non-exclusive factors in Tennessee

2010Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 660 .

2010See id.

2011The division of marital property is rooted in equity, and a division of marital property is not rendered inequitable merely because it is not precisely equal, Cohen v. Cohen, 937 S.W.2d 823, 832 (Tenn. 1996); Ellis v. Ellis, 748 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tenn. 1988), or because each party does not receive a share or portion of each marital asset.

2010Ann § 36-4-121(c).2 The division of marital property is rooted in equity, and a division of marital property is not rendered inequitable merely because it is not precisely equal, Cohen v. Cohen, 937 S.W.2d 823, 832 (Tenn. 1996); Ellis v. Ellis, 748 S.W.2d 424 , 2 These statutory factors are: 1.

2011The division of marital property is rooted in equity, and a division of marital property is not rendered inequitable merely because it is not precisely equal, Cohen v. Cohen, 937 S.W.2d 823, 832 (Tenn. 1996); Ellis v. Ellis, 748 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tenn. 1988), or because each party does not receive a share or portion of each marital asset.

2010Ann § 36-4-121(c).2 The division of marital property is rooted in equity, and a division of marital property is not rendered inequitable merely because it is not precisely equal, Cohen v. Cohen, 937 S.W.2d 823, 832 (Tenn. 1996); Ellis v. Ellis, 748 S.W.2d 424 , 2 These statutory factors are: 1.

2017Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 365 (citations omitted). -8- Even when the actor and victim are complete strangers and have no relationship, the basis for the ordinary duty of reasonable care . . . is conduct that creates a risk to another.

2017Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 365 (citations omitted). .

2022In State v. Hooper, 29 S.W.3d 1, 10-12 (Tenn. 2000), our supreme court specifically noted the following non-exclusive factors for consideration when denying probation solely upon the basis of deterrence: (1) Whether other incidents of the charged offense are increasingly present in the community, jurisdiction, or in the state as a whole; -6- (2) Whether the defendant’s crime was the result of intentional, knowing, or reckless conduct or was otherwise motivated by a desire to profit or gain from the criminal behavior; (3) Whether the defendant’s crime and conviction have received substantial pu

2021Likewise, in State v. Hooper, 29 S.W.3d 1, 10-12 (Tenn. 2000), our supreme court specifically noted the following non-exclusive factors for consideration when denying probation solely upon the basis of deterrence: (1) Whether other incidents of the charged offense are increasingly present in the community, jurisdiction, or in the state as a whole; (2) Whether the defendant’s crime was the result of intentional, knowing, or reckless conduct or was otherwise motivated by a desire to profit or gain from the criminal behavior; (3) Whether the defendant’s crime and conviction have received substant

2019Our supreme court has identified the following non-exclusive factors in determining whether a qualified defendant should or should not receive pretrial diversion: “[the] defendant’s amenability to correction, any factors that tend to accurately reflect whether a particular defendant will become a repeat offender, the circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s criminal record, social history, physical and mental condition, the need for general deterrence, and the likelihood that pretrial diversion will serve the ends of justice and the best interest[s] of both the public and the defendant.”

2016State v. Richardson, 357 S.W.3d 620, 626 (Tenn.2012) (citing Hammersley, 650 S.W.2d at 354-55 ).

2017Id. at 596 ; see also John Martin Co., Inc., 819 S.W.2d at 431-32 . 6 The Satterfield court listed the following non-exclusive factors for determining the existence of a duty of care: (1) the foreseeable probability of the harm or injury occurring; (2) the possible magnitude of the potential harm or injury; (3) the importance or social value of the activity engaged in by the defendant; (4) the usefulness of the conduct to the defendant; (5) the feasibility of alternative conduct that is safer; (6) the relative costs and burdens associated with that safer conduct; (7) the relative usefulness of

2017Id. at 596 ; see also John Martin Co., Inc., 819 S.W.2d at 431-32 . 6 The Satterfield court listed the following non-exclusive factors for determining the existence of a duty of care: (1) the foreseeable probability of the harm or injury occurring; (2) the possible magnitude of the potential harm or injury; (3) the importance or social value of the activity engaged in by the defendant; (4) the usefulness of the conduct to the defendant; (5) the feasibility of alternative conduct that is safer; (6) the relative costs and burdens associated with that safer conduct; (7) the relative usefulness of

2016Among the non-exclusive factors that the court must consider are: -6- “(1) the amount of time that elapsed between the plea and the motion to withdraw it; (2) the presence (or absence) of a valid reason for the failure to move for withdrawal earlier in the proceedings; (3) whether the defendant has asserted or maintained his innocence; (4) the circumstances underlying the entry of the guilty plea; (5) the defendant‟s nature and background; (6) the degree to which the defendant has had prior experience with the criminal justice system; and (7) potential prejudice to the government if the motion

2013Phelps, 329 S.W.3d at 446 (quoting United States v. Haygood, 549 F.3d 1049, 1052 (6th Cir. 2008)).

2025Id., 302 S.W.3d at 839 (quoting Means, 907 N.E.2d at 659-661 ); see Parsons, 437 S.W.3d at 485 ; State v. Jerry A. Thigpen, No. M2019-00047-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 2216205 , at *9 (Tenn. Crim.

2024In determining whether a trial court abused its discretion in denying a mistrial because of inappropriate testimony before the jury, this court should consider the following non-exclusive factors: “(1) whether the State elicited the testimony, or whether it was unsolicited and unresponsive; (2) whether the trial court offered and gave a curative jury instruction; and (3) the relative strength or weakness of the State’s proof.” Nash, 294 S.W.3d 541 at 547 (citing State v. Smith, 893 S.W.2d 908, 923 (Tenn. 1994)). 3.

2024In determining whether a trial court abused its discretion in denying a mistrial because of inappropriate testimony before the jury, this court should consider the following non-exclusive factors: “(1) whether the State elicited the testimony, or whether it was unsolicited and unresponsive; (2) whether the trial court offered and gave a curative jury instruction; and (3) the relative strength or weakness of the State’s proof.” Nash, 294 S.W.3d 541 at 547 (citing State v. Smith, 893 S.W.2d 908, 923 (Tenn. 1994)). 3.

2022Generally, when denying alternative sentencing based on the seriousness of the offense alone, “‘the circumstances of the offense as committed must be especially violent, horrifying, shocking, reprehensible, offensive or otherwise of an excessive or exaggerated degree,’ and the nature of the offense must outweigh all factors favoring a sentence other than confinement.” State v. Trotter, 201 S.W.3d 651, 654 (Tenn. 2006) (quoting State v. Grissom, 956 S.W.2d 514, 520 (Tenn. Crim.

2022Generally, when denying alternative sentencing based on the seriousness of the offense alone, “‘the circumstances of the offense as committed must be especially violent, horrifying, shocking, reprehensible, offensive or otherwise of an excessive or exaggerated degree,’ and the nature of the offense must outweigh all factors favoring a sentence other than confinement.” State v. Trotter, 201 S.W.3d 651, 654 (Tenn. 2006) (quoting State v. Grissom, 956 S.W.2d 514, 520 (Tenn. Crim.

2021Our supreme court noted in State v. Sihapanya, 516 S.W.3d 473, 476 (Tenn. 2014), that “the heightened standard of review [from Hooper and Trotter] that applies to cases in which the trial court denies probation based on only one of these factors is inapplicable” when the trial court “combined the need to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense with the need for deterrence and the nature and circumstances of the offense.” This court has explained that according to Sihapanya, - 10 - [I]f only one factor found in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35- 103(1) is utilized by the trial co

2020Hooper, 29 S.W.3d at 10-12 ; see also State v. Fields, 40 S.W.3d 435, 441-42 (Tenn. 2001).

2019The circumstances of the offense and the need for deterrence “‘cannot be given controlling weight unless they are of such overwhelming significance that they [necessarily] outweigh all other factors.’” State v. McKim, 215 S.W.3d 781, 787 (Tenn. 2007) (quoting State v. Washington, 866 S.W.2d 950, 951 (Tenn. 1993)).

2019The circumstances of the offense and the need for deterrence “‘cannot be given controlling weight unless they are of such overwhelming significance that they [necessarily] outweigh all other factors.’” State v. McKim, 215 S.W.3d 781, 787 (Tenn. 2007) (quoting State v. Washington, 866 S.W.2d 950, 951 (Tenn. 1993)).