first degree violation in Ohio

2006For the following reasons, we affirm the denial of the Motion to Withdraw Plea, but reverse the Judgment Entry of Sentence and remand this case for re-sentencing in accordance with State v. Foster , 109 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2006-Ohio-856 . {¶ 2} On March 8, 2001, Green was indicted by the Ashtabula County Grand Jury on one count of Aggravated Burglary, a felony of the first degree in violation of R.C. 2911.11 (A)(1), and one count of Theft, a felony of the fifth degree in violation of R.C. 2913.02 (A)(1).

2006Due to the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2006-Ohio-856 , we reverse the sentence imposed by the court below and remand this matter for resentencing. {¶ 2} On January 9, 2006, Frisina entered guilty pleas to five counts of Robbery, a felony of the second degree in violation of R.C. 2911.02 (A)(2), five counts of Robbery, a felony of the third degree in violation of R.C. 2911.02 (A)(3), one count of Theft, a felony of the fifth degree in violation of R.C. 2913.02 (A)(1), and one count of Engaging in a Pattern of Corrupt Activity, a felony of the first degre

2017One of the burglary counts arose from the entrance into the first apartment and the second from the entrance into the victim’s apartment. {¶4} On August 16, 2016, Appellant entered an Alford plea in accordance with North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970).

2007Leasure, entered a plea pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford (1970) 400 U.S. 25 , to charges of felonious assault, a felony of the first degree and a violation of R.C. 2903.11 (A)(2), and attempted possession of crack cocaine, a felony of the second degree and a violation of R.C. 2923.02 and R.C. 2925.11 (A), (C)(4)(e).

2026In the alternative, Appellant argued that he possesses a protected right to privacy as to his own sexual activity in accordance with Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). {¶11} On February 6, 2025, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion to dismiss, determining that the statute is neither vague nor overbroad.

2023Lake No. 2021-L-016, 2022-Ohio-3481 . {¶5} On remand, Jackson was retried on the following charges renumbered from the original Indictment: Attempted Murder (Count 1), a felony of the first degree in violation of R.C. 2923.02 and 2903.02(A) with Firearm Specifications as set forth in R.C. 2941.145 and 2941.146; Felonious Assault (Count 2), a felony of the second degree in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) with Firearm Specifications as set forth in R.C. 2941.145 and 2941.146; Improperly Discharging a Firearm at or into a Habitation or School Safety Zone (Count 3), a felony of the second degree i

2023As stated in the Plea Agreement, Amin was subject to the following potential penalties: “Prison: 2-8 years”; “Subject to Regan Tokes: Yes, indefinite prison term maximum up to 12 years”; “Post release control: Mandatory up to 3 years but not less than 18 months”; and “Maximum fine up to $15,000.00.” {¶4} On March 7, 2023, the trial court sentenced Amin to a prison term of 2 years, up to 3 years but not less than 18 months of post-release control, and a fine of $5,000.00. {¶5} On appeal, Amin raises the following assignments of error: [1.] Appellant did not enter a knowing, intelligent, or volu

2023As stated in the Plea Agreement, Amin was subject to the following potential penalties: “Prison: 2-8 years”; “Subject to Regan Tokes: Yes, indefinite prison term maximum up to 12 years”; “Post release control: Mandatory up to 3 years but not less than 18 months”; and “Maximum fine up to $15,000.00.” {¶4} On March 7, 2023, the trial court sentenced Amin to a prison term of 2 years, up to 3 years but not less than 18 months of post-release control, and a fine of $5,000.00. {¶5} On appeal, Amin raises the following assignments of error: [1.] Appellant did not enter a knowing, intelligent, or volu

2021Portage No. 2018-P-0027, 2019-Ohio-2508 , this court affirmed the jury’s verdicts and the imposition of consecutive sentences but reversed for failing to merge allied offenses.

2020The court may not reserve ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal made at the close of the state's case. {¶ 11} The standard to be employed by a trial court in determining a Crim.R. 29 motion is set out in State v. Bridgeman, 55 Ohio St.2d 261 , 381 N.E.2d 184 (1978), syllabus: "Pursuant to Crim.R. 29(A), a court shall not order an entry of judgment of acquittal if the evidence is such that reasonable minds can reach different conclusions as to whether each material element of a crime has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt." {¶ 12} Appellant challenges his conviction of felonious assau

2020The court may not reserve ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal made at the close of the state's case. {¶ 11} The standard to be employed by a trial court in determining a Crim.R. 29 motion is set out in State v. Bridgeman, 55 Ohio St.2d 261 , 381 N.E.2d 184 (1978), syllabus: "Pursuant to Crim.R. 29(A), a court shall not order an entry of judgment of acquittal if the evidence is such that reasonable minds can reach different conclusions as to whether each material element of a crime has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt." {¶ 12} Appellant challenges his conviction of felonious assau

2020The court may not reserve ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal made at the close of the state's case. {¶ 11} The standard to be employed by a trial court in determining a Crim.R. 29 motion is set out in State v. Bridgeman, 55 Ohio St.2d 261 , 381 N.E.2d 184 (1978), syllabus: "Pursuant to Crim.R. 29(A), a court shall not order an entry of judgment of acquittal if the evidence is such that reasonable minds can reach different conclusions as to whether each material element of a crime has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt." {¶ 12} Appellant challenges his conviction of felonious assau

2020The court may not reserve ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal made at the close of the state's case. {¶ 11} The standard to be employed by a trial court in determining a Crim.R. 29 motion is set out in State v. Bridgeman, 55 Ohio St.2d 261 , 381 N.E.2d 184 (1978), syllabus: "Pursuant to Crim.R. 29(A), a court shall not order an entry of judgment of acquittal if the evidence is such that reasonable minds can reach different conclusions as to whether each material element of a crime has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt." {¶ 12} Appellant challenges his conviction of felonious assau

2019State v. Elmore, 111 Ohio St.3d 515 , 2006-Ohio-6207 , 857 N.E.2d 547, ¶ 44 .

2019State v. Elmore, 111 Ohio St.3d 515 , 2006-Ohio-6207 , 857 N.E.2d 547, ¶ 44 .

2013For the following reasons, we reverse the decision of the court below. {¶2} On December 9, 2011, the Ohio State Highway Patrol issued Harmon a traffic ticket, charging her with OVI, a misdemeanor of the first degree in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) (driving under the influence of alcohol) and (d) (driving with a prohibited breath alcohol concentration), and with a Tail Lights violation, a minor misdemeanor in violation of R.C. 4513.05(A). {¶3} On December 12, 2011, Harmon entered a plea of “not guilty.” {¶4} On January 30, 2012, Harmon filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence, seeking the supp

2013For the following reasons, we reverse the decision of the court below. {¶2} On December 9, 2011, the Ohio State Highway Patrol issued Harmon a traffic ticket, charging her with OVI, a misdemeanor of the first degree in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) (driving under the influence of alcohol) and (d) (driving with a prohibited breath alcohol concentration), and with a Tail Lights violation, a minor misdemeanor in violation of R.C. 4513.05(A). {¶3} On December 12, 2011, Harmon entered a plea of “not guilty.” {¶4} On January 30, 2012, Harmon filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence, seeking the supp

2013Johnson (2012) in Portage County Municipal Court case 2011 TRC 04090.” {¶5} On June 6, 2012, a suppression hearing was held, at which the municipal court “limit[ed] its review of Defendant’s Motion to Suppress solely to the admissibility of a BAC test from the Intoxilyzer 8000.” The court ruled that “the State of Ohio was required to produce some relevant competent evidence to convince the Court that the test results from the Intoxilyzer 8000 are scientifically reliable and, therefore, admissible at trial.” The State did not produce such evidence, but contended that “the legislature mandates t

2013Johnson (2012) in Portage County Municipal Court case 2011 TRC 04090.” {¶5} On June 6, 2012, a suppression hearing was held, at which the municipal court “limit[ed] its review of Defendant’s Motion to Suppress solely to the admissibility of a BAC test from the Intoxilyzer 8000.” The court ruled that “the State of Ohio was required to produce some relevant competent evidence to convince the Court that the test results from the Intoxilyzer 8000 are scientifically reliable and, therefore, admissible at trial.” The State did not produce such evidence, but contended that “the legislature mandates t

2011PADDEN RONALD COUCH 139 West Eighth Street 121 West Eighth Street Cambridge, OH 43725 Cambridge, OH 43725 [Cite as State v. Harper, 2011-Ohio-4568 .] Gwin, P.J. {¶1} Defendant-appellant Henry Harper appeals the judgment of the Guernsey County Court of Common Pleas convicting him of Kidnapping with a firearm specification, a felony of the first degree in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(1) and (2), Having Weapons While Under a Disability with a firearm specification a felony of the third degree in violation of R.C. 2923.13, and Discharge of a Firearm on or Near Prohibited Premises a misdemeanor of

2011Rich St., Ste. 2100 Newark, OH 43055 Colummbus, OH 43215 [Cite as State v. Elkins, 2011-Ohio-3611 .] Gwin, P.J. {¶1} Defendant-appellant Timothy Elkins appeals his convictions and sentences from the Licking County Court of Common Pleas for one count of Rape of a minor less than ten years old, a felony of the first degree in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) and two counts of Gross Sexual Imposition felonies of the third degree in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4).

2008Per the *Page 3 notice, Mr. Hundzsa was admitted to the correctional facility and began serving his sentence on November 4, 2004. {¶ 7} Roughly two months later, on January 13, 2005, the trial court issued another nunc pro tunc order and judgment entry, which changed the terms of the sentences to run consecutively instead of concurrently. {¶ 8} On December 15, 2005, Mr. Hundzsa, pro se, filed a motion for postconviction relief, alleging sentencing errors in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Blakely v. Washington (2004), 542 U.S. 296 .

2005Appellant was sentenced to six months incarceration, suspended on condition of good behavior; ordered to perform 50 hours of community service; ordered to pay costs of supervision, court-appointed counsel, and costs; and fined $250. {¶ 2} Appellant's counsel has submitted a request to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 738 .

2002That statute provides that expungement is precluded for: {¶ 4} “Convictions of an offense of violence when the offense is a misdemean- or of the first degree or a felony and when the offense is not a violation of section 2917.03 [riot] of the Revised Code and is not a violation of section 2903.13 [assault], 2917.01 [inciting to violence] or 2917.31 [inducing panic] of the Revised Code that is a misdemeanor of the first degree.” *686 {¶ 5} P.D. admits that the statute is not a model of clarity, but she submits that the first part of R.C. 2953.36(C) states the general proposition that expungemen

2002That statute provides that expungement is precluded for: {¶ 4} “Convictions of an offense of violence when the offense is a misdemean- or of the first degree or a felony and when the offense is not a violation of section 2917.03 [riot] of the Revised Code and is not a violation of section 2903.13 [assault], 2917.01 [inciting to violence] or 2917.31 [inducing panic] of the Revised Code that is a misdemeanor of the first degree.” *686 {¶ 5} P.D. admits that the statute is not a model of clarity, but she submits that the first part of R.C. 2953.36(C) states the general proposition that expungemen

1990In State v. Jenkins (1976), 48 Ohio App. 2d 99 , the eighth district ruled that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate prior calculation and design in a case where the defendant went to his car, removed a shotgun and fired upon the victim, holding that "'[p]rior calculation and design' sets up a *** more demanding standard than the old first degree standard of 'deliberate and premeditated malice'. 'Prior calculation and design' require some kind of studied analysis ***.

1990Momentary premeditation is no longer sufficient." Jenkins, supra, at the first paragraph of the syllabus.