second Teague exception in Illinois

2003App. 3d at 706 ), and recognized that neither this court nor the Supreme Court has ever found any new rule to qualify for retroactivity under the second Teague exception (Beachem, 317 Ill.

2003In Beachem , the appellate court acknowledged that "[f]inding retroactivity never should be lightly done" ( Beachem, 317 Ill.App.3d at 706 , 251 Ill.Dec. 308 , 740 N.E.2d 389 ), and recognized that neither this court nor the Supreme Court has ever found any new rule to qualify for retroactivity under the second Teague exception ( Beachem, 317 Ill.App.3d at 702 , 251 Ill.

2012Flowers, 138 Ill. 2d at 242 ; see also People v. Morris, 236 Ill. 2d 345, 361-62 (2010) (citing Teague, 489 U. S. at 313-14 ). ¶ 43 Moreover, specific to the cause at bar, our supreme court has reiterated: “[A] rule that only affects the enhancement of a defendant’s sentence does not amount to an error which seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings so as to fall within the second Teague exception requiring retroactivity in all cases.” Morris, 236 Ill. 2d at 363 (citing People v. De La Paz, 204 Ill. 2d 426, 438 (2003)). ¶ 44 In Morris, two defendant

2006Defendant contends that De La Paz is distinguishable because our supreme court’s holding in that case was limited to the conclusion that Apprendi does not apply retroactively pursuant to the second Teague exception in that Apprendi did not represent a procedure that was “ ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ ” De La Paz, 204 Ill. 2d at 434 , quoting Flowers, 138 Ill. 2d at 237 , citing Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 , 103 L.

2002Third, the Kizer court noted that the second Teague exception must be narrowly construed so as to recognize that “ 1 “[application of constitutional rules not in existence at the time a conviction became final seriously undermines the principle of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system.” ’ ” Kizer, 318 Ill.

2002Third, the Kizer court noted that the second Teague exception must be narrowly construed so as to recognize that “application of constitutional rules not in existence at the time a conviction became final seriously undermines the principle of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system.” Kizer , 318 Ill.

2014Id. ¶¶ 42, 46. “ ‘[A] rule that only affects the enhancement of a defendant’s sentence does not amount to an error which seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings so as to fall within the second Teague exception requiring retroactivity in all cases.’ ” Id. ¶ 43 (quoting People v. Morris, 236 Ill. 2d 345, 363 (2010)). ¶ 24 Accordingly, we concluded that White did not apply retroactively to the defendant’s case.

2012Thus, “a rule that only affects the enhancement of a defendant’s sentence does not amount to an error which seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings so as to fall within the second Teague exception requiring retroactivity in all cases.” Id. at 363 . ¶ 45 In support of his argument that we should not conduct a Teague retroactivity analysis, defendant notes that the Supreme Court held in Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 (2008), that the states need not follow Teague; that is, it does not “constrain[ ] the authority of state courts to give broader

2003The second Teague exception permits retroactive application only of those “ ‘watershed rules of criminal procedure’ ” that “ ‘ “alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements” ’ essential to the fairness of a proceeding” (emphasis omitted) (Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 241-42 , Ill L.

2003The second Teague exception permits retroactive application only of those "`watershed rules of criminal procedure'" that "`"alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements"' essential to the fairness of a proceeding" (emphasis omitted) ( Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 241-42 , 110 S.Ct. at 2831 , 111 L.Ed.2d at 211 , quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311, 315 , 109 S.Ct. at 1076, 1078 , 103 L.Ed.2d at 357, 359 (plurality op.), quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 , 91 S.Ct. 1160, 1180 , 28 L.Ed.2d 404, 421 (1971)), "without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously di

2003The second Teague exception permits retroactive application only of those "`watershed rules of criminal procedure'" that "`"alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements"' essential to the fairness of a proceeding" (emphasis omitted) ( Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 241-42 , 110 S.Ct. at 2831 , 111 L.Ed.2d at 211 , quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311, 315 , 109 S.Ct. at 1076, 1078 , 103 L.Ed.2d at 357, 359 (plurality op.), quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 , 91 S.Ct. 1160, 1180 , 28 L.Ed.2d 404, 421 (1971)), "without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously di

2003The second Teague exception permits retroactive application only of those "`watershed rules of criminal procedure'" that "`"alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements"' essential to the fairness of a proceeding" (emphasis omitted) ( Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 241-42 , 110 S.Ct. at 2831 , 111 L.Ed.2d at 211 , quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311, 315 , 109 S.Ct. at 1076, 1078 , 103 L.Ed.2d at 357, 359 (plurality op.), quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 , 91 S.Ct. 1160, 1180 , 28 L.Ed.2d 404, 421 (1971)), "without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously di

2002The Sanders court also recognized that a rule which merely shifts the factfinding duties from an impartial judge to a jury clearly does not fall within the scope of the second Teague exception. 247 F.3d at 148; see also Neder v. United States , 527 U.S. 1 , 144 L.

2002The Sanders court also recognized that a rule which merely shifts the factfinding duties from an impartial judge to a jury clearly does not fall within the scope of the second Teague exception. 247 F.3d at 148; see also Neder v. United States , 527 U.S. 1 , 144 L.

2002The Second Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals, in Bilzerian v. United States, 127 F.3d 237, 241 (2d Cir. 1997), recognized that the Supreme Court in United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 , 132 L.

2002The Second Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals, in Bilzerian v. United States , 127 F.3d 237, 241 (2d Cir. 1997), recognized that the Supreme Court in United States v. Gaudin , 515 U.S. 506 , 132 L.

2001The Kizer court began its Teague analysis by noting that federal courts hold differing views on the matter, citing both Murphy, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 1064 , and Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1238 (9th Cir. 2000) (in which the Ninth Circuit declined to grant habeas corpus relief based on retroactive application of Apprendi under the second Teague exception).

2001The Kizer court began its Teague analysis by noting that federal courts hold differing views on the matter, citing both Murphy, 109 F.Supp.2d at 1064 , and Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1238 (9th Cir. 2000) (in which the Ninth Circuit declined to grant habeas corpus relief based on retroactive application of Apprendi under the second Teague exception).

2000See, e.g., Harmon v. Marshall, 69 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 1995); Adams v. Aiken, 41 F.3d 175 (4th Cir. 1994); Gaines v. Kelley, 202 F.3d 598 (2d Cir. 2000).

2000See, e.g. , Harmon v. Marshall , 69 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 1995); Adams v. Aiken , 41 F.3d 175 (4th Cir. 1994); Gaines v. Kelley , 202 F.3d 598 (2d Cir. 2000).

2012In doing so, the court in Morris noted that in its prior decision in De La Paz, 204 Ill. 2d at 438 , rejecting the retroactive application of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), to cases on collateral review, it had made clear that a rule that only affects the enhancement of a defendant’s sentence does not fall into the category of errors that affect the integrity of the judicial system so as to trigger the second Teague exception.

2012See Morris, 236 Ill. 2d at 363 ; see also People v. De La Paz, 204 Ill. 2d at 438 (holding that the decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), does not meet the second Teague exception so as to be applied to cases on collateral review, because that decision only affects the enhancement of a defendant’s sentence and does not amount to an error that seriously affects the fairness or reputation of court proceedings).

2012Flowers, 138 Ill. 2d at 242 ; see also People v. Morris, 236 Ill. 2d 345, 361-62 (2010) (citing Teague, 489 U. S. at 313-14 ). ¶ 43 Moreover, specific to the cause at bar, our supreme court has reiterated: “[A] rule that only affects the enhancement of a defendant’s sentence does not amount to an error which seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings so as to fall within the second Teague exception requiring retroactivity in all cases.” Morris, 236 Ill. 2d at 363 (citing People v. De La Paz, 204 Ill. 2d 426, 438 (2003)). ¶ 44 In Morris, two defendant

2012In doing so, the court in Morris noted that in its prior decision in De La Paz, 204 Ill. 2d at 438 , rejecting the retroactive application of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), to cases on collateral review, it had made clear that a rule that only affects the enhancement of a defendant’s sentence does not fall into the category of errors that affect the integrity of the judicial system so as to trigger the second Teague exception.

2002Reddick discussed the constitutional obligation of the jury to follow the trial judge's instructions (see People v. Jenkins, 69 Ill.2d 61, 66-67 , 12 Ill.Dec. 728 , 370 N.E.2d 532 (1977)), but, unlike Victor, Cage, Sullivan, or now Apprendi , it did not implicate the right to a jury verdict beyond a reasonable doubt, and, consequently, the fundamental fairness and accuracy concerns inherent in the second Teague exception.

2002Reddick discussed the constitutional obligation of the jury to follow the trial judge's instructions (see People v. Jenkins, 69 Ill.2d 61, 66-67 , 12 Ill.Dec. 728 , 370 N.E.2d 532 (1977)), but, unlike Victor, Cage, Sullivan, or now Apprendi , it did not implicate the right to a jury verdict beyond a reasonable doubt, and, consequently, the fundamental fairness and accuracy concerns inherent in the second Teague exception.

2001The Beachem court also relied, in part, on United States v. Murphy, 109 F.Supp.2d 1059, 1064 (D.Minn.2000), which held that the Apprendi rule satisfies the second Teague exception because it "compels a radical shift in criminal procedure." Less than one month after the court filed its opinion in Beachem , a first division panel of the First District Appellate Court decided that Apprendi should not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review because the Apprendi rule did not "alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to a fair trial." People v. Kizer, 318 I

2001The Kizer court began its Teague analysis by noting that federal courts hold differing views on the matter, citing both Murphy, 109 F.Supp.2d at 1064 , and Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1238 (9th Cir. 2000) (in which the Ninth Circuit declined to grant habeas corpus relief based on retroactive application of Apprendi under the second Teague exception).

2013Williams, 2012 IL App (1st) 111145, ¶¶ 52-53 (modified December 12, 2012).

2011We have frequently held that the Teague bar to retroactivity applies to new rules that are based on “bedrock” constitutional rights. [Citation.] Similarly, “[t]hat a new procedural rule is ‘fundamental’ in some abstract sense is not enough.” [Citation.] Instead, in order to meet this requirement, a new rule must itself constitute a previously unrecognized bedrock procedural element that is essential to the fairness of a proceeding. 12 1-09-3337 In applying this requirement, we again have looked to the example of Gideon, and “we have not hesitated to hold that less sweeping and fundamental rule

2003See also Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 , 118 S.Ct. 1604, 1610 , 140 L.Ed.2d 828, 838 (1998) ("The Teague doctrine is founded on the notion that one of the `principal functions of habeas corpus [is] "to assure that no man has been incarcerated under a procedure which creates an impermissibly large risk that the innocent will be convicted"'").

2003See also Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 , 118 S.Ct. 1604, 1610 , 140 L.Ed.2d 828, 838 (1998) ("The Teague doctrine is founded on the notion that one of the `principal functions of habeas corpus [is] "to assure that no man has been incarcerated under a procedure which creates an impermissibly large risk that the innocent will be convicted"'").

2002See, e.g., People v. Johnston, 327 Ill.