prevailing party standard in Arizona

2023See Breitbart- Napp v. Napp, 216 Ariz. 74, 84, ¶ 39 (App. 2007) (“A.R.S. § 25–324 does not establish a prevailing party standard for awarding fees and costs.”).

2023See Breitbart-Napp v. Napp, 216 Ariz. 74, 83, ¶ 35 (App. 2007). ¶43 The fact that Wife prevailed on the business valuation does not support the award of expert witness fees. "[Section] 25-324 does not establish a prevailing party standard for awarding fees and costs." Id. at 84, ¶ 39 .

2021His tax obligations are not a contractually assumed duty. 7 SOLDWEDEL v. SOLDWEDEL Decision of the Court concedes the prevailing-party standard is erroneous under Breitbart-Napp v. Napp, 216 Ariz. 74, 84, ¶ 39 (App. 2007), and Bobrow v. Bobrow, 241 Ariz. 592, 593, ¶ 1 (App. 2017) (holding pre-marital agreements stipulating to a prevailing-party standard for awarding attorneys’ fees violate public policy per se). ¶23 However, the superior court also awarded Wife attorneys’ fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-324, finding Husband had “far greater financial resources than Wife,” which Husband does not d

2018The court cited § 25-324 and specifically referred to Wife’s unreasonableness and Husband’s reasonableness. ¶37 In its final order, the court acknowledged the applicable case law, including Bobrow v. Bobrow, 241 Ariz. 592, 599, ¶ 31 (App. 2017), which holds that the court’s consideration and application of § 25-324 controls over a prevailing party clause.

2021Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343, 351, ¶ 32 (App. 1998). ¶22 Given the pre-marital agreement provision for attorneys’ fees under a prevailing-party standard, the superior court found Wife the prevailing party and awarded her attorneys’ fees partly on that basis.

2018See Pownall, 197 Ariz. at 583, ¶ 26 .

2014Thompson v. Corry, 231 Ariz. 161, 163, ¶ 4 , 291 P.3d 358, 360 (App. 2012). ¶9 MacLean asserts that the court should have “honored the prevailing-party clause” in the Rule 69 agreement and decree, arguing that principles of contract law mandate enforcement of the parties’ agreement by its terms.

2014Thompson v. Corry, 231 Ariz. 161, 163, ¶ 4 , 291 P.3d 358, 360 (App. 2012). ¶9 MacLean asserts that the court should have “honored the prevailing-party clause” in the Rule 69 agreement and decree, arguing that principles of contract law mandate enforcement of the parties’ agreement by its terms.

2014See, e.g., MacMillan, 226 Ariz. at 592, ¶ 37 , 250 P.3d at 1221 (“Although the intent of A.R.S. § 25–324 is to assure a remedy for the party least able to pay, the trial court may also consider whether a party has adopted unreasonable positions.”) Moreover, the Legislature is aware of how to craft a prevailing-party standard.

2014See, e.g., MacMillan, 226 Ariz. at 592, ¶ 37 , 250 P.3d at 1221 (“Although the intent of A.R.S. § 25–324 is to assure a remedy for the party least able to pay, the trial court may also consider whether a party has adopted unreasonable positions.”) Moreover, the Legislature is aware of how to craft a prevailing-party standard.

2012See S & R Props. v. Maricopa County, 178 Ariz. 491, 502-03 , 875 P.2d 150, 161-62 (App.1993) (citing Exodyne Props., 165 Ariz. 373 , 798 P.2d 1382 ) (plaintiff taxpayers were prevailing parties under § 12-2030 even though they did not prevail on their original relief request for refunds). ¶ 9 The County also contends that the ruling in favor of Hess on the paragraph 19 claim did not constitute an adjudication on the merits because the County had taken “corrective action.” We disagree. ¶ 10 In Tom Mulcaire Contracting, LLC v. City of Cottonwood, we examined the prevailing party requirement and

2012See S & R Props. v. Maricopa County, 178 Ariz. 491, 502-03 , 875 P.2d 150, 161-62 (App.1993) (citing Exodyne Props., 165 Ariz. 373 , 798 P.2d 1382 ) (plaintiff taxpayers were prevailing parties under § 12-2030 even though they did not prevail on their original relief request for refunds). ¶ 9 The County also contends that the ruling in favor of Hess on the paragraph 19 claim did not constitute an adjudication on the merits because the County had taken “corrective action.” We disagree. ¶ 10 In Tom Mulcaire Contracting, LLC v. City of Cottonwood, we examined the prevailing party requirement and

2012See S & R Props. v. Maricopa County, 178 Ariz. 491, 502-03 , 875 P.2d 150, 161-62 (App.1993) (citing Exodyne Props., 165 Ariz. 373 , 798 P.2d 1382 ) (plaintiff taxpayers were prevailing parties under § 12-2030 even though they did not prevail on their original relief request for refunds). ¶ 9 The County also contends that the ruling in favor of Hess on the paragraph 19 claim did not constitute an adjudication on the merits because the County had taken “corrective action.” We disagree. ¶ 10 In Tom Mulcaire Contracting, LLC v. City of Cottonwood, we examined the prevailing party requirement and

2012See S & R Props. v. Maricopa County, 178 Ariz. 491, 502-03 , 875 P.2d 150, 161-62 (App.1993) (citing Exodyne Props., 165 Ariz. 373 , 798 P.2d 1382 ) (plaintiff taxpayers were prevailing parties under § 12-2030 even though they did not prevail on their original relief request for refunds). ¶ 9 The County also contends that the ruling in favor of Hess on the paragraph 19 claim did not constitute an adjudication on the merits because the County had taken “corrective action.” We disagree. ¶ 10 In Tom Mulcaire Contracting, LLC v. City of Cottonwood, we examined the prevailing party requirement and

2012See S & R Props. v. Maricopa County, 178 Ariz. 491, 502-03 , 875 P.2d 150, 161-62 (App.1993) (citing Exodyne Props., 165 Ariz. 373 , 798 P.2d 1382 ) (plaintiff taxpayers were prevailing parties under § 12-2030 even though they did not prevail on their original relief request for refunds). ¶ 9 The County also contends that the ruling in favor of Hess on the paragraph 19 claim did not constitute an adjudication on the merits because the County had taken “corrective action.” We disagree. ¶ 10 In Tom Mulcaire Contracting, LLC v. City of Cottonwood, we examined the prevailing party requirement and

2012See S & R Props. v. Maricopa County, 178 Ariz. 491, 502-03 , 875 P.2d 150, 161-62 (App.1993) (citing Exodyne Props., 165 Ariz. 373 , 798 P.2d 1382 ) (plaintiff taxpayers were prevailing parties under § 12-2030 even though they did not prevail on their original relief request for refunds). ¶ 9 The County also contends that the ruling in favor of Hess on the paragraph 19 claim did not constitute an adjudication on the merits because the County had taken “corrective action.” We disagree. ¶ 10 In Tom Mulcaire Contracting, LLC v. City of Cottonwood, we examined the prevailing party requirement and

2007See Burnette v. Bender, 184 Ariz. 301, 306 , 908 P.2d 1086, 1091 (App.1995) (stating that whether a party prevails is irrelevant to A.R.S. § 25-324).

2007See Burnette v. Bender, 184 Ariz. 301, 306 , 908 P.2d 1086, 1091 (App.1995) (stating that whether a party prevails is irrelevant to A.R.S. § 25-324).