8 Oregon opinions name it 1 courts 2001–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lemargie v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2021See id.; see also Lemargie v. Johnson, 212 Or App 451 , 454 n 3, 157 P3d 1284 (2007) (“Under ORS 20.077, there can be more than one prevailing party in actions that involve multiple claims or counterclaims as in the present matter.”). 2021See id.; see also Lemargie v. Johnson, 212 Or App 451 , 454 n 3, 157 P3d 1284 (2007) (“Under ORS 20.077, there can be more than one prevailing party in actions that involve multiple claims or counterclaims as in the present matter.”). | 1 | 1 |
Kellas v. Department of Correctionsgreen2 sentences2012We express no opinion on whether Nay-as-trustee properly characterizes the issue as one of “standing.” See Kellas v. Dept. of Corrections, 341 Or 471, 476-77 , 145 P3d 139 (2006) (“ ‘Standing’ is a legal term that identifies whether a party to a legal proceeding possesses a status or qualification necessary for the assertion, enforcement, or adjudication of legal rights or duties.”); id. at 477 (where a statute circumscribes standing, “[t]he source of law that determines that question is the statute that confers standing in the particular proceeding that the party has initiated, ‘because stand 2012We express no opinion on whether Nay-as-trustee properly characterizes the issue as one of “standing.” See Kellas v. Dept. of Corrections, 341 Or 471, 476-77 , 145 P3d 139 (2006) (“ ‘Standing’ is a legal term that identifies whether a party to a legal proceeding possesses a status or qualification necessary for the assertion, enforcement, or adjudication of legal rights or duties.”); id. at 477 (where a statute circumscribes standing, “[t]he source of law that determines that question is the statute that confers standing in the particular proceeding that the party has initiated, ‘because stand | 1 | 1 |
Wilkes v. Zurlindengreen2 sentences2001See Wilkes v. Zurlinden, 328 Or 626, 633 , 984 P2d 261 (1999) (holding that “prevailing party” was specific to the claim and statute under which attorney fees were awarded). 2001See Wilkes v. Zurlinden, 328 Or 626, 633 , 984 P2d 261 (1999) (holding that “prevailing party” was specific to the claim and statute under which attorney fees were awarded). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Birdnest Mobile Estates v. MCH Property Management
green
1 sentence2023MCH also moved for summary judgment as to Birdnest’s breach of contract claim, arguing that Birdnest “waived” its claim against MCH “by agreeing to obtain insurance for the benefit of [MCH].” The trial court granted that motion, concluding that Birdnest waived the claim by “failing to fully comply with the portion of the management agreement that required that [MCH] be named as an addi- tional insured on any insurance policy and that proof or copy of that be provided to [Birdnest].” Cite as 323 Or App 542 (2023) 547 Subsequently, MCH moved to dismiss its second counterclaim pursuant to ORCP 54 | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Lawrence v. Peel
green
2 sentences2014The prevailing party on a claim is the party that received a favorable judgment on a claim, and that is determined by “weighting] ‘what was sought by each party against the result obtained.’” Beggs, 221 Or App at 538 -39 (quoting Lawrence v. Peel, 45 Or App 233, 243 , 607 P2d 1386 (1980)). 2014The prevailing party on a claim is the party that received a favorable judgment on a claim, and that is determined by “weighting] ‘what was sought by each party against the result obtained.’” Beggs, 221 Or App at 538 -39 (quoting Lawrence v. Peel, 45 Or App 233, 243 , 607 P2d 1386 (1980)). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Beggs v. Hart
green
1 sentence2014The prevailing party on a claim is the party that received a favorable judgment on a claim, and that is determined by “weighting] ‘what was sought by each party against the result obtained.’” Beggs, 221 Or App at 538 -39 (quoting Lawrence v. Peel, 45 Or App 233, 243 , 607 P2d 1386 (1980)). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Freedland v. Trebes
green
2 sentences2009If the party asserts several claims that are subject to an award of fees but prevails on only one of them, fees can be awarded only for the time reasonably necessary to prevail on the sole claim on which the party prevailed.” Freedland v. Trebes, 162 Or App 374, 378 , 986 P2d 630 (1999). 7 Finally, as discussed above, under ORS 20.077, where a case involves multiple claims for which attorney fees are authorized, the court must determine the prevailing party on a claim-by-claim basis and award fees appropriately. 2009If the party asserts several claims that are subject to an award of fees but prevails on only one of them, fees can be awarded only for the time reasonably necessary to prevail on the sole claim on which the party prevailed.” Freedland v. Trebes, 162 Or App 374, 378 , 986 P2d 630 (1999). 7 Finally, as discussed above, under ORS 20.077, where a case involves multiple claims for which attorney fees are authorized, the court must determine the prevailing party on a claim-by-claim basis and award fees appropriately. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Miller v. Fernley
green
2 sentences2007Defendant contends that, even though “an award of attorney fees is ‘mandator/ under ORS 105.180(2), the Oregon Supreme Court has said that ‘[t]his is not to say that any denial of attorney fees would always be an abuse of discretion.’ ” Miller v. Fernley, 280 Or 333, 338 , 570 P2d 1178 (1977). 2007Defendant contends that, even though “an award of attorney fees is ‘mandator/ under ORS 105.180(2), the Oregon Supreme Court has said that ‘[t]his is not to say that any denial of attorney fees would always be an abuse of discretion.’ ” Miller v. Fernley, 280 Or 333, 338 , 570 P2d 1178 (1977). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Preble v. Department of Revenue
green
2 sentences2007ORS 105.180(2) provides that the prevailing party on a claim under ORS 105.175 “shall” recover attorney fees. “ ‘Shall’ is a command: it is ‘used in laws, regulations, or directives to express what is mandatory.’ ” Preble v. Dept, of *455 Rev., 331 Or 320, 324 , 14 P3d 613 (2000) (citing Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 2085 (unabridged ed 1993)). 4 ORS 105.180(2) means what it says. 2007ORS 105.180(2) provides that the prevailing party on a claim under ORS 105.175 “shall” recover attorney fees. “ ‘Shall’ is a command: it is ‘used in laws, regulations, or directives to express what is mandatory.’ ” Preble v. Dept, of *455 Rev., 331 Or 320, 324 , 14 P3d 613 (2000) (citing Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 2085 (unabridged ed 1993)). 4 ORS 105.180(2) means what it says. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Independent School District
green
1 sentence2004Thus, the Court shifted the “touchstone” of the prevailing party inquiry from success on the “primary” issue, as viewed from the litigants’ subjective perspective, to whether there has been a “material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties.” Id. at 792-93 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Farrar v. Hobby
green
1 sentence2004In sum, as the Court emphasized, “the prevailing party inquiry does not turn on the magnitude of the relief obtained.” Id. at 114 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources
green
2 sentences2004Finally, Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 532 US 598 , 121 S Ct 1835 , 149 L Ed 2d 855 (2001), is also instructive. 2004Finally, Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 532 US 598 , 121 S Ct 1835 , 149 L Ed 2d 855 (2001), is also instructive. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.