first degree violation in New York

2016In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence before the grand jury, a court must evaluate “ ‘whether the evidence, viewed most favorably to the People, if unexplained and uncontradicted — and deferring all questions as to the weight or quality of the evidence — would warrant conviction’ ” (People v Mills, 1 NY3d 269, 274-275 [2003], quoting People v Carroll, 93 NY2d 564, 568 [1999]; see People v Bello, 92 NY2d 523, 525 [1998]). “ ‘Legally sufficient evidence’ means competent evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every element of an offense charged and the defendant’s commission

2016In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence before the grand jury, a court must evaluate “ ‘whether the evidence, viewed most favorably to the People, if unexplained and uncontradicted — and deferring all questions as to the weight or quality of the evidence — would warrant conviction’ ” (People v Mills, 1 NY3d 269, 274-275 [2003], quoting People v Carroll, 93 NY2d 564, 568 [1999]; see People v Bello, 92 NY2d 523, 525 [1998]). “ ‘Legally sufficient evidence’ means competent evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every element of an offense charged and the defendant’s commission

2016In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence before the grand jury, a court must evaluate “ ‘whether the evidence, viewed most favorably to the People, if unexplained and uncontradicted — and deferring all questions as to the weight or quality of the evidence — would warrant conviction’ ” (People v Mills, 1 NY3d 269, 274-275 [2003], quoting People v Carroll, 93 NY2d 564, 568 [1999]; see People v Bello, 92 NY2d 523, 525 [1998]). “ ‘Legally sufficient evidence’ means competent evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every element of an offense charged and the defendant’s commission

2016In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence before the grand jury, a court must evaluate “ ‘whether the evidence, viewed most favorably to the People, if unexplained and uncontradicted — and deferring all questions as to the weight or quality of the evidence — would warrant conviction’ ” (People v Mills, 1 NY3d 269, 274-275 [2003], quoting People v Carroll, 93 NY2d 564, 568 [1999]; see People v Bello, 92 NY2d 523, 525 [1998]). “ ‘Legally sufficient evidence’ means competent evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every element of an offense charged and the defendant’s commission

2016In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence before the grand jury, a court must evaluate “ ‘whether the evidence, viewed most favorably to the People, if unexplained and uncontradicted — and deferring all questions as to the weight or quality of the evidence — would warrant conviction’ ” (People v Mills, 1 NY3d 269, 274-275 [2003], quoting People v Carroll, 93 NY2d 564, 568 [1999]; see People v Bello, 92 NY2d 523, 525 [1998]). “ ‘Legally sufficient evidence’ means competent evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every element of an offense charged and the defendant’s commission

2016In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence before the grand jury, a court must evaluate “ ‘whether the evidence, viewed most favorably to the People, if unexplained and uncontradicted — and deferring all questions as to the weight or quality of the evidence — would warrant conviction’ ” (People v Mills, 1 NY3d 269, 274-275 [2003], quoting People v Carroll, 93 NY2d 564, 568 [1999]; see People v Bello, 92 NY2d 523, 525 [1998]). “ ‘Legally sufficient evidence’ means competent evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every element of an offense charged and the defendant’s commission

2023Contrary to defendant's contention, although the superseding indictment later incorrectly specified that the class D felony of sexual abuse in the first degree (§ 130.65 [2]), rather than the class B felony of sodomy in the first degree (Penal Law former § 130.50 [2]), was the class B felony on the pending indictment, that error constituted a mere "misnomer in the designation of the crime" that "d[id] not render [the superseding] indictment jurisdictionally defective" with respect to the bail jumping count ( People v Rodriguez , 97 AD3d 246 , 252 [1st Dept 2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 1028 [2012];

2020An essential element of that crime is that the defendant has violated an order of protection issued pursuant to "sections two hundred forty and two hundred fifty-two of the domestic relations law, articles four, five, six and eight of the family court act and section 530.12 of the criminal procedure law, or an order of protection issued by a court of competent jurisdiction in another state, territorial or tribal jurisdiction, which requires the respondent or defendant to stay away from the person or persons on whose behalf the order was issued" (Penal Law § 215.51[c]; see People v Coleman , 10

2020Penal Law § 60.35 (1) (a) expressly exempts from its coverage certain Vehicle and Traffic Law offenses, including those forming the basis for defendant's conviction, leaving the imposition of any mandatory surcharges to the provisions of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1809 et seq. ( see People v Grant , 178 AD2d 699, 699 [1991]).

2019Contrary to the father's further contention, we conclude that there is a sound and substantial basis for the court's ultimate determination that the child was neglected and abused as a result of the father's sexual abuse of the child ( see generally Family Ct Act § 1046 [b] [i]; Matter of Sean P. [Brandy P.] , 156 AD3d 1339, 1339-1340 [4th Dept 2017], lv denied 31 NY3d 903 [2018]).

2012The defendant’s claim that the Supreme Court’s charge with respect to manslaughter in the first degree was in error because it failed to relate his claim of intoxication to that charge’s intent element is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Smith, 36 AD3d 633, 633 [2007]; People v Masi, 154 AD2d 623, 623 [1989]).

2012The defendant’s claim that the Supreme Court’s charge with respect to manslaughter in the first degree was in error because it failed to relate his claim of intoxication to that charge’s intent element is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Smith, 36 AD3d 633, 633 [2007]; People v Masi, 154 AD2d 623, 623 [1989]).

2010Accordingly, the grand jury evidence did not demonstrate prima facie (see People v Gordon, 88 NY2d 92, 95-96 [1996]), that the defendant operated a motor vehicle with knowledge that his license was “suspended, revoked or otherwise withdrawn” by the Department of Motor Vehicles (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511 [1] [a]) and, thus, was not legally sufficient to establish the offense of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the first degree in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511 (3).

2009However, as this Court has previously held, the crime of conspiracy to commit immigration fraud has no analogue in the New York Penal Law (Matter of Markovitch, 191 AD2d 116, 117 [1993]).

2006In this regard, we note first that defendant pleaded guilty to count 4 of the indictment, which charged bur glary in the first degree in violation of Penal Law § 140.30 (1) (armed with a deadly weapon), and count 2 of the indictment, which charged robbery in the first degree in violation of Penal Law § 160.15 (1) (causes physical injury to a nonparticipant in the crime). * The robbery and burglary offenses thus involved separate and distinct acts (see Penal Law § 70.25 [2]; People v Yong Yun Lee, 92 NY2d 987, 989 [1998]; People v Wright, 1 AD3d 707 , 709 [2003], lv denied 1 NY3d 636 [2004]).

2006Furthermore, the record clearly demonstrates that the robbery charge under count 2, as opposed to the burglary charge under count 4, was the underlying offense to felony murder (see People v Parks, 95 NY2d 811, 815 [2000]).

2001Ordered that the application is granted to the extent that the appellant is granted leave to serve and file a brief on the issue of whether he was convicted of both robbery in the first degree and criminal use of a firearm in the first degree in violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy (see, People v Brown, 67 NY2d 555 , cert denied 479 US 1093 ; see also, Jackson v Leonardo, 162 F3d 81 ); and it is further, Ordered that pursuant to County Law § 722 the following named attorney is assigned as counsel to prosecute the application: Arza Rayches Feldman, 300 Rabro Drive, Hauppauge, N.