de facto officer doctrine in Illinois

2024Mireles urges his position is supported by Justice McMorrow’s concurrence in Daniels v. Industrial Commission, 201 Ill. 2d 160 (2002) insofar as it urged that the de facto officer doctrine should not be applied “mechanically” and should not apply where illegal appointments “were the result of malfeasance or a deliberate attempt to subvert” a governing statute.

2024Mireles urges his position is supported by Justice McMorrow’s concurrence in Daniels v. Industrial Comm’n, 201 Ill. 2d 160 (2002), insofar as it urged that the de facto officer doctrine should not be applied “mechanically” and should not apply where illegal appointments “were the result of malfeasance or a deliberate attempt to subvert” a governing statute.

2020That decision, along with the denial of rehearing in Baggett v. Industrial Comm’n, 201 Ill. 2d 187 (2002), and the decision in Vuagniaux v. Department of Professional Regulation, 208 Ill. 2d 173 (2003), created confusion over how this court viewed the de facto officer doctrine.

2020Id.; see also Vuagniaux, 208 Ill. 2d at 187 (‘Pursuant to the doctrine, litigants may not assert collateral challenges to the officer’s qualifications to hold office as a means of contesting the legality of the officer’s acts.’).” (Emphasis in original.) See also Clokey, supra, at 1124 (the de facto officer doctrine “bars collateral title challenges—that is, attempts to litigate title via an attack on the actions taken, rather than in a direct action where the sole issue is validity of title.

2023Id. ¶ 36 However, the de facto officer doctrine is applied as a defense to an attack on the acts of an officer or appointee in a collateral proceeding once some official act or decision has been rendered.

2023Defendant emphasizes the fact that the Merit Board ruled on evidentiary objections during the hearings, which is not without its significance, but we think commencing a hearing generally and allowing both sides to present all of the evidence is the more significant factor here that constitutes substantive action sufficient to trigger the de facto officer doctrine. ¶ 43 The de facto officer doctrine “confers validity upon acts performed by a person acting under the color of official title even though it is later discovered that the legality of that person’s appointment to office is deficient.”

2024Specifically, the Sheriff argued that Lopez v. Dart, 2018 IL App (1st) 170733 and Cruz v. Dart, 2019 IL App (1st) 170915 , had “altered the legal application of Taylor v. Dart.” The Sheriff argued that in light of those decisions, the de facto officer doctrine barred Mireles from relying on Taylor to collaterally attack his termination decision. ¶ 16 In his opposition to the Sheriff’s motion, Mireles argued that the de facto officer doctrine did not apply to him.

2024The circuit court noted that the First District had applied the de facto officer doctrine in Cruz v. Dart, 2019 IL App (1st) 170915 and Lopez v. Dart, 2018 IL App (1st) 170733 , notwithstanding that the Board decisions at issue in those cases were also rendered after the 2014 Taylor order. ¶ 27 Further, the circuit court found that in Malacina v. Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Board, 2021 IL App (1st) 191893 , “the First District has now expressly held that the de facto officer doctrine applies unless the plaintiff raised the issue of the illegal composition of the Merit Board before the issuance

2024See, e.g., Acevedo v. Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Board, 2019 IL App (1st) 181128, ¶ 25 (plaintiff’s claim that his termination decision was void because Rosales participated in it was barred by the de facto officer doctrine where “Acevedo - 13 - No. 1-22-1088 raises the same issue with Rosales’ appointment as was raised in Taylor, Lopez, and Cruz—an appointment to a term of less than six years); Cruz v. Dart, 2019 IL App (1st) 170915, ¶ 38 (de facto officer doctrine applied to attempt to void decision based on appointments of three other Board members to terms of less than six years, which wa

2024See, e.g., Acevedo v. Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Board, 2019 IL App (1st) 181128, ¶ 25 (plaintiff’s claim that his termination decision was void because Rosales participated in it was barred by the de facto officer doctrine where “Acevedo raises the same issue with Rosales’s appointment as was raised in Taylor, Lopez, and Cruz—an appointment to a term of less than six years”); Cruz, 2019 IL App (1st) 170915, ¶ 38 (de facto officer doctrine applied to attempt to void decision based on appointments of three other Board members to terms of less than six years, which was “the same problem with th

2024Specifically, the Sheriff argued that Lopez v. Dart, 2018 IL App (1st) 170733 and Cruz v. Dart, 2019 IL App (1st) 170915 , had “altered the legal application of Taylor v. Dart.” The Sheriff argued that in light of those decisions, the de facto officer doctrine barred Mireles from relying on Taylor to collaterally attack his termination decision. ¶ 16 In his opposition to the Sheriff’s motion, Mireles argued that the de facto officer doctrine did not apply to him.

2024The circuit court noted that the First District had applied the de facto officer doctrine in Cruz v. Dart, 2019 IL App (1st) 170915 and Lopez v. Dart, 2018 IL App (1st) 170733 , notwithstanding that the Board decisions at issue in those cases were also rendered after the 2014 Taylor order. ¶ 27 Further, the circuit court found that in Malacina v. Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Board, 2021 IL App (1st) 191893 , “the First District has now expressly held that the de facto officer doctrine applies unless the plaintiff raised the issue of the illegal composition of the Merit Board before the issuance

2017See Vuagniaux, 208 Ill. 2d at 187 . ¶ 45 The defendants also rely on Max Shepard, Inc. v. Industrial Comm’n, 348 Ill.

2017See Vuagniaux, 208 Ill. 2d at 187 . ¶ 45 The defendants also rely on Max Shepard, Inc. v. Industrial Comm’n, 348 Ill.

2024The circuit court noted that the First District had applied the de facto officer doctrine in Cruz v. Dart, 2019 IL App (1st) 170915 and Lopez v. Dart, 2018 IL App (1st) 170733 , notwithstanding that the Board decisions at issue in those cases were also rendered after the 2014 Taylor order. ¶ 27 Further, the circuit court found that in Malacina v. Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Board, 2021 IL App (1st) 191893 , “the First District has now expressly held that the de facto officer doctrine applies unless the plaintiff raised the issue of the illegal composition of the Merit Board before the issuance

2024Nonetheless, even assuming that res judicata did not apply, we otherwise agree with the circuit court that the de facto officer doctrine independently warranted dismissal. ¶ 46 De Facto Officer Doctrine ¶ 47 “The de facto officer rule is a common law equitable doctrine that confers validity on acts performed by an official acting under the color of official title, even though it is later determined that the official’s appointment to that position was legally deficient.” Malacina v. Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Board, 2021 IL App (1st) 191893, ¶ 20 (citing Goral, 2020 IL 125085, ¶ 71 .) “Under t

2020See, e.g., United States v. Beltran, 306 F. Supp. 385 (N.D.

2002See, e.g., United States v. Beltran, 306 F. Supp. 385 (N.D.

2020Chillicothe Township v. Board of Review, 19 Ill. 2d 424, 426 (1960).

2002Chillicothe Township v. Board of Review, 19 Ill. 2d 424, 426 (1960).

2017Peabody Coal Co., 349 Ill.

2017Peabody Coal Co., 349 Ill.

2024Nonetheless, even assuming that res judicata did not apply, we otherwise agree with the circuit court that the de facto officer doctrine independently warranted dismissal. ¶ 46 De Facto Officer Doctrine ¶ 47 “The de facto officer rule is a common law equitable doctrine that confers validity on acts performed by an official acting under the color of official title, even though it is later determined that the official’s appointment to that position was legally deficient.” Malacina v. Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Board, 2021 IL App (1st) 191893, ¶ 20 (citing Goral, 2020 IL 125085, ¶ 71 .) “Under t

2024Nonetheless, even assuming that res judicata did not apply, we otherwise agree with the circuit court that the de facto officer doctrine independently warranted dismissal. ¶ 46 De Facto Officer Doctrine ¶ 47 “The de facto officer rule is a common law equitable doctrine that confers validity on acts performed by an official acting under the color of official title, even though it is later determined that the official’s appointment to that position was legally deficient.” Malacina v. Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Board, 2021 IL App (1st) 191893, ¶ 20 (citing Goral, 2020 IL 125085, ¶ 71 .) “Under t

2024Plaintiffs’ cases were pending *** and the de facto officer doctrine did not prevent them from challenging the Board’s composition.” (Emphasis added.) Goral, 2019 IL App (1st) 181646 , ¶ 105. ¶ 59 Importantly, this statement of the law “not only survived the supreme court’s review of our decision but was the very basis for the supreme court’s holding” affirming our decision in Goral.

2020First, on May 7, 2019, the Second Division issued an opinion in Acevedo v. Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Bd., 2019 IL App (1st) 181128 , following Cruz and Lopez, and applying 6 1-19-1264 the de facto officer doctrine to reject a terminated correctional officer’s claim that the Merit Board’s decision to fire him was void. ¶ 20 On June 19, 2019, the Third Division issued an opinion in Goral v. Dart, 2019 IL App (1st) 181646 .

2021We thus declined to relax the equitable doctrine of the de facto officer. ¶ 27 Likewise, in Pietryla v. Dart, 2019 IL App (1st) 182143, ¶ 18 , we held that the de facto officer doctrine barred claims that all the Board members’ appointments were illegal in some respect—including nonstaggered terms, holdover appointments, and excessive terms.

2021We thus declined to relax the equitable doctrine of the de facto officer. ¶ 27 Likewise, in Pietryla v. Dart, 2019 IL App (1st) 182143, ¶ 18 , we held that the de facto officer doctrine barred claims that all the Board members’ appointments were illegal in some respect—including nonstaggered terms, holdover appointments, and excessive terms.

2024Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 222 Ill. 2d 422, 429 (2006); see also Cahokia Unit School District No. 187 v. Pritzker, 2021 IL 126212, ¶ 24 (de novo review applies to a dismissal under either section 2-1615 or section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure). 4 ¶ 36 Res Judicata Bars Mireles’ Current Claim Because It Could Have Been Raised Earlier ¶ 37 Before we delve into the parties’ arguments regarding the application of the de facto officer doctrine, we address the Sheriff’s threshold arguments that Mireles’ second amended complaint is procedurally barred by waiver, forfeiture, or res judicat

2024Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 222 Ill. 2d 422, 429 (2006); see Cahokia Unit School District No. 187 v. Pritzker, 2021 IL 126212, ¶ 24 (de novo review applies to a dismissal under either section 2-615 or section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure). 4 ¶ 35 Res Judicata Bars Mireles’s Current Claim Because It Could Have Been Raised Earlier ¶ 36 Before we delve into the parties’ arguments regarding the application of the de facto officer doctrine, we address the Sheriff’s threshold arguments that Mireles’s second amended complaint is procedurally barred by waiver, forfeiture, or res judicata.

2024Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 222 Ill. 2d 422, 429 (2006); see also Cahokia Unit School District No. 187 v. Pritzker, 2021 IL 126212, ¶ 24 (de novo review applies to a dismissal under either section 2-1615 or section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure). 4 ¶ 36 Res Judicata Bars Mireles’ Current Claim Because It Could Have Been Raised Earlier ¶ 37 Before we delve into the parties’ arguments regarding the application of the de facto officer doctrine, we address the Sheriff’s threshold arguments that Mireles’ second amended complaint is procedurally barred by waiver, forfeiture, or res judicat

2024Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 222 Ill. 2d 422, 429 (2006); see Cahokia Unit School District No. 187 v. Pritzker, 2021 IL 126212, ¶ 24 (de novo review applies to a dismissal under either section 2-615 or section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure). 4 ¶ 35 Res Judicata Bars Mireles’s Current Claim Because It Could Have Been Raised Earlier ¶ 36 Before we delve into the parties’ arguments regarding the application of the de facto officer doctrine, we address the Sheriff’s threshold arguments that Mireles’s second amended complaint is procedurally barred by waiver, forfeiture, or res judicata.

2002As noted in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 535-36 , 82 S.Ct. 1459, 1465 , 8 L.Ed.2d 671, 678-79 (1962), "[t]he rule does not obtain, of course, when the alleged *945 defect of authority operates also as a limitation on this Court's appellate jurisdiction * * * [or] when the statute claimed to restrict authority is not merely technical but embodies a strong policy concerning the proper administration of judicial business, [so that] this Court has treated the alleged defect as `jurisdictional' and agreed to consider it on direct review even though not raised at the earliest practicable opp

2002Ed. 2d 671, 678-79 , 82 S. Ct. 1459, 1465 (1962), “[t]he rule does not obtain, of course, when the alleged defect of authority operates also as a limitation on this Court’s appellate jurisdiction *** [or] when the statute claimed to restrict authority is not merely technical but embodies a strong policy concerning the proper administration of judicial business, [so that] this Court has treated the alleged defect as ‘jurisdictional’ and agreed to consider it on direct review even though not raised at the earliest practicable opportunity *** [or] when the challenge is based upon nonfrivolous con

2020That decision, along with the denial of rehearing in Baggett v. Industrial Comm’n, 201 Ill. 2d 187 (2002), and the decision in Vuagniaux v. Department of Professional Regulation, 208 Ill. 2d 173 (2003), created confusion over how this court viewed the de facto officer doctrine.

2019Acevedo cites no authority for the proposition that a litigant who claims that his constitutional rights were violated by a termination decision by a statutorily infirm Board is immunized from application of the de facto officer doctrine. ¶ 28 Acevedo also argues that the Lopez decision "glossed over" Justice Thomas's dissent in the case of Baggett v. Industrial Comm'n , 201 Ill. 2d 187 , 266 Ill.Dec. 836 , 775 N.E.2d 908 (2002).

2018See Iowa Farm Bureau Federation v. Environmental Protection Commission , 850 N.W.2d 403 , 423 (Iowa 2014) ("Over time, the doctrine has achieved 'practically universal acceptance by the courts.' [Citation.]"); see also In re Fichner , 144 N.J. 459 , 677 A.2d 201 , 205 (1996) ("the de facto officer doctrine serves the needs of contemporary society" and is "founded on tenets of practicality and convenience in the administration of justice").

2018See Iowa Farm Bureau Federation v. Environmental Protection Commission , 850 N.W.2d 403 , 423 (Iowa 2014) ("Over time, the doctrine has achieved 'practically universal acceptance by the courts.' [Citation.]"); see also In re Fichner , 144 N.J. 459 , 677 A.2d 201 , 205 (1996) ("the de facto officer doctrine serves the needs of contemporary society" and is "founded on tenets of practicality and convenience in the administration of justice").

2019Defendants, as appellees, were not required to file a cross-appeal in order to raise the de facto officer doctrine as a basis for affirming the trial court, however. "[A]n appellee may raise any argument or basis supported by the record to show the correctness of the judgment below, even though he had not previously advanced such an argument." In re Veronica C. , 239 Ill. 2d 134 , 151, 346 Ill.Dec. 1 , 940 N.E.2d 1 (2010) ; see also Olson v. Williams All Seasons Co. , 2012 IL App (2d) 110818 , ¶ 41, 363 Ill.Dec. 117 , 974 N.E.2d 914 ("[A]n appellee who fails to raise an issue in the circuit co

2019Defendants, as appellees, were not required to file a cross-appeal in order to raise the de facto officer doctrine as a basis for affirming the trial court, however. "[A]n appellee may raise any argument or basis supported by the record to show the correctness of the judgment below, even though he had not previously advanced such an argument." In re Veronica C. , 239 Ill. 2d 134 , 151, 346 Ill.Dec. 1 , 940 N.E.2d 1 (2010) ; see also Olson v. Williams All Seasons Co. , 2012 IL App (2d) 110818 , ¶ 41, 363 Ill.Dec. 117 , 974 N.E.2d 914 ("[A]n appellee who fails to raise an issue in the circuit co

2018First, the State failed to raise it in both the circuit and appellate courts, and it is thereby forfeited.8 See, e.g., People v. Washington, 2012 IL 110283, ¶ 62 (stating “[w]here the appellant in the appellate court fails to raise an issue in that court, this court will not address it”); People v. James, 163 Ill. 2d 302, 321-22 (1994) (declining to consider issue that State never presented to trial or appellate court); People v. Adams, 131 Ill. 2d 387, 395-96 (1989) (same).

2017First, the State failed to raise it in both the circuit and appellate courts, and it is thereby forfeited. 8 See, e.g. , People v. Washington , 2012 IL 110283 , ¶ 62, 357 Ill.Dec. 1 , 962 N.E.2d 902 (stating "[w]here the appellant in the appellate court fails to raise an issue in that court, this court will not address it"); People v. James , 163 Ill. 2d 302 , 321-22, 206 Ill.Dec. 190 , 645 N.E.2d 195 (1994) (declining to consider issue that State never presented to trial or appellate court); People v. Adams , 131 Ill. 2d 387 , 395-96, 137 Ill.Dec. 616 , 546 N.E.2d 561 (1989) (same).

2018First, the State failed to raise it in both the circuit and appellate courts, and it is thereby forfeited.8 See, e.g., People v. Washington, 2012 IL 110283, ¶ 62 (stating “[w]here the appellant in the appellate court fails to raise an issue in that court, this court will not address it”); People v. James, 163 Ill. 2d 302, 321-22 (1994) (declining to consider issue that State never presented to trial or appellate court); People v. Adams, 131 Ill. 2d 387, 395-96 (1989) (same).

2017First, the State failed to raise it in both the circuit and appellate courts, and it is thereby forfeited. 8 See, e.g. , People v. Washington , 2012 IL 110283 , ¶ 62, 357 Ill.Dec. 1 , 962 N.E.2d 902 (stating "[w]here the appellant in the appellate court fails to raise an issue in that court, this court will not address it"); People v. James , 163 Ill. 2d 302 , 321-22, 206 Ill.Dec. 190 , 645 N.E.2d 195 (1994) (declining to consider issue that State never presented to trial or appellate court); People v. Adams , 131 Ill. 2d 387 , 395-96, 137 Ill.Dec. 616 , 546 N.E.2d 561 (1989) (same).

2018People v. Campa, 217 Ill. 2d 243, 269-70 (2005) (and cases cited therein). ¶ 36 The State additionally contends that “even if Gaither’s appointment was invalid due to procedural errors, defendants cannot exclude the evidence obtained incident to their arrests on that basis.” The State offers three reasons: (1) the exclusionary rule is not available based solely on the alleged invalidity of Gaither’s appointment, (2) the traffic stops were valid citizen’s arrests, and (3) the de facto officer doctrine precluded defendants from challenging the validity of Gaither’s appointment at their suppressi

2017People v. Campa , 217 Ill. 2d 243 , 269-70, 298 Ill.Dec. 722 , 840 N.E.2d 1157 (2005) (and cases cited therein). *747 ¶ 36 The State additionally contends that "even if Gaither's appointment was invalid due to procedural errors, defendants cannot exclude the evidence obtained incident to their arrests on that basis." The State offers three reasons: (1) the exclusionary rule is not available based solely on the alleged invalidity of Gaither's appointment, (2) the traffic stops were valid citizen's arrests, and (3) the de facto officer doctrine precluded defendants from challenging the validity

2018First, the State failed to raise it in both the circuit and appellate courts, and it is thereby forfeited.8 See, e.g., People v. Washington, 2012 IL 110283, ¶ 62 (stating “[w]here the appellant in the appellate court fails to raise an issue in that court, this court will not address it”); People v. James, 163 Ill. 2d 302, 321-22 (1994) (declining to consider issue that State never presented to trial or appellate court); People v. Adams, 131 Ill. 2d 387, 395-96 (1989) (same).

2017First, the State failed to raise it in both the circuit and appellate courts, and it is thereby forfeited. 8 See, e.g. , People v. Washington , 2012 IL 110283 , ¶ 62, 357 Ill.Dec. 1 , 962 N.E.2d 902 (stating "[w]here the appellant in the appellate court fails to raise an issue in that court, this court will not address it"); People v. James , 163 Ill. 2d 302 , 321-22, 206 Ill.Dec. 190 , 645 N.E.2d 195 (1994) (declining to consider issue that State never presented to trial or appellate court); People v. Adams , 131 Ill. 2d 387 , 395-96, 137 Ill.Dec. 616 , 546 N.E.2d 561 (1989) (same).

2024See Medponics Illinois, LLC v. Department of Agriculture, 2021 IL 125443, ¶ 29 (describing standard for reviewing administrative agency’s determinations on questions of law, fact or mixed questions of law and fact).