remedial clause in Pennsylvania

1948Plaintiff’s contention that the statute is penal and must therefore be strictly construed, overlooks the settled rule that ‘there is no impropriety in putting a literal construction on a penal clause and a liberal construction on a remedial clause’ in the same statute: Com. v. Shaleen, 215 Pa. 595 , 64 A. 797 .

1948Plaintiff’s contention that the statute is penal and must therefore be strictly construed, overlooks the settled rule that ‘there is no impropriety in putting a literal construction on a penal clause and a liberal construction on a remedial clause’ in the same statute: Com. v. Shaleen, 215 Pa. 595 , 64 A. 797 .

1959Commonwealth v. Shaleen, 215 Pa. 595 , 64 A. 797 ; Alford v. Raschiatore, 163 Pa. Superior Ct. 635 , 63 A. 2d 366 .

1959Commonwealth v. Shaleen, 215 Pa. 595 , 64 A. 797 ; Alford v. Raschiatore, 163 Pa. Superior Ct. 635 , 63 A. 2d 366 .

1948In considering its meaning, it is also important to note that the requirement of the license is in aid of the collection of the revenue payable by brokers pursuant to the Act of 1907, supra. It is settled that ‘statutes to prevent frauds upon the revenue are considered as enacted for the public good and to suppress a public wrong, and therefore, although they impose penalties or forfeitures, are not to be construed, like penal laws generally, strictly in favor of the defendant; but they are to be fairly and reasonably construed, so as to carry out the intention of the legislature’: United Stat

1933In considering its meaning, it is also important to note that the requirement of the license is in aid of the collection of the revenue payable by brokers pursuant to the Act of 1907, supra. It is settled that “statutes to prevent frauds upon the revenue are considered as enacted for the public good and to suppress a public wrong, and therefore, although they impose penalties or forfeitures, are not to be construed, like penal laws generally, strictly in favor of the defendant; but they are to be fairly and reasonably construed, so as to carry out the intention of the legislature”: United Stat

1948In considering its meaning, it is also important to note that the requirement of the license is in aid of the collection of the revenue payable by brokers pursuant to the Act of 1907, supra. It is settled that ‘statutes to prevent frauds upon the revenue are considered as enacted for the public good and to suppress a public wrong, and therefore, although they impose penalties or forfeitures, are not to be construed, like penal laws generally, strictly in favor of the defendant; but they are to be fairly and reasonably construed, so as to carry out the intention of the legislature’: United Stat

1933In considering its meaning, it is also important to note that the requirement of the license is in aid of the collection of the revenue payable by brokers pursuant to the Act of 1907, supra. It is settled that “statutes to prevent frauds upon the revenue are considered as enacted for the public good and to suppress a public wrong, and therefore, although they impose penalties or forfeitures, are not to be construed, like penal laws generally, strictly in favor of the defendant; but they are to be fairly and reasonably construed, so as to carry out the intention of the legislature”: United Stat

2025Moreover, if this Court 12 allows the Commonwealth to, as Dow puts it, “collect additional taxes from Dow in the future[,]” Dow will be treated differently than “other similarly situated corporations based solely on an ‘arbitrary and unreasonable classification which is prohibited by the Uniformity Clause.’” Dow’s Br. at 22 (quoting Nextel II, 171 A.3d at 699 ).

2016Commonwealth v. Philistin, 774 A.2d 741, 743 (Pa. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 907 (2002) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

1988We are guided by the remedial rule contained in Chapter 100 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 150, and this court's consideration of that rule's applicability to Pa.R. *39 Crim.P. 130 in Commonwealth v. Schimelfenig, 361 Pa.Super. 325 , 522 A.2d 605 (1987).

1988We are guided by the remedial rule contained in Chapter 100 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 150, and this court's consideration of that rule's applicability to Pa.R. *39 Crim.P. 130 in Commonwealth v. Schimelfenig, 361 Pa.Super. 325 , 522 A.2d 605 (1987).

1987Co., 358 Pa. 7, 11 , 55 A.2d 756, 758 (1947); also see Springer v. County of Allegheny, 401 Pa. 557 , 165 A.2d 383 (1960) and Commonwealth v. Rough, 275 Pa.Super. 50 , 61 n. 5, 418 A.2d 605 , 611 n. 5 (1980).

1987Co., 358 Pa. 7, 11 , 55 A.2d 756, 758 (1947); also see Springer v. County of Allegheny, 401 Pa. 557 , 165 A.2d 383 (1960) and Commonwealth v. Rough, 275 Pa.Super. 50 , 61 n. 5, 418 A.2d 605 , 611 n. 5 (1980).

1987Co., 358 Pa. 7, 11 , 55 A.2d 756, 758 (1947); also see Springer v. County of Allegheny, 401 Pa. 557 , 165 A.2d 383 (1960) and Commonwealth v. Rough, 275 Pa.Super. 50 , 61 n. 5, 418 A.2d 605 , 611 n. 5 (1980).

1987Co., 358 Pa. 7, 11 , 55 A.2d 756, 758 (1947); also see Springer v. County of Allegheny, 401 Pa. 557 , 165 A.2d 383 (1960) and Commonwealth v. Rough, 275 Pa.Super. 50 , 61 n. 5, 418 A.2d 605 , 611 n. 5 (1980).

1979Otherwise, it must be pleaded as an affirmative defense by way of new matter in a responsive pleading: Rule 1030; Ziemba v. Hagerty, 436 Pa. 179 , 259 A. 2d 876 (1969).

1979Otherwise, it must be pleaded as an affirmative defense by way of new matter in a responsive pleading: Rule 1030; Ziemba v. Hagerty, 436 Pa. 179 , 259 A. 2d 876 (1969).

1978Thus, in Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263 , 282 A. 2d 206 (1971), original defendant, a druggist, was permitted to join as additional defendants, both the manufacturer of the drug and the physician who prescribed its use.

1978Thus, in Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263 , 282 A. 2d 206 (1971), original defendant, a druggist, was permitted to join as additional defendants, both the manufacturer of the drug and the physician who prescribed its use.

1978As a remedial rule, it has been liberally construed and applied: Ragan v. Steen, supra; Coppage v. Smith, 381 Pa. 400 , 113 A. 2d 247 (1955); Pa.R.C.P. 126.

1978As a remedial rule, it has been liberally construed and applied: Ragan v. Steen, supra; Coppage v. Smith, 381 Pa. 400 , 113 A. 2d 247 (1955); Pa.R.C.P. 126.

1974Commonwealth v. Murray, 437 Pa. 326 , 263 A. 2d 886 (1970).

1974Commonwealth v. Murray, 437 Pa. 326 , 263 A. 2d 886 (1970).

1974Upon review of the history of the grand jury proceedings and the fundamental privilege against self-incrimination, “[i]n seeking to balance society’s interest in the grand jury’s freedom of orderly inquiry and a *64 witness’s right to exercise Ms privilege against self incrimination knowingly and intelligently,” Commonwealth v. McCloskey, supra at 143, 277 A.2d at 777 , we conclude that the McCloskey rule is to be interpreted broadly as a remedial rule 9 and that the evidence in tMs case satisfies the “in any way based” language of McCloshey.

1959As stated by Judge Hirt in Commonwealth v. Yaste, supra, at page 277: . . courts may put a literal construction on a penal clause and a liberal construction on a remedial clause in the same statute.

1933Bechtel’s Election Expenses, supra. In the opinion in that case, the late Judge Head quoted with approval from the opinion in Com. v. Shaleen, 215 Pa. 595 , 597: “ ‘There is no impropriety in putting a literal construction on a penal clause and a liberal construction on a remedial clause in the same act of parliament.’ This was said by Chief Justice Best in Short v. Hubbard, 2 Bing. 349, 9 E.