fellow officer rule in New York

2026For example, we have applied the fellow officer rule to uphold arrests where the arresting officer acted on a radio transmission from another officer providing a description of an individual who had [*2] just purchased illegal drugs ( see People v Ketcham , 93 NY2d 416, 418 [1999]; People v Maldonado , 86 NY2d 631, 633 [1995]; cf. People v Lypka , 36 NY2d 210, 213-214 [1975] [observing that an officer may "act on the strength of . . . a telephone or teletype alert from a fellow officer or department" but remitting to County Court to determine whether the sending agency had probable cause]).

2026For example, we have applied the fellow officer rule to uphold arrests where the arresting officer acted on a radio transmission from another officer providing a description of an individual who had <span>[*2]</span>just purchased illegal drugs (<i>see People v Ketcham</i>, 93 NY2d 416, 418 [1999]; <i>People v Maldonado</i>, 86 NY2d 631, 633 [1995]; <i>cf.</i> <i>People v Lypka</i>, 36 NY2d 210, 213-214 [1975] [observing that an officer may "act on the strength of . . . a telephone or teletype alert from a fellow officer or department" but remitting to County Court to determine whether the sen

2026Under the fellow officer rule, "even if an arresting officer lacks personal knowledge sufficient to establish probable cause, the arrest will be lawful if the officer 'acts upon the direction of or as a result of communication with a superior or fellow officer or another police department provided that the police as a whole were in possession of information sufficient to constitute probable cause to make the arrest' " ( Ramirez-Portoreal , 88 NY2d at 113 [internal brackets omitted], quoting People v Horowitz , 21 NY2d 55, 60 [1967]).

2026Under the fellow officer rule, "even if an arresting officer lacks personal knowledge sufficient to establish probable cause, the arrest will be lawful if the officer 'acts upon the direction of or as a result of communication with a superior or fellow officer or another police department provided that the police as a whole were in possession of information sufficient to constitute probable cause to make the arrest' " (<i>Ramirez-Portoreal</i>, 88 NY2d at 113 [internal brackets omitted], quoting <i>People v Horowitz</i>, 21 NY2d 55, 60 [1967]).

2026The fellow officer rule "has been employed in a variety of circumstances and through the use of various modes of communication" ( People v Rosario , 78 NY2d 583, 588 [1991]).

2026The fellow officer rule "has been employed in a variety of circumstances and through the use of various modes of communication" (<i>People v Rosario</i>, 78 NY2d 583, 588 [1991]).

2026For example, we have applied the fellow officer rule to uphold arrests where the arresting officer acted on a radio transmission from another officer providing a description of an individual who had [*2] just purchased illegal drugs ( see People v Ketcham , 93 NY2d 416, 418 [1999]; People v Maldonado , 86 NY2d 631, 633 [1995]; cf. People v Lypka , 36 NY2d 210, 213-214 [1975] [observing that an officer may "act on the strength of . . . a telephone or teletype alert from a fellow officer or department" but remitting to County Court to determine whether the sending agency had probable cause]).

2026For example, we have applied the fellow officer rule to uphold arrests where the arresting officer acted on a radio transmission from another officer providing a description of an individual who had <span>[*2]</span>just purchased illegal drugs (<i>see People v Ketcham</i>, 93 NY2d 416, 418 [1999]; <i>People v Maldonado</i>, 86 NY2d 631, 633 [1995]; <i>cf.</i> <i>People v Lypka</i>, 36 NY2d 210, 213-214 [1975] [observing that an officer may "act on the strength of . . . a telephone or teletype alert from a fellow officer or department" but remitting to County Court to determine whether the sen

2026For example, we have applied the fellow officer rule to uphold arrests where the arresting officer acted on a radio transmission from another officer providing a description of an individual who had [*2] just purchased illegal drugs ( see People v Ketcham , 93 NY2d 416, 418 [1999]; People v Maldonado , 86 NY2d 631, 633 [1995]; cf. People v Lypka , 36 NY2d 210, 213-214 [1975] [observing that an officer may "act on the strength of . . . a telephone or teletype alert from a fellow officer or department" but remitting to County Court to determine whether the sending agency had probable cause]).

2026For example, we have applied the fellow officer rule to uphold arrests where the arresting officer acted on a radio transmission from another officer providing a description of an individual who had <span>[*2]</span>just purchased illegal drugs (<i>see People v Ketcham</i>, 93 NY2d 416, 418 [1999]; <i>People v Maldonado</i>, 86 NY2d 631, 633 [1995]; <i>cf.</i> <i>People v Lypka</i>, 36 NY2d 210, 213-214 [1975] [observing that an officer may "act on the strength of . . . a telephone or teletype alert from a fellow officer or department" but remitting to County Court to determine whether the sen

2024Contrary to defendant's contention, under the fellow officer rule ( see People v Rosario , 78 NY2d 583, 588 [1991], cert denied 502 US 1109 [1992]), police officers in Washington had probable cause to arrest him based on the information contained in the National Crime Information Center bulletin issued with respect to defendant.

2024Contrary to defendant's contention, under the fellow officer rule ( see People v Rosario , 78 NY2d 583, 588 [1991], cert denied 502 US 1109 [1992]), police officers in Washington had probable cause to arrest him based on the information contained in the National Crime Information Center bulletin issued with respect to defendant.

2021The fellow officer rule is a "straightforward application" of the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test ( see Spinelli v United States , 393 US 410 ; Aguilar v Texas , 378 US 108 ), "which New York courts use to assess whether hearsay information is sufficient to establish probable cause for a warrantless arrest or the issuance of a warrant" ( People v Oglesby , 121 AD3d 818, 819 ; see People v Parris , 83 NY2d 342, 346 ; People v Dodt , 61 NY2d 408, 415 ).

2014Under the fellow officer rule, Fortuna was entitled to rely on the information he received from his partner that was obtained from the victim (see People v Ketcham, 93 NY2d 416, 419-420 [1999]; People v Ramirez-Portoreal, 88 NY2d 99, 113 [1996]; People v Parker, 84 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 927 [2012]; People v Bell, 5 AD3d 858, 859 [2004]), who, as an “ ‘identified citizen informant, ... is presumed to be personally reliable’ ” (People v Bell, 5 AD3d at 860 , quoting People v Parris, 83 NY2d 342, 349 [1994]; see People v Vanness, 106 AD3d 1262, 1264 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 1

2014Under the fellow officer rule, Fortuna was entitled to rely on the information he received from his partner that was obtained from the victim (see People v Ketcham, 93 NY2d 416, 419-420 [1999]; People v Ramirez-Portoreal, 88 NY2d 99, 113 [1996]; People v Parker, 84 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 927 [2012]; People v Bell, 5 AD3d 858, 859 [2004]), who, as an “ ‘identified citizen informant, ... is presumed to be personally reliable’ ” (People v Bell, 5 AD3d at 860 , quoting People v Parris, 83 NY2d 342, 349 [1994]; see People v Vanness, 106 AD3d 1262, 1264 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 1

2014Under the fellow officer rule, Fortuna was entitled to rely on the information he received from his partner that was obtained from the victim (see People v Ketcham, 93 NY2d 416, 419-420 [1999]; People v Ramirez-Portoreal, 88 NY2d 99, 113 [1996]; People v Parker, 84 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 927 [2012]; People v Bell, 5 AD3d 858, 859 [2004]), who, as an “ ‘identified citizen informant, ... is presumed to be personally reliable’ ” (People v Bell, 5 AD3d at 860 , quoting People v Parris, 83 NY2d 342, 349 [1994]; see People v Vanness, 106 AD3d 1262, 1264 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 1

2012Contrary to the People’s contention, the defendant’s contention that the hearing court improperly relied upon the fellow-officer rule to conclude that his arrest was supported by probable cause is preserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Feingold, 7 NY3d 288, 290 [2006]; People v Prado, 4 NY3d 725, 726 [2004]; People v Powell, 101 AD3d 756 [2012] [decided herewith]; People v Berry, 49 AD3d 888, 889 [2008]).

2012Contrary to the People’s contention, the defendant’s contention that the hearing court improperly relied upon the fellow-officer rule to conclude that his arrest was supported by probable cause is preserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Feingold, 7 NY3d 288, 290 [2006]; People v Prado, 4 NY3d 725, 726 [2004]; People v Powell, 101 AD3d 756 [2012] [decided herewith]; People v Berry, 49 AD3d 888, 889 [2008]).

2012Contrary to the People’s contention, the defendant’s contention that the hearing court improperly relied upon the fellow-officer rule to conclude that his arrest was supported by probable cause is preserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Feingold, 7 NY3d 288, 290 [2006]; People v Prado, 4 NY3d 725, 726 [2004]; People v Powell, 101 AD3d 756 [2012] [decided herewith]; People v Berry, 49 AD3d 888, 889 [2008]).

2012Contrary to the People’s contention, the defendant’s contention that the hearing court improperly relied upon the fellow-officer rule to conclude that his arrest was supported by probable cause is preserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Feingold, 7 NY3d 288, 290 [2006]; People v Prado, 4 NY3d 725, 726 [2004]; People v Powell, 101 AD3d 756 [2012] [decided herewith]; People v Berry, 49 AD3d 888, 889 [2008]).

2012Contrary to the People’s contention, the defendant’s contention that the hearing court improperly relied upon the fellow-officer rule to conclude that his arrest was supported by probable cause is preserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Feingold, 7 NY3d 288, 290 [2006]; People v Prado, 4 NY3d 725, 726 [2004]; People v Powell, 101 AD3d 756 [2012] [decided herewith]; People v Berry, 49 AD3d 888, 889 [2008]).

2012Contrary to the People’s contention, the defendant’s contention that the hearing court improperly relied upon the fellow-officer rule to conclude that his arrest was supported by probable cause is preserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Feingold, 7 NY3d 288, 290 [2006]; People v Prado, 4 NY3d 725, 726 [2004]; People v Powell, 101 AD3d 756 [2012] [decided herewith]; People v Berry, 49 AD3d 888, 889 [2008]).

2026Under the fellow officer rule, "even if an arresting officer lacks personal knowledge sufficient to establish probable cause, the arrest will be lawful if the officer 'acts upon the direction of or as a result of communication with a superior or fellow officer or another police department provided that the police as a whole were in possession of information sufficient to constitute probable cause to make the arrest' " ( Ramirez-Portoreal , 88 NY2d at 113 [internal brackets omitted], quoting People v Horowitz , 21 NY2d 55, 60 [1967]).

2026Under the fellow officer rule, "even if an arresting officer lacks personal knowledge sufficient to establish probable cause, the arrest will be lawful if the officer 'acts upon the direction of or as a result of communication with a superior or fellow officer or another police department provided that the police as a whole were in possession of information sufficient to constitute probable cause to make the arrest' " (<i>Ramirez-Portoreal</i>, 88 NY2d at 113 [internal brackets omitted], quoting <i>People v Horowitz</i>, 21 NY2d 55, 60 [1967]).

1999Discussion Under the fellow officer rule, a police officer can make a lawful arrest even without personal knowledge sufficient to establish probable cause, so long as the officer is acting “ ‘upon the direction of or as a result of communication with’ ” a fellow officer or another police agency in possession of information sufficient to constitute probable cause for the arrest (People v Mims, 88 NY2d 99, 113 ; People v Maldonado, 86 NY2d 631 , *420 635-636; People v Landy, 59 NY2d 369, 375 ).

1999Indeed, there can be no question that Detective Lemonaca was entitled to rely upon the communication he received from the undercover since, under the fellow officer rule, “[ijnformation received from another police officer is presumptively reliable” (People v Ketcham, supra, at 420 ; see, People v Landy, 59 NY2d 369 ).

1995The fellow officer rule has been stated as follows: "The arresting officer acts with probable cause when he arrests on the direction of a fellow officer who has probable cause or without such direction on the basis of information received from a fellow officer who testifies at the suppression hearing concerning how he obtained his knowledge, which information itself or together with that known to the arresting officer establishes probable cause” (People v Brnja, 50 NY2d 366, 373, n 4 , supra; see also, People v Petralia, 62 NY2d 47 , cert denied 469 US 852 ).

1983Under the fellow officer rule, an arresting officer acts with probable cause when he arrests either at the direction of another law enforcement officer who has probable cause or, in the absence of such direction, on the basis of information transmitted from the other officer which itself or together with information already known to the arresting officer establishes probable cause (Whiteley v Warden, 401 US 560 ; People v Brnja, 50 NY2d 366, 373, n 4 , supra; People v Lypka, 36 NY2d 210 ; People v Horowitz, 21 NY2d 55 ).

2024The bulletin gave the license plate number of defendant's vehicle, asked officers to stop the "felony involved vehicle" and identify its occupants, described defendant's physical appearance, and identified him as a "possible murder suspect" who was believed to be armed ( see People v Motter , 235 AD2d 582, 583, 586 [3d Dept 1997], lv denied 89 NY2d 1038 [1997]; People v Arefaine , 221 AD2d 979 , 979 [4th Dept 1995], lv denied 87 NY2d 919 [1996]).

2024The bulletin gave the license plate number of defendant's vehicle, asked officers to stop the "felony involved vehicle" and identify its occupants, described defendant's physical appearance, and identified him as a "possible murder suspect" who was believed to be armed ( see People v Motter , 235 AD2d 582, 583, 586 [3d Dept 1997], lv denied 89 NY2d 1038 [1997]; People v Arefaine , 221 AD2d 979 , 979 [4th Dept 1995], lv denied 87 NY2d 919 [1996]).

2022Given the circumstances, either the description was based on the ghost officer's own observations, or it could only have originated from the undercover officer who made the purchase ( see id . at 421-422; People v Dickerson , 20 AD3d 359, 360 [1st Dept 2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 852 [2005]).

2022Given the circumstances, either the description was based on the ghost officer's own observations, or it could only have originated from the undercover officer who made the purchase ( see id . at 421-422; People v Dickerson , 20 AD3d 359, 360 [1st Dept 2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 852 [2005]).

2021People v Harris , 305 AD2d 282, 283 [1st Dept 2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 582 [2003]).

2021People v Harris , 305 AD2d 282, 283 [1st Dept 2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 582 [2003]).

2017“Under the fellow officer rule, a police officer can make a lawful arrest even without personal knowledge sufficient to establish probable cause, so long as the officer is acting upon the direction of or as a result of communication with a fellow officer ... in possession of information sufficient to constitute probable cause for the arrest” (People v Ketcham, 93 NY2d 416, 419-420 [1999] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v Dowling, 75 AD3d 838, 840 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 952 [2010]).

2011Further, the fellow officer rule entitled the arresting officers, who had not directly observed the transaction, to act on information received from the other officers to establish probable cause for the arrest (see People v Ramirez-Portoreal, 88 NY2d 99, 113-114 [1996]; People v Dowling, 75 AD3d 838, 840 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 952 [2010]).

2014Under the fellow officer rule, Fortuna was entitled to rely on the information he received from his partner that was obtained from the victim (see People v Ketcham, 93 NY2d 416, 419-420 [1999]; People v Ramirez-Portoreal, 88 NY2d 99, 113 [1996]; People v Parker, 84 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 927 [2012]; People v Bell, 5 AD3d 858, 859 [2004]), who, as an “ ‘identified citizen informant, ... is presumed to be personally reliable’ ” (People v Bell, 5 AD3d at 860 , quoting People v Parris, 83 NY2d 342, 349 [1994]; see People v Vanness, 106 AD3d 1262, 1264 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 1

2014Under the fellow officer rule, Fortuna was entitled to rely on the information he received from his partner that was obtained from the victim (see People v Ketcham, 93 NY2d 416, 419-420 [1999]; People v Ramirez-Portoreal, 88 NY2d 99, 113 [1996]; People v Parker, 84 AD3d 1508, 1509 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 927 [2012]; People v Bell, 5 AD3d 858, 859 [2004]), who, as an “ ‘identified citizen informant, ... is presumed to be personally reliable’ ” (People v Bell, 5 AD3d at 860 , quoting People v Parris, 83 NY2d 342, 349 [1994]; see People v Vanness, 106 AD3d 1262, 1264 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 1

2012Contrary to the People’s contention, the defendant’s contention that the hearing court improperly relied upon the fellow-officer rule to conclude that his arrest was supported by probable cause is preserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Feingold, 7 NY3d 288, 290 [2006]; People v Prado, 4 NY3d 725, 726 [2004]; People v Powell, 101 AD3d 756 [2012] [decided herewith]; People v Berry, 49 AD3d 888, 889 [2008]).

2012Contrary to the People’s contention, the defendant’s contention that the hearing court improperly relied upon the fellow-officer rule to conclude that his arrest was supported by probable cause is preserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Feingold, 7 NY3d 288, 290 [2006]; People v Prado, 4 NY3d 725, 726 [2004]; People v Powell, 101 AD3d 756 [2012] [decided herewith]; People v Berry, 49 AD3d 888, 889 [2008]).

2015Furthermore, the appellant’s arrest was proper pursuant to the fellow officer rule (see People v Oglesby, 121 AD3d 818, 819 [2014]; People v Gittens, 211 AD2d 242, 246 [1995]).

2001Under the fellow officer rule (see, People v Gittens, 211 AD2d 242, 244 ), the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant since he fit the description that the undercover officer provided and since the undercover officer had probable cause to arrest him.

2021The fellow officer rule is a "straightforward application" of the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test ( see Spinelli v United States , 393 US 410 ; Aguilar v Texas , 378 US 108 ), "which New York courts use to assess whether hearsay information is sufficient to establish probable cause for a warrantless arrest or the issuance of a warrant" ( People v Oglesby , 121 AD3d 818, 819 ; see People v Parris , 83 NY2d 342, 346 ; People v Dodt , 61 NY2d 408, 415 ).

2019Under the fellow officer rule, "even if an arresting officer lacks personal knowledge sufficient to establish probable cause, the arrest will be lawful if the officer acts upon the direction of or as a result of communication with a superior or [fellow] officer or another police department provided that the police as a whole were in possession of information sufficient to constitute probable cause to make the arrest'" ( People v Ramirez- Portoreal , 88 NY2d 99, 113 , quoting People v Horowitz , 21 NY2d 55, 60 ; see People v Mobley , 157 AD3d 826 , 827; People v Moreno , 148 AD3d 827, 828 ; Peo

2021The fellow officer rule is a "straightforward application" of the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test ( see Spinelli v United States , 393 US 410 ; Aguilar v Texas , 378 US 108 ), "which New York courts use to assess whether hearsay information is sufficient to establish probable cause for a warrantless arrest or the issuance of a warrant" ( People v Oglesby , 121 AD3d 818, 819 ; see People v Parris , 83 NY2d 342, 346 ; People v Dodt , 61 NY2d 408, 415 ).

2014The fellow officer rule is a “straightforward application” of the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test (see Aguilar v Texas, 378 US 108 [1964]; Spinelli v United States, 393 US 410 [1969]), which New York courts use to assess whether hearsay information is sufficient to establish probable cause for a warrantless arrest or the issuance of a warrant (People v Parris, 83 NY2d 342, 346 [1994]; see People v Dodt, 61 NY2d 408, 415 [1984]).

2021The fellow officer rule is a "straightforward application" of the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test ( see Spinelli v United States , 393 US 410 ; Aguilar v Texas , 378 US 108 ), "which New York courts use to assess whether hearsay information is sufficient to establish probable cause for a warrantless arrest or the issuance of a warrant" ( People v Oglesby , 121 AD3d 818, 819 ; see People v Parris , 83 NY2d 342, 346 ; People v Dodt , 61 NY2d 408, 415 ).

2014The fellow officer rule is a “straightforward application” of the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test (see Aguilar v Texas, 378 US 108 [1964]; Spinelli v United States, 393 US 410 [1969]), which New York courts use to assess whether hearsay information is sufficient to establish probable cause for a warrantless arrest or the issuance of a warrant (People v Parris, 83 NY2d 342, 346 [1994]; see People v Dodt, 61 NY2d 408, 415 [1984]).

2021"The Aguilar-Spinelli test first requires the suppression court to assess whether the information on which the police have acted is reliable" ( People v Oglesby , 121 AD3d at 819 ; see Aguilar v Texas , 378 US at 114 ; People v Ketcham , 93 NY2d 416, 423 ; People v Bigelow , 66 NY2d 417, 423 ).

2014Probable cause exists when “an officer has knowledge of facts and circumstances sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed” (People v Maldonado, 86 NY2d 631, 635 [1995] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Bigelow, 66 NY2d 417, 423 [1985]).