweep in the legal causation question, presuming that the first necessarily answers the second. ¶24 Legal causation “is grounded in policy determinations as to how far the consequences of a defendant’s acts should extend.” Crowe v. Gaston, 134 Wn.2d 509, 518 , 951 P.2d 1118 (1998).

2013In this way, the majority relies on Keller’s narrow language about municipalities’ duties to motorists to not only answer the duty question but also sweep in the legal causation question, presuming that the first necessarily answers the second. ¶24 Legal causation “is grounded in policy determinations as to how far the consequences of a defendant’s acts should extend.” Crowe v. Gaston, 134 Wn.2d 509, 518 , 951 P.2d 1118 (1998).

1985Although several cases have alluded to this distinction, see, e.g., Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wn.2d at 440 ; Rhea v. Grandview Sch.