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38 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1993–2025 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ungergreen2 sentences2025In this case, in considering those factors, we remem- ber the importance of the “exploitation analysis,” described above, in which we must engage: “Exploitation analysis rec- ognizes that police conduct that constitutes an illegal stop or an illegal search may * * * require suppression because the police took advantage of information gained from their illegal conduct or some other aspect of that conduct to obtain 6 State v. Wagner * * * an advantage that they would not have had the police stayed within the bounds of the law.” Unger, 356 Or at 74 (so noting in the context of gaining the “advant 2022In Unger, the Supreme Court articu- lated the exploitation test as inquiring whether “the police took advantage of information gained from their illegal conduct or some other aspect of that conduct to obtain consent—an advantage that they would not have had had the police stayed within the bounds of the law.” Id. at 74 . | 7 | 16 |
State v. Hallgreen2 sentences2020In Unger, the Supreme Court reexamined the exploitation analysis that it had articulated in State v. Hall, 339 Or 7, 25 , 115 P3d 908 (2005), in which a defendant seek- ing to suppress evidence was required to show a “minimal factual nexus” between unlawful police conduct and the evi- dence that the defendant sought to suppress. 2020In Unger, the Supreme Court reexamined the exploitation analysis that it had articulated in State v. Hall, 339 Or 7, 25 , 115 P3d 908 (2005), in which a defendant seek- ing to suppress evidence was required to show a “minimal factual nexus” between unlawful police conduct and the evi- dence that the defendant sought to suppress. | 3 | 17 |
State v. Kennedygreen2 sentences2014In particular, the majority relied on State v. Rodriguez, 317 Or 27 , 854 P2d 399 (1993), and State v. Kennedy, 290 Or 493 , 624 P2d 99 (1981), noting that those cases had borrowed from the exploitation analysis that the United States Supreme Court had announced in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 US 471 , 83 S Ct 407 , 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963), to analyze whether Article I, section 9, required suppression of evidence obtained through voluntary consent searches. 6 Although neither Rodriguez nor Kennedy required suppression on the facts of those cases, the majority in Hall noted that both cases had a 2014In particular, the majority relied on State v. Rodriguez, 317 Or 27 , 854 P2d 399 (1993), and State v. Kennedy, 290 Or 493 , 624 P2d 99 (1981), noting that those cases had borrowed from the exploitation analysis that the United States Supreme Court had announced in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 US 471 , 83 S Ct 407 , 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963), to analyze whether Article I, section 9, required suppression of evidence obtained through voluntary consent searches. 6 Although neither Rodriguez nor Kennedy required suppression on the facts of those cases, the majority in Hall noted that both cases had a | 3 | 4 |
State v. Rodriguezgreen2 sentences2015Her theory was that all evidence discovered after Lane’s unlawful entry into her backyard — beginning with Lane’s observation of the odor of alcohol on defendant’s person — was subject to suppression under the exploitation analysis of State v. Rodriguez, 317 Or 27 , 854 P2d 399 (1993), and State v. Hall, 339 Or 7 , 115 P3d 908 (2005). 1 The trial court granted the motion in part. 2015Her theory was that all evidence discovered after Lane’s unlawful entry into her backyard — beginning with Lane’s observation of the odor of alcohol on defendant’s person — was subject to suppression under the exploitation analysis of State v. Rodriguez, 317 Or 27 , 854 P2d 399 (1993), and State v. Hall, 339 Or 7 , 115 P3d 908 (2005). 1 The trial court granted the motion in part. | 2 | 8 |
State v. Vondehngreen2 sentences2015In our decision in State v. Vondehn, 219 Or App 492, 499-507 , 184 P3d 567 (2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 348 Or 462 , 236 P3d 691 (2010), we considered whether courts should apply an exploitation analysis to vindicate the constitutional right not to be compelled to provide testimony or furnish evidence against oneself under Article I, section 12, similar to the one applied to determine whether suppression of evidence following a violation of Article I, section 9, is necessary to vindicate that constitutional right. 2015In our decision in State v. Vondehn, 219 Or App 492, 499-507 , 184 P3d 567 (2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 348 Or 462 , 236 P3d 691 (2010), we considered whether courts should apply an exploitation analysis to vindicate the constitutional right not to be compelled to provide testimony or furnish evidence against oneself under Article I, section 12, similar to the one applied to determine whether suppression of evidence following a violation of Article I, section 9, is necessary to vindicate that constitutional right. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Ungergreen2 sentences2014Because, on appeal, defendant did not argue that his consent had been involuntarily given, the court went on to apply the exploitation analysis set forth in Hall to deter- mine “whether the [detectives’] illegal entry into defendant’s backyard invalidated defendant’s consent to the [detectives’] entry into and search of his home.”4 Id. at 483-84 . 2014Because, on appeal, defendant did not argue that his consent had been involuntarily given, the court went on to apply the exploitation analysis set forth in Hall to determine “whether the [detectives’] illegal entry into defendant’s backyard invalidated defendant’s consent to the [detectives’] entry into and search of his home.” 4 Id. at 483-84. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Tylergreen2 sentences2025Put another way, evidence obtained after an unlaw- ful search must be suppressed, absent attenuation, because “the remedy for governmental intrusion upon the personal right guaranteed under Article I, section 9, is ‘to restore the parties to the position they would have been in’ prior to the governmental intrusion.” State v. Serrano (A173250), 324 Or App 453, 463 , 527 P3d 54 , adh’d to as modified on recons, 325 Or App 296 , 528 P3d 1219 (2023), rev den, 372 Or 192 (2024) (quoting State v. Mansor, 363 Or 185, 221 , 421 P3d 323 (2018)); see also State v. Tyler, 218 Or App 105, 109 , 178 P3d 28 2025Put another way, evidence obtained after an unlaw- ful search must be suppressed, absent attenuation, because “the remedy for governmental intrusion upon the personal right guaranteed under Article I, section 9, is ‘to restore the parties to the position they would have been in’ prior to the governmental intrusion.” State v. Serrano (A173250), 324 Or App 453, 463 , 527 P3d 54 , adh’d to as modified on recons, 325 Or App 296 , 528 P3d 1219 (2023), rev den, 372 Or 192 (2024) (quoting State v. Mansor, 363 Or 185, 221 , 421 P3d 323 (2018)); see also State v. Tyler, 218 Or App 105, 109 , 178 P3d 28 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Mockgreen1 sentence2023Cf. Escudero, 311 Or App at 174 (declining to con- sider the state’s alternative basis for affirmance where the record may have developed differently with respect to the exploitation analysis involving the fact-specific question of the defendant’s voluntary consent to search the car with a drug dog); Mock, 310 Or App at 464 (rejecting the state’s attenuation argument because the purpose or lawfulness of the officer’s questioning was not fully explored below but the topic was “highly relevant to whether the travel question was reasonably related to the traffic investigation”); State v. Najar, 2 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Escuderogreen1 sentence2023Cf. Escudero, 311 Or App at 174 (declining to con- sider the state’s alternative basis for affirmance where the record may have developed differently with respect to the exploitation analysis involving the fact-specific question of the defendant’s voluntary consent to search the car with a drug dog); Mock, 310 Or App at 464 (rejecting the state’s attenuation argument because the purpose or lawfulness of the officer’s questioning was not fully explored below but the topic was “highly relevant to whether the travel question was reasonably related to the traffic investigation”); State v. Najar, 2 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Heatergreen2 sentences2021See, e.g., State v. Heater, 271 Or App 538, 540 , 351 P3d 776 (2015) (concluding that the record may have devel- oped differently if the state had raised its “no exploitation” argument at trial). 2021See, e.g., State v. Heater, 271 Or App 538, 540 , 351 P3d 776 (2015) (concluding that the record may have devel- oped differently if the state had raised its “no exploitation” argument at trial). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Mussergreen2 sentences2015ORS 164.245(1) provides that “[a] person commits the crime of criminal trespass in the second degree if the person enters or remains unlawfully in a motor vehicle or in or upon premises.” Unger , which was decided after this case was argued, left intact Hall’s general requirement that the state bears the burden of proof with respect to the exploitation analysis. 356 Or at 84 (“[W]e adhere to Hall in requiring the state to prove that the consent was independent of, or only tenuously related to, the illegal police conduct.”); State v, Musser, 356 Or 148, 150 , 335 P3d 814 (2014) (“[W]hen a defen 2015ORS 164.245(1) provides that “[a] person commits the crime of criminal trespass in the second degree if the person enters or remains unlawfully in a motor vehicle or in or upon premises.” Unger , which was decided after this case was argued, left intact Hall’s general requirement that the state bears the burden of proof with respect to the exploitation analysis. 356 Or at 84 (“[W]e adhere to Hall in requiring the state to prove that the consent was independent of, or only tenuously related to, the illegal police conduct.”); State v, Musser, 356 Or 148, 150 , 335 P3d 814 (2014) (“[W]hen a defen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Courtneygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Thompkingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Whipple v. Courseygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Stanleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Hemenway
green
2 sentences2014Last year, we addressed that issue in State v. Hemenway, 353 Or 129 , 295 P3d 617 (2013), and modified part of this court’s exploitation analysis previously described in State v. Hall, 339 Or 7, 34-35 , 115 P3d 908 (2005). 2014Last year, we addressed that issue in State v. Hemenway, 353 Or 129 , 295 P3d 617 (2013), and modified part of this court’s exploitation analysis previously described in State v. Hall, 339 Or 7, 34-35 , 115 P3d 908 (2005). | 7 | 2013–2014 |
Wong Sun v. United States
green
2 sentences2014In particular, the majority relied on State v. Rodriguez, 317 Or 27 , 854 P2d 399 (1993), and State v. Kennedy, 290 Or 493 , 624 P2d 99 (1981), noting that those cases had borrowed from the exploitation analysis that the United States Supreme Court had announced in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 US 471 , 83 S Ct 407 , 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963), to analyze whether Article I, section 9, required suppression of evidence obtained through voluntary consent searches. 6 Although neither Rodriguez nor Kennedy required suppression on the facts of those cases, the majority in Hall noted that both cases had a 2014In particular, the majority relied on State v. Rodriguez, 317 Or 27 , 854 P2d 399 (1993), and State v. Kennedy, 290 Or 493 , 624 P2d 99 (1981), noting that those cases had borrowed from the exploitation analysis that the United States Supreme Court had announced in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 US 471 , 83 S Ct 407 , 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963), to analyze whether Article I, section 9, required suppression of evidence obtained through voluntary consent searches. 6 Although neither Rodriguez nor Kennedy required suppression on the facts of those cases, the majority in Hall noted that both cases had a | 4 | 2013–2014 |
State v. Lorenzo
green
2 sentences2015Indeed, defendant acknowledges that “the encounter was calm.” Although that kind of restrained interaction does “not present the kind of flagrant circumstances that likely would have affected defendant’s voluntary consent,” State v. Lorenzo, 356 Or 134, 145-46 , 335 P3d 821 (2014), the absence of flagrant conduct, though relevant, does not control the exploitation inquiry. 2015Indeed, defendant acknowledges that “the encounter was calm.” Although that kind of restrained interaction does “not present the kind of flagrant circumstances that likely would have affected defendant’s voluntary consent,” State v. Lorenzo, 356 Or 134, 145-46 , 335 P3d 821 (2014), the absence of flagrant conduct, though relevant, does not control the exploitation inquiry. | 3 | 2014–2015 |
State v. Hemenway
green
2 sentences2014Alternatively, the state argues that this court should modify Hall as it did in State v. Hemenway, 353 Or 129 , 295 P3d 617 , vac’d as moot, 353 Or 498 , 302 P3d 413 (2013), by emphasizing that the exploitation analysis set forth in Hall overvalued the temporal proximity between the illegality and the consent, while undervaluing the defendant’s voluntary consent. 2014Alternatively, the state argues that this court should modify Hall as it did in State v. Hemenway, 353 Or 129 , 295 P3d 617 , vac’d as moot, 353 Or 498 , 302 P3d 413 (2013), by emphasizing that the exploitation analysis set forth in Hall overvalued the temporal proximity between the illegality and the consent, while undervaluing the defendant’s voluntary consent. | 3 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Quinn
green
2 sentences2013In particular, the majority relied on State v. Kennedy, 290 Or 493 , 624 P2d 99 (1981), and State v. Rodriguez, 317 Or 27 , 854 P2d 399 (1993), noting that those cases bor- rowed from the exploitation analysis that the United States Supreme Court announced in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 US 471 , 83 S Ct 407 , 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963), to analyze whether Article I, section 9, required suppression of evidence obtained through valid consent searches.2 Although neither Kennedy nor Rodriguez required suppression on the facts of those cases, the majority in Hall noted that both cases 2 The majority a 2013In particular, the majority relied on State v. Kennedy, 290 Or 493 , 624 P2d 99 (1981), and State v. Rodriguez, 317 Or 27 , 854 P2d 399 (1993), noting that those cases borrowed from the exploitation analysis that the United States Supreme Court announced in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 US 471 , 83 S Ct 407 , 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963), to analyze whether Article I, section 9, required suppression of evidence obtained through valid consent searches.2 Although neither Kennedy nor Rodriguez required suppression on the facts of those cases, the majority in 2 The majority also discussed and disavowed p | 3 | 1996–2013 |
State v. Quinn
green
2 sentences2013In particular, the majority relied on State v. Kennedy, 290 Or 493 , 624 P2d 99 (1981), and State v. Rodriguez, 317 Or 27 , 854 P2d 399 (1993), noting that those cases bor- rowed from the exploitation analysis that the United States Supreme Court announced in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 US 471 , 83 S Ct 407 , 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963), to analyze whether Article I, section 9, required suppression of evidence obtained through valid consent searches.2 Although neither Kennedy nor Rodriguez required suppression on the facts of those cases, the majority in Hall noted that both cases 2 The majority a 2013In particular, the majority relied on State v. Kennedy, 290 Or 493 , 624 P2d 99 (1981), and State v. Rodriguez, 317 Or 27 , 854 P2d 399 (1993), noting that those cases borrowed from the exploitation analysis that the United States Supreme Court announced in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 US 471 , 83 S Ct 407 , 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963), to analyze whether Article I, section 9, required suppression of evidence obtained through valid consent searches.2 Although neither Kennedy nor Rodriguez required suppression on the facts of those cases, the majority in 2 The majority also discussed and disavowed p | 3 | 1996–2013 |
State v. Williams
green
2 sentences2023Turning to the substance of the issue, “when a Miranda violation has occurred, a defendant’s voluntary consent can attenuate the prior violation if the consent was either not affected by or was only tenuously connected to a prior illegality.” State v. Williams, 320 Or App 705, 715 , 514 P3d 501 (2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). 2023Turning to the substance of the issue, “when a Miranda violation has occurred, a defendant’s voluntary consent can attenuate the prior violation if the consent was either not affected by or was only tenuously connected to a prior illegality.” State v. Williams, 320 Or App 705, 715 , 514 P3d 501 (2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). | 2 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Vondehn
green
2 sentences2015In our decision in State v. Vondehn, 219 Or App 492, 499-507 , 184 P3d 567 (2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 348 Or 462 , 236 P3d 691 (2010), we considered whether courts should apply an exploitation analysis to vindicate the constitutional right not to be compelled to provide testimony or furnish evidence against oneself under Article I, section 12, similar to the one applied to determine whether suppression of evidence following a violation of Article I, section 9, is necessary to vindicate that constitutional right. 2015In our decision in State v. Vondehn, 219 Or App 492, 499-507 , 184 P3d 567 (2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 348 Or 462 , 236 P3d 691 (2010), we considered whether courts should apply an exploitation analysis to vindicate the constitutional right not to be compelled to provide testimony or furnish evidence against oneself under Article I, section 12, similar to the one applied to determine whether suppression of evidence following a violation of Article I, section 9, is necessary to vindicate that constitutional right. | 2 | 2010–2015 |
State v. Hall
green
2 sentences2005Id. at 72, 50 P.3d 1258 (Deits, C. 2002The majority gives little, if any, weight to such knowledge. 183 Or.App. at 58 n. 8, 50 P.3d at 1264 n. 8. | 2 | 2002–2005 |
State v. Mansor
green
2 sentences2025Put another way, evidence obtained after an unlaw- ful search must be suppressed, absent attenuation, because “the remedy for governmental intrusion upon the personal right guaranteed under Article I, section 9, is ‘to restore the parties to the position they would have been in’ prior to the governmental intrusion.” State v. Serrano (A173250), 324 Or App 453, 463 , 527 P3d 54 , adh’d to as modified on recons, 325 Or App 296 , 528 P3d 1219 (2023), rev den, 372 Or 192 (2024) (quoting State v. Mansor, 363 Or 185, 221 , 421 P3d 323 (2018)); see also State v. Tyler, 218 Or App 105, 109 , 178 P3d 28 2025Put another way, evidence obtained after an unlaw- ful search must be suppressed, absent attenuation, because “the remedy for governmental intrusion upon the personal right guaranteed under Article I, section 9, is ‘to restore the parties to the position they would have been in’ prior to the governmental intrusion.” State v. Serrano (A173250), 324 Or App 453, 463 , 527 P3d 54 , adh’d to as modified on recons, 325 Or App 296 , 528 P3d 1219 (2023), rev den, 372 Or 192 (2024) (quoting State v. Mansor, 363 Or 185, 221 , 421 P3d 323 (2018)); see also State v. Tyler, 218 Or App 105, 109 , 178 P3d 28 | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Serrano (A173250)
green
2 sentences2025Put another way, evidence obtained after an unlaw- ful search must be suppressed, absent attenuation, because “the remedy for governmental intrusion upon the personal right guaranteed under Article I, section 9, is ‘to restore the parties to the position they would have been in’ prior to the governmental intrusion.” State v. Serrano (A173250), 324 Or App 453, 463 , 527 P3d 54 , adh’d to as modified on recons, 325 Or App 296 , 528 P3d 1219 (2023), rev den, 372 Or 192 (2024) (quoting State v. Mansor, 363 Or 185, 221 , 421 P3d 323 (2018)); see also State v. Tyler, 218 Or App 105, 109 , 178 P3d 28 2025Put another way, evidence obtained after an unlaw- ful search must be suppressed, absent attenuation, because “the remedy for governmental intrusion upon the personal right guaranteed under Article I, section 9, is ‘to restore the parties to the position they would have been in’ prior to the governmental intrusion.” State v. Serrano (A173250), 324 Or App 453, 463 , 527 P3d 54 , adh’d to as modified on recons, 325 Or App 296 , 528 P3d 1219 (2023), rev den, 372 Or 192 (2024) (quoting State v. Mansor, 363 Or 185, 221 , 421 P3d 323 (2018)); see also State v. Tyler, 218 Or App 105, 109 , 178 P3d 28 | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Serrano
neutral
2 sentences2025Put another way, evidence obtained after an unlaw- ful search must be suppressed, absent attenuation, because “the remedy for governmental intrusion upon the personal right guaranteed under Article I, section 9, is ‘to restore the parties to the position they would have been in’ prior to the governmental intrusion.” State v. Serrano (A173250), 324 Or App 453, 463 , 527 P3d 54 , adh’d to as modified on recons, 325 Or App 296 , 528 P3d 1219 (2023), rev den, 372 Or 192 (2024) (quoting State v. Mansor, 363 Or 185, 221 , 421 P3d 323 (2018)); see also State v. Tyler, 218 Or App 105, 109 , 178 P3d 28 2025Put another way, evidence obtained after an unlaw- ful search must be suppressed, absent attenuation, because “the remedy for governmental intrusion upon the personal right guaranteed under Article I, section 9, is ‘to restore the parties to the position they would have been in’ prior to the governmental intrusion.” State v. Serrano (A173250), 324 Or App 453, 463 , 527 P3d 54 , adh’d to as modified on recons, 325 Or App 296 , 528 P3d 1219 (2023), rev den, 372 Or 192 (2024) (quoting State v. Mansor, 363 Or 185, 221 , 421 P3d 323 (2018)); see also State v. Tyler, 218 Or App 105, 109 , 178 P3d 28 | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Najar
green
2 sentences2023Cf. Escudero, 311 Or App at 174 (declining to con- sider the state’s alternative basis for affirmance where the record may have developed differently with respect to the exploitation analysis involving the fact-specific question of the defendant’s voluntary consent to search the car with a drug dog); Mock, 310 Or App at 464 (rejecting the state’s attenuation argument because the purpose or lawfulness of the officer’s questioning was not fully explored below but the topic was “highly relevant to whether the travel question was reasonably related to the traffic investigation”); State v. Najar, 2 2023Cf. Escudero, 311 Or App at 174 (declining to con- sider the state’s alternative basis for affirmance where the record may have developed differently with respect to the exploitation analysis involving the fact-specific question of the defendant’s voluntary consent to search the car with a drug dog); Mock, 310 Or App at 464 (rejecting the state’s attenuation argument because the purpose or lawfulness of the officer’s questioning was not fully explored below but the topic was “highly relevant to whether the travel question was reasonably related to the traffic investigation”); State v. Najar, 2 | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Lowell
green
2 sentences2018State v. Lowell , 275 Or.App. 365 , 375, 364 P.3d 34 (2015). 2018State v. Lowell , 275 Or.App. 365 , 375, 364 P.3d 34 (2015). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Clayton v. Hill
green
2 sentences2015Nevertheless, petitioner relies on State v. Fitzgerald, 117 Or App 152 , 843 P2d 964 (1992), and State v. Enemesio, 233 Or App 156 , 255 P3d 115 , rev den, 348 Or 414 (2010), for his argument that there is an exploitation requirement to be read into factor C. 2015Nevertheless, petitioner relies on State v. Fitzgerald, 117 Or App 152 , 843 P2d 964 (1992), and State v. Enemesio, 233 Or App 156 , 255 P3d 115 , rev den, 348 Or 414 (2010), for his argument that there is an exploitation requirement to be read into factor C. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Dougan v. SAIF Corp.
green
1 sentence2015Id. at 74 (“Exploitation analysis recognizes that police conduct that constitutes an illegal stop or an illegal search may fall short of coercing a defendant to consent to a subsequent request to search, but nevertheless may require suppression because the police took advantage of information gained from their illegal conduct or some other aspect of that conduct to obtain consent — an advantage that they would not have had had the police stayed within the bounds of the law.” (Citing State v. Hall, 339 Or 1, 27-28 , 115 P3d 908 (2005).)). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Fitzgerald
neutral
2 sentences2015Nevertheless, petitioner relies on State v. Fitzgerald, 117 Or App 152 , 843 P2d 964 (1992), and State v. Enemesio, 233 Or App 156 , 255 P3d 115 , rev den, 348 Or 414 (2010), for his argument that there is an exploitation requirement to be read into factor C. 2015Nevertheless, petitioner relies on State v. Fitzgerald, 117 Or App 152 , 843 P2d 964 (1992), and State v. Enemesio, 233 Or App 156 , 255 P3d 115 , rev den, 348 Or 414 (2010), for his argument that there is an exploitation requirement to be read into factor C. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Enemesio
green
2 sentences2015Nevertheless, petitioner relies on State v. Fitzgerald, 117 Or App 152 , 843 P2d 964 (1992), and State v. Enemesio, 233 Or App 156 , 255 P3d 115 , rev den, 348 Or 414 (2010), for his argument that there is an exploitation requirement to be read into factor C. 2015Nevertheless, petitioner relies on State v. Fitzgerald, 117 Or App 152 , 843 P2d 964 (1992), and State v. Enemesio, 233 Or App 156 , 255 P3d 115 , rev den, 348 Or 414 (2010), for his argument that there is an exploitation requirement to be read into factor C. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Corona green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Hinds
green
2 sentences2015Unger, 356 Or at 87 ; State v. Hinds, 225 Or App 470, 475-76 , 202 P3d 187 , rev den, 347 Or 43 (2009). 2015Unger, 356 Or at 87 ; State v. Hinds, 225 Or App 470, 475-76 , 202 P3d 187 , rev den, 347 Or 43 (2009). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Poulsen green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Jordan v. BELLEQUE green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Towai neutral | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Arabzadeh green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| State v. Williamson green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.