exceptional sentence below standard in Washington

2025App. 95, 100 , 47 P.3d 173 (2002) (quoting Garcia-Martinez, 88 Wn.

2019App. 95, 100 , 47 P.3d 173 (2002); State v. O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680, 697 , 358 P.3d 359 (2015), review denied, 189 Wn.2d 1007 (2017). 6 No. 51000-6-II “While no defendant is entitled to an exceptional sentence below the standard range, every defendant is entitled to ask the trial court to consider such a sentence and to have the alternative actually considered.” State v. Grayson, 154 Wn.2d 333, 342 , 111 P.3d 1183 (2005) (emphasis added).

2020In O’Dell, the Washington Supreme Court held the decision in State v. Ha’mim, 132 Wn.2d 834 , 940 P.2d 633 (1997), did not bar the sentencing court from considering the characteristics of a youth who just turned 18-years-old as a substantial and compelling factor supporting an exceptional sentence below the standard-range sentencing guidelines under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), chapter 9.94A RCW.

2017In 1997, in State v. Ha'mim, an 18-year-old defendant requested an exceptional sentence below the standard range on the basis of her youth and her absence of police contacts. 132 Wn.2d 834, 837 , 940 P.2d 633 (1997).

2025But in O’Dell, the court did not rely on a constitutional analysis, but rather, considered statutory factors under the SRA to conclude that a “defendant’s youthfulness can support an exceptional sentence below the standard range applicable to an adult felony defendant, and that the sentencing court must exercise its discretion to decide when that is.” 183 Wn.2d at 688, 698-99 . 8 197 Wn.2d at 329 . 9 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 , 132 S. Ct. 2455 , 183 L.

2025But in O’Dell, the court did not rely on a constitutional analysis, but rather, considered statutory factors under the SRA to conclude that a “defendant’s youthfulness can support an exceptional sentence below the standard range applicable to an adult felony defendant, and that the sentencing court must exercise its discretion to decide when that is.” 183 Wn.2d at 688, 698-99 . 8 197 Wn.2d at 329 . 9 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 , 132 S. Ct. 2455 , 183 L.

2001Mr. Hernandez-Hernandez claims it was deficient for defense counsel not to argue for an exceptional sentence below the standard range based on State v. Sanchez, 69 Wn.

2001Mr. Hernandez-Hernandez claims it was deficient for defense counsel not to argue for an exceptional sentence below the standard range based on State v. Sanchez, 69 Wash. App. 255, 261 , 848 P.2d 208 , review denied, 122 Wash.2d 1007 , 859 P.2d 604 (1993) because the multiple offense policy resulted in a clearly excessive presumptive sentence.

2026State v. Jeannotte, 133 Wn.2d 847, 852 , 947 P.2d 1192 (1997).

2019Jeannotte, 133 Wn.2d 847, 851-52 , 947 P.2d 1192 (1997).

2026State v. Jeannotte, 133 Wn.2d 847, 852 , 947 P.2d 1192 (1997).

2019Jeannotte, 133 Wn.2d 847, 851-52 , 947 P.2d 1192 (1997).

2023App. 407, 421 , 183 P.3d 1086 (2008), aff’d, 169 Wn.2d 571 , 238 P.3d 487 (2010); State v. Lemke, 7 Wn.

2021App. 407, 421 , 183 P.3d 1086 (2008) (quoting State v. Grayson, 154 Wn.2d 333, 342 , 111 P.3d 1183 (2005)).

2021In State v. Brown, 139 Wn.2d 20, 28-29 , 983 P.2d 608 (1999), overruled in part by State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1 , 391 P.3d 409 (2017), our Supreme Court held that firearm and deadly weapon sentencing enhancements are mandatory and must be imposed consecutively, regardless of whether an offender receives an exceptional sentence below the standard range on the underlying offense.

2020RCW 9.94A.535 permits a court to impose an exceptional sentence below the standard range if “substantial and compelling reasons [justify] an exceptional sentence” and “mitigating circumstances are established by a preponderance of the evidence.” However, RCW 9.94A.533(3)(e) provides that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, all firearm enhancements under this section are mandatory, shall be served in total confinement, and shall run consecutively to all other sentencing provisions, including other firearm or deadly weapon enhancements.” In State v. Brown, our Supreme Court held that

2021In State v. Brown, 139 Wn.2d 20, 28-29 , 983 P.2d 608 (1999), overruled in part by State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1 , 391 P.3d 409 (2017), our Supreme Court held that firearm and deadly weapon sentencing enhancements are mandatory and must be imposed consecutively, regardless of whether an offender receives an exceptional sentence below the standard range on the underlying offense.

2020RCW 9.94A.535 permits a court to impose an exceptional sentence below the standard range if “substantial and compelling reasons [justify] an exceptional sentence” and “mitigating circumstances are established by a preponderance of the evidence.” However, RCW 9.94A.533(3)(e) provides that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, all firearm enhancements under this section are mandatory, shall be served in total confinement, and shall run consecutively to all other sentencing provisions, including other firearm or deadly weapon enhancements.” In State v. Brown, our Supreme Court held that

2020Solis-Diaz, 194 Wn.

2017Solis-Diaz, 194 Wn.

2017Statement of Additional Grounds In his pro se statement of additional grounds, Ibrahim relies on State v. Graham, 181 Wn.2d 878 , 337 P.3d 319 (2014), to argue the court abused its discretion by not considering the purposes in RCW 9.94A.010 in denying his request for an exceptional sentence below the standard range.

2017Statement of Additional Grounds In his pro se statement of additional grounds, Ibrahim relies on State v. Graham, 181 Wn.2d 878 , 337 P.3d 319 (2014), to argue the court abused its discretion by not considering the purposes in RCW 9.94A.010 in denying his request for an exceptional sentence below the standard range.

2014But a criminal defendant "may appeal a standard range sentence if the sentencing court failed to comply with procedural requirements of the SRA [Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, ch. 9.94A RCW] or constitutional requirements." State v. Osman, 157 Wn.2d 474 ,481­ 82, 139 P.3d 334 (2006). "[W]here a defendant has requested an exceptional sentence below the standard range, review is limited to circumstances where the court has refused to exercise its discretion at all or has relied on an impermissible basis for refusing to impose an exceptional sentence below the standard range." State v. Garcia-Mar

2013Nevertheless, a criminal defendant “may appeal a standard range sentence if the sentencing court failed to comply with procedural requirements of the SRA or constitutional requirements.” State v. Osman, 157 Wn.2d 474, 481-82 , 139 P.3d 334 (2006). “[W]here a defendant has requested an exceptional sentence below the standard range [,] review is limited to circumstances where the court has refused to exercise discretion at all or has relied on an impermissible basis for refusing to impose an exceptional sentence below the standard range.” State v. Garcia-Martinez, 88 Wn.

1994Similarly, in State v. Allert, 117 Wn.2d 156, 164 , 815 P.2d 752 (1991), the court held that "[alcoholism is not in and of itself a reason justifying imposition of an exceptional sentence.” The Allert court further noted that "a defendant’s chemical dependency problem is not a factor which can be relied upon as justifying a durational departure.” Allert , at 166-67 (citing State v. Gardner, 328 N.W.2d 159, 162 (Minn. 1983)); State v. Hutsell, 120 Wn.2d 913 , 845 P.2d 1325 (1993) (regardless of whether the defendant suffers from drug addiction, RCW 9.94A.390(1)(e) excludes consideration of the

1994Similarly, in State v. Allert, 117 Wn.2d 156, 164 , 815 P.2d 752 (1991), the court held that "[alcoholism is not in and of itself a reason justifying imposition of an exceptional sentence.” The Allert court further noted that "a defendant’s chemical dependency problem is not a factor which can be relied upon as justifying a durational departure.” Allert , at 166-67 (citing State v. Gardner, 328 N.W.2d 159, 162 (Minn. 1983)); State v. Hutsell, 120 Wn.2d 913 , 845 P.2d 1325 (1993) (regardless of whether the defendant suffers from drug addiction, RCW 9.94A.390(1)(e) excludes consideration of the

2025Given the age of the case, the State is in the position where it has no remedy for this breach beyond asking the court to impose 3 183 Wn.2d 680, 698-99 , 358 P.3d 359 (2015) (holding that a “defendant’s youthfulness can support an exceptional sentence below the standard range applicable”). 4 161 Wn.2d 322 , 166 P.3d 677 (2007). 4 No. 60170-2-II the high end of the range for both counts and run them consecutively, just as Hale and the State negotiated.

2024Restraint of Mulholland¸161 Wn.2d 322, 333, 166 P.3d 677 (2007)). 29 No. 84487-3-I/30 Kingma requested an exceptional sentence below the standard range based on “incomplete defenses.”8 The court may impose a sentence outside the standard range for “substantial and compelling reasons.” RCW 9.94A.535.

2023State v. Gregg, 196 Wn.2d 473, 486 , 474 P.3d 539 (2020).

2023State v. Gregg, 196 Wn.2d 473, 486 , 474 P.3d 539 (2020).

2021App. 322, 330 , 944 P.2d 1104 (1997); State v. Khanteechit, 101 Wn.

2020But when “a defendant has requested an exceptional sentence below the standard range, we may review the decision if the [trial] court either refused to exercise its discretion at all or relied on an impermissible basis for refusing to impose an exceptional sentence.” State v. Khanteechit, 101 Wn.

2014But a criminal defendant "may appeal a standard range sentence if the sentencing court failed to comply with procedural requirements of the SRA [Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, ch. 9.94A RCW] or constitutional requirements." State v. Osman, 157 Wn.2d 474 ,481­ 82, 139 P.3d 334 (2006). "[W]here a defendant has requested an exceptional sentence below the standard range, review is limited to circumstances where the court has refused to exercise its discretion at all or has relied on an impermissible basis for refusing to impose an exceptional sentence below the standard range." State v. Garcia-Mar

2013Nevertheless, a criminal defendant “may appeal a standard range sentence if the sentencing court failed to comply with procedural requirements of the SRA or constitutional requirements.” State v. Osman, 157 Wn.2d 474, 481-82 , 139 P.3d 334 (2006). “[W]here a defendant has requested an exceptional sentence below the standard range [,] review is limited to circumstances where the court has refused to exercise discretion at all or has relied on an impermissible basis for refusing to impose an exceptional sentence below the standard range.” State v. Garcia-Martinez, 88 Wn.

2025Restraint of Light-Roth, 191 Wn.2d 328 , 336, 422 P.3d 444 (“RCW 9.94A.535(1)(e) has always provided the opportunity to raise youth for the purpose of requesting an exceptional sentence downward, and mitigation based on youth is within the trial court's discretion.”). 16 No. 85086-5-I/17 sentence aligns with the goal of rehabilitation, given the court’s imposition of a sentence below the standard range after considering Hardy’s youth and TBI.

2020Restraint Pet. of Light-Roth, 191 Wn.2d 328 , 336, 422 P.3d 444 (2018) (“[The Sentencing Reform Act of 1981] 8 has always provided the opportunity to raise youth for the purpose of requesting an exceptional sentence downward, and mitigation based on youth is within the trial court’s discretion.”) And, even assuming a possibility that the court would have imposed a different sentence if Key’s counsel had relied on State v. O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680 , 358 P.3d 359 (2015), to advocate for an exceptional sentence below the standard range, “mere possibilities do not establish a prima facie showing of a

2024Furthermore, because 1 543 U.S. 551 , 125 S. Ct. 1183 , 161 L.

2017In Roper, 543 U.S. at 574 , the United States Supreme Court recognized that “[t]he qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual turns 18.” Consistently with that recognition, the Washington Supreme Court held in O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d at 698-99 , that a defendant’s youthfulness can support an exceptional sentence below the standard range applicable to an adult felony defendant, and that the sentencing court must exercise its discretion to decide when that is.