lawyer-client privilege in California

1988(See Holm v. Superior Court (1984) 42 Cal.2d 500, 506-509 ; City and County of S.F. v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.2d 227, 234-237 ; City of Long Beach v. Superior Court (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 65, 71-72 ; People v. Boehm (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 13, 21 ; Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Bd. of Suprs. (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 41, 53-54 ; Jessup v. Superior Court (1957) 151 Cal.App.2d 102, 107-110 .) In answer to the question presented, therefore, we conclude that the lawyer-client privilege and work-product rule, when claimed by a public officer, do not automatically terminate upon set

1987Government lawyers have historically been able to assert the lawyer-client privilege (Holm v. Superior Court (1954) 42 Cal.2d 500, 506-509 ; City & County of S.F. v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.2d 227, 234-237 ; Jessup v. Superior Court (1957) 151 Cal.App.2d 102, 107-110 ).

2023The trial court was correct in concluding that a court “‘may not require disclosure of information claimed to be privileged . . . in order to rule on the claim of privilege . . . .’” (Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 725, 736 (Costco), quoting Evid.

2014As the Crimson Trace court found in regard to Oregon law, in California it is well-settled that “the attorney-client privilege is a legislative creation, which courts have no power to limit by recognizing implied exceptions.” (Costco, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 739 ; see Wells Fargo, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 206 ; HLC Properties, Ltd. v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 54, 67 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 105 P.3d 560 ]; Citizens for Ceres v. Superior Court (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 889, 912 [ 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 789 ] [“we are forbidden to create privileges or establish exceptions to privileges through case-b

1980Thirdly, unless the client knows that his lawyer cannot be compelled to reveal what is told him, the client will suppress what he thinks to be unfavorable facts.’ [Citation.] Given the privilege, a client may make such a disclosure without fear that his attorney may be forced to reveal the information confided to him. ‘[T]he absence of the privilege would convert the attorney habitually and inevitably into a mere informer for the benefit of the opponent.’” (City & County of S.F. v. Superior Court (1951) 37 Cal.2d 227, 235 [ 231 P.2d 26 , 25 A.L.R.2d 1418 ]; in accord: People v. Canfield (1974)

1980Thirdly, unless the client knows that his lawyer cannot be compelled to reveal what is told him, the client will suppress what he thinks to be unfavorable facts.’ [Citation.] Given the privilege, a client may make such a disclosure without fear that his attorney may be forced to reveal the information confided to him. ‘[T]he absence of the privilege would convert the attorney habitually and inevitably into a mere informer for the benefit of the opponent.’” (City & County of S.F. v. Superior Court (1951) 37 Cal.2d 227, 235 [ 231 P.2d 26 , 25 A.L.R.2d 1418 ]; in accord: People v. Canfield (1974)

2014As the Crimson Trace court found in regard to Oregon law, in California it is well-settled that “the attorney-client privilege is a legislative creation, which courts have no power to limit by recognizing implied exceptions.” (Costco, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 739 ; see Wells Fargo, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 206 ; HLC Properties, Ltd. v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 54, 67 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 105 P.3d 560 ]; Citizens for Ceres v. Superior Court (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 889, 912 [ 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 789 ] [“we are forbidden to create privileges or establish exceptions to privileges through case-b

2014As the Crimson Trace court found in regard to Oregon law, in California it is well-settled that “the attorney-client privilege is a legislative creation, which courts have no power to limit by recognizing implied exceptions.” (Costco, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 739 ; see Wells Fargo, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 206 ; HLC Properties, Ltd. v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 54, 67 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 105 P.3d 560 ]; Citizens for Ceres v. Superior Court (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 889, 912 [ 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 789 ] [“we are forbidden to create privileges or establish exceptions to privileges through case-b

2013(See Dietz v. Meisenheimer & Herron (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 771, 787 [ 99 Cal.Rptr.3d 464 ]; Goldstein v. Lees (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 614, 621, fn. 5 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 253 ]; see generally Rest.3d Law Governing Lawyers, § 59 [“[confidential client information consists of information relating to representation of a client, other than information that is generally known”]; ABA Model Rules Prof.

2013(See Dietz v. Meisenheimer & Herron (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 771, 787 [ 99 Cal.Rptr.3d 464 ]; Goldstein v. Lees (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 614, 621, fn. 5 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 253 ]; see generally Rest.3d Law Governing Lawyers, § 59 [“[confidential client information consists of information relating to representation of a client, other than information that is generally known”]; ABA Model Rules Prof.

2003(In re Providian Credit Card Cases, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 301 [documents which are not trade secrets may nonetheless be subject to sealing in the face of a proper rule 243.1 showing of prejudice to an overriding interest].) More importantly, communications relative to the sources of funds used to settle lawsuits, depending on the circumstances, may be protected by the lawyer-client privilege. [See Southern California Edison Co. v. Peevey (2003) 31 Cal.4th 781, 798 [ 3 Cal.Rptr. 3d 703 ] [‘ “If the public’s “right to know” compelled admission of an audience, the ringside seats would be oc

2003(In re Providian Credit Card Cases, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 301 [documents which are not trade secrets may nonetheless be subject to sealing in the face of a proper rule 243.1 showing of prejudice to an overriding interest].) More importantly, communications relative to the sources of funds used to settle lawsuits, depending on the circumstances, may be protected by the lawyer-client privilege. [See Southern California Edison Co. v. Peevey (2003) 31 Cal.4th 781, 798 [ 3 Cal.Rptr. 3d 703 ] [‘ “If the public’s “right to know” compelled admission of an audience, the ringside seats would be oc

2004But the Code does not bar the courts from creating by decisional law new exceptions to various privileges.’ ” (Chicago Title, supra, 174 Cal.App.3d at p. 1149, fn. 8 , quoting 2 Jefferson, Cal. Evidence Benchbook (2d ed. 1982) § 40: 3, p. 1467, original italics.) Applying this reasoning, the court in Merritt held that the plaintiff had impliedly waived the attorney-client privilege since he had specifically put the state of mind of his attorney at issue by alleging that the defendant’s attorney had confused his attorney and impeded his attorney’s ability to settle his claim.

1990But the Code does not bar the courts from creating by decisional law new exceptions to various privileges.’ ” (Chicago Title Insurance Co. v. Superior Court (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 1142, 1149, fn. 8 . [ 220 Cal.Rptr. 507 ], quoting 2 Jefferson, Cal. Evidence Benchbook (2d ed. 1982) § 40.3, p. 1467 (italics in original).) Applying this reasoning, the court in Merritt held that plaintiff had impliedly waived his privilege since he had specifically put the state of mind of his attorney at issue by alleging that the defendant’s attorney had confused his attorney and impeded his attorney’s ability to

1983As we stated last Term in Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980): ‘The lawyer-client privilege rests on the need for the advocate and counselor to know all that relates to the client’s reasons for seeking representation if the professional mission is to be carried out.’ And in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976), we recognized the purpose of the privilege to be ‘to encourage clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys.’ This rationale for the privilege has long been recognized by the Court, see Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (privilege ‘is founded up

1983As we stated last Term in Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980): `The lawyer-client privilege rests on the need for the advocate and counselor to know all that relates to the client's reasons for seeking representation if the professional mission is to be carried out.' And in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976), we recognized the purpose of the privilege to be `to encourage clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys.' This rationale for the privilege has long been recognized by the Court, see Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (privilege `is founded up

1980Thirdly, unless the client knows that his lawyer cannot be compelled to reveal what is told him, the client will suppress what he thinks to be unfavorable facts.’ [Citation.] Given the privilege, a client may make such a disclosure without fear that his attorney may be forced to reveal the information confided to him. ‘[T]he absence of the privilege would convert the attorney habitually and inevitably into a mere informer for the benefit of the opponent.’” (City & County of S.F. v. Superior Court (1951) 37 Cal.2d 227, 235 [ 231 P.2d 26 , 25 A.L.R.2d 1418 ]; in accord: People v. Canfield (1974)

1980Thirdly, unless the client knows that his lawyer cannot be compelled to reveal what is told him, the client will suppress what he thinks to be unfavorable facts.’ [Citation.] Given the privilege, a client may make such a disclosure without fear that his attorney may be forced to reveal the information confided to him. ‘[T]he absence of the privilege would convert the attorney habitually and inevitably into a mere informer for the benefit of the opponent.’” (City & County of S.F. v. Superior Court (1951) 37 Cal.2d 227, 235 [ 231 P.2d 26 , 25 A.L.R.2d 1418 ]; in accord: People v. Canfield (1974)

1976Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 144 , 514 P.2d 1224 ].) The majority’s interpretation of Evidence Code section 1012 ignores, for example, Evidence Code section 917 that pertains to all the confidential communication privileges—the lawyer-client privilege, the physician-patient privilege, the clergyman-penitent privilege, the husband-wife privilege, as well as the psychotherapist-patient relationship.

1976Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 144 , 514 P.2d 1224 ].) The majority’s interpretation of Evidence Code section 1012 ignores, for example, Evidence Code section 917 that pertains to all the confidential communication privileges—the lawyer-client privilege, the physician-patient privilege, the clergyman-penitent privilege, the husband-wife privilege, as well as the psychotherapist-patient relationship.

2023The Trial Court Did Not Err in Unsealing the Asbestos Case Number An order unsealing documents “is the functional equivalent of denying a motion to seal them.” (In re Providian Credit Card Cases (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 292, 302 .) “[W]e review the ultimately discretionary decision to deny sealing by inquiring whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s express or implied findings that the requirements for sealing are not met.” (Overstock.com, Inc. v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 492 ; see People v. Jackson (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1020 ; In re Providian

2003(In re Providian Credit Card Cases, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 301 [documents which are not trade secrets may nonetheless be subject to sealing in the face of a proper rule 243.1 showing of prejudice to an overriding interest].) More importantly, communications relative to the sources of funds used to settle lawsuits, depending on the circumstances, may be protected by the lawyer-client privilege. [See Southern California Edison Co. v. Peevey (2003) 31 Cal.4th 781, 798 [ 3 Cal.Rptr. 3d 703 ] [‘ “If the public’s “right to know” compelled admission of an audience, the ringside seats would be oc

1977The lawyer-client privilege clearly does apply to such communications. ( People v. Lines (1975) 13 Cal.3d 500, 509-510 [ 119 Cal. Rptr. 225 , 531 P.2d 793 ]; Evid.

1977The lawyer-client privilege clearly does apply to such communications. ( People v. Lines (1975) 13 Cal.3d 500, 509-510 [ 119 Cal. Rptr. 225 , 531 P.2d 793 ]; Evid.

2023The Trial Court Did Not Err in Unsealing the Asbestos Case Number An order unsealing documents “is the functional equivalent of denying a motion to seal them.” (In re Providian Credit Card Cases (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 292, 302 .) “[W]e review the ultimately discretionary decision to deny sealing by inquiring whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s express or implied findings that the requirements for sealing are not met.” (Overstock.com, Inc. v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 492 ; see People v. Jackson (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1020 ; In re Providian

2014As the Crimson Trace court found in regard to Oregon law, in California it is well-settled that “the attorney-client privilege is a legislative creation, which courts have no power to limit by recognizing implied exceptions.” (Costco, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 739 ; see Wells Fargo, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 206 ; HLC Properties, Ltd. v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 54, 67 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 105 P.3d 560 ]; Citizens for Ceres v. Superior Court (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 889, 912 [ 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 789 ] [“we are forbidden to create privileges or establish exceptions to privileges through case-b

2014As the Crimson Trace court found in regard to Oregon law, in California it is well-settled that “the attorney-client privilege is a legislative creation, which courts have no power to limit by recognizing implied exceptions.” (Costco, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 739 ; see Wells Fargo, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 206 ; HLC Properties, Ltd. v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 54, 67 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 105 P.3d 560 ]; Citizens for Ceres v. Superior Court (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 889, 912 [ 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 789 ] [“we are forbidden to create privileges or establish exceptions to privileges through case-b

2014As the Crimson Trace court found in regard to Oregon law, in California it is well-settled that “the attorney-client privilege is a legislative creation, which courts have no power to limit by recognizing implied exceptions.” (Costco, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 739 ; see Wells Fargo, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 206 ; HLC Properties, Ltd. v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 54, 67 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 105 P.3d 560 ]; Citizens for Ceres v. Superior Court (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 889, 912 [ 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 789 ] [“we are forbidden to create privileges or establish exceptions to privileges through case-b

2014As the Crimson Trace court found in regard to Oregon law, in California it is well-settled that “the attorney-client privilege is a legislative creation, which courts have no power to limit by recognizing implied exceptions.” (Costco, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 739 ; see Wells Fargo, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 206 ; HLC Properties, Ltd. v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 54, 67 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 105 P.3d 560 ]; Citizens for Ceres v. Superior Court (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 889, 912 [ 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 789 ] [“we are forbidden to create privileges or establish exceptions to privileges through case-b

2014As the Crimson Trace court found in regard to Oregon law, in California it is well-settled that “the attorney-client privilege is a legislative creation, which courts have no power to limit by recognizing implied exceptions.” (Costco, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 739 ; see Wells Fargo, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 206 ; HLC Properties, Ltd. v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 54, 67 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 105 P.3d 560 ]; Citizens for Ceres v. Superior Court (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 889, 912 [ 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 789 ] [“we are forbidden to create privileges or establish exceptions to privileges through case-b

2014As the Crimson Trace court found in regard to Oregon law, in California it is well-settled that “the attorney-client privilege is a legislative creation, which courts have no power to limit by recognizing implied exceptions.” (Costco, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 739 ; see Wells Fargo, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 206 ; HLC Properties, Ltd. v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 54, 67 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 105 P.3d 560 ]; Citizens for Ceres v. Superior Court (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 889, 912 [ 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 789 ] [“we are forbidden to create privileges or establish exceptions to privileges through case-b

2014As the Crimson Trace court found in regard to Oregon law, in California it is well-settled that “the attorney-client privilege is a legislative creation, which courts have no power to limit by recognizing implied exceptions.” (Costco, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 739 ; see Wells Fargo, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 206 ; HLC Properties, Ltd. v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 54, 67 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 105 P.3d 560 ]; Citizens for Ceres v. Superior Court (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 889, 912 [ 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 789 ] [“we are forbidden to create privileges or establish exceptions to privileges through case-b

2013(People v. Roldan, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 724 ; People v. Lines, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 510 .) Moreover as expressly noted by the Law Revision Commission in its comments, “[T]he attorney-client privilege may provide protection in some cases where an exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege is applicable.” (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29B pt. 3B West’s Ann.

2013(Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 725, 739 [ 101 Cal.Rptr.3d 758 , 219 P.3d 736 ].) “Courts may not add to the statutory privileges except as required by state or federal constitutional law [citations], nor may courts imply unwritten exceptions to existing statutory privileges.” (Roberts v. City of Palmdale (1993) 5 Cal.4th 363, 373 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 330 , 853 P.2d 496 ]; see HLC Properties, Ltd. v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 67 [“ ‘[t]he privileges set out in the Evidence Code are legislative creations; the courts of this state have no power to expand the

2013The right to reasonably necessary ancillary defense services and the lawyer-client privilege Several interrelated doctrines ensure that a defendant in a criminal case or a minor subject to a juvenile wardship petition has the right not only to counsel but also to necessary ancillary defense services and that communications with both counsel and any experts engaged to assist counsel will remain protected from disclosure. 5 First, “ ‘[t]he right to counsel guaranteed by both the federal and state Constitutions includes, and indeed presumes, the right to effective counsel [citations], and thus al

2013The right to reasonably necessary ancillary defense services and the lawyer-client privilege Several interrelated doctrines ensure that a defendant in a criminal case or a minor subject to a juvenile wardship petition has the right not only to counsel but also to necessary ancillary defense services and that communications with both counsel and any experts engaged to assist counsel will remain protected from disclosure. 5 First, “ ‘[t]he right to counsel guaranteed by both the federal and state Constitutions includes, and indeed presumes, the right to effective counsel [citations], and thus al

2013First, “[A] statute must be construed, if reasonably possible, in a manner that avoids a serious constitutional question.” (People v. Engram (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1131, 1161 [ 116 Cal.Rptr.3d 762 , 240 P.3d 237 ]; accord, People v. Leiva (2013) 56 Cal.4th 498, 506-507 [ 154 Cal.Rptr.3d 634 , 297 P.3d 870 ] [“ ‘ “a court, when faced with an ambiguous statute that raises serious constitutional questions, should endeavor to construe the statute in a manner which avoids any doubt concerning its validity” ’ ”].) Second, courts have no power to recognize implied exceptions to the lawyer-client privilege

2013First, “[A] statute must be construed, if reasonably possible, in a manner that avoids a serious constitutional question.” (People v. Engram (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1131, 1161 [ 116 Cal.Rptr.3d 762 , 240 P.3d 237 ]; accord, People v. Leiva (2013) 56 Cal.4th 498, 506-507 [ 154 Cal.Rptr.3d 634 , 297 P.3d 870 ] [“ ‘ “a court, when faced with an ambiguous statute that raises serious constitutional questions, should endeavor to construe the statute in a manner which avoids any doubt concerning its validity” ’ ”].) Second, courts have no power to recognize implied exceptions to the lawyer-client privilege

2013(See Dietz v. Meisenheimer & Herron (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 771, 787 [ 99 Cal.Rptr.3d 464 ]; Goldstein v. Lees (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 614, 621, fn. 5 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 253 ]; see generally Rest.3d Law Governing Lawyers, § 59 [“[confidential client information consists of information relating to representation of a client, other than information that is generally known”]; ABA Model Rules Prof.

2013(See Dietz v. Meisenheimer & Herron (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 771, 787 [ 99 Cal.Rptr.3d 464 ]; Goldstein v. Lees (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 614, 621, fn. 5 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 253 ]; see generally Rest.3d Law Governing Lawyers, § 59 [“[confidential client information consists of information relating to representation of a client, other than information that is generally known”]; ABA Model Rules Prof.

2013The right to reasonably necessary ancillary defense services and the lawyer-client privilege Several interrelated doctrines ensure that a defendant in a criminal case or a minor subject to a juvenile wardship petition has the right not only to counsel but also to necessary ancillary defense services and that communications with both counsel and any experts engaged to assist counsel will remain protected from disclosure. 5 First, “ ‘[t]he right to counsel guaranteed by both the federal and state Constitutions includes, and indeed presumes, the right to effective counsel [citations], and thus al

2013The right to reasonably necessary ancillary defense services and the lawyer-client privilege Several interrelated doctrines ensure that a defendant in a criminal case or a minor subject to a juvenile wardship petition has the right not only to counsel but also to necessary ancillary defense services and that communications with both counsel and any experts engaged to assist counsel will remain protected from disclosure. 5 First, “ ‘[t]he right to counsel guaranteed by both the federal and state Constitutions includes, and indeed presumes, the right to effective counsel [citations], and thus al

2013First, “[A] statute must be construed, if reasonably possible, in a manner that avoids a serious constitutional question.” (People v. Engram (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1131, 1161 [ 116 Cal.Rptr.3d 762 , 240 P.3d 237 ]; accord, People v. Leiva (2013) 56 Cal.4th 498, 506-507 [ 154 Cal.Rptr.3d 634 , 297 P.3d 870 ] [“ ‘ “a court, when faced with an ambiguous statute that raises serious constitutional questions, should endeavor to construe the statute in a manner which avoids any doubt concerning its validity” ’ ”].) Second, courts have no power to recognize implied exceptions to the lawyer-client privilege

2013First, “[A] statute must be construed, if reasonably possible, in a manner that avoids a serious constitutional question.” (People v. Engram (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1131, 1161 [ 116 Cal.Rptr.3d 762 , 240 P.3d 237 ]; accord, People v. Leiva (2013) 56 Cal.4th 498, 506-507 [ 154 Cal.Rptr.3d 634 , 297 P.3d 870 ] [“ ‘ “a court, when faced with an ambiguous statute that raises serious constitutional questions, should endeavor to construe the statute in a manner which avoids any doubt concerning its validity” ’ ”].) Second, courts have no power to recognize implied exceptions to the lawyer-client privilege