fellow officer rule in Florida

2017“The fellow officer rule allows an arresting officer to assume probable cause to arrest a suspect from information supplied by other officers.” Voorhees, 699 So.2d at 609 .

2014Voorhees, 699 So.2d at 609 ; see also Strickroth v. State, 963 So.2d 366, 368 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (noting that the collective knowledge of the police investigating a crime is imputed to each member under the fellow officer rule, which can involve direct communications between officers who have sufficient information and the officer who stops the suspect, or it can involve general communications among officers when at least one officer possesses the required level of suspicion); State v. Bagley, 844 So.2d 688, 690 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (reversing the trial court’s order suppressing the evidence and

2009See Voorhees v. State, 699 So.2d 602, 609 (Fla.1997) (imputation of collective knowledge of police from two different states investigating the same crime); see also State v. Peterson, 739 So.2d 561, 566 (Fla.1999) (quoting United States v. Wilson, 894 F.2d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir.1990)) ("Moreover, when a group of officers is conducting an operation and there exists at least minimal communication between them, their collective knowledge is determinative of probable cause.”); Johnson v. State, 660 So.2d 648, 664 (Fla.1995) ("Under the fellow-officer rule, information shared by officers investigati

2007NOTES [1] "[T]he collective knowledge of police investigating a crime is imputed to each member under a rule of law often called the fellow officer rule' or `collective knowledge doctrine.'" Johnson v. State, 660 So.2d 648, 657 (Fla.1995); see also State v. Marrero, 890 So.2d 1278, 1282 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).

2023Sawyer, 905 So. 2d at 234 (internal quotations and alterations omitted) (quoting Steiner, 690 So. 2d at 708 ). 1 We agree that reversal is required because the arresting officer did not witness each element of the DUI crime, did not conduct his own personal investigation at the scene of the traffic crash, and is precluded by the fellow officer rule from relying on the public safety aide’s investigation because the aide was not a deputized police officer with the power to arrest the defendant.

2023See § 901.15(5), Fla. Stat. (2019) (“Any law enforcement officer, upon receiving information relayed to him or her from a fellow officer . . . that a driver of a vehicle has violated chapter 316, may arrest the driver for violation of those laws when reasonable and proper identification of the vehicle and the violation has been communicated to the arresting officer.” (emphasis added)); see also Sawyer v. State, 905 So. 2d 232, 234 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (“The [fellow officer] rule does not impute the knowledge of citizen informants to officers.”); Riehle v. Dep’t of High.

2014This court has previously held that the fellow officer rule applies to misdemeanor arrests, finding no reason the rule "should not allow the information that a misdemeanor has occurred in the presence of an officer to be imputed from one officer to another.’’ State v. Boatman, 901 So.2d 222, 223-24 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).

2011Id.; see also State v. Boatman, 901 So.2d 222, 224 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (citing B.D.K. in support of conclusion that an officer may arrest a defendant for a misdemeanor offense committed in the presence of a fellow officer under the fellow officer rule).

2018See id. (finding BOLO sufficient to prove that the officer had reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop in lawful execution of his legal duty); State v. Bowers, 87 So. 3d 704, 707 (Fla. 2012) (explaining that "the fellow officer rule provides that if an officer relies on a chain of evidence to -4- formulate the existence of probable cause for an arrest or a search and seizure," an officer is not required "to possess personal knowledge of each link in the chain of information if the collective knowledge of all the officers supports a finding of probable cause").

2018See id. (finding BOLO sufficient to prove that the officer had reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop in lawful execution of his legal duty); State v. Bowers , 87 So.3d 704 , 707 (Fla. 2012) (explaining that "the fellow officer rule provides that if an officer relies on a chain of evidence to formulate the existence of probable cause for an arrest or a search and seizure," an officer is not required "to possess personal knowledge of each link in the chain of information if the collective knowledge of all the officers supports a finding of probable cause").

2012In State v. Peterson, 739 So.2d 561, 564-67 (Fla.1999), this Court addressed the issue of whether the fellow officer rule could be applied to information in a search warrant regarding the reliability of a confidential informant.

2012As this Court stressed in Peterson , another “unknowing” officer cannot rely on the fellow officer rule simply because the officer finds out relevant information possessed by another officer “after the fact.” Peterson, 739 So.2d at 568 .

2026As this Court stated in Albo v. State, 477 So. 2d 1071, 1073 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), the fellow officer rule “makes very clear . . . that the rule works both ways: to validate an arrest when the responsible officers have probable cause and to vitiate it when, as here, none objectively exists.” In addition, in quoting Whitely v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971), this Court stated in Albo: Certainly police officers called upon to aid other officers in executing arrest warrants are entitled to assume that the officers requesting aid offered the magistrate the information requisite to support an independen

2012Although the fellow officer rule is said to have its origin in the United States Supreme Court opinion of Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 , 91 S.Ct. 1031 , 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971), in that case, the fellow officer rule did not provide the basis for the Court’s ruling.

2012See Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Nader, 4 So.3d 705 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009).”) (emphasis supplied).

2009Nevertheless, we grant certiorari relief on the basis that Ferrer misapplied the fellow officer rule and should be rejected. 1 See Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Nader, 4 So.3d 705 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009).

2018See id. (finding BOLO sufficient to prove that the officer had reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop in lawful execution of his legal duty); State v. Bowers, 87 So. 3d 704, 707 (Fla. 2012) (explaining that "the fellow officer rule provides that if an officer relies on a chain of evidence to -4- formulate the existence of probable cause for an arrest or a search and seizure," an officer is not required "to possess personal knowledge of each link in the chain of information if the collective knowledge of all the officers supports a finding of probable cause").

2018See id. (finding BOLO sufficient to prove that the officer had reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop in lawful execution of his legal duty); State v. Bowers , 87 So.3d 704 , 707 (Fla. 2012) (explaining that "the fellow officer rule provides that if an officer relies on a chain of evidence to formulate the existence of probable cause for an arrest or a search and seizure," an officer is not required "to possess personal knowledge of each link in the chain of information if the collective knowledge of all the officers supports a finding of probable cause").

2014Voorhees, 699 So.2d at 609 ; see also Strickroth v. State, 963 So.2d 366, 368 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (noting that the collective knowledge of the police investigating a crime is imputed to each member under the fellow officer rule, which can involve direct communications between officers who have sufficient information and the officer who stops the suspect, or it can involve general communications among officers when at least one officer possesses the required level of suspicion); State v. Bagley, 844 So.2d 688, 690 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (reversing the trial court’s order suppressing the evidence and

2005Smith v. State, 719 So.2d 1018, 1022-23 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) ("[W]e need not decide whether Colangelo himself had a reasonable suspicion that Smith was carrying a weapon because we find that by application of the `fellow officer' rule, the pat down can be justified....

2014Voorhees, 699 So.2d at 609 ; see also Strickroth v. State, 963 So.2d 366, 368 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (noting that the collective knowledge of the police investigating a crime is imputed to each member under the fellow officer rule, which can involve direct communications between officers who have sufficient information and the officer who stops the suspect, or it can involve general communications among officers when at least one officer possesses the required level of suspicion); State v. Bagley, 844 So.2d 688, 690 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (reversing the trial court’s order suppressing the evidence and

2011See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 , 124 S.Ct. 795 , 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003); see also Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 , 129 S.Ct. 781 , 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009); see also State v. Bagley, 844 So.2d 688, 690 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (“The fellow officer rule allows an arresting officer to assume probable cause to arrest a suspect from information supplied by other officers.” (quoting Voorhees v. State, 699 So.2d 602, 609 (Fla.1997))).

2005See State v. Adderly, 809 So.2d 75, 76 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).

2003See State v. Adderly, 809 So.2d 75 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Ferrer v. State, 785 So.2d 709 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).

2005See Routly v. State, 440 So.2d 1257, 1261 (Fla.1983).

2005See Routly v. State, 440 So.2d 1257, 1261 (Fla.1983).

2012As to the admissibility of the arresting officer’s testimony to establish the traffic violation, the circuit court expressly relied on Ferrer v. State, 785 So.2d 709, 711 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), in which the Fourth District held that the fellow officer rule does not require an arresting officer to have firsthand knowledge of an initial traffic stop in order to be able to testify with regard to the circumstances surrounding that stop.

2009The circuit court relied on Ferrer v. State, 785 So.2d 709 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), to conclude that Officer Tracy’s hearsay testimony was admissible under the fellow officer rule.

2009Polk v. Williams, 565 So.2d 1387 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990).

1999See State v. Evans, 692 So.2d 216 , 218 n. 3 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) ("This so-called fellow officer rule has been applied to search warrants as well as arrests."); Polk v. Williams, 565 So.2d 1387, 1390 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990).

2012The circuit court found that the arresting officer’s testimony regarding what another officer told him was admissible under the fellow officer rule and further “concluded that the county court’s decision to grant the motion to suppress was not supported by competent, substantial evidence or the law.” Id.

2012The Second District granted the petition and, after reviewing Florida cases setting forth the fellow officer rule and reviewing the rules of evidence, the court held that “Ferrer was wrongly decided because it misapplies the fellow officer rule to circumvent the hearsay rule of evidence.” Id. at 769 .

1997See Whiteley v. Warden, Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560 , 91 S.Ct. 1031 , 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971); People v. Ramirez-Portoreal, 88 N.Y.2d 99 , 643 N.Y.S.2d 502, 510-11 , 666 N.E.2d 207, 215 (1996) (finding the fellow officer rule provides that even if an arresting officer lacks personal knowledge sufficient to establish probable cause, the arrest will be lawful if the officer acts upon the direction of or as a result of communication with a superior or fellow officer or another police department provided that the police as a whole were in possession of information sufficient to constitu

1997See Whiteley v. Warden, Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560 , 91 S.Ct. 1031 , 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971); People v. Ramirez-Portoreal, 88 N.Y.2d 99 , 643 N.Y.S.2d 502, 510-11 , 666 N.E.2d 207, 215 (1996) (finding the fellow officer rule provides that even if an arresting officer lacks personal knowledge sufficient to establish probable cause, the arrest will be lawful if the officer acts upon the direction of or as a result of communication with a superior or fellow officer or another police department provided that the police as a whole were in possession of information sufficient to constitu

2005See *1283 Voorhees v. State, 699 So.2d 602, 609 (Fla.1997); Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Porter, 791 So.2d 32, 34 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).

2002Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Porter, 791 So.2d 32 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).

2005In support of that statement, we cited Horsley v. State, 734 So.2d 525 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), in which we held that the collective observations of two officers did not provide the officers with sufficient information to arrest the defendant for violating a municipal ordinance, but noted that we agreed with the State's general argument that the fellow officer rule applied to misdemeanor arrests.

2005See Horsley v. State, 734 So.2d 525, 526 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).

2005Sams, 676 So.2d at 1046 ("[T]here is no hyper-technical requirement that certain `magic words' be used by one officer with knowledge of facts supporting probable cause when instructing another officer who ultimately carries out the direction.") (citing Carroll v. State, 497 So.2d 253, 260 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), review denied, 511 So.2d 297 (Fla.1987); see also A.J.M. v. State, 746 So.2d 1222, 1224 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)) ("Although the officer did not use the frequently utilized magic word, "bulge," the officer clearly articulated the specific matter that caused him to become concerned for his, and h

2003"The fellow officer rule allows an arresting officer to assume probable cause to arrest a suspect from information supplied by other officers." Voorhees v. State, 699 So.2d 602, 609 (Fla.1997); State v. Sams, 676 So.2d 1045 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)(concluding that if the officer initiating an arrest is ultimately found by a court to have had probable cause to make an arrest or search, it does not matter whether the officer who carried out the directive of the initiating officer had an independent basis for determining that probable cause existed).

2026As this Court stated in Albo v. State, 477 So. 2d 1071, 1073 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), the fellow officer rule “makes very clear . . . that the rule works both ways: to validate an arrest when the responsible officers have probable cause and to vitiate it when, as here, none objectively exists.” In addition, in quoting Whitely v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971), this Court stated in Albo: Certainly police officers called upon to aid other officers in executing arrest warrants are entitled to assume that the officers requesting aid offered the magistrate the information requisite to support an independen