prevailing professional standard in Florida

2026“This inquiry involves determining whether proving the claim requires the plaintiff to establish that the allegedly negligent act ‘represented a breach of the prevailing professional standard of care,’ as testified to by a qualified medical expert.” Id. at 311-12 ; see also Joseph v. Univ.

2026“This inquiry involves determining whether proving the claim requires the plaintiff to establish that the allegedly negligent act ‘represented a breach of the prevailing professional standard of care,’ as testified to by a qualified medical expert.” Id. at 311-12 ; see also Joseph v. Univ.

2025Cf. Catron v. Roger Bohn, D.C., P.A., 580 So. 2d 814, 822 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (Altenbernd, J., concurring) ("We cannot create one definition of 'similar health care provider' for 3 The definition of specialist has remained largely unchanged since 1979.

1997Id. at 608-09 ; see also Catron, 580 So.2d at 821 (Altenbernd, J., concurring).

2024Such a requirement would improperly shift 6 the burden of proof and contravene the language in the statute providing that “the claimant shall have the burden of proving by the greater weight of evidence that the alleged actions of the health care provider represented a breach of the prevailing professional standard of care for that health care provider.” § 766.102(1), Fla. Stat. (2022); see also Saunders v. Dickens, 151 So. 3d 434, 441 (Fla. 2014) (“[I]n a medical malpractice action, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish that the care provided by the physician was not that of a reasonabl

2022Saunders v. Dickens, 151 So. 3d 434, 441 (Fla. 2014).

2002The prevailing professional standard of care for a given health care provider shall be that level of care, skill, and treatment which, in light of all relevant surrounding circumstances, is recognized as acceptable and appropriate by reasonably prudent similar health care providers. [6] Ch. 77-64, §§ 7-8, at 110-11, Laws of Fla. [7] Although the decision in Weinstock did not involve the application of chapter 400, within the decision, this Court relied upon and adopted the reasoning of NME Properties, Inc. v. McCullough, 590 So.2d 439 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), which held "although a nursing home is

1995In Weinstock v. Groth, 629 So.2d 835 (Fla. 1993), the supreme court stated that the "prospective defendants" entitled to presuit notice are the health care providers listed in Section 768.50(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1985).

2003Haynes v. Anderson, 304 Minn. 185 , 232 N.W.2d 196, 199-200 (1975). [4] Cf. Grenitz v. Tomlian, 858 So.2d 999, 1002-03 , 2003 WL 21290887, at *3 (Fla. June 5, 2003) ("[A] neuropsychologist is competent to testify regarding the results of psychological testing reflecting the presence of organic impairment.... [However], the trial court ... did not err in disallowing the opinion testimony of someone other than a qualified physician as to the medical causation of ... brain damage." (citations and footnotes omitted)); Cross v. Lakeview Ctr., Inc., 529 So.2d 307, 310 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (explaining

1993Subsection (2)(c), however, permits one who does not meet the definition of similar health care provider to submit expert testimony as to the prevailing professional standard of care in a given field of medicine if such person, "to the satisfaction of the court, possesses sufficient training, experience, and knowledge as a result of practice or teaching in the specialty of the defendant or practice or teaching in a related field of medicine... . within the 5-year period before the incident giving rise to the claim." Although section 766.102(2)(c) relaxes the general rule precluding one who is

2002The prevailing professional standard of care for a given health care provider shall be that level of care, skill, and treatment which, in light of all relevant surrounding circumstances, is recognized as acceptable and appropriate by reasonably prudent similar health care providers. [6] Ch. 77-64, §§ 7-8, at 110-11, Laws of Fla. [7] Although the decision in Weinstock did not involve the application of chapter 400, within the decision, this Court relied upon and adopted the reasoning of NME Properties, Inc. v. McCullough, 590 So.2d 439 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), which held "although a nursing home is

2002The prevailing professional standard of care for a given health care provider shall be that level of care, skill, and treatment which, in light of all relevant surrounding circumstances, is recognized as acceptable and appropriate by reasonably prudent similar health care providers. [6] Ch. 77-64, §§ 7-8, at 110-11, Laws of Fla. [7] Although the decision in Weinstock did not involve the application of chapter 400, within the decision, this Court relied upon and adopted the reasoning of NME Properties, Inc. v. McCullough, 590 So.2d 439 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), which held "although a nursing home is

2025These types of issues arise out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services. 4 Browne, 44 So. 3d at 238–39; see also S. Miami Hosp., Inc. v. Perez, 38 So. 3d 809 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (similar); Specialty Hosp.-Gainesville, Inc. v. Barth, 277 So. 3d 201 , 208 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (holding that, because the use of restraints required individualized orders each day from a doctor, the plaintiff’s claims of improper application and long-term use of restraints sounded in medical negligence).

2018The alleged “breach of the prevailing professional standard of care” must be testified to by a qualified medical expert. § 766.102(5), Fla. Stat. (2013); see Townes, 242 So. 3d at 309 . 5 2008) (concluding that allegations a nurse and hospital failed to render appropriate medical care and treatment implicated medical negligence standard of care so that the claim was a medical malpractice claim); Quintanilla v. Coral Gables Hosp., Inc., 941 So. 2d 468, 469-70 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006); Puentes v. Tenet Hialeah Healthsystem, 843 So. 2d 356, 357-58 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (concluding that plaintiff’s claim t

2018See *532 Auster v. Gertrude & Philip Strax Breast Cancer Detection Inst., 649 So.2d 883 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).

2018See id. § 766.102(1), (5). 7 As we stated in Silva , "[i]n the absence of clear legislative intent to the contrary, we are not at liberty to construe" terms defined in chapter 766 "so as to deprive plaintiffs of their causes of action." 601 So.2d at 1189 .

2018The alleged “breach of the prevailing professional standard of care” must be testified to by a qualified medical expert. § 766.102(5), Fla. Stat. (2013); see Townes, 242 So. 3d at 309 . 5 2008) (concluding that allegations a nurse and hospital failed to render appropriate medical care and treatment implicated medical negligence standard of care so that the claim was a medical malpractice claim); Quintanilla v. Coral Gables Hosp., Inc., 941 So. 2d 468, 469-70 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006); Puentes v. Tenet Hialeah Healthsystem, 843 So. 2d 356, 357-58 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (concluding that plaintiff’s claim t

2016See Ch. 2013–108, § 2, at 1466, Laws of Fla. (revising and narrowing qualifications for health care providers giving expert testimony on the prevailing professional standard); Ch. 2011–233, § 10, at 3474, Laws of Fla. (requiring that a health care provider who provides expert testimony hold an “active” and valid license and “conducts a complete review of the pertinent medical records”); Ch. 2003–416, § 48, at 4086, Laws of Fla. (revising requirements for health care providers providing expert testimony in medical negligence actions and requiring certification that an expert witness not previou

2008Reich v. Dep't of Health, 973 So.2d 1233, 1235 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (citing Dep't of Banking & Fin. v. Osborne Stern & Co., 670 So.2d 932 (Fla.1996)).

2007See Torres v. Sullivan, 903 So.2d 1064, 1067-68 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).

2006Pate, 661 So.2d at 280.

2004Hill v. State, 839 So.2d 865, 866 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (citation omitted).

2003Haynes v. Anderson, 304 Minn. 185 , 232 N.W.2d 196, 199-200 (1975). [4] Cf. Grenitz v. Tomlian, 858 So.2d 999, 1002-03 , 2003 WL 21290887, at *3 (Fla. June 5, 2003) ("[A] neuropsychologist is competent to testify regarding the results of psychological testing reflecting the presence of organic impairment.... [However], the trial court ... did not err in disallowing the opinion testimony of someone other than a qualified physician as to the medical causation of ... brain damage." (citations and footnotes omitted)); Cross v. Lakeview Ctr., Inc., 529 So.2d 307, 310 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (explaining

2003Haynes v. Anderson, 304 Minn. 185 , 232 N.W.2d 196, 199-200 (1975). [4] Cf. Grenitz v. Tomlian, 858 So.2d 999, 1002-03 , 2003 WL 21290887, at *3 (Fla. June 5, 2003) ("[A] neuropsychologist is competent to testify regarding the results of psychological testing reflecting the presence of organic impairment.... [However], the trial court ... did not err in disallowing the opinion testimony of someone other than a qualified physician as to the medical causation of ... brain damage." (citations and footnotes omitted)); Cross v. Lakeview Ctr., Inc., 529 So.2d 307, 310 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (explaining

2003Haynes v. Anderson, 304 Minn. 185 , 232 N.W.2d 196, 199-200 (1975). [4] Cf. Grenitz v. Tomlian, 858 So.2d 999, 1002-03 , 2003 WL 21290887, at *3 (Fla. June 5, 2003) ("[A] neuropsychologist is competent to testify regarding the results of psychological testing reflecting the presence of organic impairment.... [However], the trial court ... did not err in disallowing the opinion testimony of someone other than a qualified physician as to the medical causation of ... brain damage." (citations and footnotes omitted)); Cross v. Lakeview Ctr., Inc., 529 So.2d 307, 310 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (explaining

2003Haynes v. Anderson, 304 Minn. 185 , 232 N.W.2d 196, 199-200 (1975). [4] Cf. Grenitz v. Tomlian, 858 So.2d 999, 1002-03 , 2003 WL 21290887, at *3 (Fla. June 5, 2003) ("[A] neuropsychologist is competent to testify regarding the results of psychological testing reflecting the presence of organic impairment.... [However], the trial court ... did not err in disallowing the opinion testimony of someone other than a qualified physician as to the medical causation of ... brain damage." (citations and footnotes omitted)); Cross v. Lakeview Ctr., Inc., 529 So.2d 307, 310 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (explaining

1997See generally Archer v. Maddux, 645 So.2d at 546-47.