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11 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1946–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Young v. Stategreen2 sentences2020Rather, the Court noted its agreement “with those courts that have found that sex registration and notification statutes are not punishment in the constitutional sense,” and therefore held that “requiring petitioner to register as a sex offender … does not constitute punishment, but is a remedial requirement for the protection of the public.” Id. 2020The fractured resolution of Doe left open the question whether registration under the current version of MSORA is “punishment in the constitutional sense,” or rather “is a remedial requirement for the protection of the public,” Young, 370 Md. at 716 , as determined through application of the intents-effects test. | 3 | 5 |
Smith v. Higinbothomgreen2 sentences1989For example, in Smith v. Higinbothom, 187 Md. 115, 130-31 , 48 A.2d 754, 762 (1946), dealing with a statute regulating election practices, we said that “[tjhere is no impropriety in putting a liberal construction on a remedial clause, and a literal construction on a penal clause in the same statute.” Simply because the Virginia criminal statute receives a strict construction when incorporated in the statute providing for a civil remedy, the latter does not become a law penal in the international sense. 1989For example, in Smith v. Higinbothom, 187 Md. 115, 130-31 , 48 A.2d 754, 762 (1946), dealing with a statute regulating election practices, we said that “[tjhere is no impropriety in putting a liberal construction on a remedial clause, and a literal construction on a penal clause in the same statute.” Simply because the Virginia criminal statute receives a strict construction when incorporated in the statute providing for a civil remedy, the latter does not become a law penal in the international sense. | 1 | 2 |
Willard Green v. River Terminal Railway Co., Third Party Jerald E. Dawson, Third Partygreen2 sentences2010Co., 763 F.2d 805, 806 (6th Cir.1985) (noting that courts should liberally construe the provisions of FELA in favor of injured railroad employees in light of the remedial objective of the statute). 2010Co., 763 F.2d 805, 806 (6th Cir.1985) (noting that courts should liberally construe the provisions of FELA in favor of injured railroad employees in light of the remedial objective of the statute). | 1 | 1 |
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway v. Buellgreen2 sentences2010Co., v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 562 , 107 S.Ct. 1410, 1414 , 94 L.Ed.2d 563, 571 (1987) (explaining that Congress intended FELA to provide a remedial framework for railroad employees and to eliminate several common law defenses to tort liability); cf. Green v. River Terminal Ry. 2010Co., v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 562 , 107 S.Ct. 1410, 1414 , 94 L.Ed.2d 563, 571 (1987) (explaining that Congress intended FELA to provide a remedial framework for railroad employees and to eliminate several common law defenses to tort liability); cf. Green v. River Terminal Ry. | 1 | 1 |
Mason v. Stategreen2 sentences2001To ascertain the permissible retrospective or prospective 18 sweep of Rule 15-207(e), it is necessary to examine and *555 “effectuate the legislative intention.” 19 Mason v. State, 309 Md. 215, 219 , 522 A.2d 1344, 1345 (1987) (citing Tucker v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. 2001To ascertain the permissible retrospective or prospective 18 sweep of Rule 15-207(e), it is necessary to examine and *555 “effectuate the legislative intention.” 19 Mason v. State, 309 Md. 215, 219 , 522 A.2d 1344, 1345 (1987) (citing Tucker v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cain v. State
green
2 sentences2010Stated differently, a requirement to register as a “child sexual offender” is statutory, see Graves v. State, 364 Md. 329, 343 , 772 A.2d 1225 (2001), and it is often imposed as a “condition of probation.” See, e.g., State v. Duran, 407 Md. 532, 545 , 967 A.2d 184 (2009); Cain v. State, 386 Md. 320, 340 , 872 A.2d 681 (2005); State v. Snowden, 385 Md. 64 , 74 n. 8, 867 A.2d 314 (2005). 2010Stated differently, a requirement to register as a “child sexual offender” is statutory, see Graves v. State, 364 Md. 329, 343 , 772 A.2d 1225 (2001), and it is often imposed as a “condition of probation.” See, e.g., State v. Duran, 407 Md. 532, 545 , 967 A.2d 184 (2009); Cain v. State, 386 Md. 320, 340 , 872 A.2d 681 (2005); State v. Snowden, 385 Md. 64 , 74 n. 8, 867 A.2d 314 (2005). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Snowden
green
2 sentences2010Stated differently, a requirement to register as a “child sexual offender” is statutory, see Graves v. State, 364 Md. 329, 343 , 772 A.2d 1225 (2001), and it is often imposed as a “condition of probation.” See, e.g., State v. Duran, 407 Md. 532, 545 , 967 A.2d 184 (2009); Cain v. State, 386 Md. 320, 340 , 872 A.2d 681 (2005); State v. Snowden, 385 Md. 64 , 74 n. 8, 867 A.2d 314 (2005). 2010Stated differently, a requirement to register as a “child sexual offender” is statutory, see Graves v. State, 364 Md. 329, 343 , 772 A.2d 1225 (2001), and it is often imposed as a “condition of probation.” See, e.g., State v. Duran, 407 Md. 532, 545 , 967 A.2d 184 (2009); Cain v. State, 386 Md. 320, 340 , 872 A.2d 681 (2005); State v. Snowden, 385 Md. 64 , 74 n. 8, 867 A.2d 314 (2005). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Graves v. State
green
2 sentences2010Stated differently, a requirement to register as a “child sexual offender” is statutory, see Graves v. State, 364 Md. 329, 343 , 772 A.2d 1225 (2001), and it is often imposed as a “condition of probation.” See, e.g., State v. Duran, 407 Md. 532, 545 , 967 A.2d 184 (2009); Cain v. State, 386 Md. 320, 340 , 872 A.2d 681 (2005); State v. Snowden, 385 Md. 64 , 74 n. 8, 867 A.2d 314 (2005). 2010Stated differently, a requirement to register as a “child sexual offender” is statutory, see Graves v. State, 364 Md. 329, 343 , 772 A.2d 1225 (2001), and it is often imposed as a “condition of probation.” See, e.g., State v. Duran, 407 Md. 532, 545 , 967 A.2d 184 (2009); Cain v. State, 386 Md. 320, 340 , 872 A.2d 681 (2005); State v. Snowden, 385 Md. 64 , 74 n. 8, 867 A.2d 314 (2005). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Duran
green
2 sentences2010Stated differently, a requirement to register as a “child sexual offender” is statutory, see Graves v. State, 364 Md. 329, 343 , 772 A.2d 1225 (2001), and it is often imposed as a “condition of probation.” See, e.g., State v. Duran, 407 Md. 532, 545 , 967 A.2d 184 (2009); Cain v. State, 386 Md. 320, 340 , 872 A.2d 681 (2005); State v. Snowden, 385 Md. 64 , 74 n. 8, 867 A.2d 314 (2005). 2010Stated differently, a requirement to register as a “child sexual offender” is statutory, see Graves v. State, 364 Md. 329, 343 , 772 A.2d 1225 (2001), and it is often imposed as a “condition of probation.” See, e.g., State v. Duran, 407 Md. 532, 545 , 967 A.2d 184 (2009); Cain v. State, 386 Md. 320, 340 , 872 A.2d 681 (2005); State v. Snowden, 385 Md. 64 , 74 n. 8, 867 A.2d 314 (2005). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Young v. State
green
2 sentences2010Young v. State, 138 Md.App. 380, 391 , 771 A.2d 525 (2001). “[I]t is instead ‘a remedial requirement for the protection of the public.’ ” Nguyen v. State, 189 Md.App. 501, 511 , 985 A.2d 87 (2009) (quoting Young v. State, 370 Md. 686, 716 , 806 A.2d 233 (2002)). 2010Young v. State, 138 Md.App. 380, 391 , 771 A.2d 525 (2001). “[I]t is instead ‘a remedial requirement for the protection of the public.’ ” Nguyen v. State, 189 Md.App. 501, 511 , 985 A.2d 87 (2009) (quoting Young v. State, 370 Md. 686, 716 , 806 A.2d 233 (2002)). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
MY NGUYEN v. State
green
2 sentences2010Young v. State, 138 Md.App. 380, 391 , 771 A.2d 525 (2001). “[I]t is instead ‘a remedial requirement for the protection of the public.’ ” Nguyen v. State, 189 Md.App. 501, 511 , 985 A.2d 87 (2009) (quoting Young v. State, 370 Md. 686, 716 , 806 A.2d 233 (2002)). 2010Young v. State, 138 Md.App. 380, 391 , 771 A.2d 525 (2001). “[I]t is instead ‘a remedial requirement for the protection of the public.’ ” Nguyen v. State, 189 Md.App. 501, 511 , 985 A.2d 87 (2009) (quoting Young v. State, 370 Md. 686, 716 , 806 A.2d 233 (2002)). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Dawson v. State
green
2 sentences2008We have not had occasion to decide whether required registration by certain offenders is a direct or collateral consequence of a plea of guilty, see Dawson v. State, 172 Md.App. 633, 917 A.2d 133 (2007) (declining to address the issue of whether registration is a direct or collateral consequence of a conviction because appellate courts do not decide constitutional questions where the case can be decided on non-constitutional grounds), although the Court of Appeals has concluded that the registration requirement does not constitute punishment, but rather, is a remedial requirement for the prote 2008We have not had occasion to decide whether required registration by certain offenders is a direct or collateral consequence of a plea of guilty, see Dawson v. State, 172 Md.App. 633, 917 A.2d 133 (2007) (declining to address the issue of whether registration is a direct or collateral consequence of a conviction because appellate courts do not decide constitutional questions where the case can be decided on non-constitutional grounds), although the Court of Appeals has concluded that the registration requirement does not constitute punishment, but rather, is a remedial requirement for the prote | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Apprendi v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences2002Increased Penalty Even assuming, arguendo, that sexual offender registration constituted punishment for the purposes of our Apprendi analysis, the requisite statutory predicate that Jessica was under eighteen years of age at the time of petitioner's crime is not a "fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum." Apprendi 530 U.S. at 490 , 120 S.Ct. at 2362-63 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 . 2002Increased Penalty Even assuming, arguendo, that sexual offender registration constituted punishment for the purposes of our Apprendi analysis, the requisite statutory predicate that Jessica was under eighteen years of age at the time of petitioner's crime is not a "fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum." Apprendi 530 U.S. at 490 , 120 S.Ct. at 2362-63 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Commonwealth v. Shaleen
neutral
2 sentences1946Commonwealth v. Shaleen, 215 Pa. 595 , 64 A. 797 ; In re Wilhelm’s Petition, 111 Pa. Super. 133 , 169 A. 456 . 1946Commonwealth v. Shaleen, 215 Pa. 595 , 64 A. 797 ; In re Wilhelm’s Petition, 111 Pa. Super. 133 , 169 A. 456 . | 1 | 1946–1946 |
In Re Petition of Wilhelm
neutral
2 sentences1946Commonwealth v. Shaleen, 215 Pa. 595 , 64 A. 797 ; In re Wilhelm’s Petition, 111 Pa. Super. 133 , 169 A. 456 . 1946Commonwealth v. Shaleen, 215 Pa. 595 , 64 A. 797 ; In re Wilhelm’s Petition, 111 Pa. Super. 133 , 169 A. 456 . | 1 | 1946–1946 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.