remnant of abandoned doctrine in New Mexico

2025Citing Padilla v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 2003-NMSC-011, ¶ 7 , 133 N.M. 661 , 68 P.3d 901 , and Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-031, ¶ 34 , 125 N.M. 721 , 965 P.2d 305 , Defendant implicitly claims two “compelling reason[s]” we should overrule our relevant precedent: (1) the current rules regarding self-defense jury instructions are “so unworkable as to be intolerable,” and (2) “principles of law have developed to such an extent as to leave the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine.” Padilla, 2003-NMSC-011, ¶ 7 (internal quotation marks and citati

2025Citing Padilla v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 2003-NMSC-011, ¶ 7 , 133 N.M. 661 , 68 P.3d 901 , and Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-031, ¶ 34 , 125 N.M. 721 , 965 P.2d 305 , Defendant implicitly claims two “compelling reason[s]” we should overrule our relevant precedent: (1) the current rules regarding self-defense jury instructions are “so unworkable as to be intolerable,” and (2) “principles of law have developed to such an extent as to leave the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine.” Padilla, 2003-NMSC-011, ¶ 7 (internal quotation marks and citati

2021This Court only overturns precedent in limited circumstances when it is “a remnant of abandoned doctrine,” when it is unworkable, or if “changing circumstances have deprived the precedent of its original justification.” State v. Montoya, 2013-NMSC-020 , ¶ 40, 306 P.3d 426 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {29} While this Court has ultimate authority over questions of practice and procedure, we choose to be prudent in exercising that authority.

2021See State v. Montoya, 2013-NMSC-020, ¶ 40 , 306 P.3d 426 (“When deciding whether to overrule our own precedents, this Court considers such common-sense factors as whether the precedent is a remnant of abandoned doctrine, whether the precedent has proved to be unworkable, whether changing circumstances have deprived the precedent of its original justification, and the extent to which parties relying on the precedent would suffer hardship from its overruling.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {102} The standard announced today, that a defendant cannot “be liable for [a] victim’s

2022A party asking this Court to overturn a decision must generally show either obvious error or that (1) the decision “is so unworkable as to be intolerable”; (2) reversing the decision would not “create an undue hardship” as a result of reliance on the previous decision; (3) the law surrounding the prior decision has “developed to such an extent as to leave the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine”; or (4) “the facts have changed in the interval from the old rule to reconsideration so as to have robbed the old rule of justification.” Herrera, 2003-NMSC-018, ¶ 15 (internal quotat

2021A party asking this Court to overrule one of our prior decisions must ordinarily demonstrate that (1) the decision “is so unworkable as to be intolerable”; (2) reversing the decision would not “create an undue hardship” as a result of justifiable reliance on our earlier, erroneous pronouncement of the law; (3) the law surrounding the prior decision has “developed to such an extent as to leave the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine”; or (4) “the facts have changed in the interval from the old rule to reconsideration so as to have robbed the old rule of justification.” Herrera

2013See Rivera, 2008-NMSC-056, ¶ 22 (concluding that the Confrontation Clause does not bar the use of hearsay to demonstrate probable cause and that “the Hensel opinion does not reflect current confrontation clause jurisprudence and is of no current value to our courts”). {23} Before reconsidering our own precedent and overcoming the legal stability principles of stare decisis, we must consider “such common-sense factors as whether the precedent is a remnant of abandoned doctrine, whether the precedent has proved to be unworkable, whether changing circumstances have deprived the precedent of its o

2013See Rivera, 2008-NMSC-056, ¶ 22 (concluding that the Confrontation Clause does not bar the use of hearsay to demonstrate probable cause and that “the Hensel opinion does not reflect current confrontation clause jurisprudence and is of no current value to our courts”). {22} Before reconsidering our own precedent and overcoming the legal stability principles of stare decisis, we must consider “such common-sense factors as whether the precedent is a remnant of abandoned doctrine, whether the precedent has proved to be unworkable, whether changing circumstances have deprived the precedent of its o

2015State v. Swick, 2012-NMSC-018, ¶ 17 , 279 P.3d 747 (quoting State v. Riley, 2010-NMSC-005, ¶ 34 , 147 N.M. 557 , 226 P.3d 656 , overruled on other grounds by State v. Montoya, 2013-NMSC-020, ¶ 2 , 306 P.3d 426 ).

2015State v. Swick, 2012-NMSC-018, ¶ 17 , 279 P.3d 747 (quoting State v. Riley, 2010-NMSC-005, ¶ 34 , 147 N.M. 557 , 226 P.3d 656 , overruled on other grounds by State v. Montoya, 2013-NMSC-020, ¶ 2 , 306 P.3d 426 ).

2025In other words, Defendant provides no analysis demonstrating that changes in the law have arisen to render the relevant principles in Abeyta “no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine.” Trujillo, 1998-NMSC-031, ¶ 34 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (parenthetically quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989), superseded by statute on other grounds, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.

1998Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 855 , 112 S.Ct. 2791 ; see also Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 , 109 S.Ct. 2363 , 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (noting that special circumstances to reverse precedent might include “subsequent changes or development in the law” or showing that the precedent has become a “detriment to coherence and consistency in the law”). {35} This Court always demonstrates the highest regard for stare decisis, but when one of the aforementioned circumstances convincingly demonstrates that a past decision is wrong, the Court has not hesitated to overrule even rec

2020State v. Pieri, 2009- NMSC-019, ¶ 21, 146 N.M. 155 , 207 P.3d 1132 , (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), sets forth the factors: 1) whether the precedent is so unworkable as to be intolerable; 2) whether parties justifiably relied on the precedent so that reversing it would create an undue hardship; 3) whether the principles of law have developed to such an extent as to leave the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine; and 4) whether the facts have changed in the interval from the old rule to reconsideration so as to have robbed the old rule of justification.

2020State v. Pieri, 2009- NMSC-019, ¶ 21, 146 N.M. 155 , 207 P.3d 1132 , (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), sets forth the factors: 1) whether the precedent is so unworkable as to be intolerable; 2) whether parties justifiably relied on the precedent so that reversing it would create an undue hardship; 3) whether the principles of law have developed to such an extent as to leave the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine; and 4) whether the facts have changed in the interval from the old rule to reconsideration so as to have robbed the old rule of justification.

2025Citing Padilla v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 2003-NMSC-011, ¶ 7 , 133 N.M. 661 , 68 P.3d 901 , and Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-031, ¶ 34 , 125 N.M. 721 , 965 P.2d 305 , Defendant implicitly claims two “compelling reason[s]” we should overrule our relevant precedent: (1) the current rules regarding self-defense jury instructions are “so unworkable as to be intolerable,” and (2) “principles of law have developed to such an extent as to leave the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine.” Padilla, 2003-NMSC-011, ¶ 7 (internal quotation marks and citati

2025Citing Padilla v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 2003-NMSC-011, ¶ 7 , 133 N.M. 661 , 68 P.3d 901 , and Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-031, ¶ 34 , 125 N.M. 721 , 965 P.2d 305 , Defendant implicitly claims two “compelling reason[s]” we should overrule our relevant precedent: (1) the current rules regarding self-defense jury instructions are “so unworkable as to be intolerable,” and (2) “principles of law have developed to such an extent as to leave the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine.” Padilla, 2003-NMSC-011, ¶ 7 (internal quotation marks and citati

2021The State has not addressed any of these factors. 15“[L]awful custody or confinement” is defined as “the holding of any person pursuant to lawful authority, including, without limitation, actual or constructive custody of prisoners temporarily outside a . . . jail[.]” NMSA 1978, § 30-1-12(H) (1963) (emphasis added); see Fellhauer, 1997-NMCA-064 ¶ 6 (stating “[t]he terms used in [Section 31-20-12 and Section 30-1-12(H)] are not identical, but it is reasonable to treat ‘lawful custody or confinement’ and ‘official confinement’ as closely related, if not functionally equivalent, concepts”). “actu

2020See Green, 2015-NMCA-007, ¶ 14 .

2020See Wills v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.M., 2015-NMCA-105, ¶ 19 , 357 P.3d 453 (“When New Mexico cases do not directly answer the question presented, we look for guidance in analogous law in other states or the federal system.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {8} Defendant nonetheless argues that the separation of powers doctrine requires that Green and Leon be overruled according to the analysis set forth in State v. Montoya, 2013-NMSC-020, ¶ 40 , 306 P.3d 426 (“When deciding whether to overrule our own precedents, this Court considers such common-sense factors as whether

2014See Trujillo, 1998-NMSC-031, ¶ 34 , 125 15 N.M. 721 , 965 P.2d 305 (noting, in relevant part, that before overturning precedent, 16 we must consider “whether the principles of law have developed to such an extent as 17 to leave the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine[ ]” and “whether 18 the facts have changed in the interval from the old rule to reconsideration so as to 15 1 have robbed the old rule of justification” (internal quotation marks and citation 2 omitted)). 3 {24} The Assessor further argued that the district court did not have jurisdiction to 4 make original findi

1999In civil rights cases, this Court has affirmed the award of reasonable attorney fees when authorized by statute, see NMSA 1978, § 28-1-13(D) (1987), and there is no abuse of discretion, see Lucero v. Aladdin Beauty Colleges, Inc., 117 N.M. 269, 271 , 871 P.2d 365, 367 (1994); Smith v. FDC Corp., 109 N.M. 514, 522 , 787 P.2d 433, 441 (1990). {15} In addition, our past rulings that allowed reasonable attorney fee awards in certain exceptional circumstances have not ‘“robbed the [American] rule’ of justification” or rendered it “ ‘no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine.’ ” Trujillo, 1998-NM

1999In civil rights cases, this Court has affirmed the award of reasonable attorney fees when authorized by statute, see NMSA 1978, § 28-1-13(D) (1987), and there is no abuse of discretion, see Lucero v. Aladdin Beauty Colleges, Inc., 117 N.M. 269, 271 , 871 P.2d 365, 367 (1994); Smith v. FDC Corp., 109 N.M. 514, 522 , 787 P.2d 433, 441 (1990). {15} In addition, our past rulings that allowed reasonable attorney fee awards in certain exceptional circumstances have not ‘“robbed the [American] rule’ of justification” or rendered it “ ‘no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine.’ ” Trujillo, 1998-NM

1999In civil rights cases, this Court has affirmed the award of reasonable attorney fees when authorized by statute, see NMSA 1978, § 28-1-13(D) (1987), and there is no abuse of discretion, see Lucero v. Aladdin Beauty Colleges, Inc., 117 N.M. 269, 271 , 871 P.2d 365, 367 (1994); Smith v. FDC Corp., 109 N.M. 514, 522 , 787 P.2d 433, 441 (1990). {15} In addition, our past rulings that allowed reasonable attorney fee awards in certain exceptional circumstances have not ‘“robbed the [American] rule’ of justification” or rendered it “ ‘no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine.’ ” Trujillo, 1998-NM

1999In civil rights cases, this Court has affirmed the award of reasonable attorney fees when authorized by statute, see NMSA 1978, § 28-1-13(D) (1987), and there is no abuse of discretion, see Lucero v. Aladdin Beauty Colleges, Inc., 117 N.M. 269, 271 , 871 P.2d 365, 367 (1994); Smith v. FDC Corp., 109 N.M. 514, 522 , 787 P.2d 433, 441 (1990). {15} In addition, our past rulings that allowed reasonable attorney fee awards in certain exceptional circumstances have not ‘“robbed the [American] rule’ of justification” or rendered it “ ‘no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine.’ ” Trujillo, 1998-NM