prevailing party analysis in Idaho

2026The Stunjas also cite Miller, 173 Idaho at 372 , 541 P.3d at 1292 to claim that, if the terms of the contract would lead to a different conclusion, such as awarding attorney fees to a non-prevailing party, the trial court follows the terms of the contract, however, “to be awarded attorney fees pursuant to a contractual provision, the party seeking fees must be both entitled to attorney fees under the contract and have prevailed on the discrete claim under the contract.” A portion of what the Stunjas offer for an overall prevailing party analysis is based on pre-Miller caselaw--specifically, a

2026The Stunjas also cite Miller, 173 Idaho at 372 , 541 P.3d at 1292 to claim that, if the terms of the contract would lead to a different conclusion, such as awarding attorney fees to a non-prevailing party, the trial court follows the terms of the contract, however, “to be awarded attorney fees pursuant to a contractual provision, the party seeking fees must be both entitled to attorney fees under the contract and have prevailed on the discrete claim under the contract.” A portion of what the Stunjas offer for an overall prevailing party analysis is based on pre-Miller caselaw--specifically, a

2025In Zenner v. Holcomb, 147 Idaho 444 , 210 P.3d 552 (2009), the Court noted that settlement offers should be considered in the prevailing party analysis, however, they should not be the only, or most significant factor, in the prevailing party analysis.

2025In Zenner v. Holcomb, 147 Idaho 444 , 210 P.3d 552 (2009), the Court noted that settlement offers should be considered in the prevailing party analysis, however, they should not be the only, or most significant factor, in the prevailing party analysis.

2012For example, in Israel v. Leachman, the Court held that in cases where “there are claims, counterclaims and cross-claims, the mere fact that a party is successful in asserting or defeating a single claim does not mandate an award of fees to the prevailing party on that claim.” 139 Idaho 24, 27 , 72 P.3d 864, 867 (2003) (quoting Chenery v. Agri-Lines Corp., 106 Idaho 687, 691 , 682 P.2d 640, 644 (Ct.App.1984)).

2012For example, in Israel v. Leachman, the Court held that in cases where “there are claims, counterclaims and cross-claims, the mere fact that a party is successful in asserting or defeating a single claim does not mandate an award of fees to the prevailing party on that claim.” 139 Idaho 24, 27 , 72 P.3d 864, 867 (2003) (quoting Chenery v. Agri-Lines Corp., 106 Idaho 687, 691 , 682 P.2d 640, 644 (Ct.App.1984)).

2026Citing to pre-Miller caselaw in Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 148 Idaho 536, 538 , 224 P.3d 1125, 1127 (2010) and Chadderdon v. King, 104 Idaho 406, 411 , 659 P.2d 160, 165 (Ct. App. 1983), the Stunjas argue that the prevailing party analysis under I.R.C.P. 54--based on the overall outcome view, rather than claim-by-claim--is the governing standard.

2026Citing to pre-Miller caselaw in Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 148 Idaho 536, 538 , 224 P.3d 1125, 1127 (2010) and Chadderdon v. King, 104 Idaho 406, 411 , 659 P.2d 160, 165 (Ct. App. 1983), the Stunjas argue that the prevailing party analysis under I.R.C.P. 54--based on the overall outcome view, rather than claim-by-claim--is the governing standard.

2026Citing to pre-Miller caselaw in Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 148 Idaho 536, 538 , 224 P.3d 1125, 1127 (2010) and Chadderdon v. King, 104 Idaho 406, 411 , 659 P.2d 160, 165 (Ct. App. 1983), the Stunjas argue that the prevailing party analysis under I.R.C.P. 54--based on the overall outcome view, rather than claim-by-claim--is the governing standard.

2026Citing to pre-Miller caselaw in Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 148 Idaho 536, 538 , 224 P.3d 1125, 1127 (2010) and Chadderdon v. King, 104 Idaho 406, 411 , 659 P.2d 160, 165 (Ct. App. 1983), the Stunjas argue that the prevailing party analysis under I.R.C.P. 54--based on the overall outcome view, rather than claim-by-claim--is the governing standard.

2018The "mere fact that a party is successful in asserting or defeating a single claim does not mandate an award of fees to the prevailing party on that claim." Id . (quoting Chenery v. Agri-Lines Corp. , 106 Idaho 687 , 692-93, 682 P.2d 640 , 645-46 (Ct. App. 1984) ).

2018The "mere fact that a party is successful in asserting or defeating a single claim does not mandate an award of fees to the prevailing party on that claim." Id . (quoting Chenery v. Agri-Lines Corp. , 106 Idaho 687 , 692-93, 682 P.2d 640 , 645-46 (Ct. App. 1984) ).

2018I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B) ; Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc. , 141 Idaho 716 , 718-19, 117 P.3d 130 , 132-33 (2005).

2018I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B) ; Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc. , 141 Idaho 716 , 718-19, 117 P.3d 130 , 132-33 (2005).

2025The prevailing party analysis focuses on three main factors: “(1) the final judgment or result obtained in relation to the relief sought; (2) whether there were multiple claims or issues between the parties; and (3) the extent to which each of the parties prevailed on each of the claims or issues.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2025Id. 24 However, “to the extent a contract affords a party the right to recover its attorney fees when it has prevailed on a specific claim, the overall prevailing party standard of Rule 54 does not apply.” Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc. v. Sorrells, ___ Idaho ___, ___, 568 P.3d 820 , 829 (2025) (quoting Miller Tr. of Glen Miller & Cynthia Anderson Revocable Living Tr. v. Rocking Ranch No. 3 Prop.

2024In fact, this Court has previously explained that Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(8) “provides that the attorney fee provisions of Rule 54(e) apply only to the extent they are not inconsistent with the statute or contract that entitles the claimant to the fee award.” Bailey v. Bailey, 153 Idaho 526, 531 , 284 P.3d 970, 975 (2012) (citing I.R.C.P. 54(e)(8)) (italics added); see also Zenner v. Holcomb, 147 Idaho 444, 451 , 210 P.3d 552, 559 (2009) (citing I.R.C.P. 54(e)(8) for the proposition that Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e) only applies to an attorney fee provision in a contract if

2024In fact, this Court has previously explained that Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(8) “provides that the attorney fee provisions of Rule 54(e) apply only to the extent they are not inconsistent with the statute or contract that entitles the claimant to the fee award.” Bailey v. Bailey, 153 Idaho 526, 531 , 284 P.3d 970, 975 (2012) (citing I.R.C.P. 54(e)(8)) (italics added); see also Zenner v. Holcomb, 147 Idaho 444, 451 , 210 P.3d 552, 559 (2009) (citing I.R.C.P. 54(e)(8) for the proposition that Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e) only applies to an attorney fee provision in a contract if

2024Thus, Kidwell & Heiser provides the most complete expression of the American Rule: “[A] successful litigant is not entitled to recover attorney fees for the cost of bringing an action unless such recovery is provided by statute or contract between the parties.”3 96 Idaho at 534 , 531 P.2d at 1179 (italics added).

2024Thus, Kidwell & Heiser provides the most complete expression of the American Rule: “[A] successful litigant is not entitled to recover attorney fees for the cost of bringing an action unless such recovery is provided by statute or contract between the parties.”3 96 Idaho at 534 , 531 P.2d at 1179 (italics added).

2024Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC. v. MacDonald, 162 Idaho 228, 236 , 395 P.3d 1261, 1269 (2017).

2024Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC. v. MacDonald, 162 Idaho 228, 236 , 395 P.3d 1261, 1269 (2017).

2023See Wadsworth Reese, PLLC v. Siddoway & Co., 165 Idaho 364, 370 , 445 P.3d 1090, 1096 (2019) (explaining that the prevailing party analysis should take place after the case has been fully arbitrated, not simply after a motion to compel has been granted).

2023See Wadsworth Reese, PLLC v. Siddoway & Co., 165 Idaho 364, 370 , 445 P.3d 1090, 1096 (2019) (explaining that the prevailing party analysis should take place after the case has been fully arbitrated, not simply after a motion to compel has been granted).

2021However, this Court has stated clearly that “[a]n order denying a motion for summary judgment is not an appealable order itself[.]” Aardema v. U.S. Dairy Sys., Inc., 147 Idaho 785, 789 , 215 P.3d 505, 509 (2009) (quoting Grover v. Wadsworth, 147 Idaho 60, 66 , 205 P.3d 1196, 1202 (2009)). 24 On appeal, Bruno argues that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to award costs because, considering the prevailing party factors, there was no prevailing party below.

2021However, this Court has stated clearly that “[a]n order denying a motion for summary judgment is not an appealable order itself[.]” Aardema v. U.S. Dairy Sys., Inc., 147 Idaho 785, 789 , 215 P.3d 505, 509 (2009) (quoting Grover v. Wadsworth, 147 Idaho 60, 66 , 205 P.3d 1196, 1202 (2009)). 24 On appeal, Bruno argues that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to award costs because, considering the prevailing party factors, there was no prevailing party below.

2021However, this Court has stated clearly that “[a]n order denying a motion for summary judgment is not an appealable order itself[.]” Aardema v. U.S. Dairy Sys., Inc., 147 Idaho 785, 789 , 215 P.3d 505, 509 (2009) (quoting Grover v. Wadsworth, 147 Idaho 60, 66 , 205 P.3d 1196, 1202 (2009)). 24 On appeal, Bruno argues that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to award costs because, considering the prevailing party factors, there was no prevailing party below.

2021However, this Court has stated clearly that “[a]n order denying a motion for summary judgment is not an appealable order itself[.]” Aardema v. U.S. Dairy Sys., Inc., 147 Idaho 785, 789 , 215 P.3d 505, 509 (2009) (quoting Grover v. Wadsworth, 147 Idaho 60, 66 , 205 P.3d 1196, 1202 (2009)). 24 On appeal, Bruno argues that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to award costs because, considering the prevailing party factors, there was no prevailing party below.

2021A provision that provides for attorney fees to the prevailing party is a standard clause in a contract or agreement. “ ‘Where a valid contract between the parties contains a provision for an award of attorney fees, the terms of the contract establish a right to attorney fees.’ ” Primera Beef, LLC. v. Ward, 166 Idaho 180, 189 , 457 P.3d 161, 170 (2020) (quoting Lamprecht v. Jordan, LLC, 139 Idaho 182, 187 , 75 P.3d 743, 748 (2003)). 4 This amount includes the attorney fees later added by the district court after it denied Gangi’s motion to amend. 5 The Daboll property was located to the east of

2021A provision that provides for attorney fees to the prevailing party is a standard clause in a contract or agreement. “ ‘Where a valid contract between the parties contains a provision for an award of attorney fees, the terms of the contract establish a right to attorney fees.’ ” Primera Beef, LLC. v. Ward, 166 Idaho 180, 189 , 457 P.3d 161, 170 (2020) (quoting Lamprecht v. Jordan, LLC, 139 Idaho 182, 187 , 75 P.3d 743, 748 (2003)). 4 This amount includes the attorney fees later added by the district court after it denied Gangi’s motion to amend. 5 The Daboll property was located to the east of

2021A provision that provides for attorney fees to the prevailing party is a standard clause in a contract or agreement. “ ‘Where a valid contract between the parties contains a provision for an award of attorney fees, the terms of the contract establish a right to attorney fees.’ ” Primera Beef, LLC. v. Ward, 166 Idaho 180, 189 , 457 P.3d 161, 170 (2020) (quoting Lamprecht v. Jordan, LLC, 139 Idaho 182, 187 , 75 P.3d 743, 748 (2003)). 4 This amount includes the attorney fees later added by the district court after it denied Gangi’s motion to amend. 5 The Daboll property was located to the east of

2021A provision that provides for attorney fees to the prevailing party is a standard clause in a contract or agreement. “ ‘Where a valid contract between the parties contains a provision for an award of attorney fees, the terms of the contract establish a right to attorney fees.’ ” Primera Beef, LLC. v. Ward, 166 Idaho 180, 189 , 457 P.3d 161, 170 (2020) (quoting Lamprecht v. Jordan, LLC, 139 Idaho 182, 187 , 75 P.3d 743, 748 (2003)). 4 This amount includes the attorney fees later added by the district court after it denied Gangi’s motion to amend. 5 The Daboll property was located to the east of

2016Phillips v. Blazier-Henry, 154 Idaho 724, 731 , 302 P.3d 349, 356 (2013).

2016Phillips v. Blazier-Henry, 154 Idaho 724, 731 , 302 P.3d 349, 356 (2013).

2012However, as this Court said in Jones v. Berezay, when determining the terms and conditions of dismissal under I.R.C.P. 41(a)(2), a trial court’s discretion is not circumscribed by the prevailing party analysis contained in other statute or rules. 120 Idaho 332, 335 , 815 P.2d 1072, 1075 (1991).

2012However, as this Court said in Jones v. Berezay, when determining the terms and conditions of dismissal under I.R.C.P. 41(a)(2), a trial court’s discretion is not circumscribed by the prevailing party analysis contained in other statute or rules. 120 Idaho 332, 335 , 815 P.2d 1072, 1075 (1991).

2010City of Boise v. Ada County, 147 Idaho 794, 812 , 215 P.3d 514, 532 (2009); Wolske Bros., Inc. v. Hudspeth Sawmill Co., 116 Idaho 714, 716 , 779 P.2d 28, 30 (Ct. App. 1989).

2010City of Boise v. Ada County, 147 Idaho 794, 812 , 215 P.3d 514, 532 (2009); Wolske Bros., Inc. v. Hudspeth Sawmill Co., 116 Idaho 714, 716 , 779 P.2d 28, 30 (Ct. App. 1989).

2010City of Boise v. Ada County, 147 Idaho 794, 812 , 215 P.3d 514, 532 (2009); Wolske Bros., Inc. v. Hudspeth Sawmill Co., 116 Idaho 714, 716 , 779 P.2d 28, 30 (Ct. App. 1989).

2010City of Boise v. Ada County, 147 Idaho 794, 812 , 215 P.3d 514, 532 (2009); Wolske Bros., Inc. v. Hudspeth Sawmill Co., 116 Idaho 714, 716 , 779 P.2d 28, 30 (Ct. App. 1989).

2008See also Lickley v. Max Herbold, Inc., 133 Idaho 209, 214 , 984 P.2d 697, 702 (1999) (Although plaintiff was awarded less than half of the damages he had initially requested, he was the prevailing party because he had prevailed on the greatest issue in the case.); Burns, 120 Idaho 623 , 818 P.2d 327 (Plaintiff who sought recovery of $1,000,000 was not the prevailing party on the claim when he recovered only $45.); Ruge v. Posey, 114 Idaho 890, 892 , 761 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Ct.App.1988) (Trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding there was no prevailing party when both parties had prevail

2008See also Lickley v. Max Herbold, Inc., 133 Idaho 209, 214 , 984 P.2d 697, 702 (1999) (Although plaintiff was awarded less than half of the damages he had initially requested, he was the prevailing party because he had prevailed on the greatest issue in the case.); Burns, 120 Idaho 623 , 818 P.2d 327 (Plaintiff who sought recovery of $1,000,000 was not the prevailing party on the claim when he recovered only $45.); Ruge v. Posey, 114 Idaho 890, 892 , 761 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Ct.App.1988) (Trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding there was no prevailing party when both parties had prevail