fellow officer rule in Colorado

2019An officer who does not personally possess reasonable, articulable suspicion may still lawfully make an investigatory stop under the fellow-officer rule if: "(1) he acts at the direction or as a result of communications with another officer, and (2) the police as a whole possess a sufficient basis to make the [stop]." People v. Arias , 159 P.3d 134 , 139 (Colo. 2007).

2019"The purpose of the fellow officer rule is to allow law enforcement agencies to work together as a team," instead of requiring that each officer personally and independently "possess the particularized information necessary to make the [stop]." Id.

2013See People v. Arias, 159 P.3d 134 , 139 (Colo.2007). ¶ 36 Colorado is no stranger to the fellow officer rule, and Colorado courts have applied it to find probable cause in the context of (1) an arrest, People v. Freeman, 668 P.2d 1371 , 1377 (Colo.1983), (2) a search warrant, People v. Reed, 56 P.3d 96 , 100 (Colo.2002), and (3) obtaining a blood draw from a person suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, Grassi, 364 P.3d at 1149 .

1990A. The fellow officer rule provides that “[a]n officer who does not personally possess sufficient information to constitute probable cause may nevertheless make a valid arrest if he acts upon the direction[,] or as a result of a communication from[,] a fellow officer, and the police, as a whole, possess sufficient information to constitute probable cause.” People v. Freeman, 668 P.2d 1371, 1377 (Colo.1983).

1987The fellow officer rule provides that “an arresting officer who does not personally possess sufficient information to constitute probable cause may still make a warrantless arrest if (1) he acts upon the direction or as a result of a communication from a fellow officer, and (2) the police, as a whole, possess sufficient information to constitute probable cause.” People v. Baca, 198 Colo. 399, 401 , 600 P.2d 770, 771 (1979).

1987The fellow officer rule provides that “an arresting officer who does not personally possess sufficient information to constitute probable cause may still make a warrantless arrest if (1) he acts upon the direction or as a result of a communication from a fellow officer, and (2) the police, as a whole, possess sufficient information to constitute probable cause.” People v. Baca, 198 Colo. 399, 401 , 600 P.2d 770, 771 (1979).

1983In People v. Nanes, 174 Colo. 294, 300-01 , 483 P.2d 958, 962 (1971), we said: "It is not necessary for the arresting officer to know of the reliability of the informer or to be himself, in possession of information sufficient to constitute probable cause, provided he acts upon the direction or as a result of communication with a brother officer or that of another police department and provided the police as a whole are in possession of information sufficient to constitute probable cause to make the arrest." The fellow officer rule is also applicable in determining whether the police have a re

1983In People v. Nanes, 174 Colo. 294, 300-01 , 483 P.2d 958, 962 (1971), we said: "It is not necessary for the arresting officer to know of the reliability of the informer or to be himself, in possession of information sufficient to constitute probable cause, provided he acts upon the direction or as a result of communication with a brother officer or that of another police department and provided the police as a whole are in possession of information sufficient to constitute probable cause to make the arrest." The fellow officer rule is also applicable in determining whether the police have a re

2025This is because, Ryan continues, “the fellow officer rule imputes information that the police possess as a whole to an individual officer who effects a search or arrest if (1) that officer acts pursuant to a coordinated investigation and (2) 7 the police possess the information at the time of the search or arrest.” Grassi v. People, 2014 CO 12, ¶ 1 .

2019When an investigation is expanded so as to include officers not at the scene of an alleged crime, the fellow-officer rule "operates to integrate those outside officers and make them part of the coordinated investigation." People v. Swietlicki , 2015 CO 67 , ¶ 27, 361 P.3d 411 , 416 (quoting Grassi v. People , 2014 CO 12 , ¶ 14, 320 P.3d 332 , 336 ).

2015When the scope of an investigation expands to include officers not at the scene of an alleged crime, the rule “operates to integrate those outside officers and make them part of the coordinated investigation.” Id. at ¶ 14, 320 P.3d at 336 . ¶28 We have applied the fellow officer rule to find probable cause for (1) an arrest, Hazelhurst, 662 P.2d at 1086–87, (2) a search warrant, People v. Reed, 56 P.3d 96, 100 (Colo. 2002), and (3) a blood draw, Grassi, ¶¶ 23–24, 31, 320 P.3d at 338, 340 .

2015When the scope of an investigation expands to include officers not at the scene of an alleged crime, the rule "operates to integrate those outside officers and make them part of the coordinated investigation." Id. at ¶ 14, 320 P.8d at 386. 4 28 We have applied the fellow officer rule to find probable cause for (1) an arrest, Hazelhurst, 662 P.2d at 1086-87 , (2) a search warrant, People v. Reed, 56 P.83d 96, 100 (Colo.2002), and (3) a blood draw, Grassi, T1 283-24, 31, 320 P.3d at 8838, 340 .

2015When the scope of an investigation expands to include officers not at the scene of an alleged crime, the rule “operates to integrate those outside officers and make them part of the coordinated investigation.” Id. at ¶ 14, 320 P.3d at 336 . ¶28 We have applied the fellow officer rule to find probable cause for (1) an arrest, Hazelhurst, 662 P.2d at 1086–87, (2) a search warrant, People v. Reed, 56 P.3d 96, 100 (Colo. 2002), and (3) a blood draw, Grassi, ¶¶ 23–24, 31, 320 P.3d at 338, 340 .

2013See People v. Arias, 159 P.3d 134 , 139 (Colo.2007). ¶ 36 Colorado is no stranger to the fellow officer rule, and Colorado courts have applied it to find probable cause in the context of (1) an arrest, People v. Freeman, 668 P.2d 1371 , 1377 (Colo.1983), (2) a search warrant, People v. Reed, 56 P.3d 96 , 100 (Colo.2002), and (3) obtaining a blood draw from a person suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, Grassi, 364 P.3d at 1149 .

2014See id. at --, 2011 WL 4837291 at *5 , T10 We granted certiorari to consider whether the fellow officer rule provided the police with probable cause to order the blood draws.

2013See People v. Arias, 159 P.3d 134 , 139 (Colo.2007). ¶ 36 Colorado is no stranger to the fellow officer rule, and Colorado courts have applied it to find probable cause in the context of (1) an arrest, People v. Freeman, 668 P.2d 1371 , 1377 (Colo.1983), (2) a search warrant, People v. Reed, 56 P.3d 96 , 100 (Colo.2002), and (3) obtaining a blood draw from a person suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, Grassi, 364 P.3d at 1149 .

2014"While certain facts may not establish probable cause in isolation, those same facts may support a finding of probable cause when considered in combination." Grassi ¶ 23 (citing Schall, 59 P.3d at 852 ). 129 The fellow officer rule operates to impute information that the police possess as a whole to an individual officer.

2011See Schall, 59 P.3d at 851 ("The probable cause determination [for probable cause to arrest] rests on all of the facts and cireumstances known to the police at the time of the arrest."). 3, The Fellow Officer Rule Defendant also contends that the fellow officer rule does not apply to this case.

1975No persuasive reason has been advanced why a parole officer should not come within the fellow officer doctrine, as recognized by our decisions in People v. Hamilton, 188 Colo. 250 , 533 P.2d 919 ; People v. Nanes, 174 Colo. 294 , 483 P.2d 958 .

1975No persuasive reason has been advanced why a parole officer should not come within the fellow officer doctrine, as recognized by our decisions in People v. Hamilton, Colo., 533 P.2d 919 ; People v. Nanes, 174 Colo. 294 , 483 P.2d 958 .

1974Under those facts, this court ruled that the arresting officer could “. . . reasonably conclude that probable cause existed to stop the van and arrest the occupants, as he had a right to rely upon the information relayed to him by his fellow law enforcement officers . . . .” In referring to what has become known as the fellow-officer rule, the court said, in theNanes case: “It is not necessary for the arresting officer to know of the reliability of the informer or to be, himself, in possession of information sufficient to constitute probable cause, provided he acts upon the direction or as a r

1974Under those facts, this court ruled that the arresting officer could “. . . reasonably conclude that probable cause existed to stop the van and arrest the occupants, as he had a right to rely upon the information relayed to him by his fellow law enforcement officers . . . .” In referring to what has become known as the fellow-officer rule, the court said, in theNanes case: “It is not necessary for the arresting officer to know of the reliability of the informer or to be, himself, in possession of information sufficient to constitute probable cause, provided he acts upon the direction or as a r

2025See Thompson, 793 P.2d at 1175 .

2015See id. at T15 n. 7, 320 P.3d at 886 n. 7 (noting that the fellow officer rule applies equally to arrests and searches "[because] both scenarios require probable cause"); Arias, 159 P.3d at 189 (stating generally that "[t]he fellow officer rule may be used to find ... probable cause"); see also People v. Jauch, 2018 COA 127, 136 , -- P.3d -- (finding "no principled reason" to exclude plain view seizures from the scope of the fellow officer rule). 5 129 Turning to the facts of this case, then, the fellow officer rule provided Deputy Clauss with probable cause to seize Swiet-licki's laptop if (1

2014See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 599 , 111 S.Ct. 1982 ("Neither evidence uncovered in the course of a search nor the seope of the search conducted can be used to provide post hoc justification for a search unsupported by probable cause at its inception."); see, eg., Grassi v. People, 2014 CO 12, ¶ 15 , 320 P.3d 332, 336 (applying this concept to the fellow officer rule); see also United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 559 , 105 S.Ct. 3304 , 87 L.Ed.2d 381 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[PJost Roc rationalizations have no place in our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which demands that

2014See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 599 , 111 S.Ct. 1982 ("Neither evidence uncovered in the course of a search nor the seope of the search conducted can be used to provide post hoc justification for a search unsupported by probable cause at its inception."); see, eg., Grassi v. People, 2014 CO 12, ¶ 15 , 320 P.3d 332, 336 (applying this concept to the fellow officer rule); see also United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 559 , 105 S.Ct. 3304 , 87 L.Ed.2d 381 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[PJost Roc rationalizations have no place in our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which demands that

2014See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 599 , 111 S.Ct. 1982 ("Neither evidence uncovered in the course of a search nor the seope of the search conducted can be used to provide post hoc justification for a search unsupported by probable cause at its inception."); see, eg., Grassi v. People, 2014 CO 12, ¶ 15 , 320 P.3d 332, 336 (applying this concept to the fellow officer rule); see also United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 559 , 105 S.Ct. 3304 , 87 L.Ed.2d 381 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[PJost Roc rationalizations have no place in our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which demands that

2014See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 599 , 111 S.Ct. 1982 ("Neither evidence uncovered in the course of a search nor the seope of the search conducted can be used to provide post hoc justification for a search unsupported by probable cause at its inception."); see, eg., Grassi v. People, 2014 CO 12, ¶ 15 , 320 P.3d 332, 336 (applying this concept to the fellow officer rule); see also United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 559 , 105 S.Ct. 3304 , 87 L.Ed.2d 381 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[PJost Roc rationalizations have no place in our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which demands that

2014See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 599 , 111 S.Ct. 1982 ("Neither evidence uncovered in the course of a search nor the seope of the search conducted can be used to provide post hoc justification for a search unsupported by probable cause at its inception."); see, eg., Grassi v. People, 2014 CO 12, ¶ 15 , 320 P.3d 332, 336 (applying this concept to the fellow officer rule); see also United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 559 , 105 S.Ct. 3304 , 87 L.Ed.2d 381 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[PJost Roc rationalizations have no place in our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which demands that

2014See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 599 , 111 S.Ct. 1982 ("Neither evidence uncovered in the course of a search nor the seope of the search conducted can be used to provide post hoc justification for a search unsupported by probable cause at its inception."); see, eg., Grassi v. People, 2014 CO 12, ¶ 15 , 320 P.3d 332, 336 (applying this concept to the fellow officer rule); see also United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 559 , 105 S.Ct. 3304 , 87 L.Ed.2d 381 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[PJost Roc rationalizations have no place in our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which demands that

2013See Moody v. People, 159 P.3d 611 , 616 (Colo.2007) (appellate court should only exercise sua sponte review where there is "a complete and factually developed lower court record"). ¶ 40 The fellow officer rule, however, is not an independent exception to the warrant requirement. *62 Rather, we consider it here as part of the probable cause analysis under the plain view exception.

2013In addition, by order of this court, the parties were given the opportunity to address the application of the fellow officer rule in supplemental briefing and at oral argument. ¶ 41 Further, we have discretion to affirm decisions of the trial court, "particularly denial of suppression motions, on any basis for which there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law." Id. at 615 (citing People v. Aarness, 150 P.3d 1271 , 1277 (Colo.2006) ; People v. Backus, 952 P.2d 846 , 850 (Colo.App.1998) ). ¶ 42 Jauch also contends that, at the time Officer Bliss conferred with Investigator Bahl, th

2013See People v. Taylor, 131 P.3d 1158 , 1165 (Colo.App.2005) (describing the imputation of knowledge under the fellow officer rule); see also United States v. Waldrop, 404 F.3d 365 , 370 (5th Cir.2005) (probable cause may be based on collective knowledge of officers at the scene, so long as there is some general communication among them).

2013See People v. Taylor, 131 P.3d 1158 , 1165 (Colo.App.2005) (describing the imputation of knowledge under the fellow officer rule); see also United States v. Waldrop, 404 F.3d 365 , 370 (5th Cir.2005) (probable cause may be based on collective knowledge of officers at the scene, so long as there is some general communication among them).

2013See People v. Taylor, 131 P.3d 1158 , 1165 (Colo.App.2005) (describing the imputation of knowledge under the fellow officer rule); see also United States v. Waldrop, 404 F.3d 365 , 370 (5th Cir.2005) (probable cause may be based on collective knowledge of officers at the scene, so long as there is some general communication among them).

2013See People v. Taylor, 131 P.3d 1158 , 1165 (Colo.App.2005) (describing the imputation of knowledge under the fellow officer rule); see also United States v. Waldrop, 404 F.3d 365 , 370 (5th Cir.2005) (probable cause may be based on collective knowledge of officers at the scene, so long as there is some general communication among them).

2011See Arias, 159 P.3d at 139 (referencing knowledge of "the police as a whole"); see also People v. Fields, 785 P.2d 611, 613 (Colo.1990) ("We have upheld con victions where an arresting officer, without probable cause, acted at the direction of a dispatcher, and the police as a whole possessed probable cause.") (citing People v. Freeman, 668 P.2d 1371, 1377-78 (Colo.1983); People v. Baca, 198 Colo. 399, 402 , 600 P.2d 770, 771-72 (1979); and People v. Nanes, 174 Colo. 294, 300-01 , 483 P.2d 958, 962 (1971)).

2007See Baca, 198 Colo. 399 , 600 P.2d 770 ; People v. Pigford, 17 P.3d 172, 176 (Colo.App.2000).