prompt complaint instruction in Pennsylvania

2025See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Snoke, 580 A.2d 295, 298 (Pa. 1990) (stating, “where the actual occurrence of the [sexual] assault is at issue in the case, the trial judge is required to charge the jury as to the relevance of a delay in disclosure and the significance of a prompt complaint”); Sandusky, 77 A.3d at 668 (holding that trial court erred in concluding that prompt complaint was inapplicable to child victims of sexual abuse and that trial courts must assess whether to give the instruction on a case-by-case basis). -9- J-S40036-24 absence of a prompt complaint instruction as the case hinged

2025Furthermore, even assuming the trial court should have provided the prompt complaint instruction, the court negated any prejudice to McFadden by thoroughly instructing the jury on how to assess the credibility of witnesses and resolve conflicts in the testimony. - 11 - J-S40036-24 See N.T., 1/30/23, at 130-34; see also Sandusky, 77 A.3d at 668-69 (concluding that, although trial court erred in denying request for prompt complaint instruction, issuance of standard credibility instruction “provided the jury with a sufficient framework to question the victims’ credibility,” ensuring there was no

2023See N.T., 3/28/22, at 106-08; accord Commonwealth v. Thomas, 904 A.2d 964, 971 (Pa. Super. 2006) (concluding there was no error in the omission of a prompt complaint instruction under similar circumstances).

2022Rather, “[t]he propriety of a prompt complaint instruction is determined on a case-by-case basis pursuant to a subjective standard based upon the age and condition of the victim.” Commonwealth v. Thomas, 904 A.2d 964, 970 (Pa. Super. 2006).

2025See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Snoke, 580 A.2d 295, 298 (Pa. 1990) (stating, “where the actual occurrence of the [sexual] assault is at issue in the case, the trial judge is required to charge the jury as to the relevance of a delay in disclosure and the significance of a prompt complaint”); Sandusky, 77 A.3d at 668 (holding that trial court erred in concluding that prompt complaint was inapplicable to child victims of sexual abuse and that trial courts must assess whether to give the instruction on a case-by-case basis). -9- J-S40036-24 absence of a prompt complaint instruction as the case hinged

2021The touchstone regarding the propriety of issuing a prompt complaint instruction to the jury - 10 - J-S35012-20 is not whether it is beneficial to the defendant, but whether it is warranted under the facts of the case.3 We believe Appellant’s case is fairly analogous to Commonwealth v. Snoke, 580 A.2d 295 (Pa.Super. 1990), wherein a five-year-old victim delayed reporting a sexual assault perpetrated by her father for approximately five months.

2025See Ables, 590 A.2d at 340-41 (affirming trial court’s denial of request for a prompt complaint instruction where the trial court considered the appropriate factors).

2025See Ables, 590 A.2d at 340-41 (affirming trial court’s denial of request for a prompt complaint instruction where the trial court considered the appropriate factors).

2026Notably, “in a case such as this, where some evidence favored a prompt complaint instruction and some did not, it fell within the trial court's discretion to deny this instruction.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 274 A.3d 722, 737 (Pa. Super. 2022).

2025Notably, “in a case such as this, where some evidence favored a prompt complaint instruction and some did not, it fell within the trial court’s discretion to deny this instruction.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 274 A.3d 722, 737 (Pa. Super. 2022).

2015See Commonwealth v. Prince, 719 A.2d 1086, 1091 (Pa. Super. 1998). … “The propriety of a prompt complaint instruction is determined on a case-by-case basis pursuant to a subjective standard based upon the age and condition of the victim.” Thomas, 904 A.2d at 970 .

2014See Commonwealth v. Prince, 719 A.2d 1086, 1091 (Pa. Super. 1998). … “The propriety of a prompt complaint instruction is determined on a case-by-case basis pursuant to a subjective standard based upon the age and condition of the victim.” Thomas, 904 A.2d at 970 .

2003As such, we do not find that Judge Temin erred in admitting Jeffrey’s testimony. ¶ 15 Alternatively, we agree with the Commonwealth in this instance that Jeffrey’s hearsay testimony was admissible under Rule of Evidence 613(c), commonly known as the prompt complaint exception to the hearsay rule. 7 Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 613(c)(1) allows evidence of prior consistent statements to rebut an express or implied charge of “fabrication, bias, improper influence or motive, or faulty mem *322 ory.” In cases involving sexual assault, Rule 613 authorizes the Commonwealth to present evidence in it

2003As such, we do not find that Judge Temin erred in admitting Jeffrey’s testimony. ¶ 15 Alternatively, we agree with the Commonwealth in this instance that Jeffrey’s hearsay testimony was admissible under Rule of Evidence 613(c), commonly known as the prompt complaint exception to the hearsay rule. 7 Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 613(c)(1) allows evidence of prior consistent statements to rebut an express or implied charge of “fabrication, bias, improper influence or motive, or faulty mem *322 ory.” In cases involving sexual assault, Rule 613 authorizes the Commonwealth to present evidence in it

2025Both Commonwealth v. Snoke, 580 A.2d 295, 297 (Pa. 1990), and Commonwealth v. Lane, 555 A.2d 1246, 1251 (Pa. 1989), indicate that 18 Pa.C.S. § 3105 authorizes related arguments by the parties, not specifically the now-deleted jury instruction.

2019During the course of this review, the trial court concluded that a prompt complaint instruction was inappropriate because the victim’s young age and maturity prevented her held that, “[i]n determining whether or not the delay [in making a prompt complaint] reflects the insincerity of the complainant, the maturity [of the child] is merely an additional factor to be considered by the jury in deciding the question.” Lane, 555 A.2d at 1251 . -4- J.

2018To the contrary, in Commonwealth v. Stohr, 522 A.2d 589, 592 (Pa.Super. 1987), this court determined that testimony by a victim’s mother corroborating “her daughter’s statements concerning the assault and the identity of the defendant” was admissible under the prompt complaint exception to the rule against hearsay.

2003“Evidence of a complaint of a sexual assault is ‘competent evidence, properly admitted when limited to establish that a complaint was made and also to identify the occurrence complained of with the offense charged.’ ” Commonwealth v. Stohr, 361 Pa.Super. 293 , 522 A.2d 589, 592-593 (1987) (en banc), quoting Commonwealth v. Freeman, 295 Pa.Super. 467 , 441 A.2d 1327, 1331 (1982).

2006Commonwealth v. Bryson, 860 A.2d 1101, 1104-1105 (Pa.Super.2004). *971 ¶ 31 Herein, an examination of the instruction the trial court provided to the jury as a whole reveals that the omission of a prompt complaint instruction did not amount to fundamental error, nor did the absence of that charge prejudice Appellant.

2006Commonwealth v. Bryson, 860 A.2d 1101, 1104-1105 (Pa.Super.2004). *971 ¶ 31 Herein, an examination of the instruction the trial court provided to the jury as a whole reveals that the omission of a prompt complaint instruction did not amount to fundamental error, nor did the absence of that charge prejudice Appellant.

2019See Jones, 672 A.2d at 1357 n.2 (stating, “[w]here an assault is of such a nature that the minor victim may not have appreciated the offensive nature of the conduct, the lack of a prompt complaint would not necessarily justify an inference of fabrication.”). -6- J.

2016For example, where the victim of a sexual assault is a minor who “may not have appreciated the offensive nature of the conduct, the lack of a prompt complaint would not necessarily justify an inference of fabrication.” Commonwealth v. Jones, [] 672 A.2d 1353 , 1357 n. 2 ([Pa. Super.] 1996).

2025See Green, 273 A.3d at 1084 .

2025See Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 108 A.3d 821, 845 (Pa. 2014) (providing that the suggested instructions are not binding and intended only as “guides” for trial courts in crafting jury instructions).

2022Upon review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to give a prompt complaint instruction. “[O]ur standard of review when considering the denial of jury instructions is one of deference—an appellate court will reverse a court’s decision only when it abused its discretion or committed an error of law.” Commonwealth v. Snyder, 251 A.3d 782 , 790 (Pa. Super. 2021).

2022Consistent with these principles, a prompt complaint instruction rests upon “a belief that a victim of a violent assault would reveal the assault occurred at the first available opportunity.” Snyder, 251 A.3d at 791.

2021See Treiber, 121 A.3d at 444 ; Spotz, 84 A.3d at 315 .

2015“In PCRA appeals, our scope of review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence on the record of the PCRA court’s hearing, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.” Commonwealth v. Reyes-Rodriguez, 111 A.3d 775, 779 (Pa. Super. -3- J-S38026-15 2015) (en banc) (internal quotation omitted).

1987See Commonwealth v. Green, supra, 487 Pa. at 328 , 409 A.2d at 374-75 ; Commonwealth v. Bailey, supra, 353 Pa.Superior Ct. at 395, 510 A.2d at 369 ; Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, supra, 343 Pa.Superior Ct. at 492-493, 495 A.2d at 572 ; Commonwealth v. Freeman, supra, 295 Pa.Superior Ct. 475, 441 A.2d at 1331 ; Commonwealth v. Pettiford, 265 Pa.Super. 466, 468 , 402 A.2d 532, 533 (1979); Commonwealth v. Sanders, 260 Pa.Super. 358, 365 , 394 A.2d 591, 594 (1978).

1987See Commonwealth v. Green, supra, 487 Pa. at 328 , 409 A.2d at 374-75 ; Commonwealth v. Bailey, supra, 353 Pa.Superior Ct. at 395, 510 A.2d at 369 ; Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, supra, 343 Pa.Superior Ct. at 492-493, 495 A.2d at 572 ; Commonwealth v. Freeman, supra, 295 Pa.Superior Ct. 475, 441 A.2d at 1331 ; Commonwealth v. Pettiford, 265 Pa.Super. 466, 468 , 402 A.2d 532, 533 (1979); Commonwealth v. Sanders, 260 Pa.Super. 358, 365 , 394 A.2d 591, 594 (1978).

1987See Commonwealth v. Green, supra, 487 Pa. at 328 , 409 A.2d at 374-75 ; Commonwealth v. Bailey, supra, 353 Pa.Superior Ct. at 395, 510 A.2d at 369 ; Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, supra, 343 Pa.Superior Ct. at 492-493, 495 A.2d at 572 ; Commonwealth v. Freeman, supra, 295 Pa.Superior Ct. 475, 441 A.2d at 1331 ; Commonwealth v. Pettiford, 265 Pa.Super. 466, 468 , 402 A.2d 532, 533 (1979); Commonwealth v. Sanders, 260 Pa.Super. 358, 365 , 394 A.2d 591, 594 (1978).

1987See Commonwealth v. Green, supra, 487 Pa. at 328 , 409 A.2d at 374-75 ; Commonwealth v. Bailey, supra, 353 Pa.Superior Ct. at 395, 510 A.2d at 369 ; Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, supra, 343 Pa.Superior Ct. at 492-493, 495 A.2d at 572 ; Commonwealth v. Freeman, supra, 295 Pa.Superior Ct. 475, 441 A.2d at 1331 ; Commonwealth v. Pettiford, 265 Pa.Super. 466, 468 , 402 A.2d 532, 533 (1979); Commonwealth v. Sanders, 260 Pa.Super. 358, 365 , 394 A.2d 591, 594 (1978).

1987In Commonwealth v. Bailey, supra, the exception was applied to a case involving charges of indecent assault and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse. 353 Pa.Superior Ct. at 395, 510 A.2d at 369 (Hoffman, J., concurring).

1987See Commonwealth v. Green, supra, 487 Pa. at 328 , 409 A.2d at 374-75 ; Commonwealth v. Bailey, supra, 353 Pa.Superior Ct. at 395, 510 A.2d at 369 ; Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, supra, 343 Pa.Superior Ct. at 492-493, 495 A.2d at 572 ; Commonwealth v. Freeman, supra, 295 Pa.Superior Ct. 475, 441 A.2d at 1331 ; Commonwealth v. Pettiford, 265 Pa.Super. 466, 468 , 402 A.2d 532, 533 (1979); Commonwealth v. Sanders, 260 Pa.Super. 358, 365 , 394 A.2d 591, 594 (1978).

1987(Emphasis added). 5 In Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 343 Pa.Super. 486, 491-92 , 495 A.2d 569, 571-72 (1985), this Court extended the prompt complaint exception to include prompt complaints of sodomy.

1987(Emphasis added). 5 In Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 343 Pa.Super. 486, 491-92 , 495 A.2d 569, 571-72 (1985), this Court extended the prompt complaint exception to include prompt complaints of sodomy.

1987However, even though the Court in Green expressly declined to define the scope of the prompt complaint exception, the Court noted that any testimony which went beyond identifying the complaint and its nature was inadmissible. *303 Green, supra, 487 Pa. at 328 , 409 A.2d at 374 .

1987However, even though the Court in Green expressly declined to define the scope of the prompt complaint exception, the Court noted that any testimony which went beyond identifying the complaint and its nature was inadmissible. *303 Green, supra, 487 Pa. at 328 , 409 A.2d at 374 .