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12 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Floresgreen2 sentences2022The State questioned trial counsel about a string of emails between trial counsel and the State on April 5, 2021.5 After refreshing her recollection with the emails, trial counsel stated she was stuck in a hearing in another county during D.L.’s hearing and then she remained in the Zoom waiting room for D.L.’s hearing until the judge brought her in and explained to her what had happened with regard to the default that day. ¶13 At the second hearing date, the court began with the issue of whether filing an ineffectiveness motion waived attorney-client confidentiality under State v. Flores, 170 2022The State questioned trial counsel about a string of emails between trial counsel and the State on April 5, 2021.5 After refreshing her recollection with the emails, trial counsel stated she was stuck in a hearing in another county during D.L.’s hearing and then she remained in the Zoom waiting room for D.L.’s hearing until the judge brought her in and explained to her what had happened with regard to the default that day. ¶13 At the second hearing date, the court began with the issue of whether filing an ineffectiveness motion waived attorney-client confidentiality under State v. Flores, 170 | 2 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Kylegreen2 sentences2016See Kyle, 533 A.2d at 131 n.15 ("We note parenthetically that permitting in camera review of information protected by the absolute privilege between psychologist and client could possibly render other absolute (continued) 55 No. 2011AP2680-CR privileges subject to the same limitation."). 2016See Kyle, 533 A.2d at 131 n.15 ("We note parenthetically that permitting in camera review of information protected by the absolute privilege between psychologist and client could possibly render other absolute (continued) 55 No. 2011AP2680-CR privileges subject to the same limitation."). | 2 | 2 |
State Ex Rel. Dudek v. Circuit Court for Milwaukee Countygreen2 sentences2002See Wis. Stat. § 905.03 (3); see also Dudek, 34 Wis. 2d at 605 (only the client can waive the lawyer-client privilege); Borgwardt, 196 Wis. 2d at 355 ; Swan Sales Corp., 126 Wis. 2d at 31-32 . 2002See Wis. Stat. § 905.03 (3); see also Dudek, 34 Wis. 2d at 605 (only the client can waive the lawyer-client privilege); Borgwardt, 196 Wis. 2d at 355 ; Swan Sales Corp., 126 *100 Wis. 2d at 31-32. | 2 | 2 |
Lane v. SHARP PACKAGING SYSTEMS, INC.green2 sentences2013Our precedent is that "attorney billing records are protected by the lawyer-client privilege." Lane v. Sharp Packaging Systems, Inc., 2002 WI 28, ¶ 3 , 251 Wis. 2d 68 , 640 N.W.2d 788 . 2013Our precedent is that "attorney billing records are protected by the lawyer-client privilege." Lane v. Sharp Packaging Systems, Inc., 2002 WI 28, ¶ 3 , 251 Wis. 2d 68 , 640 N.W.2d 788 . | 1 | 2 |
Hampton Police Ass'n v. Town of Hamptongreen1 sentence2011The approach in Lane is consistent with the approach of many jurisdictions that have rejected the argument that "descriptive billing entries are per se privileged from disclosure under the attorney-client privilege." Hampton Police Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Hampton, 20 A.3d 994, 1001 (N.H. 2011). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Zolingreen2 sentences2002See Borgwardt, 196 Wis. 2d at 357 -358 (citing United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 568-569 ). 2002See Borgwardt, 196 Wis. 2d at 357 -358 (citing United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 568-569 ). | 1 | 1 |
Borgwardt v. Redlingreen2 sentences2002See Wis. Stat. § 905.03 (3); see also Dudek, 34 Wis. 2d at 605 (only the client can waive the lawyer-client privilege); Borgwardt, 196 Wis. 2d at 355 ; Swan Sales Corp., 126 Wis. 2d at 31-32 . 2002The work product doctrine was adopted in Wisconsin in Dudek, and codified by Wis. Stat. § 804.01 (2)(c). 24 Unlike the lawyer-client privilege, the work product doctrine is a "qualified privilege." Borgwardt, 196 Wis. 2d at 353 -354 (quoting United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 237-238 (1975)). | 1 | 1 |
George v. Record Custodiangreen2 sentences2002See George v. Record Custodian, 169 Wis. 2d 573, 582 , 485 N.W2d 460 (Ct. App. 1992) (instructing trial court to conduct in camera inspection to determine if lawyer-client privilege applies). 2002See George v. Record Custodian, 169 Wis. 2d 573, 582 , 485 N.W.2d 460 (Ct. App. 1992) (instructing trial court to conduct in camera inspection to determine if lawyer-client privilege applies). | 1 | 1 |
Dallas L. Holifield v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2002Lane relies on Holifield v. United States, 909 F.2d 201, 204 (7th Cir. 1990), where the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals refused to address the merits of the alleged lawyer-client privilege because Holifield failed to properly raise the issue. 2002Lane relies on Holifield v. United States, 909 F.2d 201, 204 (7th Cir. 1990), where the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals refused to address the merits of the alleged lawyer-client privilege because Holifield failed to properly raise the issue. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Grand Jury Subpoena Issued to Gerson S. Horn. United States of America v. Gerson S. Horngreen2 sentences2002Appellants rely on the distinction drawn in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Issued to Horn, 976 F.2d 1314, 1316-1317 (9th Cir. 1992), and Real v. Continental Group, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 211, 213-214 (N.D. 2002In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 976 F.2d at 1318 ; Real, 116 F.R.D. at 214 . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Noblesgreen2 sentences2002The work product doctrine was adopted in Wisconsin in Dudek, and codified by Wis. Stat. § 804.01 (2)(c). 24 Unlike the lawyer-client privilege, the work product doctrine is a "qualified privilege." Borgwardt, 196 Wis. 2d at 353 -354 (quoting United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 237-238 (1975)). 2002The work product doctrine was adopted in Wisconsin in Dudek, and codified by Wis. Stat. § 804.01 (2)(c). [24] Unlike the lawyer-client privilege, the work product doctrine is a "qualified privilege." Borgwardt, 196 Wis. 2d at 353 -354 (quoting United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 237-238 (1975)). | 1 | 1 |
Real v. Continental Group, Inc.green2 sentences2002Appellants rely on the distinction drawn in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Issued to Horn, 976 F.2d 1314, 1316-1317 (9th Cir. 1992), and Real v. Continental Group, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 211, 213-214 (N.D. 2002In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 976 F.2d at 1318 ; Real, 116 F.R.D. at 214 . | 1 | 1 |
Dyson v. Hempegreen2 sentences2002See Dyson, 140 Wis. 2d at 815 (answer may not be compelled to inquiries that threaten to reveal the substance of lawyer-client communications). ¶ 41. 2002See Dyson, 140 Wis. 2d at 815 (answer may not be compelled to inquiries that threaten to reveal the substance of lawyer-client communications). ¶ 41. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Nelsongreen2 sentences1987See State v. Nelson, 138 Wis. 2d 418, 430 , 406 N.W.2d 385, 390 (1987); State v. Malone, 136 Wis. 2d 250 , 260-61 401 N.W.2d 563, 567 (1987). 7 The exception in California Evidence Code, sec. 954 provides: "There is no privilege under this article as to a communication relevant to an issue of breach, by the lawyer or by the client, of a duty arising out of the lawyer-client relationship.” 8 The Dudek court set forth the policy reasons behind the restrictions placed on the scope of the lawyer-client privilege as follows: In discussing the reasons for the narrowness of the scope of the attorney- 1987See State v. Nelson, 138 Wis. 2d 418, 430 , 406 N.W.2d 385, 390 (1987); State v. Malone, 136 Wis. 2d 250 , 260-61 401 N.W.2d 563, 567 (1987). 7 The exception in California Evidence Code, sec. 954 provides: "There is no privilege under this article as to a communication relevant to an issue of breach, by the lawyer or by the client, of a duty arising out of the lawyer-client relationship.” 8 The Dudek court set forth the policy reasons behind the restrictions placed on the scope of the lawyer-client privilege as follows: In discussing the reasons for the narrowness of the scope of the attorney- | 1 | 1 |
| Knoff v. American Crystal Sugar Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Malonegreen | 1 | 1 |
United States v. United Shoe MacHinery Corporationgreen1 sentence1987It is generally agreed that the classic statement of the lawyer-client privilege is found in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jacobi v. Podevels
green
2 sentences2002Furthermore, because the lawyer-client privilege is " 'an obstacle to the investigation of the truth' it should be 'strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of the principle.'" Jax, 73 Wis. 2d at 579 (quoting Jacobi, 23 Wis. 2d at 157 ). ¶ 22. 2002Furthermore, because the lawyer-client privilege is "`an obstacle to the investigation of the truth' it should be `strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of the principle.'" Jax, 73 Wis. 2d at 579 (quoting Jacobi, 23 Wis. 2d at 157 ). ¶ 22. | 2 | 1987–2002 |
State v. MacHner
green
2 sentences2014Most importantly, the referee understood the importance of having the communication "filtered through the adversary process, or the judiciary's role in limiting the extent of the defendant's waiver of the lawyer-client privilege." Id. 1 State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797 , 285 N.W.2d 905 (Wis. App. 1979). 2 No. 2011AP2458-D.awb ¶60 At a Machner hearing, the disclosure of information is subject to a judicial determination of relevance and privilege. 2014Most importantly, the referee understood the importance of having the communication "filtered through the adversary process, or the judiciary's role in limiting the extent of the defendant's waiver of the lawyer-client privilege." Id. 1 State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797 , 285 N.W.2d 905 (Wis. App. 1979). 2 No. 2011AP2458-D.awb ¶60 At a Machner hearing, the disclosure of information is subject to a judicial determination of relevance and privilege. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Hicks v. Nunnery
green
1 sentence2014Most importantly, the referee understood the importance of having the communication "filtered through the adversary process, or the judiciary's role in limiting the extent of the defendant's waiver of the lawyer-client privilege." Id. 1 State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797 , 285 N.W.2d 905 (Wis. App. 1979). 2 No. 2011AP2458-D.awb ¶60 At a Machner hearing, the disclosure of information is subject to a judicial determination of relevance and privilege. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings Against O'Neil
green
2 sentences2014SCR 20:1.6(a) and (c)(4). ¶24 The published comment to SCR 20:1.6 further informs a lawyer's decision to disclose confidential client information in 7 We deem unpersuasive the OLR's reliance on In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against O'Neil, 2003 WI 48 , 261 Wis. 2d 404 , 661 N.W.2d 813 , where we concluded an attorney violated SCR 20:1.6 by disclosing his client's file and discussing its contents with the police department without obtaining client waiver. 2014SCR 20:1.6(a) and (c)(4). ¶24 The published comment to SCR 20:1.6 further informs a lawyer's decision to disclose confidential client information in 7 We deem unpersuasive the OLR's reliance on In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against O'Neil, 2003 WI 48 , 261 Wis. 2d 404 , 661 N.W.2d 813 , where we concluded an attorney violated SCR 20:1.6 by disclosing his client's file and discussing its contents with the police department without obtaining client waiver. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Harold Sampson Children's Trust v. Linda Gale Sampson 1979 Trust
green
2 sentences2008Our supreme court held in Harold Sampson Children's Trust v. Linda Gale Sampson 1979 Trust, 2004 WI 57, ¶ 31 , 271 Wis. 2d 610 , 679 N.W.2d 794 , that because the lawyer-client privilege belongs to the client, and not the lawyer, only the client can waive it. 2008Our supreme court held in Harold Sampson Children's Trust v. Linda Gale Sampson 1979 Trust, 2004 WI 57, ¶ 31 , 271 Wis. 2d 610 , 679 N.W.2d 794 , that because the lawyer-client privilege belongs to the client, and not the lawyer, only the client can waive it. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Journal/Sentinel, Inc. v. School Board of the School District
green
2 sentences2002Dist. of Shorewood, 186 Wis. 2d 443, 460 , 521 N.W.2d 165 (Ct. App. 1994). 2002Dist. of Shorewood, 186 Wis. 2d 443, 460 , 521 N.W.2d 165 (Ct. App. 1994). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Milroy v. Hanson
green
2 sentences2002In Milroy , the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska, examined whether a director and minority stockholder of a corporation has the right to documents otherwise protected under the lawyer-client privilege. 875 F. Supp. at 646 . 2002In Milroy , the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska, examined whether a director and minority stockholder of a corporation has the right to documents otherwise protected under the lawyer-client privilege. 875 F.Supp. at 646 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Jesse Ex Rel. Reinecke v. Danforth
green
2 sentences2002Id. [13] Whether attorney billings are protected by the lawyer-client privilege is a somewhat different issue and is discussed below in Section 2. [14] Even though Jesse v. Danforth, 169 Wis. 2d 229, 242 , 485 N.W.2d 63 (1992), originally adopted and applied the entity rule in a conflict of interest case, we find it appropriate to rely on the entity rule here as well. 2002Id. [13] Whether attorney billings are protected by the lawyer-client privilege is a somewhat different issue and is discussed below in Section 2. [14] Even though Jesse v. Danforth, 169 Wis. 2d 229, 242 , 485 N.W.2d 63 (1992), originally adopted and applied the entity rule in a conflict of interest case, we find it appropriate to rely on the entity rule here as well. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Swan Sales Corp. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co.
green
2 sentences2002See Wis. Stat. § 905.03 (3); see also Dudek, 34 Wis. 2d at 605 (only the client can waive the lawyer-client privilege); Borgwardt, 196 Wis. 2d at 355 ; Swan Sales Corp., 126 Wis. 2d at 31-32 . 2002See Wis. Stat. § 905.03 (3); see also Dudek, 34 Wis. 2d at 605 (only the client can waive the lawyer-client privilege); Borgwardt, 196 Wis. 2d at 355 ; Swan Sales Corp., 126 Wis. 2d at 31-32 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub
green
2 sentences2002In addition to relying on the entity rule and Jesse , appellants rely on Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985), for their position that even as a former director of Sharp, Lane may not waive the lawyer-client privilege and the present directors of Sharp may effectively assert the privilege against him. 2002In addition to relying on the entity rule and Jesse , appellants rely on Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985), for their position that even as a former director of Sharp, Lane may not waive the lawyer-client privilege and the present directors of Sharp may effectively assert the privilege against him. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Jax v. Jax
green
2 sentences2002Furthermore, because the lawyer-client privilege is " 'an obstacle to the investigation of the truth' it should be 'strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of the principle.'" Jax, 73 Wis. 2d at 579 (quoting Jacobi, 23 Wis. 2d at 157 ). ¶ 22. 2002Furthermore, because the lawyer-client privilege is "`an obstacle to the investigation of the truth' it should be `strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of the principle.'" Jax, 73 Wis. 2d at 579 (quoting Jacobi, 23 Wis. 2d at 157 ). ¶ 22. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Pickens v. State
red
2 sentences2001The application of the lawyer-client privilege during reexamination proceedings implies the right to counsel during said proceedings. 3 State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 206 , 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997), overruled Pickens v. State, 96 Wis. 2d 549 , 292 N.W.2d *477 601 (1980), only to the extent that the court mandated the use of a plea colloquy in every case where an individual sought to proceed pro se, in order to demonstrate a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel. 2001The application of the lawyer-client privilege during reexamination proceedings implies the right to counsel during said proceedings. 3 State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 206 , 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997), overruled Pickens v. State, 96 Wis. 2d 549 , 292 N.W.2d *477 601 (1980), only to the extent that the court mandated the use of a plea colloquy in every case where an individual sought to proceed pro se, in order to demonstrate a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
State v. Klessig
green
2 sentences2001The application of the lawyer-client privilege during reexamination proceedings implies the right to counsel during said proceedings. 3 State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 206 , 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997), overruled Pickens v. State, 96 Wis. 2d 549 , 292 N.W.2d *477 601 (1980), only to the extent that the court mandated the use of a plea colloquy in every case where an individual sought to proceed pro se, in order to demonstrate a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel. 2001The application of the lawyer-client privilege during reexamination proceedings implies the right to counsel during said proceedings. 3 State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 206 , 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997), overruled Pickens v. State, 96 Wis. 2d 549 , 292 N.W.2d *477 601 (1980), only to the extent that the court mandated the use of a plea colloquy in every case where an individual sought to proceed pro se, in order to demonstrate a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
cluster 389579
green
1 sentence1987Dyson had the burden of establishing the lawyer-client privilege, Weil v. Investment/Indicators, Research, & Management, 647 F.2d 18 , 25 (9th Cir. 1981), but the defendants had the burden of indicating to the trial court at the hearing on their motion whether they challenged Dyson’s intent that the communications she sought to protect be confidential. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Miller v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1987Miller v. Superior Court, 111 Cal. App. 3d 390 , 168 Cal. Rptr. 589 (Ct. App. 1980), presented an almost identical fact situation. 1987Miller v. Superior Court, 111 Cal. App. 3d 390 , 168 Cal. Rptr. 589 (Ct. App. 1980), presented an almost identical fact situation. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.